The Marine Corps must continue to be a naval creature. But amphibious warfare, long the bread-and-butter play of the Corps, must not be seen as an end in itself. The marine air-ground task force can be used in defense of important choke points, in conjunction with the Rapid Deployment Force, and in the traditional mission of seizing advanced naval bases. The key is that the Corps must not view its business too narrowly—if it wants to stay in business.
Since its founding in 1775, the Marine Corps has occupied a unique place in the American military structure. Alternately maligned and lauded, it has survived by providing a useful mix of services to the nation at critical times and places. In recent years, the rapid pace of technological change has led critics to doubt the viability of the Marine Corps' role in amphibious warfare. Because of the Corps' specialized functions of providing amphibious landing doctrine and of seizing and holding advanced naval bases, some critics have argued that without an amphibious mission, there is no need for a separate Marine Corps.
Some marines have become alarmed by this. A lively debate over roles and missions was begun by the famous Brookings Study and has been joined by reporters, military analysts, politicians, and other branches of the services. Professional journals and civilian news publications have offered a multitude of suggestions, ranging from defense of amphibious techniques to proposals for mechanization. During the debate, some terms have been used rather loosely. This is particularly true in the case of amphibious warfare. Amphibious warfare is not a mission. The seizure and defense of advanced naval bases is a mission; likewise, providing a force in readiness is a mission, even if it is only implied. Even providing doctrine for amphibious operations is a mission. However, the seizure of an advanced naval base does not necessarily imply an amphibious operation. Amphibious warfare is a means, not an end. Those who accuse the Marine Corps of casting about for a mission, and even those in the Corps who fear for its survival, have lost sight of that distinction.
A Maritime Creature: The Marine Corps remains an essentially maritime creature. It should exist to complement the Navy's role in using the waters of the world for U. S. purposes when it suits our foreign policy. The only true threat to the continued existence of the Corps would be one which irretrievably separated it from its maritime identification. This is why the assignment of Marine Corps units as a strategic reserve for NATO disturbs so many marines. This fear of misuse, as exemplified by the employment of the Corps in World War I and Vietnam, may be justified.
Of the other potential uses for marines, three may be identified as potential strategies, not missions, for the 1980s. These are the standard amphibious landing, the use of marines as part of a rapid deployment force, or the use of marines in defense of a strategic littoral. These major options include potential use of marines on the NATO flanks. Many observers see these options as being mutually exclusive. On closer observation, this view simply doesn't hold up. Each of these potential uses has a place in the ebb and flow of a future conflict; each has a potential for success, given some fairly moderate retooling of existing and planned Marine Corps organization, tactics, and technology. To get a feeling for the potential integration of these uses, we should examine the strengths and weaknesses of each.
The Standard Amphibious Operation: The much maligned but historically effective amphibious assault is, of course, the Marine Corps' traditional "bread-and-butter play." It still has the advantage of creating an indirect effect on an enemy's maritime flank as well as providing the capability to wage maneuver warfare on a strategic level. In addition to the assault, the other types of amphibious operations have potential in the future. Amphibious raids and demonstrations provide interesting possibilities for a theater commander. Likewise, the evacuation of U. S. nationals remains an important amphibious function. In a May 1980 Proceedings article, Lieutenant Colonel William M. Krulak argues against putting so much emphasis on the amphibious role as has been the case in the past. As one of his several reasons, he contends that early air and sea superiority in a war against the Soviet Union would by no means be a certainty.1 Other critics cite a lack of mobility ashore and inadequate sealift for all elements of the existing marine amphibious force as crippling limitations. While it is true that these are limitations which must be considered and overcome, it is unrealistic to write off the amphibious concept arbitrarily because of them.
One irony of the entire debate is that of the three possible strategies discussed in this essay, the amphibious operation is the only one that is not necessarily tied to the seizure and defense of advanced bases or readiness missions. Historically, amphibious operations are conducted in the latter stages of a conflict when naval support assets have been released from purely defensive considerations. The concept of using amphibious operations at the outset of a large-scale conflict is a new one, and its ancestry is dubious at best.
