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The U. S. Maritime Industry— In the National Interest
Irwin M. Heine. Washington. D.C.: Acropolis Books. 1980. 397 pp. Ilius. Append. Bib. Ind. $11.95 ($10.75).
Reviewed by Colonel Lane C. Kendall l-'- S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
For anyone seriously interested in ”e United States’ ship-operating and shipbuilding industry, this presenta- i°n by Mr. Heine is a useful compendium of statistics, brief analyses °‘ existing laws and regulations, and a wide-ranging series of commentaries ealing with many of the problems acing the nation’s shipowners, ship- elders, and ship-repairers. Sponsored by the National Mari- ■ IITle Council, an organization which, y 1978, consisted of the principal • S.-flag steamship operators, major aritime unions, land-based mari- jnie-related labor unions, shipbuild- wS'. and representatives from the aritime Administration, it is under- andable that the book contains no particulars of what should be stipu- ^ed in a national maritime policy.
■ Heine directs many critical ^sts, however, at the absence of a s, .ns*^tent policy toward commercial 'Pping, and at the erratic record of ./Congress in appropriating funds
•he |f'n^ l° °r 'n suPPor,'n8 over ‘ long term, such legislative enact- mepnt? as do exist.
.l airness requires the observation iti '* Con8ressional interest in the mar- me. problem has been rather well stained in recent years, but the I any conflicting views—all too often c/c°nc'lable—on the part of con- thenC^ groups have militated against preatI0Ption of a policy to which the jn/°nderant portion of the maritime /stry would give its support, the Carefu"y developed chapter on |jee elation between the merchant jn.oar>d the national defense brings Riilit. °CUs not only the need of the shjary services for logistical support the ■ 'n® kut also the dependence of ^tat'^US,r'a* caPahility of the United es upon ships to transport essential materials. Mr. Heine makes a convincing case for closer cooperation than now exists between the Navy and the merchant marine industry in the matter of design and number of units in the active commercial fleet.
In the chapter entitled “United States Maritime Industries and the American Economy,” the significance to the nation of foreign trade is set forth: “The variety of commodities and goods carried by ships in U. S. foreign trade is numbered in the thousands, the volume in the millions of tons, and their value in billions of dollars.” Unfortunately, the proportion of that trade handled by ships owned and registered in the United States has been declining steadily over the last two decades: “U. S. flag ships, on a value basis, carried only 15.7 percent of the total American oceanborne exports and imports in 1978, compared with 20.7 percent in 1970and 25.1 percent in 1962.. . .The downward trend is particularly significant in the bulk and tanker segments.” Even in its depleted state, however, the U. S. merchant marine “accounted for sales or output of $8.3 billion; created and maintained 244.900 jobs; generated personal income of $2.4 billion and corporate income of $800 million; contributed $500 million in federal tax revenues . . . and $300 million to state and local tax revenues; and produced for each dollar of sales a total output of $1.80 in sales throughout the economy.”
The merits of this book outweigh its deficiencies, chief of which are the lack of a positive, well-reasoned statement of what a national maritime policy should encompass, the rather ponderous literary style, and the compression of complex topics of great dimensions into a few pages. The results of such compression do not make either for easy reading or ready comprehension. The failure to make specific recommendations for maritime policy, which would have given timely meaning to the obviously careful and comprehensive research underlying this book, comes as a disappointment to those who worry over, and who seek a cure for, the continuing decline of the national capability to support our crucial maritime industry.
The 56 appendices contain a wealth of data, of which the compilation of cargo reservation laws and other discriminatory practices in 54 nations around the world is probably the most valuable. Also, the 36 tables integrated into the text cover a wide range of topics dealing with trade, shipbuilding, and maritime labor. A brief bibliography for each chapter is included, and a comprehensive index facilitates use of the book.
Colonel Kendall was Commercial Shipping Advisor to Commander, Military Sealift Command, from 1960 to 1969. He is the author of The Business of Shipping as well as numerous articles in the maritime press.
Superspill: The Future of Ocean Pollution
James Dawson. New York: Jane's. 1981. 127 pp. Illus. Bib. $18.95 ($17.05).
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Sidney A. Wallace, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)
This is an expensive little book. Here, however, price is no measure of substantive worth. Superspil! is lightweight in every sense. The book promises much and delivers little.
