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:d
well
A*lS
194 destroyers, and 129 submarines while the
In September 1939, conflict with the Royal Air Force had so stunted naval aircraft design and doctrine that the obsolescent Fairey Swordfish, above, was the Royal Navy’s front-line strike aircraft. Similarly, some historians blame conflict with the Luftwaffe for the German Navy’s lack of carrier aircraft and for the failure to complete the carrier Graf Zeppelin, which had been launched in December 1938.
Tbt Royal Navy: With the surrender of the German fleet in 1918, no European navy was a threat to Britain. Nevertheless, Jutland had been anything but a tactical success, and German submarines had almost defeated Britain. Only the War Cabinet’s intervention forced the Admiralty to introduce the convoy system that ended the submarine menace. Moreover, the appearance of aircraft in World War I threatened to change many of the premises of naval warfare.
Although victorious, the Royal Navy faced serious strategic problems. Commercial interests in the Far East and obligations to the dominions stretched commitments to the limit. Britain’s inglorious waffling during the Abyssinian crisis of 1935 result partially from a fear that any battle losses could upseJ the naval balance. The British Chiefs of Staff warne that Japan might take advantage of a Mediterranean war. A war against Italy would open up Britain s lantic trade routes to German surface raiders. Sue strategic studies, no matter how unrealistic, in^u enced the policies of an indecisive government thaf preached a hard line at Geneva and appeasement 1(1 Paris. As a result, Britain neither appeased nor de terred and after 1935 faced a potential enemy ly*n^ astride the Mediterranean trade routes.
Thus, naval planners in the late 1930s assumeJ that Britain would confront Italy and Japan, as as Germany. While Britain possessed naval super'°r ity in European waters, neither the Admiralty n° the Chiefs of Staff framed strategic studies solely terms of Europe. As late as February 1939. ^
Chatfield, minister for coordination of defense, mitted that British naval policy had not waver£[0 from ”... a firm intention to dispatch the fleet the Far East even if it meant abandoning the East Mediterranean.” ^
Britain and its allies possessed formidable stress in Europe. With the help of the French, the R°^e Navy would dominate the Atlantic and most of Mediterranean. In early 1938, the two navies had sl aircraft carriers, while Germany and Italy had n°n The British and French also possessed 102 cruisef
had
*eak
nesses in the program. No capital ships would
Th ^ cru'sers> 139 destroyers, and 116 submarines. Tl)6 d'Sparity between battle fleets was even greater.
e Western Powers possessed 18 battleships, the ar^’ans 2 reconditioned World War I battleships, k t*le Germans none. Nazi Germany’s first two I(v^e cruisers would not enter active service until ^ > and the first battleship of the Bismarck class
^°u*d not be ready until 1941. The three utschland-class “pocket battleships” were little ga^re cban glorified cruisers. In addition, geography dom-Britain important advantages. The British Isles ari^tllnated the North Sea, and British control of Suez Nf ,^'braltar effectively locked the Italians in the Iterfanean. However, Japanese intervention g . d radically change the strategic balance, because •j^ltain would have to send a fleet to the Far East.
bJavy felt that tge maintenance of Singapore, com- of Atlents *n rhe Mediterranean, and the protection Ij^. antic convoys would strain its resources to the
^Ut^fVa* rearmament a^ter 1935 was considerable, c0n aCed ma)or difficulties because of the hiatus in ***** in the early 1930s. In 1933, completed 1935 tonnaSe was only 10,665, while the 1930- t0annual average was barely in excess of 30,000 aCc^j ^*11, once naval rearmament begap, it rapidly u , erated. On 1 January 1935, warship tonnage ■ ®r construction was 139,300; by 31 March 1939, reached 659,000 tons. There were, however,
be ready until 1941, and the first aircraft carrier would not enter service until 1939. Moreover, the program concentrated on major fleet units to the exclusion of smaller ships. Not until 1939 did the Admiralty begin to increase substantially the strength of antisubmarine forces.
