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I
In the future, it is likely that U. S. Navy warships will face threats from the Soviet Union and from hostile Third World nations as well. If we are to carry out our sea control and power projection missions, we will need sophisticated new systems in many areas.
U-
f the need should arise in the near future, ability to control the sea in support of a ^
would be marginal. This problem results ft>n 3f. tally from a paucity of U. S. surface, air, and so face assets. While mention of the sea control rnlSt evokes visions in a naval officer’s mind of merCf convoys with naval escorts, mention of the P ^ projection mission evokes visions of aircraft c^giSt and their embarked air wings standing off the ^ of Southeast Asia conducting air raids and Pr°vl^r air cover for ground forces ashore or images of a ble amphibious landing in a contested area. 1° case, our experience since World War II ^aS that of projection of power by naval forces "* f| significant opposition. The situation now, ho"6’ has changed dramatically.
The U. S. Navy’s capability to project P e( ashore has declined markedly. The number of a ^ carriers has declined from 23 in 1968 to 13 t0 ^ The number of attack carrier air wings has g°nC 15 in 1968 to 12 today. There are now three f1*1
rrwW'n^S' ^uring this same period, there has been a natio°r'C *ncrease *n the capability of Third World the nS>. not t0 rnenti°n the Soviet Union. Indeed, t>ati(j3r0*eCt*0n Power today into a Third World for- ^y carrier air power and/or a marine assault and he hkely to face air, surface, submarine,
jng 0re-based opposition. A major factor in bring- cate, ls ahout has been the availability of sophisti- Theseant‘sh.p weapon systems at relatively low costs. cri)islnclude small surface combatants with antiship 'v>th rriIssiles» diesel-powered submarines armed ter- t0rPedoes, and shore-based cruise missile bat- e]e ' iVlany Third World nations have also acquired
b; '
5p ^nts °f modern air power and defensive shore- Surface-to-air-missile batteries which would Slgnificant threat to carrier air strikes.
.e development of the ship-launched, terminal-
'ased f°se a
cre^'n^ antiship cruise missile has dramatically in- the risk to naval units engaged in the projec-
t'on
Power ashore. Among the characteristics ^OrU rendef cruise missiles attractive to Third are , nat>ons seeking a limited sea-denial capability t Allowing:
1 1’!^ are relatively inexpensive.
L, ey Can be adapted to a wide variety of existing i Platforms.
i They ate relatively simple and reliable.
Un<j e,r capability to hit and damage ships is widely
i ^st°od and accePtecl-
^bird^^ °P t^le*r use are militarily credible.
ter ^°tld nations have also acquired shore-based,
thena 'homing antiship cruise missiles which share
far Sartle advantages as their cousins launched by sur-
ThhipS'
ty |C d’esel-powered submarines acquired by Third
rial waters and have the following advantages over nuclear-powered vessels:
y They are difficult to detect since they are not in transit
y They can take advantage of environmental factors. y They can attack with a high degree of anonymity. y Their lesser mobility is no longer a disadvantage. y U. S. active sonars and antisubmarine weapons are relatively ineffective in shallow water where these submarines choose to operate.
The spread of advanced antiship weaponry to non-industrial nations is an established trend. More than 50 nations either operate or have ordered surface combatants equipped with antiship cruise missiles; nearly 40 operate or have ordered diesel-powered attack submarines; and more than 30 of these nations have or have ordered both types of systems. Significantly, at least one of these nations is located in the vicinity of virtually every important “choke point” or area of high shipping density throughout the world. Although none of these Third World nations could prevail in a protracted war, their forces could very probably inflict or threaten to inflict appreciable damage in a short time. This capability materially affects risk calculations in connection with the projection of naval power in their territorial waters.
"°rld
■rations are normally operated within territo-
Combat Systems Requirements: It is imperative that future ships be designed to optimize U. S. capability in the face of the likely threats. These include threats posed by the Soviet Navy and by Third World nations. Additionally, as present fleet ships are overhauled, they must be retrofitted to upgrade U. S. fighting power. The following is a review of the combat systems items and concepts which are required, in addition to major programs currently au-
rOCl
le®dia
lfts / August 1981
47
ed by
and display of vital tactical information empl°y^ , today’s battle group commanders must be re‘‘ These seagoing commanders must be given m^P . . data processing and display capability of su 1 scope to manage the sea battles which they afe j pected to encounter in both the sea contro power projection missions. They must have 'nS^eI
thorized and forthcoming.
