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Th
e Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.
-'tutci
nar>t Colonel Thomas M. Johnson, U. S. Army, and Lieutenant Commander Raymond T. Barrett, U. S. Navy
"Let ,
an>Ur Petition be absolutely dear . . . :,intr!l'1^ any uutside force to gain regufj "J Persian Gulf region will be "f thj* aS Un assau^ on ‘he vital interest kin b nite^ States, and such an assault '"‘lua- ret>e^e‘L by any means necessary.
‘n^ Military force." (President C0 r s State of the Union Address to 8rtss' 23 January 1980)
Th
Ploy 1 a^Vant<--mcnt of the Rapid De- c0nyment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) a0cj ' nas generated much argument Thy ITlUt*1 fhat needs to be argued. rr>atitSUb^eCC 'nv°lves political, diplo- pyj^l. ' and military commitments.
the
Monies, and interests vital to
nittd States and much of the as ^.^1° ^orld and the Third World ingfui ’ ^ the debate is to be meanly ’ lc must be underpinned by an iatenrftanding R[2ITF- what it is
its t Ct t0 do, and also the cause for
To'"8'
ple^ c*e®r the way for a more com- sh0u] |*nderstanding of the RDJTF, we by,. examine the reasons the RDJTF
earnc-
of a rapid reaction force has been brought forward in different forms at different times, including a 1977 DoD study, but the recent events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia added the necessary impetus to bring the concept into a reality. The new RDJTF reinforces the U. S. commitment and ability to contest Soviet moves in the Third World arena by providing an in-being, four-service headquarters and specially trained and integrated units ready to deploy on short notice.
The discord in the Middle East provides the Soviets with the kind of opportunities that they seem to find attractive. The strain of various ideologies and governmental systems, the colonial boundaries that cross ethnic lines, and religious sectarianism are all causes of antagonism and disunity. The specter of Afghanistan is not so much that it is a move beyond traditional borders in peacetime, but
rather that the Soviets were able to accomplish the action with so little effort and were whiling to accept the costs. The question must be: “Where will the Soviets hit next?”
The RDJTF reflects the commitment to the region President Carter stated in defining the Persian Gulf as a vital U. S. interest and by implication to other areas of the world where vital U. S. interests lie. The RDJTF allows us to generate a security posture for the region that would deny Soviet opportunism while the region finds the political unity it needs to survive without outside assistance. If it is, indeed, control of oil that the Soviets are after, then it is as much in the region’s own interest as the West’s that the Soviets be countered; for if they threaten the world’s economies, they threaten the region’s freedom.
Thus, a new strategy which requires a moderate increase in the capability to surge forces to the Persian Gulf re-
necessary. In recent years, the CaPab'S h&Ve shown both an increased art-asllity to project power to distant
St
"'viy
and
a willingness to use this
tbtn ’ The Soviet Navy, under its
°r Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, is a
P()tyttXample of the growth of Soviet
arid c Trojection capabilities. Angola
th,. „ mmpia are examples of where So- ■
Vlets have recently used their capabilities. The rapid and
%
n,ass.
diifj e Tsupply of Egypt and Syria an ’■be 1973 Arab-Israeli War is air|jparnPlc of the Soviets’ use of their titj()n ^abilities. The Soviet compe-
*** u .
By as increased at an alarming rate. Sov- °f being postured to contest such
arided
I
•- 11 ^°t the traditional Third World
vlet
by • moves, the United States may
by,
'nviti
lng them. This realization hits
'ten |
rtyiij 10118 appreciated by the U. S.
11 tar
7- but our response has been ‘Wplementation. The concept
*
quir'n£
minimum application of force, ^ ^
ations where mid-intensity co be expected upon arrival in the five area. (C.
On 29 November 1979. the ^ tary of Defense directed the esta ^ ment of an RDJTF HeadquatuT
MacDill Air Force Base, near Florida. Major General P. X- ^^g- U. S. Marine Corps, a highly 1 rated combat veteran who led the
. vietm111
Marine Corps regiment in V1 was selected to command the R ( and received a promotion to lieu genera1. jng
The RDJTF consists of eX . e units, generally those not ou committed to European or Asia11 sions. From these existing units "
be drawn force packages <■" • - -
artieuli
size and structure depending 0 ,af
U. S. NAVY (G. BRUDER
gion was considered to be prudent. The primary objective would be to deter Soviet adventurism, but if deterrence failed, to have the capability to rapidly deploy the necessary U. S. combat forces. In any U. S./Soviet confrontation, the potential for conflict escalation is great. This is why deterrence is so important and why the RDJTF with a capability to back up our political commitment with military force is so important to deterrence.