One aspect of British shipbuilding remained beyond Admiralty control but had a direct impact on the war: merchant shipyard capacity had steadily decreased from a World War I high. In 1933, merchant ship construction had fallen to less than 140,000 tons, a factor in shipping shortages at the outbreak of the war. Significantly, no landing craft appeared in British programs until the summer of 1939.
Failure to prepare for submarine warfare was the Admiralty’s greatest error. In 1938, Russell Grenfell, an interwar naval expert, warned that the shipbuilding program was dangerously distorted:
“The great amount of battleship and heavy cruiser tonnage that has been laid down since rearmament started has been much in excess of our requirements in European waters ... At the same time we have been left seriously short of small ships for anti-submarine and anti-aircraft work in home waters. The Admiralty, therefore, seem to have been committing the grave error of preparing for ambitious operations in a far distant theater without first taking steps to ensure the safety of the home base.”
r*o,
ln<?8 / April 1981
39
These German photographs, one of the Dieppe beach and one of a disabled Canadian tank, chronicle the failure of an Anglo-Canadian amphibious raid when 3,330 of the 3,000-man force were killed or wounded. The Dieppe debacle occurred in August 11)42, only 12 days after the U. S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal, thus suggesting which of the English-speaking Allies had done its amphibious warfare homework between the wars and which had not.
NAVAL INSTITUTE
The basic cause lay in an underestimation of the submarine danger. In 1935, Samuel Hoare, secretary of state for foreign affairs, told the cabinet that . the Admiralty were rather less apprehensive of submarines today than they had been during the war.” In 1937, the Naval Staff claimed in regard to the previous war’s submarine campaign that “our defeat was in reality not quite so near as it appeared then.” Supposedly, antisubmarine warfare had reached the point at which Britain could “face the future with confidence . . .,” and “it can be stated that in future warfare submarines will have to face a form of defense which to a large extent robs them of their chief advantage, i.e., their invisibility.” Because asdic (sonar) had substantially advanced the ability to locate submerged submarines, the Admiralty felt confident it had solved the submarine danger.
Unfortunately, the Royal Navy had not. It had tested antisubmarine tactics only in daytime, in good weather, in limited areas, and for short periods of time. Exercises dealt almost exclusively with battle fleet protection. Little was done to prepare for protecting slow-moving merchant convoys. British optimism resulted from the mistaken belief that submarines would attack only while submerged, but a
etit
Command. Compared with other major comic remained a poor second well into the war. Admiralty also badly misjudged antiaircraft fire
I 0ss of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales in j 'vas a direct result of such overconfidence, to n t^le late 1930s, the British Government decided tailor the Army to a perceived strategic frame
namely submarine and air attack, they are no test °f strength; for against these two forms of attack, battleships can provide no protection whatsoever.” the late 1930s, the Royal Navy was far behind U. S. and Japanese navies in development of naval air power. The more extreme air power advoCates in Britain, as well as RAF control of the Fleet lr Arm, had hindered development of a British naval air force. In July 1918, the aircraft carrier Furi- jS sent off seven Sopwith Camels that destroyed ^Ppelins L 54 and L 60 in their hangars. This striking start aborted. In 1918, the Admiralty put up tle opposition to the transfer to the newly created
^ A P C • . .
^ ot its air arm consisting of 2,500 aircraft and ’0°0 airmen. In the early interwar period, the RAF and the Royal Navy reached a temporary compromise which the Admiralty established aircraft require- n^nts and the RAF was responsible for the aircraft 7 Gaining of the Fleet Air Arm. Of the air crews 0 were naval personnel, but they were “attached” not “seconded” to the RAF. They received equiv- th C rank‘ This compromise did much to stunt Sr°wth of naval air power since few “attached” Cers reached high rank. At this time, the Ameri- s and the Japanese were training and promoting al officers who were aware of aircraft. Ignorance of everaft at command levels in the Royal Navy, how- th ' Caused an underestimation of the capabilities of air weapon in the interwar period. l„^eturning the Fleet Air Arm to the Admiralty in ^ c°uld not correct basic deficiencies, because the retained control of aircraft research and devel- nor Cnt ne*rher the time, the money,
j^r rhe interest to develop specialized naval aircraft, j 0reoveri the transfer of the Fleet Air Arm did not ^ApU^e *an<^'h>ase<J aircraft. Not until 1936 did the establish the Coastal Command as an indepen-
mands.
