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“A Jl\- Cadillac ... a better reconnaissance plane than the F-4 was a fighter.” The words, understandably chauvinistic, are from the heart. The one-time RA-5 driver’s memories are in the present tense, as though he had just launched from the Constellation (CVA-64) on Yankee Station. A dozen years later, he can still vividly recall the maneuvers he used to sneak in under North Vietnamese radar. He would pop up with his cameras rolling, pull the Vigilante over in a half loop to reverse his direction, then head for the water and the safety of the ship. His thoughts and words are representative of those men who flew the only Mach 2 heavy attack reconnaissance aircraft to be deployed on board U. S. carriers. For the most part, the RA-5C Vigilante is remembered by those who flew it with a mixture of pride and satisfaction, seasoned with a little frustration and annoyance. The veterans agree that it took a long while for the RA-5 to be accepted and used in the way it was intended; lack of knowledge concerning its capabilities and limitations hindered it. But all that is over now. RVAH-7, the first operational Vigilante squadron, also became the last when it was decommissioned in October 1979. The Vigilante, or Viggie as it was known throughout the fleet, started life as the A3J. First flown in 1958, it w « a super-hot, super-sophisticated, twin-engine, twin-tailed nuclear bomber with futuristic navigational and bombing gear and an innovative linear bomb bay which ejected the weapon out the rear of the aircraft. The Navy was going into a partial eclipse in the mid-1950s as its shared role of nuclear delivery was given to the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command. While the Polaris submarine program gained momentum, the carrier Navy slipped easily into the role of roving peacekeeper, and its aircraft became less involved with strategic weapons delivery and more involved with strike warfare and fleet defense. A-5s had been in fleet squadrons little more than a year when the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis served to accelerate the transformation of the bomber into the RA-5 photo reconnaissance plane. The early 1960s were a difficult time for the Vigilante crews as they adjusted to the idiosyncrasies of their sleek aircraft. There were several fatalities— more, perhaps, than were normal for a new airplane. The plane, though not difficult to fly, required precise handling, and pilots were selected only from second-tour applicants. There were also occasionally people who could not meet the aircraft’s demands, such as a squadron executive officer who flunked carrier qualifications and was quietly removed. And there was a landing signal officer (LSO) who turned | in his wings because he did not want to fly the Vig' ilante. Hard landings were forbidden. The carrier approach procedure for the A-5/RA-5 was very exact ing, and the initial high stall speed of 195 knots ^ landing weight was eventually reduced to 140-D knots with the use of blown flaps, which smooth^ out the turbulance over the wing during the landing’ Deliveries of the first RA-5Cs—the A-5B having been a progressive development of the A-5A with inl^ proved engines, a 60% increase in gross weight, an extended range—were made in June 1963- By J11^ 1965, all remaining A-5s had been replaced in c squadrons by the reconnaissance variant. The esta lishment of several new squadrons brought the over all number of Vigilante units, including the trainin'^ squadron (RVAH-3) to ten. The RA-5C was a two-man aircraft, with the & attack navigator (RAN) riding behind the pilot in ^ own fully enclosed cockpit. The RAN operated 1 attack radar and photographic systems during 101 ^ sions, usually closing off his cockpit’s two sft[ windows in order to obscure any outside visual re ence. This was for both operational and physiologlC reasons; the sometimes violent evasive maneuver! t employed by experienced RA-5 pilots were condu to airsickness. During carrier approaches, the * could provide instrument readouts—airspeed. ^ titude and radio communications—since his v outside was so severely restricted. But the plane definitely a two-man system, and one veteran states that he could not think of any other aircra*^ which the naval flight officer (NFO) played such 3 role, indicating both the satisfaction and loyalty Vigilante engendered among its crews. t It was during the next several years, in Sout ^ Asia, that the RA-5C had its greatest period ofay ity, providing much of the Navy’s aerial recon ‘ ^ sance requirement. It began with mapping surveVs North and South Vietnam, including route for A-6 Intruder strikes into the industrial areas, involved with pre- and post-strike photography well. RVAH-5 was the first squadron to take the P ^ into action, operating from the deck of rhe Ranger (CVA-61) in September 1964. :p During these early periods, the flight crews £i> concern was for small arms, especially in South nam, where surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and lfy ceptors were yet to be deployed in any numbers- ^ RA-5s were usually flown clean, with no ^ stores, and relied on their speed for defense- u ever, as the focus of activity eventually moved 11 to the more industrialized staging areas, the ^ crews encountered heavier flak, SAMs, and inter j,e tor activity. One solution developed during |
| . . l T.iTlfi * |
64
Proceedings / Julie
P°st-bombing halt period in 1968 was known as the Photo-gaggle." The Vigilante would stand off as “ghts of flak suppressors (F-4s, A-4s, or A-7s) would ®fbit suspected areas of enemy defenses, enticing the 1 orth Vietnamese to fire and thereby reveal their po- Slt(ons. With the opposition thus diverted, the RA-5s w°uld dash into the area, gaining the required cover- aSe and getting out with a minimum of exposure.
