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A Breach in the Ramparts
y Ensign Christopher A. Abel, U. S. Coast Guard
didn’t we react to the challenge "f those Soviet warships visiting avana in mid-1969? Perhaps it was
ecause we were distracted by Neil ^r>nstrong taking one small step for ® ttian at the precise moment when the fftet Navy was taking one giant leap °r Mother Russia.
rl St;
n 1962, the Soviet Union forced the United j,ates into a military showdown in the Caribbean. °r their efforts, the Soviets were rewarded with in-
^ national humiliation and a naval embarassment of e first order. Seven years later, the Soviet Navy turned to the Caribbean. This time, fully aware of dangers involved in challenging the United ates in its own back yard, pipped with t^ple-—and it
S,
*°viet
back a game plan worked. In
the Soviets came as subtle as it was a single decade, the
Navy progressed from having no Caribbean
Pre. sds
aii(] . . . . .
eXercise in the area without so much as raising
? Am,
'hat
Se°ce at all to the point at which its surface ves- submarines, and aircraft could routinely operate
erican eyebrow. The Soviet Navy has proven ,ts Caribbean game plan works, and accord-
'nS*y, the
">t0
United States can well expect to see it put
Th
Use again, perhaps in the very near future.
^ e strategy employed by the Soviets was a natu- f lv,|i °Ut8rowth of their 1962 Missile Crisis defeat, dearly demonstrated that their “big play” tac- ^ Were far too risky a gamble in the Caribbean. aC°rd>ngly, the Soviets reverted to a more subtle hr h’ one taking in the elements of gradual, s^rPoseful buildup (incrementalism) as well as Sfategic use 0f favorable opportunities when preopportunism). Inherently low-risk in nature, tfj stfategy seeks steady success in the long run at fjc^exPense of larger triumphs. Indeed, the most dif- c facet of the formula is the patience it requires.
Put simply, the plan calls for the setting of an initial precedent which is followed by desensitizing regional powers to that action’s significance. Once accomplished, another precedent is set and the process begins over again, slowly but steadily moving toward the ultimate attainment of Soviet policy goals. Of course, resistance to any precedent could seriously stall an already time-consuming process, so each step must represent a relatively small escalation, so as to appear as innocuous as possible. Similarly, since opposition is less likely to be encountered when the competition s attention is focused elsewhere, careful timing of each step is also essential. As a result, the Soviets have often been forced to bide their time, waiting until the time was right. When they have, they have met with spectacular success; when they have not, they have met with failure.
Perhaps the best example of opportunism in the Caribbean is the Soviet Navy’s initial entry into the region. Convinced that their timing must be flawless, the Soviet leadership seized upon mid-July 1969—when the world was preoccupied with Apollo 11, the space mission which placed the first men on the moon. Moreover, as luck would have it, two American destroyers had exercised in the Black Sea just a month before the American moon shot. Thus, should a furor have been raised over the notion of Soviet warships cruising in the Caribbean, the Soviets would be able to point out the recent American maneuver as justification for their own. In early July, then, the Soviets dispatched an eight-vessel squadron to the Caribbean, and as Neil Armstrong was making one small step for a man on the moon, the Soviet Navy was steaming into Havana to make one giant leap for Mother Russia.
The United States greeted this entry into what had once been the “American lake” by having Navy officials assure reporters that there was “nothing sinister” about the rival presence to the South. Yet the makeup of the squadron alone should have raised serious questions. To begin with, the force included
I V""”“
gs / July 1980
47
a cruiser, normally absent from Third World visits. The presence of two “Foxtrot”-class diesel attack submarines, a “November”-class nuclear-powered attack boat (which did not put into any ports), and a submarine tender hinted at the possibility of future submarine support operations in the region.
With this initial visit’s success, the Caribbean seemed wide open to Soviet naval exploitation. Moscow decision-makers therefore opted to jump right ahead to the next incremental step as soon as the time was right. The “right time” arrived in the spring of 1970. In late April and early May of that year, the Soviets scheduled the first global naval exercise ever conducted by their fleet, 0kean-70. The event was far from a secret, and the world was put on notice that Soviet naval vessels and aircraft would be engaged in unprecedented training operations during the exercise. On 18 April, two Tu-95D “Bear” naval reconnaissance aircraft flew directly from the Soviet Union to Cuba, marking the First time these long-range reconnaissance and missile-guidance aircraft had landed outside of the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, a squadron of Soviet vessels had broken off from the Okean exercises, proceeded to the Carib-
bean, and not only called at the Cuban ports 0 Havana and Cienfuegos but also conducted train"1!’ operations in the Caribbean before departing the region in June. Once again, a cruiser, two “Foxtrot class submarines, and a submarine tender were in h'c force for desensitization, and an “Echo-II” nucle^ powered guided missile submarine (SSGN) was add as the next incremental step. The “Echo” was ma ing the class’s first port call ever made at a nojt Russian port. Furthermore, unlike the initial Car bean visit, which the Soviets had announced as mere courtesy call, this latest series of stops . billed as being for the provisioning and repairing Soviet vessels. In other words, Okean included ^ open announcement that Cuba would be used for1. support of Soviet naval units in the course of thel operations.