► Real-Time Secure CommandlControllCommunications (C3). C3 systems are essential to the U. S. Navy for effective direction of deployed forces; for efficient operation of sophisticated weapon systems and combat direction systems; and for the coordination of critical off-board surveillance sensors, shore-based processing systems, and sea-based forces which employ this information. Unfortunately, current C3 systems are highly vulnerable to Soviet countermeasures. Data links, in particular, are vulnerable because of the present emphasis and reliance on the high frequency rather than ultra-high frequency spectrum. It is essential that new, jam-resistant data links, communications, IFF (identification friend or foe), and TACAN (tactical air navigation) be developed. It is also imperative that reliable, secure, and real-time means of communications with direct support submarines be developed. Furthermore, the dependence of shipboard C3 and combat systems on a single, vulnerable computer must be alleviated. Operationally, the decentralized C3 control concept employing the federated systems paradigm must be advanced and improved in order to reduce vulnerability*. Concurrently, significant improvements in the processing
*The C'! federated systems paradigm refers to various systems (missile fire control, communications, Navy tactical data system, search radars, etc.) within a ship operating on a single bus tie encompassing several system-specific computers. This allows each system to tap the computer associated with a different system if its own computer suffers a casualty.
access to selected vital information residing ,n . ships and aircraft, carrier intelligence centers, < exploitation spaces, antisubmarine warfare 1 support centers, and shore-based command CL‘nf This is within current state-of-the-art capabiHtieS has not had centralized responsible managed emphasis. Adequate access to selected vital m ,^|e tion and satisfactory displays is simply not ava in the flag spaces of any seagoing combatant- ► Over-the-Horizon Targeting. Today’s battle gfl not to mention merchant convoys, are highly vl able to Soviet cruise missiles launched from sUf air, and subsurface platforms when our own force -s not afforded the protection of carrier air supP°ft '^Q[CeS situation is now beginning to change as U. S- ^ gain the Harpoon missile which will divers1 )
oup5’
capability and permit independent offensive
tions with or without carrier air support-
ope'
But
.val *ur'
Harpoon adds a new dimension to U. S- nav< face warfare, it also adds new and demand11’# quirements for targeting which are beyond (^i of existing ships and submarines. Ideally> range, bearing, and identification data are recI^ 0(
Furthermore, since the missile could have a flight of 20 to 30 minutes, data on the direct1111’ ^ speed of the target are also desirable. One wou j want to ensure that the target is within rang1' that there are no friendly or neutral ships t>et' jy the target and the launching platform or restri close to the target. Aside from manned aircra sonar data, over-the-horizon targeting infor111* systems are germinal and classification proble1115
,d
dud,
8rou
6 t*le*r discussion in the present article. If battle
an. jl 1.111 j aw '
Harpoon, for example, to neutralize antiship
Cruise
ence
on
fissile launch platforms and reduce depend-
nit]ues must be improved. Accurate, secure, and
tages^f^d convoys are fully to exploit the advan-
i
feci . a*fcraft carrier air support, over-the-horizon
videdresistant external targeting sources must be pro- iswhich are not dependent on a cooperative (that this • l0‘recluency radiating) enemy. In some respects l an extension of improved battle group C3. aCq ■ Missile Defense. One might hope that the an<j 'tl0n tmProved over-the-horizon equipment or,, CaPat>ilities would eliminate the need for ship’s ejjp lc. antiship missile defense. Such a hope is an ofj^S'On of naivete. Despite the offensive potential nit]UearP0on and improved over-the-horizon techie .S’ t-He requirement for shipboard missile defense ctrt-'nS 'ntact- Regrettably, available defense against n Soviet air-launched cruise missiles is in
adequate at present. It is imperative, therefore, that systems be developed which provide reliable detection, tracking, and destruction capability against cruise missiles, regardless of their speeds or flight profiles. First we must achieve improvements in the Aegis air defense system in order to permit it to counter effectively the full antiship cruise missile threat spectrum. The anticipated introduction of the close-in weapon system will provide a much-needed defense capability, but its limited application still leaves many ships without adequate defense. Thus, the continued search for still newer developments in terminal defense weapon systems is mandatory. y Electronic Support Measures. The need for secure, jam-resistant C3 equipment results from the sophisticated electronic countermeasures capability of the Soviet Navy. This formidable capability has been amply demonstrated by the Soviets in numerous fleet exercises. It is not sufficient for U. S. forces to gain a capability to defend against this threat. U. S. forces must gain the capability to exercise electronic countermeasures against the Soviets in order to disrupt their attacks and permit U. S. forces to seize the initiative. Experience and analysis of recent Soviet exercises point out the highly centralized nature of Soviet command and control of naval forces from Moscow. This type of command network is highly vulnerable to countermeasures. The U. S. Navy must ensure that it possesses the capability to exploit this vulnerability if the tactical situation so dictates. It appears that this capability could most effectively be employed if invested in advanced airborne platforms. y Antisubmarine Warfare. It is undeniable that great strides have been realized by U. S. naval forces in general and surface forces in particular in the area of antisubmarine warfare during the past ten years. The development of the towed acoustic array and substantial achievements in ship silencing have advanced inestimably the practice and probability of success of U. S. antisubmarine warfare efforts. Much remains to be done, however. In particular, detection of soviet diesel-electric submarines, even with active sonar, remains an onerous and considerably less than certain feat.