The title is enticing. It makes one think of Supership, Noel Mostert’s highly readable and informative book of the mid-1970s. Much has happened since Mostert traced the development of “supertankers” and asked tough questions about theirfuture versus the environment. One expects the author of Superspill, a student of the sea and a member of Lloyd’s, to develop the supertanker theme (i.e.. don’t superspills come from supertankers?). The book’s jacket and the author’s early statements sustain those expectations. As an underwriter, perhaps the author would be expected to shed some light on the murky subject of marine insurance.
Sadly, Superspill does not live up
The modest amount of oil being dumped from a tanker which is being maneuvered by tugboats in Baltimore does not deserve to be called a “superspill” and neither, says the reviewer, does the book deserve its flamboyant title.
to the promise of its title. The jacket’s claims are puffery. And the author’s stated objectives remain to be satisfied. This book is a rambling, repetitious, disjointed potpourri of anecdotes. favorite theories, and pet ideas. Incidents, such as collisions and groundings, are mentioned in passing, but with only a few if any of the salient facts. Analogies are inept, especially those drawn from aviation. The author quotes and paraphrases the statements of others, but usually fails to disclose sources and contexts. Perhaps worst of all, some assertions of fact are clearly wrong, casting doubts on other statements that the author expects to be taken on faith. Spasmodically, the author attempts to convert the reader with portents of world disaster, to occur if the pollution from ships does not stop. The predictions are shrill but unconvincing.
The author repeatedly makes these principal arguments:
► Nautical charts must be used with care, because their hydrographic data are old, incomplete, and undependable. Seafarers do not know' this, so they pile their ships up on rocks.
► Investigations of marine accidents are published too long after the events to do any good. The cause of each accident must be publicized soon after the event to encourage corrective measures.
► Legislators pay little attention to ship-source pollution.
► Pollution is a waste of irreplaceable resources. Unless it is curtailed, the lights will go out.
► Boredom is endemic on modern commercial ships at sea. making seafarers indolent and thus causing accidents.
► Ships sink because of episodic waves generated by storms and swell systems in confluence over continental shelves.
The author does not make his case on any of these points, or on the other random issues that he strews along the reader’s path. Indeed, he makes no real effort to build a convincing case, apparently believing that a series of casual references to maritime casualties, interspersed with repeated but largely unsupported opinions, will suffice. This approach is inappropriate and ineffective for an ostensibly serious book, and it is made worse by the inaccuracies that stud the text. These are no doubt careless rather than deliberate, but nonetheless decrease the book’s credibility. Given the promise of the book's title, the prestige of its publisher, and the presumed expertise of its author, these are substantial flaws.
The author does not even explore for us the mysteries of marine insurance. He refers to the subject half a dozen times, but the statements read
together shed no light; w'orse, some seem inconsistent with others. This is most disappointing. Marine >nsU^ ance, oarticularly as related to oil P° lution. is an elusive subject. Under writers do not talk about it much. a least not in comprehensible terms- except among themselves. Those w pay the premiums seem to fear t loose lips sink coverage. The PaUCI - of information has created real pr° lems in legislating and rule-makmg- Such problems usually are res0 v5r in ways that create new problems underwriters and their customer^ Less secrecy and more understan 1 - would benefit all.
This book is carelessly written- ^ deredited, and overpriced. And. though it is short, finishing it becom an ordeal.
For eight years. Admiral Wallace represcnn. United States in negotiations with pther tries on marine pollution matters. In tlje' r on tise branch while on active service and Capitol Hill, he worked on legislative nwa ^ to enhance marine safety and control oce lution.
National Defense
Reviewed by Dr. Dov S. Zakheim
[t is
This is a very disturbing boo ■ disturbing because it raises ^ questions that too many ^e*en> ^ust servers have avoided, and tbaI jt
be asked. It is disturbing beca ^
118
Proceedings t*'»t*r
19*1
is too dogmatic in its assertion o
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and the prescriptions it puts forward. And it is disturbing because it might lead readers to conclude that the validity of its answers is directly proportional to the validity of its questions, when in fact that is not the case.