The
1Veness. Introducing the 1937 naval estimates, arc claimed that antiaircraft guns made:
• • ■ the fleet . . . the least attractive target at any possible enemy might select. He did not ^Jr|c to put the case too high or to suggest that, ecause it was such an unattractive target, no nemy would ever attack the fleet. What he said Was that a fleet of this kind would be so unattrac- ^ e a target that an enemy was likely to think Th *Ce or chrice before attacking it.”
194
work. Basil Liddell Hart, the great military thinker, argued for a strategy of “limited liability” under which Britain would not commit a large army to the European continent, but rather would attack its enemies at their weakest points. The obvious role of the Army, if not on the continent, then, was as an amphibious force. Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister; Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War; and Liddell Hart thought along such lines, but none showed any grasp of the complexities of combined operations. Unfortunately, the services displayed little interest in this area.
In 1937, the president of the Royal Naval War College suggested that Britain prepare special forces for an amphibious role. He argued that:
“. . . if in time of war we have no force suitably trained and equipped to carry out amphibious operations, we may be unable fully to exploit the advantages this naval superiority confers on our armed forces. Amphibious operations in the face of modern weapons and under the conditions of modern warfare demand a higher standard of specialist training and the provision of special technical equipment.”
He added that the Royal Marines could convert to this capacity.
In reply, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS) doubted if the Admiralty would support the Royal Marines as an amphibious force. He suggested that the services extend the study of amphibious operations at staff colleges, conduct frequent amphibious exercises, and set up special forces to serve as spearheads for amphibious operations. These modest proposals ran into heavy opposition. The Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS) argued that the Army had no units for a special amphibious role and that training in amphibious techniques was more than adequate. The Deputy Chief of Air Staff felt that a landing on the coast of a first-class air power had no prospect of success. Landings against a minor power required no special training. According to him, the Gallipoli landing during World War I had indicated that nothing was wrong with British amphibious techniques except for a few minor communication breakdowns.
Such optimism was misplaced. Combined operations exercises were on so small a scale that no real experience was gained. Commander in Chief, Southern Command, reported the following about a July 1938 exercise:
“The landing was a ‘token’ landing only and threw no new light on the problem of landing a complete force with the full means of maintaining its fighting efficiency until a port is secured. This
read
Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II had, of course,
The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement
England was a distinct possibility. A May study warned that Germany could not win sut»‘ war, given the Royal Navy’s overwhelming super ity. Germany’s unfavorable maritime position c plicated the strategic situation, and, for at foreseeable future, there was little hope of deO ^ success against England with weapons such aS ^ submarine, aircraft, and mine. In March 193^’
is mainly an engineering and administrative problem which had never been faced since the war. We do not know what is really required in the way of stores, plant, and personnel for landing the mass of mechanical vehicles, guns, ammunition, equipment, etc., which have to follow the covering force and to follow it swiftly if the momentum of the initial success is to be maintained. That landings on a considerable scale are still a feasible and essential operation of war in certain conditions is shown by recent Japanese successes in China. ’ In October 1938, General Hastings Ismay, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense, was alarmed at the lack of preparations for combined operations and suggested that HMS Adventure be converted to a landing craft carrier. Within four days, he received a reply from the DCNS announcing that the Admiralty had no intention of allotting financial resources to such a project. In November, the DCIGS commented that “. . . there was no question that an attempt to land troops in hostile territory in the face of superior air, land, or naval forces would be doomed to failure.” Britain should rule out such operations. The Navy expanded the argument with the Admiralty letter to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS). The Navy . .at the present time could not visualize any particular combined operation taking place and they were, therefore, not prepared to devote any considerable sum of money to equipment for combined training.” In January 1939, Lord John Gort, (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), commented that railroads now allowed the land-based power to concentrate more rapidly than sea-based power. Thus, the strategic mobility conferred by seapower, although “politically a very attractive idea,” no longer worked in favor of naval power.
