Book Reviews, Professional Reading & Book List

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^Qo,Vnar!j^r r°^rSC " ^currently ^{on the sta}ff °f

4 f_req ^er ^^ru'^ser-Destroyer Group Eight, the ^COntr^^{utor t0} the Proceedings in Policy t ^{6    10} change the magazine's

⁰ tnclude reviewing fiction.

to ⁰ⁿ‘y a few pages is necessary ^a tare ^ ^tkat Self-Portrait of a Hero is th_at ro^^n<^ *^nsP’^rational literary work

>s _{a raf}i ”* men in uniform. This book ir> th_e ^ ^because it does just that, not so_n I ^Cust°mary omniscient third per-

tia _f ^asured, ^natUtal,

undisciplined, and very

Le« ^P°^{rtrait of a Hero: The}

(]₍j^^rS]^ Jonafhan Netanyahu

Y*ⁿ, ^anc^ ^do Netanyahu, Editors. Pp in °^{fk: Randora} House, 1980. 304

^PP' ^Illus- Ind. $12.₉₅ ($11.65).

John       lieutenant Commander

^J°^{hn P}‘ Morse, U. S. Navy so_nai / ^{6 sur}^^ace> ^a collection of per- y_ear ^etters written throughout a 13- cfc*"* ^by ^an obscure Israeli Army th_e ^ ^{appears t0} promise little. And ^Seems^ntr°^^UCt*^{0n b}y Herman Wouk ^readi^{S Strangd}V ^out °f place. However,

^arr'^{es a} universal appeal for those a _stuj ^{Sar a} military uniform. It is also si_c ^ °f military leadership in a clas-

letter^¹⁶⁰⁵*⁰¹¹- ^{Ybe man wbo wrote tbe} to h; r'^S J°^nathan Netanyahu, known Fel ^{i6nds as Y}om. depths f^Vr'^{ters bave} plumbed the ^emotion, commitment, and

Uotnea^^{1 m}, ^tbe f^rst person and in an op j_n *^aV- The reader is easily caught arid sou"⁶ *^{etters t0} family, friends, er_S) ^lers (including his two broth- written by candlelight in fr_{0m a} during a moment snatched ^etati_0ris *^{n wb}i^cb personal consid- ^CQtiSci₀ ^Were sublimated and made the_CQ°^Udy subordinate to service to liv_ecj ^fltrg J^onathan Netanyahu loved, ’ ^and died for: “I am not at all reconciled to being a civilian. Not only am I restless, but I feel that by con­tinuing with my present way of life I m being untrue to myself. I have been torn between my desire to go on with my present life, and my conviction that my duty to my country, to my people, and above all to myself dictates that I go back to serve in the army. Spon­taneous, prophetic, written from the heart without consideration of the bu­reaucratic conceit or nuance, often po­etic, these unvarnished letters differ markedly from those apologists col­lections ghost written or edited specif­ically for publication. By comparison, J. Glenn Gray’s moving account of World War II, The Warriors, while ac­curately portraying the ennobling spirit of comradeship in the throes of war and focused on the same philosophical plane, lacks the intensity and urgency of Yoni’s letters.

Self-Portrait of a Hero inspires as well. The meaning of the book is universal; the medium is a classic story of tragedy. A warrior, Netanyahu’s commitment and sense of duty are the antithesis of the “what’s in it for me’ syndrome: “The truth is that if something does happen while I’m in the country, I would rather be a soldier in the army than a civilian in Jerusalem. His life ended at 30 on the airstrip at Entebbe in 1976 when he led an Israeli com­mando raid to rescue a planeload of Israeli citizens held hostage. The only Israeli soldier to die in the daring op­eration, later named “Operation Jon­athan” in his honor, Netanyahu quickly became a household word throughout his country, and his short career gave new hope that someday the energy and creativity of such men might be channeled into some peaceful purpose.