Even as their plan was reaping its healthy marg of success, the Soviet leadership was already bet0111
ing convinced that strict adherence to its
time'.
consuming guidelines was far too cautious in viev^ 0 the American response (or lack thereof) to the 1 two visits. As a result, the decision was made to
leap
forward to the construction and operation of a Sov,e nuclear submarine support facility in Cuba. Instea
of waiting for an opportune time to make move, the Soviets charged right ahead, pressing too much too soon.
the"
for
The United States became aware that someth'[1]®
• rlv ^
out of the ordinary was going on in Cuba as ear j
mid-July 1970. Accordingly, American in
telligeflCe
iblern
analysts concentrated their attention on the pr° and by August were rewarded by having accum" proof that the Soviet Union was constructing facilities at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. Never less, American decision-makers chose to monit°f situation quietly while continuing to collect
Iateo
navd ■the'
criminating intelligence. By September, ho"e
id'
■d ^
yet another Soviet naval squadron had entere1 Caribbean, including a submarine tender, as marine rescue vessel, a tug, and an “Alligator 'c landing ship carrying two barges clearly identi
Cthe
as the kind used for the receipt of submarine nnc reactor effluent. With this force in CienfuegoSi
Soviet Union had all the tools necessary for the ^ port of its nuclear-powered submarines in a racing toward completion just a little more than miles away from the American coast. . . e(
This time, however, the United States was nelt ^ distracted by other events nor willing to dism'55 happenings as some kind of harmless curiosity- j stead, quiet diplomatic protests were first made- when they proved unsuccessful, the United made public the damning intelligence. Alm°st
48
Proceedings
/ juiy10
i
l
e
i
stantly, the American media seized upon the Caribbean goings-on, and references to the Missile Crisis 1962 abounded. The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Mendel Rivers, even Went so far as to urge military action against the base 'f that was what the Nixon administration deemed necessary.
b,
In Moscow, Soviet leaders found themselves in just tI'e kind of showdown that their plan was intended to avoid. They first denied any base construction and lamely backpedalled to an admission that it was e*ng built for the Cuban Navy—which was devoid submarines at the time. Meanwhile, the move- ^nts of the tender and tug in and out of various p0rts (including one layover in Kingston, Jamaica) ^fleeted indecision and confusion in the Soviet lerarchy as to just what should be done next. Fi- nal)y, in mid-November, the United States an- n°unced that it had reached an “understanding” with Soviets to prevent the servicing of Russian nu- ekar submarines in or out of Cuba. The Soviets had een challenged in the Caribbean for the first time smce 1962 and had come away losers.
/et, although Soviet decision-makers were clearly "'fling to concede the battle, the Caribbean “war’ VVas far from over. Within a month of the “underStanding’s” announcement, still another Soviet SflUadron visited the Caribbean to return to the old Sensitization theme and serve as a reminder that flflngs were back to business as usual for the Soviet Alavy jn region. In February 1971, with the visit of yet another Soviet squadron, a nuclear-powered “November”-class attack submarine was serviced at the Cienfuegos base. And while expressing its opinion that the visit was clearly intended to feel out the American position, the United States allowed the incident to go by without protest. By May, the Soviets were willing to test a little more. This time, an “Echo-II” SSGN was similarly serviced in Cuba, setting the precedent of a nuclear-powered, short-range missile-capable submarine using the Caribbean facility. American response was negligible.
The next two visits to the Caribbean (in October 1971 and January 1972) offered nothing new in the way of precedents and merely served to chip away at the task of desensitization. By May 1972, however, the opportunity to test American resolve once again appeared, when the United States was more than a little preoccupied with stemming the “Easter Offensive” in Vietnam. Furthermore, as added insurance, the Soviets could fall back on the fact that May 1972 was when President Richard M. Nixon was to make his unprecedented visit to Moscow, and American leaders were far more concerned with promoting U. S.-Soviet cooperation than they were with confrontation. Protected by these considerations, then, the Soviets quietly slipped a “Golf-II” conventionally-powered, nuclear ballistic missile-equipped submarine and tender into the Cuban port of Nipe for servicing. And once again, the United States let the precedent pass by without protest. In fact, the most that came from the U. S. Department of Defense was this announcement:
”... This looks like steady escalation. All that’s left now is for them to bring in a nuclear sub with ballistic missiles and they’ll be crowding the so- called ‘understanding’ between us . .
In other words, the Soviets had succeeded in backing the United States into accepting the narrowest possible definition of the 1970 accord. By resolutely sticking to their Caribbean strategy, they managed to make up for lost ground and even to take a few steps forward at the same time.