The DCOS did not attempt to establish an amphibious capability until July 1939. Even as the first steps were taken to order landing craft, Rear Admiral Sir Tom Phillips reminded the Deputy Chiefs that they “. . . had recently expressed the opinion that landing operations against modern defenses, including aircraft, were not a feasible operation of war.” Thus, despite the decision that the Army should be able to take advantage of Britain’s naval superiority, little was done to prepare for such a contingency. Had the services examined the possibilities with more care, the costs of establishing an amphibious capability would probably have proven higher than the government would have supported. Nevertheless, the failure even to study the problem contributed directly to the 1940 disaster in Norway.
In spite of all its deficiencies, the Royal Navy was an effective fighting force. Fleet performance against superior Italian forces in 1940 and 1941 (the victory off Calabria, the destruction of the Italian fleet at Taranto, and Cape Matapan) indicates a high level o leadership, and such leadership would adapt in die coming war, but at high cost.
The German Navy: The German Navy’s position in its nation’s military hierarchy resembled that of the British Army. Few in Germany knew, understoo > or cared what the Navy was for. Admiral Alfred von
Alfred Thayer Mahan before World War I, but the performance of the High Seas Fleet does not indicate that the Germans possessed a coherent naval Strategy- Early in the century, Tirpitz had coined the rl fleet” strategy; supposedly, if Germany possessed a fleet large enough to sink a substantial part of Royal Navy, the British would not oppose the RelC for fear of damaging their overall strategic positi°n- Recent research indicates that Tirpitz’s theory was smoke screen behind which he hoped to build a deet to challenge the Royal Navy with some successNothing shows the paucity of innovative ideas German naval strategy more than the resurrection the “risk theory” in the 1930s as justification f°r new great fleet. In spite of what happened in 1/ ’
German naval planners now seemed to believe tha the theory had validity.
lowed Germany to begin full-scale naval rearmamen and recognized Germany’s right to build a fleet t was 35% of the Royal Navy’s tonnage. The agree ment had serious repercussions. The French "er outraged at this breach in the provisions of the sailles Treaty and the direct slap at France’s strare£ position. The 35% Figure meant that Germany n could build a fleet equal to that of France. Moreove it did not hinder German naval rearmament, si neither the dockyards nor the economy could ha^ supported a larger building program than that lowed under this agreement.
Through 1936, the German Navy planned f°r.^ possible war with France, or with France and Ru , combined. Naval studies emphasized that Germaflj^ only hope in such a case was British neutrality- summer 1937, planners recognized that war ^
ch
ava] High Command commented: k ^rerequisite for the prosecution of a naval war y Germany ... is the neutrality of Eng- nd- . . The naval balance, which cannot be
dualized in war because of the length of time it rakes to construct ships, forces Germany to strive lr> any possible war at the minimum for England’s neutrality. Should England nevertheless intervene gainst Germany on the side of Russia and France, ermany, because of her great inferiority is thus j, rce<a ro wage a defensive war in the North a a strategy which can inflict military damage °n tke enemy, but which will not be able to pro- 6ct effectively the sea-lanes in the North Sea.” e^ever> the May 1938 crisis made the Germans rvar^niZe ^nS^anc^ as a probable opponent in a future jnj ke British warned the Germans that if they ]anj eia Czechoslovakia they could well involve Eng- and Germany in war.
tjj terrns of doctrine and shipbuilding programs, tU • erman Navy was the most backward of the rjlar°r Powers. The Versailles prohibition of sub- rien*neS resuBed in few admirals having U-boat expe- gayCe’ while creation of the “pocket battleships”
J fke high command a vested interest in surface itej • Spite of the fact that the Navy’s size lim- ancj ^trategic alternatives, it preferred surface ships anj , guns. "Pocket battleships,” battle cruisers, bu;i att*eships became the key elements in the new
Phasi ng program- The “Z” Plan of 1938-1939 em- battleships and commerce raiders and rec- 5 h en<aed a fleet of 10 battleships, 3 battle cruisers, riersavy cruisers, 10 new and 6 old cruisers, 4 car’ ^ destroyers, and 129 submarines. The only
ship type in which planners failed to step significantly beyond the 1935 Treaty’s 35% limitation was the carrier. Not until Pearl Harbor did the Germans realize the value of self-contained naval air power.