Viewed in absolute terms without the usual bias that a soldier harbors for his country and its historic adversaries, these letters form a comprehensive study of leadership. Decisive, brave, versatile, sensitive to the emotional and philosophical order of his men, a skilled tactician, and a man who embraced the stoic tradition, recognizing the futility of war but also its necessity for the preservation of his tiny state, Yoni often relied on his conscience: “I de­liberated for months before reaching the conclusion that I must return to the army. ... I know I’m doing the right thing." During the brief periods of time when Yoni was not on active duty, his chief interest was education. For the most part, his studies were apolitical—mathematics and philoso­phy were his subjects of choice at Har­vard and the Hebrew University. With an unusual and infinite capacity for life itself, Yoni could be measured by any yardstick and still declared a leader. He had an unambiguous sense of right and wrong, made hard decisions with a clear head, and bore no regret for the emotional baggage that he carried.

All the letters are arranged according to natural divisions of Yoni's life, each being prefaced by explanatory notes written by his brothers. Beginning with a letter written as a homesick, determined young man of 17, the char­acter of Jonathan Netanyahu is revealed in many ways. The last letter was writ­ten just a few days before his death. What emerges is a true and detailed portrait. Of the many memorable pas­sages that will stir the reader, perhaps one captures the hue that sets this man apart from the accomplishment that led to this book. It also puts the sacrifices we make as military people into proper perspective: “I must feel certain that not only at the moment of my death shall I be able to account for the time I have lived; I ought to be ready at every moment of my life to confront myself and say—this is what I’ve done.”

79

Captain Schratz graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1939 and established a distinguished record in the submarine force during his naval career. With a Ph.D. from Ohio State University, he is widely known as a writer on foreign policy and national security affairs. He is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings, has a regular feature in Shipmate, and is now writing a book, The Evolution of Modern Strategy.

The use of navies in wartime is well known; much less is known of their role as political or diplomatic influ­ences in peacetime. Charles Allen ques­tions their utility in the transition from peace to war. Allen, a retired Navy captain now vice president of a Wash­ington-based consulting firm, sees the options available from peace to war, in ascending order of force applied, as: protecting sea-lanes of communication and command, interdiction (attrition), interposition (isolation by absolute blockade), and intervention (assault by ground forces). The options are applied sequentially; navies can be used at each stage to signal a country’s intentions, as by sustained deployments, by rou­tine port visits, or by special deploy­ments to crisis areas in time of tension. Allen's argument, however, is not fully convincing. He sees difficulties for the carrier battle groups:

“Their problem is that they were not designed to be effective, probably not even useful, in that transition period between peace and general war. Baldly stated, the carrier battle group is optimized for fighting at long ranges, but it is unusually vul­nerable to attack from close range.” The assumptions regarding degrees of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union immediately prior to war, which heavily influence the above, are left to the reader’s imag­ination. These and similar observations are based almost wholly on the U. S.-

80

Soviet naval confrontation in the clos­ing days of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. No documentary evidence is offered, however, and such statements are largely speculative. With no apparent expertise on naval policies of the Soviet Union, his judgments on Soviet actions in the Mediterranean, estimates of So­viet weapon effectiveness, the play of Soviet strategies in the Mediterranean, and on what the Soviets “clearly saw” in nuclear war alternatives, all require substantiation by more than mere as­sertion. The aim of the study stated in the preface is “to fill a gap in knowl­edge of the use of navies in wartime . . . and the purely political and dip­lomatic treatment of past and current affairs in which navies play a role.” That such a gap exists is questionable; that this study fills any gap is unlikely.

Allen believes that navies are potent instruments of foreign policy, but “we are no longer the only nation in the world that owns such an instrument and must use it effectively.” The dis­cussion of the employment of naval forces in the early chapters is useful; far more inquiry remains to be made on the edge of war alternatives.

■                                                ! 'The R0S

“The Russians are coming- ^ln ^

sians are coming!” has been ^rePjj_e(j

so often that we have become to it. In First Line of Defense: The

U.s-

ents

Navy Since 1945, Paul Ryan d°^cu'J^[1]' "the coming”—possible Soviet

nation of the seas. He brings to h‘^s

aval <•*

the experiences of a fruitful nav reer, two master’s degrees, one ternational relations and one in n ^ and substantiation from many P^rl

and secondary sources.