The relatively new concept of the Rapid Deployment Force has an immediate apparent impact for marines. It is a seemingly natural offshoot of the old "force in readiness" mission. It is well suited to the Marine Corps' long-established mount-out capability. The Rapid Deployment Force is not purely a Marine Corps concept; nonetheless, in most envisioned scenarios, the early seizure of a port or maritime airhead is considered necessary to take full advantage of prepositioned forces and aerial resupply which constitute the heart of the concept. Although this concept might involve the seizure of a facility by a marine air-ground task force if the force were already in the area, it would be more likely to involve early occupation and defense of an already secure airfield or port facility by a marine force augmented by pre-positioned equipment. The Commandant of the Marine Corps made this clear in his white letter number 2-81. As a result, the Rapid Deployment Force/pre-positioning concept envisions the defense of an advanced base rather than its amphibious seizure. The unique aspects of the marine air-ground task force are ideal for the seizure or defense of any such lodgement. The Corps' shore party capability is a natural for early and expeditious movement of supplies and equipment ashore.
There are some potential minuses to the concept as viewed by marines. Lieutenant Colonel G. D. Batcheller, in an article in the June 1980 Marine Corps Gazette, points out that in many cases these operations would involve power transfer rather than power projection.2 Here we must remember that the stated mission of the Corps calls for defense as well as seizure. In World War II, the nature of the beast downgraded the defensive aspect; a Rapid Deployment Force scenario might see the reverse of this trend.
A second objection to marines embracing the concept of rapid deployment would be the inability to sustain combat ashore against a mechanized force. While some of this may be answered by increased Marine Corps mechanization, a great deal of the answer lies in picking the proper time and place to fight. A seizure of Iranian oil fields would be more ill-advised than the reinforcement of a friendly airbase in Oman. Although fraught with some danger, it would appear that the rapid deployment concept has a viable potential as a tool in protecting the nation's maritime interests, and this very definitely makes it the business of the Marine Corps.
Littoral Defense: Still other observers have suggested that seizure and defense of littoral choke points might present a very suitable strategy for the Marine Corps. Writing in the September 1979 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, Commander Bruce VanHeertum suggested that this concept be used to provide sea control to deny Soviet fleets the blue water access that they need to conduct sea denial missions.3 In April 1980, I suggested early occupation of these littorals as a way of ensuring that bloody amphibious operations would not be needed to retake them.4
Commander VanHeertum pointed out that Marine Corps aviation could readily be fitted with antiship weapon systems in order to expedite the sea control portions of this strategy. The marine air-ground task force has the structure to conduct the necessary elements of this advanced base defense adequately. It has an air arm with which to challenge the Soviet amphibious task force at sea and a ground element to challenge a landing attempt.
Although this plan is cost-effective and fits within the advanced base and readiness framework of existing missions, it, too, has some drawbacks. Any attempt to relegate the Marine Corps, even temporarily, to a defensive role is bound to come under criticism. These fears are not without justification. History is replete with examples of the dangers in developing a Maginot Line mentality. Even though the proposal is strategically offensive, there is no doubt that a long-term occupation of a littoral could dull the offensive spirit of even the finest troops. Any adoption of this proposal would have to take this into account.
In his June 1980 article in the Marine Corps Gazette, Major Roger M. Jaroch, who then worked for the NATO/Europe Plans Divison at Headquarters, Marine Corps, pointed out the extreme strategic importance of Iceland and the Danish Straits to NATO.5 Early occupation and defense by of these key choke points by marine forces could be a key point of leverage in a future NATO crisis.
Synthesis: Debate on each of these options, plus several others, has been lively and intense. Senior officers are concerned with their stewardship over the Corps, and more junior officers wonder if it will exist for them to lead 20 years hence. At the same time, civilian analysts such as Jeffrey Record and William Lind understandably want the most bang for the buck.6 However, if we can separate the combatants for a moment, we may see more synthesis in these views than antithesis. The strong potential exists that each of the three strategies can be molded into a coherent and formidable system of maritime sea control and power projection, built around a flexible net of advanced naval bases. This system would provide a dual capability of providing rapid crisis response while strategically limiting Soviet blue water entry if that capability is needed.
To envision this system, one must understand the types of conflict possible in the next 20 years. Increasingly, the threat of war takes the form of a Third World peripheral outbreak or an intense conflict be tween the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies. From an American viewpoint, the intense conflict can be divided into an initial defensive stage and a recovery stage. Each of our proposed strategies has a potential use during these various levels of conflict.
Third World Low-to-Mid-Level Conflict: An intervention during a Third World crisis is the raison d’etre of the rapid deployment concept. This could include everything from evacuation of U. S. nationals to a full-fledged campaign for a Middle East nation's territorial integrity. The concept of maritime pre-positioning will provide a large improvement over a marine amphibious unit's present limited capability to intervene effectively in a crisis. The use of these forces in such a context would not detract from their readiness to intervene in a situation of increased intensity.