Fallows sets out “to give the general reader better ways of thinking about defense.” He argues that defense cannot be viewed purely in man- serial terms: that soldiers must fight and lead men, not manage a business; that weapon systems must not be de- s'gned and procured to emphasize complexity but be simple, usable, and relevant to the conditions under which they will be employed; that nuclear Policy must be conceived in realistic Ways rather than as theology; and that ttulitary service must not be limited |o the poor, undereducated, and underprivileged.
It is difficult to counter these arguments, because in very general ti^Hts, they are substantially correct. *he difficulty arises when moving r°m the general to the specific, and Specially to some of Fallows’ obser- ^ations about particular aspects of e*ense planning and programming. Fallows argues that the United ates has pursued an attrition war- are doctrine that emphasizes materiel Production and management at the xPense of strategy. In so doing, he choes serious defense thinkers, such s Edward Luttwak. Stephen Canby, . . William Lind, who have made 'Pilar arguments for nearly a decade. evhat .^allows fails to recognize, how- eihT’ 'S t*lat accounl'ng for the intan- lat Warfare does not easily trans- e into weapon systems pro- ooiming. For example, does the aneuver style of warfare argue for Against the M-l tank as opposed to
lhe M-60?
^Furthermore, the argument for map |.Ver warfare may run counter to in °^S' ,case f°r simplicity. A case c P°lnt js the air-cushioned landing rev ILCAC), which may be the most tem° Utionary new Marine Corps systran . because landing forces could ..lcJnre else. This is the essence of tecjieuver doctrine; but air cushion ity n°logy is the essence of complex-
Fallows' arguments regarding weapons acquisition are equally flawed. His case for simple aircraft does not account for the fact that some new weapon systems do work, and could indeed change the nature of combat just as the machine gun and the tank before them. It is further confounded by the fact that the Soviets are constantly moving toward ever-more sophisticated aircraft and that the Israelis—the paragons of the tactics Fallows advocates—not only prefer to acquire F-15s but are deeply opposed to the aquisition of F-15s by some of their neighboring adversaries. This is not to say that Fallows and his mentors in these matters—John Boyd and Pierre Sprey—do not have a case for reevaluating the measures by means of which aircraft effectiveness is determined. Rather, it is to point out that Fallows presents that case too simplistically and in too one-sided a fashion to be of use as a truly objective guide to the lay reader as to what defense programs are about.
Similarly, Fallows argues against MX, or other developments in the strategic realm, on the grounds that there are more than enough nuclear weapons available in the arsenals of both superpowers to destroy the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and that there is only a dubious case for spending tens of billions of dollars on weapons purported to affect superpower perceptions, when policymakers on both sides are uncertain of the precision and effectiveness of those weapons. Here Fallows ignores the fact that the Soviets have consistently improved their strategic weapon systems and that Soviet military doctrine, disseminated in both the Soviet Union and the West, clearly involves the use of nuclear weapons. Most important, when he argues against tempting “credulous leaders to believe they could pull off a first strike,” Fallows forgets that the temptation is equally great on the Soviet side, and that only through a manifestly strong posture can we minimize (though never fully ensure) that the temptation will be resisted in Moscow.
Again, Fallows’ case for developing a new spirit in the armed services based on the elimination of careerist generals, admirals, colonels, and captains seems hollow since he relies on quotes from full colonels and, indeed, the Army Chief of Staff to support his position. If the military is so corrupted by careerism, why is Dan Malone a full colonel, and why is he permitted to brief his ideas to aspiring generals and admirals? And how did Shy Meyer, who is implementing many of the reforms that Fallows advocates, make it to the top? Perhaps the issue is not as black and white as Fallows would have his readers believe.
These are but a few examples of the dangers inherent in the thinking that underlies this book. In many ways it adopts the moralistic and indiscriminate tone that its author decries. The problem is not that Fallows deliberately wishes to mislead his readers; rather, his argument lacks the necessary depth, discernment, and understanding of defense programs and problems. Unfortunately, the author conveys the impression that he knows all the answers, and the danger is that some readers will finish the book thinking they know them, too.
The USNI Insignia Scarf is the classic fashion addition to your sport shirts — or to your favorite gal’s wardrobe.
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Dr. Zakheim is Special Assistant (Designate) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). Until June 1981. he was a Principal Analyst with the National Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office.