Ryan starts with the demobi *** jj

of the United States following

War II, when the Soviets were

ing their military power. The _fS

of the U. S. Sixth and Sevent

was to contain Soviet expans>°

Whatever the influence of ^ _r.

• ,o ^tc

• e 19^'

ritory in Western Europe sine ^Je Ryan then quickly surveys the

icre*⁵'

Fleet, the Soviets have gained no

ban¹

,                       .         .                         _s sta'

over unification; the U. S. ^^aV^_c[ of tus in the National Security ^ ₀f

1947; and the act’s amendmen

sh

civi

tha¹

V**'

J ClV

increased authority granted to

1949’, 1953, and 1958. He shows

,                                                 _ fjl*’

leaders reduced that of mili^tafy j( and the “layering” of Pentagon P^_sS often resulted in unwarranted s

responding to international ct ₍

• tne

in

The First Line of Defense: The U. S. Navy Since 1945

Paul B. Ryan. Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 225 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).

Reviewed by Paolo E. Coletta

After receiving his Ph.D. in history, Dr. Coletta was commissioned in the Naval Reserve and served three wartime years on active duty. In 1946, he joined the teaching staff of the Naval Academy, where he is now a professor of history. He is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings, and has written numerous articles and books, including A Bibliography of American Naval History, his latest U. S. Naval Institute book.

Ryan believes that during 35 years various principles A^ave^j_[[r forgotten: diplomacy is impoc^enUj| _to out a formidable fleet and the use it; the fleet must be able ^t0 -_sSion war if necessary to carry out its ^_vy of supporting national policy; ^tf’^e eS must keep the sea-lanes open ^lf^j_{Cd of peace to ensure that the ^,_er States will remain an industria V and also to support allies in °* _oI,|y win a war; and the Navy will _s jr as strong as public opinion p^er to be.                   jj. S'

It is Ryan’s contention ^t*^ialjj_(tlj[^ policymakers erred in seeking ^ yj_et' political victories in Korea ^ nam by restraining their ¹¹¹

Proceedings / Aug⁰

•                                    anu

Washington. Flexible re-

1                                            ^A              It^­

^eration_s ^e^^enerate<^ ‘^nt0 P‘^ecemeai op­to i^{S| t}^^le services were called upon

Partly ₍

the j_Sc,.^Us’ Particularly with regard to

the i^^P^onsihle for its decline during

issue _nf

^sult_> ^{1 cos}t-overruns. The net re- 'tabilj,. ^Wever> has been the service’s half ^t0 hght more than one-and-a- ftss, the (,^^ecause °fU. S. naval weak- ^ttleri^ °^V'^ets have continued to test

irtie ₀j: ^ant^ ‘ⁿ the configuration of P^?verth | ^C^^e'^r ships, their navy can atiSty_er ^e.^ess operate worldwide. The ^c°tJle_{s to}'^{S c}^^ear for Ryan—when it Suns or butter, it is better to

So

forces

Prod \ ^ftUnately’ ^c^^e United States n_Ucl^^{Ce t}^^le Polaris missile and the atj_n ^r P^owered submarine, thus ere- ^Secuti^{C C}          that underpins our

ba_Seij ^ty^^{the ot}^^er two being ground- i ^rniss^^es and strategic bombers. n_e[j f_r^^Sernent °f the Navy contin- thr_0u l*¹¹ |^^ennedy’s Administration du_ci_n^ hlixon s. Along with intro- and _tj^ ?^{ew ma}nagement techniques gca_m ^e_R ^ve'y^ear defense planning pro­filer c'urb°^^ert ^ McNamara also fur- te_{ms a}^r ^ ^t'^le military. By using sys- exp_erti^^{a yS}*^S’ ^y'^t" ^overl°oked military matter^SC °^ver managed military Similar/ ^ *ⁿ ^ blockade of Cuba. of_th           ^eyents surrounding the loss

ag_{Uez e} ^SS ^^ue^° (ager-2) and the May- ^COrr>rna^d°^^{e revea}^^c‘d overlayering of sion i_n          ^re*^ations and civilian intru-