Progress continues on construction of the Ticonderoga (CG-47), the first of the Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers. She was launched this past April at Pascagoula, Mississippi, and is scheduled to he commissioned in early 1983.
49
two points must be remembered. First, the nu of escort ships required by carrier battle g
is especially the case in planning for NATO opera
versus nations of the Warsaw Pact. It is eV^jatgd therefore, that new ship designs with ass
re-
thc
\JL . 11V. WOO V.AV.CU11 V C UU»vv» - .
(DDG-15) and Providence (CLG-6) an manding officer of the Brooke (FFG c[ec- Belknap (CG-26). He holds a B.S. degree 1 j^te trical engineering from the Naval Postgr
earned his master's degree from the Lfmv Georgia and completed work for his docto^jf, policy analysis at the University 0 j in Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1975. He has se^
,rs‘e '
Small, quiet diesel-electric submarines, if undetected and not neutralized, inordinately increase the risk associated with the projection of power into Third World nations and the operation of U. S. naval forces through the most strategic choke points. It is necessary, therefore, that we gain the capability to detect and neutralize these small villains before they cause damage to U. S. forces in a fashion entirely disproportional to their size and number.
► Air Capability. Overall, it is the element of aircraft carrier support which until recently has tipped the tactical balance between the Soviets and the U. S. Navy in favor of the U. S. side. But in a NATO war, the resupply effort would require thousands of merchant ships to make the transit between the United States and Europe each month. Patently, this country has insufficient aircraft carriers to protect convoys of that scope and fulfill other requirements. Additionally, a cursory reading of the economic and political currents would suggest that it is very unlikely that the current shortage of aircraft carriers will be reversed in the near future. Despite its political and economic detractions, the tactical advantages, both offensive and defensive, which inhere in carrier air support remain undiminished. Accordingly, it is imperative that alternatives to current aircraft carriers be developed to augment current carrier air support. Several possibilities present themselves. One is the “midi-carrier” (CVV) with vertical and short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft. Another is the air- capable cruiser/destroyer-type with V/STOL aircraft. Adequate space does not exist for the present paper to review fully the arguments concerning large-deck versus small-deck carriers and the air-capable cruiser/destroyer-type ship. But suffice it to say that battle groups and convoys urgently need air support for reconnaissance, to assist in over-the-horizon targeting, for antisubmarine warfare, and for antiship missile defense. The determination of the best aircraft types and the most suitable ships is a long- range issue beyond the scope of this article. However, until this issue is decided, the continuation of the large-deck carrier building program (nuclear or conventionally powered) is a must.
Conclusions: Noticeably absent in the foregoing discussion is a full acknowledgement of the capable platforms and systems which were introduced and/or developed in the 1970s or will be in the 1980s. Included are the F-14 and F-18 aircraft, Phoenix, Harpoon, and Aegis missile systems, the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarine, and several capable, new surface ship types. The above list of combat systems requirements, though, represents an itemization of
generic systems which are needed to augment many advances which have been realized since These advances dearly reveal a policy empna quality rather than quantity. These new systems also characterized by technical sophistication an concomitantly significant levels of training an ^ which are required in order to operate and ma' them. This dual focus on quality and sophistic* represents a sound approach. However, in reSj()V,e the combat systems requirements discussed af
roup5’
• • _ c p forc^’
mobile logistic forces, amphibious warfare
and projected merchant convoys dictate that
of escort forces be increased with all due haste-
,cion> dent*
combat systems to fulfill this need are pressing quirements. In view of budgetary constraint5’ technological challenge needed to attain nece js numbers of quality ships for the escort mi5 ^ immense. Finally, in developing combat syste f the U. S. Navy, one must be conscious of and maintenance personnel. Reliability, main bility, and operability must be better engineere all new systems.
School and an M.B.A. from Auburn University. In aSS‘^!'jonof ashore, Admiral Walters served in the Strike Warfare the Office of the CNO, as project manager for antish P pe- defense in the Naval Ordnance Systems Command, an ^ gys- puty Commander for Surface Combatant Ships, Naval 8 terns Command. He was Commander Cruiser-Destroyer ng before reporting for duty last year as Director, General t|,js and Programming Division, Office of the CNO. In year, he became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Warfare).
. u Carol'0*: A graduate of Pfeiffer College in Nortn 5l0tie^
Lieutenant Commander Harris was conin' fit through Officer Candidate School in jtyo(
the Enterprise (CVAN-65), Vogelgesang (DD-862), - Kip.0 1044), and Semmes (DDG-18). He was assigned to the ^ unit at the University of North Carolina and served 00eCutive of Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group 8. He is now e officer of the USS Tattnall (DDG-19).