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
ring
Pon-Naval Institute titles. When air mail
naval affairs
Blue-Water Rationale, The Naval Defence °f New Zealand, 1914-1942
p McGibbon. Wellington. New Zealand:
^ D- Hasselberg. 1981. 446 pp. Illus. Maps. Ppend. Bib. Ind. Approx. $42.00.
In the years between the world wars. Brit- ph Planners devised a strategy for the Far East in which the key element was the de- ense of Singapore. Upon the outbreak of ^nrin 1941. Singapore fell after only seven ays and with it the entire British program or defending Australia and New Zealand Collapsed. In this history of naval and de- et1se policy, a New Zealand scholar at- acks this plan as having been short-sighted and confining. The book is well researched and offers a wealth of detail about defense P anning and organization in the southwest Pacific.
Plane’s Doctrine of Naval Architecture, <670
wrian Lavery, Editor. London: Conway maritime Press, 1981. (Distributed in the U. S. p„ Ia,e Mutual Book and Periodical Service.) (^PPj Ulus. Append. £ 20 Approx. $49.00
Si
lr Anthony Deane was perhaps the most ^wtied and influential ship designer of th c.en!ury- He was largely responsible for i e ^es'8n of Royal Navy ships that fought ant Wars against France between 1689 p 1^15. In 1670, at the request of his tr- r°n Samuel Pepys, he wrote his Doc- •p. e’ a <ext for ship designers and builders, witt!teXt‘s rePr'nted in this volume along ,a lengthy introduction and explana- ‘°n by Brian Lavery.
b°ok order service
Pric^ encl°sclI by parentheses are member Puhl' bdembers may order most books of other (jjs ''Iters through the Naval Institute at a 109? untn°Unt °^*'sl Pdce. (Prices quoted in this colin arC subiect to change and will be reflected det-t b'HIag ) Please allow for delays when or tagf.er sP>ec'al handling is requested, actual pos- ber handling cost will be billed to the mem- g0 °°l<s marked [3] are Naval Institute Press g s' B°oks marked 0 are Naval Institute li0t) Sections. Use the order blank in this sec- 131 Life in Nelson’s Navy
Dudley Pope. Annapolis. MD.: Naval Institute Press. 1981. 279 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($11.96).
This easy-to-read book offers a wealth of detail and insight about the daily lives of those who served in the Royal Navy during the heyday of wooden ships and iron men. The workings of the press gang, the responsibilities of officers, the food, the grog, the punishment, all are explained in a breezy style. Pope cites specific cases which provide poignant glimpses into this rugged world.
Dwight R. Messimer. Annapolis. MD.: Naval Institute Press. 1981. 167 pp. Illus. Append.
Bib. Ind. $15.95 ($12.76).
Partly to counter Lieutenant Colonel Billy Mitchell's publicity campaign on behalf of an independent air force, the U. S. Navy in 1925 planned a transpacific flight that would demonstrate the Navy’s aerial expertise. But, despite careful planning, the mission nearly turned into a disaster as the Navy's PN9 seaplane was forced down by engine failure and drifted undetected for nine days east of Hawaii. Messimer's account of this flight concentrates on the search for the missing seaplane and the survival of its crew.
Ready to Hazard, A Biography of Commodore William Bainbridge,
1774-1833
David F. Long. Ann Arbor. ML: University Microfilms International. 1981. 359 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $26.75 ($24.07).
This is the first modern biography of “Hard Luck Bill" Bainbridge, who captained American naval vessels in three wars—the Quasi War, the Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812. Though haunted by misfortune through much of his career, he recouped his reputation when, in command of the Constitution, he defeated HMS Java in a two-hour slugfest in 1812. Long's greatest contribution is the correction of many of the myths propagated by Bainbridge’s earlier biographers, thus providing a clearer portrait of this enigmatic sailor.
[31 Red Sun Setting, The Battle of the Philippine Sea
William T. Y'Blood. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 257 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. $18.95 ($15.16).
The Battle of the Philippine Sea, more popularly remembered as the “great Marianas turkey shoot,” was one of the decisive battles of World War II. Japanese naval air power was virtually eliminated as Americans shot down or destroyed on the ground more than 400 Japanese aircraft. Yet, the battle has always elicited controversy regarding Admiral Raymond Spruance's conservative tactics and his failure to destroy the Japanese carrier force. In this narrative account, Y'Blood asserts that more aggressive American tactics would have led to a more decisive result and perhaps would have shortened the war.