Between 1935 and 1939, the Germans built 63 submarines. Many of these were diminutive 250-ton U-Boats, and the whole program was limited by the 1935 treaty. Because Britain did not have a strategic requirement for submarines, the Royal Navy possessed relatively few. Thus, the 1935 naval treaty’s 45% limit of British submarine tonnage (the only exception to the 35% rule applied to other ship classes) limited the number of submarines Germany could build.
In fact, the Germans grossly underestimated the role of submarines in the next war. The Flottenab- teilung predicted that instead of attacking merchant ships, as in World War I, submarines would perform other tasks. This failure to believe that U-boats could play a major role against British trade resulted from the illusion, shared by the British, that the Royal Navy had solved the submarine problem. An October 1938 OKM study noted that a submarine offensive against Britain could not expect great success because British antisubmarine tactics and technical gear had reached such a high level. A 1939 study
n
reported that “the importance of U-boats has considerably decreased compared to 1915. One can assume that England has good submarine detection gear, which makes torpedo attacks on a secured unit or convoy impossible.” It is one of the ironies of the prewar period that, for the most part, the Germans believed British obituaries on the submarine. For the Germans, the submarine’s major role now became battle fleet reconnaissance and attacks on surface forces. This was a curious reading of the last war’s lessons because U-boats had rarely been successful in these roles. Admiral Rolf Carls, Baltic naval commander, actually urged the Navy to build artillery and mine-laying submarines as the most effective commerce raiders.
The high command’s preference for mine-laying and reconnaissance submarines led the naval staff to urge the construction of large submarines. On the other hand, Admiral Karl Donitz, commander of the submarine force, wanted small submarines, so that Germany could have the maximum number on Atlantic station. He argued that the more submarines there were on the trade routes, the more damage to Allied shipping, and that speed was not a necessity because submarines would attack on the surface at night. This conflict almost entirely halted submarine construction in 1937. The design controversy finally ended in a compromise in which seven 500-ton and eight 740-ton boats were included in the 1938-1939 program.
When war came in 1939, the Germans possessed only 26 oceangoing submarines. In the war’s first year, only 35 boats capable of use in the Atlantic entered service, while 28 were lost at sea. This slow rise in U-boat totals resulted from the Navy’s failure to grasp the submarine’s importance. The submarine situation became so difficult that in December 1939, the Germans attempted to buy submarines from Lithuania and Estonia for training vessels.
Nevertheless, in doctrine, training, and leadership, the submarine force was admirably prepared for war. Donitz was a first-class trainer and planner who recognized the limitations as well as the advantages of his weapon. The near victory of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic was almost entirely the result of his efforts.
The emphasis in planning for attacks on commerce remained on surface ships. World War I successes by the auxiliary cruisers Mowe and Wolf; and the light cruisers Emden and Karlsruhe gave the Germans an exaggerated belief in surface vessels as a weapon against trade routes. Admiral Erich Raeder’s comments at the war’s beginning indicate a firm belief that surface vessels made the best commerce raiders.
Yet the course of the Bismarck chase, from her dis covery by Coastal Command aircraft in a Norwegian fjord to the torpedoing by a Swordfish aircraft, fe vealed the bankruptcy of such a strategy.
Another glaring weakness in naval planning was a failure to recognize the importance of aircraft car riers. Some German historians have blamed the Luftwaffe for the lack of carrier aircraft and for die failure to complete Germany’s first aircraft carrier- This is at best disingenuous. Before the war, German naval strategists completely underestimated carriers- Raeder characterized them as “only gasoline tan ers.” Admiral Carls’s remarks on the subject wefe similar to Air Staff arguments in Great Britain against construction of more carriers:
_The Bismar^
'istory has a way of providing situations
from
I I which lessons can be learned. Using the B*5 marck, Hood, and Prince of Wales engagement of 17 as a starting point, some thoughts come to mind- In May of that year, the German Navy embark on an operation designed to assist in the interdict*011 and strangulation of the supply lines feeding Gre*1 Britain. Boiler problems and the Royal Air F°rce disabled the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and GneisM1^' so the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser P'"1* Eugen steamed into the Atlantic without them.