^C° ^tact'^cal matters.

in Yj ^C°^ntr°l of military operations testpj ^nam, Ryan continues, also

(K ^ With

^sP°nsi

i _Uri[. ^ivilcs were canea upon "'etg jj. ^rta^^e missions for which they ^Ua^stn ^SU’^tec^^{; an}d the policy of grad- fotce ^{not succ}essful until enough ttarn to drive North Viet-

^e conference table.

- -       « convinced that the Navy was

*"rica’                                                       '.Uiiuuutu LU itoi

Whil_e ^res°lve, as in Cuba. Mean- jnto \ ^{1 e}y hiave expanded by proxy fot° v\fjL°^^{a an<}^ Ethiopia and directly hav_e ^anistan. Although the Soviets ^°^s‘tio_n^{ea n}f^sses in their geographic have less butter and a navy that will provide stronger security. He is happy that the United States has belatedly increased its defense spending and that the battle groups in the Indian Ocean match Soviet naval strength in an area near the oil that is so necessary to the Free World for survival.

Those with a knowledge of domestic and world affairs since 1945 will find that Ryan provides an invaluable re­view; others will be given necessary information on the status of the con­temporary navy in today’s world.

Their Trade Is Treachery

Chapman Pincher. United Kingdom: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981. 240 pp. Illus. if?7.95 (Approx. $16.49) ($14.84).

Reviewed by Captain John O. Coote, Royal Navy (Retired)

Captain Coote was a Royal Navy submariner who saw war service off Norway and in the Mediterranean and later held four sea commands, 1948-54. At age 38, he resigned to go into newspaper publishing in Fleet Street, ending as Deputy Chairman of Beaverbrook Newspapers.

Their Trade is Treachery is the British publishing sensation of the year, and will not go unnoticed in Moscow. Apart from its subject—how Britain s intelligence services were infiltrated with surprising ease by the KGB during the years leading up to World War II—the manner of its launching will not be forgotten. There were no ad­vance or review copies made available. Hence, the unusual situation of a book going to the top of the best-sellers’ list overnight without the benefit of a sin­gle review. Extracts published and bril­liantly exploited by the Daily Mail did it all.

On the day of the book’s publica­tion, Prime Minister Margaret

Power, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder and, facing page, Italians at La Spezia could see that the Tunisian frigate, President Bourguiba (li-7) was upstaged by three Sixth Fleet warships. So, too, did the Sverdlov cruiser, left, and her guided missile escort visually overpower two East German ships at Gdynia.

Thatcher was obliged to make a full statement in the House of Commons on Pincher’s main allegation: that the head of MI5 from 1956 to 1965 was a KGB mole of 30 years’ standing. Sir Roger Hollis's guilt was not proven, she said. But nor was his innocence. It was probably all unfounded, but nevertheless she ordered a full inquiry into Chapman Pincher’s sources, with a hopeful innuendo lobbed in the di­rection of former Prime Minister Wil­son and his political confidante, Lady Falkender. The book rakes over familiar ground when Pincher describes how security agencies such as MI5 and the Secret Service (MI6) met their growing requirements for staff in the 1930s by recruiting mainly on the “old boy net­work,” without a backward glance at some candidates’ antecedents or char­acter deficiencies. Both at Oxford and Cambridge trendy intellectuals em­braced Marxism, attracted by its de­ceptively logical answers to society’s injustices and economic problems. They also saw themselves as saving Western civilization, first from Franco and later from Hitler. The cynical Russo-German pact of August 1939 did not bother them, because the new recruits (an impressive number of whom are identified by Pincher) had already been instructed by their con­trols to abandon their overt ties with Communism before going to war in the security agencies which they were bent on undermining with such devastating effect.