throughout its operational career, the Vigilante Seemed plagued by its sophistication. The internal Sterns constantly gave trouble; the early inertial navigation systems created problems, especially in e A-5 version. Besides the regular serial-frame Caneras, KA-51 and KA-62, the KS-69A panoramic ^amera, was also used. The latter gave horizon-to- °rizon coverage, using an 18-inch lens at high al- ude and representing the best of its type avail- e- However, the sensitivity of the unit necessi- ^ated lengthy warming procedures, initiated six °ors prior to launch, so scheduling of the aircraft d to be adjusted accordingly. Electronic intelli- ^triCe sensors carried were also of great value, and the
with both tactics and sensors. An unusual example occurred in late 1965. In this early stage of the war, a great deal of attention was given to public affairs coverage, especially strike photos, in order to show exploding bombs to the folks back home. The RA-5s of RVAH-7 in the Enterprise (CVAN-65) were jury- rigged with 16-mm. movie cameras placed in the television bubble on the underside of the nose, forward of the cockpit canopy. The intent was to send the Vigilante in right behind the strike force to obtain bomb blast pictures. However, the cameras were unable to carry enough film to cover the strikes. In addition, there was no in-flight stabilization, so the crews came in for unfair criticism for not being able to do the job. Their frustration can be imagined; here was a multi-million dollar, highly advanced intelligence gathering system, and it was being asked to do things for which it had not been designed. There were calls for the planes to be sent back to the beach or even to the United States. The fault apparently lay not with the aircraft or its crews who operated their planes in some of the war’s most hostile
U. S. NAVY, COURTESY C. D. ROWLEY
hit:
ated
*re airplane became part of a system which oper-
^ ' *n specially designed spaces on board the carrier. cht°Wn aS IOIC (*ntegrated operational intelligence L er), it processed and analysed all data obtained
r rhe Vigilantes and other airborne units. Film
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The mockup version of the Vigilante had two vertical stabilizers, hut before the plane was put into production by North American Aviation, it was redesigned with a single tail. The first operational unit to receive Vigilantes, VAH-7, got its initial delivery of planes in June 1961.
th,
returning aircraft could be processed from land- print within ten minutes.
e Vietnam War was a time of experimenting
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3nment, but with the public affairs hype which attended the airplane throughout most of its 6arly career, and with the misunderstanding on the fart of those outside the Vigilante community. th^ar'°US moc^cat*ons were implemented to satisfy e RA-5C’s shortcomings. During the war in Vietnam, AH-i first
experimented with a modified infrared sner system, which provided night photography apability without visually exposing the aircraft to ground defenses. Previously strobe flasher pods had th^ Carr‘etP TP16 aircraft’s sluggish performance in carrier landing sequence was a major problem 0 ved with the addition of up-rated J79-GE-10 ngines which contributed needed power, particu- y close in. The lack of reserve power had made a Ve°ff a tricky operation at night and during bad 'Veather.
^ As one pilot put it, the RA-5C was a “great serial ^arne camera platform, providing state-of-the-art otography.” Obviously, the Vigilante was not the ^ y photographic plane available to the Navy, but it S only aircraft which could combine all the |lu*rements into a speedy, sophisticated package
*hich
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. , when it worked, had no equal in any other lce. The heavy employment of the Vigilante, es-
^ ally during the war’s final months, is indicated y the record of RVAH-13 on board the Enterprise. Its ^ anes flew three 200-hour months, logging 271.2 °Urs *n November 1972 and 200 sorties from Janu- Jp l973 to the cease-fire in March of that year. This nop0 was logged with the six-plane complement nornially carried by the RVAH squadrons, half of the Y. nial 12-14 plane inventories of other units. All S'lante squadrons made several Vietnam deploy- ^ except RVAH-3, the training squadron, and e father short-lived RVAH-14.
The plight of the Navy’s airborne reconnaissance community is borne out by the fact that there is no ready replacement for the RA-5C; the RF-8G Crusader is expected to carry on into the early 1980s, but it cannot go on indefinitely as the only dedicated tactical reconnaissance platform. The F-14 tactical airborne reconnaissance pod system is not expected to be operational until sometime in the early 1980s, whereas the RF-18 is not scheduled to join the fleet before 1983.
As usually happens in peacetime, support units take a back seat to the more visible fighter and attack squadrons. The feeling seems to be that if you don’t drop bombs or shoot guns, you’re not affordable. Virtually all senior commanders would agree that aerial reconnaissance is vital to the Navy mission. The desire to know what is on the other side of the hill has had major impact in every war. In fact, as Commander George Cornelius wrote in the July 1959 Proceedings'. ”... you must know where your target is, what it looks like, how to reach it, whether or not you hit it, and what shape it is in thereafter.” That was the raison d'etre for aerial reconnaissance by the not-to-be-forgotten RA-5.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The following people assisted in preparing this article: Rear Admiral Charles J. Youngblade, Rear Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, Rear Admiral C. C. Smith, Captain Cliff Thompson, Captain Frank Dunne, Commander C. D. Rowley, Lieutenant Commander Al Plunkett of CRAW-1; Commander Rosario Rausa, editor of Naval Aviation News, and Clark van Vleet and Mike Walker of the Naval Aviation History Office.
Th •
^ fe Viggie is gone now.
nt °f RVAH-7, an era has come to a close for the ^ V7- Of the 156 aircraft produced, two will be used fi ^r°und targets at China Lake; a third was recently
■ *0ty
With the disestablish-
Co,
faci]
n to Memphis as a static display, and the re- ln*rig survivors of Vietnam service will be ct>Oned at the huge Davis-Monthan outdoor storage
1I:y in Arizona.
Lieutenant Commander Mersky was commis- " “ sioned through Aviation Officer Candidate School
in 1968 and subsequently served as assistant public affairs officer for Commander Naval Reserve Training Command. After release from active duty, he has drilled with various Naval Reserve units in the Boston and Washington areas. Most recently, he served four and one half years as an air intelligence officer with VFP-306. He is currently attached to NOSIC 0166. As a civilian, he is a visual information specialist for the government and maintains an FAA commercial/instrument pilot rating on the weekends. He is a lifelong aviation enthusiast whose articles, photographs, and artwork have appeared in various American, British, and Japanese publications.
ngs/June 1980
67
The Vigilantes are gone now, hut these views of both attack and reconnaissance versions evoke memories of the years when they were an important part of attack carrier air wings.
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