In 15 minutes, the Bismarck blew up the bat cruiser Hood, the pride of the Royal Navy, with r° salvos and caused such serious damage to the bat ^ ship Prince of Wales that she had to break ott action. The Prince of Wales, only two weeks from ^ builders and without any shakedown, did well herse^ in inflicting three hits, two of which affected the ^ timate outcome of the chase. The Bismarck was e'en tually caught and reduced to a wreck by lesser sh*P^ bad luck, and an incredible mistake on the PatCj; her admiral. He made lengthy, unnecessary transmissions after the ship had been brilliantly h*1(1 died and had escaped from the pursuing British.
Pursued, harried, and increasingly bloodied a ^ five days of almost continuous action and strain,
the
. „
major-caliber rounds had been fired at the from the battleships and cruisers with about ^ hits. At times, the King George V had, as the Pfinie Wales had also experienced, only two of ten rifleS
f
rad*0
unmaneuverable Bismarck was brought to bay
two battleships, the middle-aged Rodney and new King George V. In 90 minutes, nearly 2,
A
/N
Aircraft carriers: 1) for the home fleet: no remarks on existing planning. Carriers are actually undesirable as their justification lies only in the ■nsufficient range of naval aircraft necessitating launching them at sea instead of on land. Limitation of aircraft carrier building is to be advocated as soon as the range of land based aircraft correspondingly rises. This is already the case, as far as I know.”
'T’i
e Naval High Command (.Seekriegsleitung) thought a,rcraft carriers would be useful against other aircraft f°d kght naval units, but not against the enemy’s attle fleet. That task would be for battleships.
The Navy received little support from the I U'affe in developing aircraft for ocean use. Bicker
ing between the Luftwaffe and the Navy continued from 1936 through 1939. Hermann Goring claimed that air operations required a unified command under Air Force control, while the Navy argued that only naval air units could operate effectively over the ocean. Hitler settled the conflict by deciding that all aircraft would remain under Luftwaffe control. Naval bitterness over the inadequacies of the system are reflected by the naval war diary of December 1941:
“. . .in more than two years our own independent air force in attacks against large battleships, that is, the backbone of the enemy’s naval power, has not achieved what the Japanese naval air force was able to achieve in the course of a fleet operation in two days.”
sson
-By Commander Strafford Morss, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
her main battery operational. The Rodney came as close as 2,750 yards, firing full nine-gun 16-inch salvos. The Bismarck did not sink until scuttled and then torpedoed.
A large number of good ships had overcome a very good ship.
The United States, with its smallest fleet since the 1930s, is facing a very much larger force of a potential enemy. While this has been recognized for some time, the assumption has always been that the quality of the U. S. ships more than made up for their numerical inferiority. However, Soviet designs, experience, and tactics have improved. The U. S. Navy has now been put in the position of numerical inferiority and questionable qualitative superiority. It will be argued that the U. S. Navy should not be considered alone but as part of the overall NATO navies force structure. However, history shows that British allies at the beginning of World War II were later neutralized for a large part of the war.
The Bismarck action included the waters of the Norwegian Sea and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. In the 1980s, these waters take on increased importance. Carrier battle groups will be the primary means used as the United States tries to block the exit of the Soviet Northern Fleet from the Norwegian Sea. The British used carriers in these waters with varying results during World War II:
► HMS Glorious, caught with her aircraft on deck, was sunk by gunfire from the Scharnhorst.
► Aircraft from HMS Victorious and HMS Ark Royal stopped the Bismarck.