From that point on, the story of the Soviet Navy in the Caribbean became a tale of consistent gains made in small, systematic steps with U. S. acquiescence. In September 1972, Soviet “Bear-D” reconnaissance flights off the American East Coast began [2] II
ofSPe' where the
liance (WTR-615) as deck watch officer and ship's comm11 tion officer
nie}'
both to take off from and return to Cuban airfields. The United States expressed no concern, saying that only the movement of large numbers of such planes into Cuba on a permanent basis would be a problem. By 1973, there were 12 “Bear-D” flights to the island, and Soviet submarines had made their 22nd port call in Cuba, easily the largest number of visits to any foreign country. There was no American response. In April 1974, a “Golf’’-class ballistic missile submarine was put into Havana publicly. There was no official American reaction. By 1975, more than a dozen separate Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean had taken place, and more than 30 Soviet submarines had called at Cuban ports. Moreover, Cienfuegos was routinely being used by Soviet surface vessels and submarines, and a Soviet submarine rescue vessel was on constant call in Caribbean waters. The United States quietly acknowledged that “. . .The Russians are trying to build an elephant a little at a time.”[3][4] In 1976, the Soviet and Cuban Navies routinely exercised together. There was no American response. In 1977, Cuban-based “Bear-D” aircraft flew closer to the United States than ever before, flying over a U. S. naval task force off Charleston, South Carolina, and the new USS Spruance (DD-963) off Boston; and around Christmas, a Soviet four-vessel surface and submarine squadron patrolled casually off the Florida coast. No official American protest was raised. By 1978, reports of possible construction of a new Soviet naval base in Cuba merited only a few paragraphs on a back page of The New York Times.[5] In February and May of 1979, the Soviet Navy provided the Cubans with their first two submarines. The Pentagon calmly reassured reporters that the deliveries represented “no serious threat to U. S. interests.”[6][7] [8] [9]
The United States must realize that the drama to the south is a continuing phenomenon. For the time being, the Soviets have chosen to keep a low Caribbean profile as a result of the 1979 furor raised over their alleged “combat brigade” in Cuba. Yet, as in times past, American attention has been diverted to more pressing challenges elsewhere, and the issue of the Soviet military in the Caribbean has slipped considerably on the American security agenda. Consequently, the time is drawing near for the Soviets to make their next Caribbean move, and if they continue to stick to their game plan, they will be waiting for the next time the moment is just right..
That right moment could very well be during the Soviets’ next large-scale naval exercises. The Soviet Union is willing to press the limits of what is and is not “permissible” in U. S. eyes when placed under an exercise label. Indeed, 0kean-70 showed that striking precedents could be set in the Caribbean without cost; and although there were no spectacular Carib' bean precedents set as part of Okean-75, it nevertftf' less served to reinforce the notion in the minds ® American analysts that the exercises are relatively harmless. Now, with the next round of Soviet navd exercises overdue, those same analysts are natural expecting to see a number of massive and unpfece' dented undertakings included in the operation, se1' ting the stage for a major new stride to be made the Caribbean. That stride might turn out to be a massive antisubmarine warfare exercise in the regi°n’ daily reconnaissance flights off the American coast by Cuban-based “Bears,” or an amphibious landing °P' eration exercise in Cuba—or perhaps even the serv,c' ing of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine by a tender stationed in Cuba “for the duration of fbe exercise.” Only time will tell.
In any event, the possibilities are not bouo less—provided that the United States does not shru£ them off as they occur. Experience has shown thuf the Soviets do not want to force the Caribbean issue’ they will take only what the United States all°'vS them to have in the region. The burden of respOnSI bility for future Caribbean developments thus reStS squarely on the shoulders of American decisi°n makers. As Henry Kissinger has noted, “Soviet re straint, when achieved, resulted only from our f°fC ing of the issue and determined persistence."'’ son Baldwin has called the Soviet presence in c Caribbean “a breach in the American ramparts, will be up to the United States to ensure that tha breach does not widen . . . and that the ramPartS remain strong.
Ensign Abel is a 1979 graduate of the 0- Coast Guard Academy. While still a cadet’
he studied the subject of the Soviet Navy in ^ Caribbean. Since his graduation fr°n’ Academy, he has served on board the USCG
50
Proceedings / July 1
[1] into Cuba. Will 1980 exercises bring even more surprises in the Caribbean?
American attention was again riveted elsewhere in September 1979, just as the Soviet tug Fedotov towed the patrol boat Osa
’Benjamin Welles, “Soviet Submarine With Missiles Reported in 11 The New York Times, 5 May 1972, p. 4. j.
[4]“Soviet Press Sub Operations at Cuba," Aviation Week & Space 'e‘ ogy, 15 December 1975, p. 18. 7g
[5]“U. S. Denies Report of Soviet Base in Cuba," The New York Ti”ies' March 1978, p. 9. ^
[6]"U. S. Says Soviet has Added Submarine to Cuban Navy, f> ’r‘
York Times, II February 1979, p. 11.
3Henry Kissinger, The VC'htte House Years (Boston: Little, Brown,
excerpted in Time, 1 October 1979, p. 48.