#8 /

August 1981

81

Most of the home-grown spies men­tioned in the book are household names, already immortalized by Mad­ame Tussaud. While we do not learn much that is new about Philby, Bur­gess, or Maclean, Anthony Blunt is put firmly in perspective as one of the most damaging spies ever to operate in Brit­ain. And there are glimpses of several new candidates for national dishonor.

its

It is well for the future com

tten

Some, like Tom Driberg, John Cairn- cross, and Henry Kerby, have only re­cently surfaced. But it would seem that there were others who were allowed to enjoy their honors and pensions in spite of grave doubts about their loyalty. Pincher asserts that one anonymous traitor rose to flag rank in the Royal Navy, but his identity remains safe in the author's keeping—for the time being at any rate. Some were protected by the head of Mi5’s repeated failure to investigate suspicious cases brought to his attention.

The evidence against Roger Hollis is, on the whole, circumstantial and has the further drawback of being partly supplied by former MI5 col­leagues whose careers were cut short by him. But, running through the story is a powerful input from the CIA, whose James Jesus Angleton stuck to his story that repeated warnings to the British security authorities were shelved in Mi5’s Curzon Street headquarters. He was finally discouraged from his per­sistent inquiries even by his boss, Wil­liam Colby. Nevertheless, the CIA emerges from this book with more credit than it has ever before been ac­corded by a British writer. Some of the vital leads the CIA produced were later seized upon by MI5 or the Secret Service as triumphs of counter-espionage of their own.

Whether Hollis was a lifetime KGB agent or not may never be resolved. Nor does it matter too much now, for whatever damage he did cannot be un­done. But there is enough evidence in this book and elsewhere to place a sub­stantial question mark against his suit­ability for the responsibilities with which he was entrusted—if only for his curiously irresolute manner of running MIS. (Those doubts should have been

resolved then and there, rather than ^ brought to the floor of the House ^ Commons 15 years later by this ⁰⁰ ^ The credibility of this intensely tea able tale turns on how one ^v‘^eW* . author. General Hackett, in his <■ selling book The Third World describes him as “a journalist rega by some as the scourge of White and by others as its last hope • ■ Pincher’s track record as a journ* lends formidable support to his ^cr bility. In my 15 years as a Hose _r league in Fleet Street, he ^waS.ⁿ_stU. shown to have floated a journahsne^ mer, although many were put ¹⁰        ^

of him by political and defense c who wanted to exploit his unique^ sonal authority as the leading “

correspondent in the Western ⁰ ^

due¹ our security services that he has set this important book.

Books of Interest

Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor

NAVAL AFFAIRS

tS A Bibliography of American Naval History

Paolo E. Coletta. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 453 pp. Ind. S15.95 (S 12.76) paper.

Dr. Coletta, a Naval Academy history pro­fessor and prolific writer of naval history, has compiled nearly 5,000 references in this bibliographic guide. The book is organized into chapters on each chronological period from the American Revolution to the 1980s. Each chapter is subdivided into sec­tions on books, documents, and articles. Works on the U. S. Marine Corps are iden­tified with an asterisk. The references are sparsely annotated, but there is both a sub­ject and an author index.

CV: Carrier Aviation

Peter Garrison. San Rafael, CA.: Presidio Press, 1980. 101 pp. Illus. S8.95 ($8.05) paper.

This heavily illustrated booklet is designed

to provide novices with a basic understand­ing of carrier flight operations. The text is descriptive and includes a dialogue between the air boss on the USS Kitty Hawk (CV- 63) and his assistant. The photographs, by George Hall, cover all aspects of flight op­erations.

Russia in Pacific Waters, 1715—1825,

A Survey of the Origins of Russia’s Naval Presence in the North and South Pacific.