Pl'°°eedi
When World War II broke out in 1939, the German Navy was completely unprepared for a major conflict. It could not maintain a significant number of submarines on station in the North Atlantic; its surface units could only carry out tip-and-run raids against Allied commerce. Raeder’s mournful testament of September 1939, underlines the situation all too clearly:
“Today the war against England-France broke out—a war which the Fiihrer assured us would not break out before 1944, and which he believed he could avoid up to the last moment. . . . It is selfevident that the navy is in no matter sufficiently equipped in the fall of 1939 to embark on a great struggle with England. It is true that in the short time since 1935 ... we have created a well
trained submarine force which at the present time has 26 boats capable of use in the Atlantic, but which is, nevertheless, much too weak to be decisive in war. Surface forces, however, are still so few in numbers and strength compared to the English fleet that they . . . can only show that they know how to die with honor and thus create the basis for the recreation of a future fleet.’
Conclusion: Today, we can easily see where the British and the Germans went wrong. However, the significant point, which we may be all too willing t0 ignore, is that both the obvious tactical lessons as well as the composition of a fleet at the end of a may emphasize precisely the wrong direction towat which a country’s naval policies should procee •
► On several occasions off the Norwegian coast, carrier strikes against the Tirpitz were scrubbed because of sea conditions.
British ships were much smaller than present-day 80,000 to 90,000-ton U. S. carriers, but so were their aircraft. Modern 40,000-50,000-pound aircraft whistling aboard at 110-135 knots to a wet, slippery, heaving deck in Force 6 winds and seas, or above, in a high-threat environment, lead me to wonder how long a carrier air group could remain effective.
During certain periods of the year, there is a high proportion of the time when carriers cannot be expected to operate effectively in these waters. At any given time, and most likely in the poorer times of year, the United States could find itself trying to contain the Soviets from breaking out and interdicting the ports and convoy routes to NATO Europe. This might include attacks on Soviet home ports and antisubmarine warfare operations against both attack submarines and Soviet fleet ballistic missile submarines in an attempt to localize and neutralize, particularly the newer ballistic missile types, for which these northern seas could be a secure patrol area.
To accomplish this mission, proper resource allocation is vital. The United States has an authorized force strength of 13 carriers. At the risk of oversimplification, an analysis shows three carriers normally in the midst of multi-year overhauls, five carriers deployed to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific, leaving a total of five, divided between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts in various
stages of upkeep and training available for depl0^ ment. Perhaps three of these ships might be assigne to the Atlantic.
It would be a major strategic victory if, >n a
vance, we could be made to deploy our most capa
ships to an area where potential enemy interests
ble
are
M
less. The Indian Ocean appears to be such an area- the outbreak of hostilities, U. S. priorities will dra matically shift from maintaining open supply l<neS ■ the United States and the West, to the dua
priorities of trying to contain the Soviet Northern
Fleet and successfully move vast amounts of men
material to Europe. This will take place within
an
a
the
1IUU.V.11U1 IU I_,LilV_»|_'V_ . 1.1110 Will LO.rv.V_ place
framework of then available equipment and sup!
resources; the first five or six weeks will
wi11
make-or-break period. Three aircraft carriers form the nucleus of this effort. If any or all t>eC°
ineffective because of weather or enemy actiom ^
carrier’s roles of both attack and fleet defense wifi
upon the remaining surface and submarine forces
as-
foReS
signed to the carrier battle group. The surface will be called on to protect both the carrier ^ themselves and to try to conduct standoff atta with the means at their disposal. j
At present, I suggest, the availability of °aV
and
weapons needed to fight and defend our ships o ^
any period of time is inadequate. The British
World
almost 2,900 rounds at the Bismarck. A
than
II U. S. battleship would normally store more ^ 100 main battery rounds per barrel with a maxu11 capability of about 1,350 rounds. Contrast this
les
present ship loads of eight Harpoon antiship rmsSl without reload capability. The situation does
Moreover, the inherent bureaucratic tendencies of any military service combined with a fundamental Ur"viIlmgneSS to question accepted doctrine can lead t0 ossification and strategic obsolescence. The warn- ,nS is clear.