NATO-Soviet Confrontation—Defensive Phase: A Soviet assault on Western Europe would be very likely to include a massive move by the Soviet fleet into blue waters through the choke points of the Eurasian land mass. If in a time of crisis advanced parties from marine air-ground task forces could garrison these littorals in preparation for their defense, the Marine Corps could provide a formidable deterrent. If the original garrison is the size of a marine amphibious unit and the follow-up force is a marine amphibious brigade, the Marine Corps will present an impressive dagger at the throat of any Soviet naval thrust. This use of marines to provide a sea control weapon would be a tremendous asset in the desperate days sure to follow an initial Soviet strike.
As pointed out by Colonel Krulak, an amphibious operation in the early phases of such a conflict would be unlikely since the Navy would be otherwise dis- posed in this phase with sea control maintenance. This being the case, I submit that marines would be better used in assisting this sea control function than in being frittered away as part of a strategic reserve. This would also hasten the day when marines could use their unique amphibious potential to drive home against Soviet power.
NATO-Soviet Conflict—Phase II: When sea control is firmly established in U. S. and NATO hands, the full force of our amphibious potential can be used for a wide range of activities. These could include raids and demonstrations to dissipate strength from the Russian front lines; similarly, raids and demonstrations could be used in connection with the evacuation of pockets of resistance bypassed in the initial Soviet thrust. Of course, the greatest potential of amphibious warfare lies in gaining advanced bases to further contain Soviet sea power and to threaten the Soviets’ seaward flanks.
The beauty of this concept is that in each case the first step doesn't preclude the second. A Rapid Deployment Force capability doesn't preclude preparing defensive positions on littoral outcroppings. By the same logic, littoral areas provide outstanding bases for further operations. Each strategy provides for maritime uses that are needed; no strategy requires that the others be scrapped if sound planning and implementation are exercised.
Dealing With the Objections: I realize that we live in a world of apparently diminishing resources. When, I was a lieutenant, I bemoaned the Marine Corps’ apparent desire to be all things to all people. How then do I square an apparent desire to expand Marine Corps capabilities to embrace all these strategies discussed thus far? The question is legitimate and bears a fairly detailed answer.
In his article previously cited, Lieutenant Colonel Butcheller offered the opinion that the money spent for rapid deployment would be better spent on increasing the Corps' amphibious potential. Here lies the crux of the problem. In an era when the American people are asking for an increased military capability, marines must stop assuming that every capability will come at the cost of yet another capability. Each use listed in this essay will require new equipment and weapon systems. In the wave of self-flagellation by the public and Congress that followed the Vietnam War, an internal juggling of Marine Corps priorities was justified.
There is a danger that as a result of an era of scarcity, that marines might forget how to deal effectively with adequate resources. A disturbing trend in articles by marines of late is to impose constraints that don't exist. For example, in his May 1980 Proceedings article, Lieutenant Colonel Krulak suggests that Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation be reduced drastically as an economy measure; other marines, including Lieutenant Colonel Batcheller, fear a dissipation of amphibious assets to pay for the rapid deployment concept. This type of thinking is prudent, but it ignores the increasingly militant mood of the American public. Improvement in one area of force capability need no longer be accomplished at the expense of another if a reasonable necessity for both can be shown. This is the time to develop a strong, dynamic plan and ask for the funds to implement it. If the mood of the Congress and the people is being correctly interpreted, the next five years will be devoted to creating a counterbalance to a decade of neglect in defense. Any limitations which marines place on their future will be self-imposed.
I recently heard a fable about a man so used to hard times that he couldn't stand prosperity. There is no reason for the Marine Corps to emulate that sad story. Indeed, the future begins now.
Captain Anderson is a 1971 graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida. He subsequently received a master of arts in public administration from Pepperdine University, Malibu, California. He is an infantry officer who has commanded a company and been assigned to battalion and general staff duties. He is currently marine officer instructor in the NROTC unit at Vanderbilt University.
1 "The U. S. Marine Corps: Strategy for the Future," pp. 94-105.
2 "Analyzing the RDF," pp. 16-18.
3 "Power projection as a part of sea control," pp. 28-33.
4 "A Marine Corps Choke-Point Strategy," Proceedings, pp. 103-104.
5 "NATO: past, present and future," pp. 29-40.
6 "Twilight for the Corps?" Proceedings, July 1978, pp. 38-43.