Glynn Barratt. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981. 340 pp. Illus. Map. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

The first in a projected series of volumes on naval and maritime history, this book chronicles the early Russian explorers of the Pacific (including Alaska and North Amer­ica) from Peter the Great’s commission to Vitus Bering in 1725 to the collapse of Russian hopes for a naval hegemony in the northern Pacific a century later. Barratt, a professor of Russian at the University of

the

e<-

Waikato in New Zealand, exp^oscS^^_j.₍..jfi- istence of a bitter rivalry between _flU[- tile and naval interests in the P^iC' of posts that contributed to the c° Russia’s influence in North Amenta

MARITIME AFFAIRS Encyclopedia of Ships and Seafat

Peter Kemp, Editor. New York: Cr°"A Publishers, 1980. 256 pp. Illus. Irak '

($7.18).

•’ onff

Though entitled an “encyclopedia^ yi)

the final sections of this volume

ency

cloP¹

pages) are in the format of an ^ dia—that is, alphabetized entries mous naval men, ships, battles, an^^j

itime events. The greater part

of the

essay⁵

;sel^s

contains lengthy comprehensive ship development from oared ^ve^,_3[(>(^e' steamships, on warships and sea _the and on commerce and exploitan⁰¹^^-

^C ilo^f-

a. The book is well illustrated t; many of the illustrations are

i c°'

82

Proceedings

/ Aug^uS* *

So

Amb

^IV'^{et Mer}chant Ships

^erid!!! u^reenWay’ ^{White Plains}’ ^NY'^:

^S2° oo (iiiToo).¹⁹⁸¹' ^{224 pp}-^Illus-^,nd-

Publish ^ ^^0urth edition of a volume first f°trnati⁶ 'ⁿ     ^ *^ncl>-ides updated in-

^and _co '°^{n an}^ P^^ot°graphs of Russian cargo factor_v^{ntainer Sh}‘^pS’ P^assenS^er vessels, fish- and _tu ^VtSSC'^s’ research ships, icebreakers, ParticuT' ^baC^ ^sb'^{p ty}P^e'^s illustrated, and ^t0t>nag ^{ar Vesse}*^{s are} identified by builder, Merida' ^Cn®'^neer‘ⁿ8> ^and hull dimension. ^v°iutne ⁿ ^°^{use a}*^so offers a companion mercha °^{n non}'^^uss‘^an Communist Bloc Skib_t ?^{C s}h'ps entitled Comecon Merchant ^P ' ^als° $20.00.)

7_t^LIT«v affairs

^ Few

Ev_ents ^yeat Captains: The Men and of jj (, _t^at Shaped the Development

Pktyi

S' Air Power

h°ublp,) ^CoPP- Garden City, NY.:

$17.5o ($13^{531 pp}' ^Illus- ^Bib- ^lnd-

t-overi

25).

Wa_rs^lrip ^the years between the World i °^pP ^s tribute to the men who pi-

°^ncered _rc

^lar8el_{y a} ^{air arm} °f the U. S. Army is

" ¹ »ed a .

Who P^crs°nal account of the four men ^CePtanr_o^a ^^tru8S*^e f°^r recognition and ac-

def_eiK„ ^{0t air} forces within the nation's

;*nse

And

!“°Pp's

M. An/^{StabHshment: Hap} Arnold, Frank tews, Carl Spaatz, and Ira Eaker.

^^Urfian ' ¹⁰^^raPhical approach provides a Merest to the story and makes this

-------------------------------------------------

account particularly engaging. Copp in­tends for this to be the first of two such accounts, the second, presumably, to cover the war years, 1939-1945.

An Illustrated Guide to Allied Fighters of World War II

Bill Gunston, New York: Arco, 1981. 160 pp. Illus. $8.95 ($8.05).

Photographs and full-color drawings ac­company the descriptions of each of the 42 fighter aircraft included in this little book. The origin, dimensions, performance char­acteristics, armament, and history of each plane are offered in an encyclopedic format. (Arco also offers two companion volumes by Bill Gunston: one on German, Italian and Japanese Fighters of World War II. and one on Bombers of World War II, both $7.95 each.)

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Military-Industrial Complex, A

Historical Perspective

Paul A. C. Koistinen. New York: Praegar,

1980. 170 pp. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).