Dr. Murray was graduated with a B.A. degree in history from Yale University in 1963. He served in the Air Force as a flight line maintenance officer in California and as a field maintenance officer in Southeast Asia. He received a Naval War College Fellowship in 1973 and a Ph.D. in history from Yale in 1975. He then became acting dean ly J°nathan Edwards College at Yale, and lectured in military st°ty there. He is an assistant professor of history at Ohio State ^"'versity and is presently a research associate at the Air Power search Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama.
Notes on Source Materials
This article was drawn from a number of archival as well as secondary sources. On the British side, the material in the Public Record Office was invaluable. The Cabinet minutes and papers indicated the impact of military advice on the highest level while the papers of the Committee of Imperial Defense, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee all cover the evolution of defense policy, while the Admiralty papers cover the naval side. Contemporary journals such as the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute reveal the debate over naval matters outside of the naval establishment. On the German side, the German Admiralty papers are largely available either at the German military archives in Freiburg or on microfilm in the T-1022 series in the National Archives in Washington. German military journals from the period are also useful. Memoirs from both sides of the war are interesting but must be used with care, particularly on the German side. In terms of the secondary literature, S. W. Roskill’s two-volume work, Naval Policy Between the Wars on the Royal Navy and Michael Salewski’s, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung and Jost Diilffer’s, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine on the German side give the most complete picture.
1
that
only
°me Fleet at Scapa Flow. Less capable but re-
Centl
t0 get better with a recommended fiscal year and ^ Procurement °f 20 Tomahawk cruise missiles jc Phoenix air-to-air missiles. In November • che contractor celebrated the delivery of the Uth Harpoon. A reasonable estimate would be
’ at present, the total inventory of Harpoon, the th °Perational U. S. antiship missile, is no more an 1,500. It is also not difficult to conceive of a yeJl,er battle group under attack expending an entire s procurement of Phoenix air defense missiles in ^ short time.
6o |*rp00n is now deployed with the fleet in about aj n'Ps aH over the world, with certain shore-based hers C Sclua<^rons> ar>d with some allies. The num- yj available in any given location cannot be large. rP°°n is a small payload weapon. Considering the anal°gy> it will tahe several Harpoon hits to a^til-*2 C a S^'P’ a situati°n that remains desperate Mventories and delivery capabilities can be p, l UP- We cannot count on Tomahawk, a larger- Uj <a’ more-effective weapon. At present procure-
efjp rates, Tomahawk is not now and will not be
^ vely operational for a number of years, kreak^ ^ Possibilities of German heavy ship anj |)uts 'nto the Atlantic, the British recognized ea t with the resource problem by stationing
thp , chey considered their most capable ships with
c He
Modernized ships were assigned to the V/terranean- The least capable ships, the Royal fibal^” C*ass’ were used as convoy escorts to provide flnitej°Vera^e aSainst heavy ships. Similarly, the States must consider holding its own most
capable ships for the most serious threat. With too few ships required to be in too many places, several of the remaining Essex (CV-9)-cIass carriers should be considered for immediate activation, particularly for use in the Indian Ocean. If production and installation of standoff missiles cannot be increased, interim installation of such weapons as Exocet or Gabriel should be considered, and steps taken to provide on-board reload capability.
For a nation which relies on the importing of more than 100 strategic materials by sea to maintain its economy, there can be no substitute for the commitment of sufficient resources, hardware, and trained personnel to protect its ocean-borne interests and requirements. When faced with a larger number of very good Soviet ships, reliance today by the United States on a 35-year-old tradition of naval supremacy and on “qualitative superiority” can only result in an epitaph similar to that given HMS Hood: “She was a vastly overrated ship.”
Commander Morss was graduated from Harvard College in 1957 and commissioned a Naval Reserve officer after completing Officer Candidate School at Newport. During his five years of active duty through 1962, he served in the USS Eugene A. Greene (DDR-711), Norfolk Group Atlantic Reserve Fleet, and the USS Protector (AGR- 11). From 1962 to 1964, he was repair supervisor at the Boston yard of Bethlehem Steel Company. He served in various Naval Reserve billets, including commanding officer of Surface Division 1-2 (M) at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He retired from the Naval Reserve in 1977. Commander Morss is now employed as an engineering assurance engineer at Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. He lives in Westport, Massachusetts.