Understanding Soviet Naval Developments
Office of the CNO. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 140 pp.
Illus. (Free to DoD organizations.) $6.50 ($5.85).
This is a longer and updated edition of a 1978 booklet of the same name. This new edition contains appendices citing the Soviet order of battle, warship and aircraft descriptions, a missile guide, and a full- color section on flags, insignia, and uniforms. As in earlier editions, the text concerns both the history of the Russian and Soviet navies as well as lengthy chapters
on current trends, limitations, hardware, and personnel.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
Cargoes, Matson's First Century in the
Pacific
William L. Worden. Honolulu. HI.: University of Hawaii Press. 1981. 192 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. S12.95 (SI 1.65).
William Matson made his fortune in the days of the so-called robber barons by building a S4.000 investment in a sugar schooner into one of the largest shipping lines in the Pacific. The man, his ships, and the development of the Hawaii trade are the subjects of this volume. Worden's approach is chronological and traces the simultaneous and symbiotic development of Matson's steamship lines and Hawaiian trade from the 1880s to the present.
g] Soviet Bloc Merchant Ships
Bruno Bock and Klaus Bock. Annapolis. MD.: Naval Institute Press. 1981. 269 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. S29.95 (S23.96).
This data-packed volume begins with a country-by-country analysis of the merchant fleets of the Soviet Bloc countries (including Cuba). A second section provides profile line drawings of each merchant ship type, and a third section is an alphabetical index of every individual ship noting home port, shipping line, place and year built, tonnage, and other specifications. No more detailed guide to Soviet merchant shipping exists.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
To Win a War, 1918: the Year of Victory
John Terraine. New York: Doubleday. 1981.
268 pp. Ulus. Maps. Bib. Ind. SI4.95 (S13.45).
Traditional historiography of World War I holds that the Western Front was a mindless blood bath, a static war of great losses and no real victories. The villains in this scenario are the men of the Allied high command who are depicted as unimaginative if not wicked, and none more so than Sir Douglas Haig, the British Field Marshal. In this book, first published in England three years ago. Terraine turns all this on its head. The Allies won the Great War. he claims, on the battlefields of the Western Front by winning brilliant victories against Germany’s main army, victories that were engineered by Haig who is portrayed as the unsung hero of the war.
NATIONAL AFFAIRS The Eisenhower Diaries
Robert H. Ferrell. Editor. New York: W. W. Norton. 1981. 445 pp. Illus. Ind. SI9.95 (SI 7.95).
In 1935, when he was aide to General Douglas MacArthur. then-Colonel Eisenhower began a diary which he kept intermittently until 1967. The entries are irregular and large gaps exist, but they are thoughtful and well-written observations on the major events of his life—the coming of war in the early Forties, his assumption of command in Europe. D-day. the drive to the Rhine, his presidency, and the years of retirement. Entries are linked by a narrative supplied by Robert Ferrell which gives the book an engrossing continuityReforming the Military
Jeffrey G. Barlow, Editor. Washington. D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981. 44 pp. Bib.
S3.00 (S2.70) paper.
The contributors to this collection of es" says argue that increased spending alone cannot overcome the Soviet lead in the military balance. What they advocate is a restructuring of American military forces and. even more important, a refocusing ot American procurement policies to create a "leaner, more cohesive" military. To achieve this, they advocate procurement of simpler but more plentiful weapon systems rather than highly technical, and very expensive, weapons.
Setting National Priorities, The 1982 Budget
Joseph A. Pechman. Editor. Washington.
D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1981. 275 PP- Append. SI9.95 (SI7.95). S7.95 (S7.I5) paper-
In this study, a half-dozen Brooking scholars dissect the 1982 budget, in particular comparing the Carter and Reagan pf°' posals. The section on defense is by liam Kaufmann. He concludes that giyen recent Soviet military efforts, an increase in American military spending is more tha justified. But the problem, as always- that while the United States must certain y meet the challenge by increased spending- "as a practical matter, the national incom is not infinite and defense can never ha' it all.”
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122
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