The six chapters in this historical summary of the development of what President Ei­senhower labeled “the military industrial complex” (MIC) first appeared as articles in various historical journals between 1967 and 1979- Throughout the articles, Kois- tinen’s principal point is that the MIC, as he refers to it, is not a post-World War II

phenomenon, but has its roots in America's economic system—roots that can be traced back to the preindustrial ante helium society of the early 19th Century.

Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947

Michael B. Scoff. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1980. 249 pp. Bib. lnd. $20.00 ($18.00).

Energy and the National Defense Howard Bucknell III. Lexington, KY.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1981. 235 pp. Bib. Ind. $19.50.

The recognition that an oil shortage poses

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83

a serious threat to the national security dates back to well before World War II. In the first of these two monographs on energy and defense, Michael Stoff traces the effort to fashion a coherent national policy for oil during World War II and in the immediate postwar era. In 1947, at the outset of the postwar boom and with America’s nuclear monopoly intact, the effort failed to com­mand the priority necessary to see it through. To Howard Bucknell, this was clearly unfortunate. Bucknell asserts that the energy problem today is a political- military problem more than a scientific or technical problem. Whereas other studies of the current energy problem have con­cluded that a program of conservation and the development of alternative sources will see the United States through "the energy crisis," Bucknell concludes that the 1980s will be “a decade of energy traumas fre­quently involving the risk of war.”

The Winning Weapon, The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945—1950 Gregg Herken. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. 425 pp. Bib. Ind. $15.00 ($13.50).

Historians and political scientists have been squabbling for a quarter century about the diplomatic utility of U. S. possession of the atomic bomb in the Cold War era. New Left historian Gar Alperovitz claimed in 1965 that U. S. use of the atomic bomb against Japan was motivated largely by U. S. concern over Soviet actions in Eastern Europe; its use was a signal of U. S. power and determination and thus was political more than military. Others, such as Adam Ulam, argued that the bomb was not an effective instrument of diplomacy. In this new and important history, Herken traces the course of American efforts to devise a policy for the control and possible use of the A-bomb in the years of America’s nu­clear monopoly. He argues that both his­torical views are correct: that many men in the Truman Administration did hope to use the bomb as a diplomatic makeweight, but that they were never very successful in doing so.

FICTION Back to Battle

Max Hennessy. New York: Atheneum, 1980. 297 pp. $10.95 ($9.85).

This is the third volume of a trilogy about the life and career of the fictional Sir George

(Ginger) Kelly Maguire, Royal Navy- ^ lier volumes followed Maguire in ^|S . ventures at Jutland in World War Lion at Sea) and in the interwar era ^ Dangerous Years). This volume finds ' ^ the midst of naval activity in Wor < II. Like Herman Wouk’s Pug HenO ^ ^ and Remembrance), Maguire seems wherever historic action is taking V Narvik, Dunkirk, the North Atlanta ^ voys, the German invasion of Crete. "Torch” landings, the Murmansk run. erno, and, of course, D-Day.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED _(he A Dream of Wings: Americans an Airplane, 1875-1905: Tom D. “ New York: W. W. Norton, 1981- 5 Illus. Bib. Ind. $15.95 (S 14.35)-

The Armed Forces of the United dom: Chris Chant, Editor. North ^^onJ||_uS. VT.: David & Charles, 1980. 80 pP- Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).

Darby’s Rangers: We Led the Wa) _unlcf- liam O. Darby and William H- *

San Rafael, CA.: Presidio Press, 19 pp. Illus. Maps. $14.95 ($13.45)-

Second Edition

_                      .! Dead Reckoning

By H.H. Shufeldt and G.D. Dunlap

Updated and revised, this edition of the classic book on small boat piloting includes a new chapter on the use of the scientific calculator to figure speed-time-distance, fuel consumption, and course problems. Also included are chapters on tides and currents, charts, compasses, navigation, and the use of electronic aids to navigation.

1981/164 pages/illustrated

A Naval Institute Press Book List price: $11.95 Member's price: $9.56 (Please use order form in Books of Interest section.)