Recognizing the current lack of sufficient in-place U. S. forces and the limited available airlift assets, an initial defense of the area would require U. S. air and naval forces to assist friendly host nations in performing a delaying and/or holding action until sufficient U. S. ground forces could be brought to bear. The RDJTF in effect becomes the first level of commitment and deterrence.
In October 1979, the Secretary of
Defense requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J(-S) establish a United States-based joint task force to plan, train, exercise, and be prepared to deploy and employ designated U. S. forces as directed to respond to contingencies threatening American interests anywhere in the world, but with initial emphasis on the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia regions.
If much in the RDJTF concept appears familiar, it is because this step into the future reflects where we have walked in the past. Traditionally, there have been two U. S. rapid deployment force concepts in effect for many years: a Marine Corps force moved and projected ashore by the Navy, and an Army force moved and supported by the Air Force. The United States sent Marines into Lebanon in 1958 and the 82nd Airborne went to the Dominican Republic in 1965 on short notice. Our country’s
military history is replete vVlC amples of the Air Force and N»vy ^ sponding to crisis situations a the globe with rapid deployment5■ What is new about the ^e?r(.ei Rapid Deployment Joint Task ^ which became a cog in the U. tary machinery in March of this y . is the concept of committing a tr ^g[Ce and exercised four-component^^ under a single command, spec* designated and maintained f°r ^ express purpose. The RDJTF lS ^ ^ signed to move by land, sea, an^ jn to any trouble spot in the "'or ^ order to secure the vital interest5 ^ the United States. The RDJtf ty provide this nation with the caF>* afy- for deploying force packages o ^ ing size and structure, allowing flexibility to respond to situ8^ ^ ranging from those requit>nb
ce, to 511
:ornbat 1
obi*
of vary*1
nature and location of the Paf' crisis. The forces which have
fO v
identified as RDJTF units afC . ^ ready to deploy on short notKe ^ crisis. While these forces are n° (,ji signed to the Commander, RRJ ’
rtspo t0basis, the JCS would, in ^ t0 actual contingencies, in unif. '^at'on with the services and the
necj
of
ceror specified commands con’ recommend that the Secretary f0tC ense direct that designated assigned to, or operate in ^>rt of, the RDJTF.
fcilck t0tal S‘Ze rhe RDJTF is de"
r upon the assigned mission. In June press conference at the -a ®°n> General Kelley responded
-yinquestion a^out RDJTF s s‘ze hy
There is not an upward number brnit on the Rapid Deployment ^ lrit Task Force. Just like NATO ^ ; We ^ave certain forces that are es‘gnated priority to the RDJTF.
an
**ent:
18
or
As
At,
you are aware, it includes three 0u-y divisions, a Marine amphibi- s force, a number of carrier battle
Since it is extremely difficult to predict the specific contingencies that may arise and under what conditions the RDJTF might be employed, the RDJTF Headquarters is currently developing force capability packages from which increments can be drawm in a "building-block” fashion to cover an entire gamut of contingencies. The amount of time that it would take to move elements of the RDJTF to a given spot would be dependent upon the size of the RDJTF package and the distances to be moved.
Defense analyses to date indicate that in a partial mobilization scenario, the RDJTF could deploy a combat brigade-size force by air to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region in less than a week, and an airborne division of 15,000 men could arrive in 12 to 15 days to reinforce the initial unit(s) in the battle area. A sea deployment to this region would take approximately 30 to 35 days to move an infantry division from the East Coast of the United States.
Since the Soviets stand poised w'ith several combat divisions near the borders of Iran, Turkey, and now Pakistan, and an additional airborne division that could quickly reinforce any attack into other parts of the Middle East, timing becomes absolutely essential for any RDJTF deployment. Thus, the ground combat forces of the RDJTF will stand ready to be airlifted to the scene. Their heavy equipment and supplies will be placed in storage aboard specially designed and easily unloaded roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, w'hich will be prepositioned near potential trouble spots. Two chartered RO/RO ships, along with three break-bulk cargo ships and two tankers, have already been loaded and are at a selected anchorage site to provide an in-theater logistical presence. On board are sufficient equipment, supplies, fuel, and water to support a Marine Amphibious Brigade of approximately 12,000 men, and ammunition to support U. S. Air Force and Army units. This strategy provides a timely projection of combat power against a sophisticated enemy by taking maximum advantage of the speed of airlift for the troops, small arms weapons, and tactical aircraft, w'hile
Headquarters would be the on-the- scene command element for operations. The headquarters includes all of the normal joint directorates and special staff sections that are necessary to accomplish the operational and administrative functions and to command and employ a four-component Joint Task Force.
The RDJTF also maintains a 19-man liaison office in the Pentagon under the directorship of Brigadier General Dale A. Vesser, U. S. Army, to assist in crisis action planning and to provide the necessary political/military coordination betw'een the RDJTF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the National Command Authorities.
The entire RDJTF organization is lean and, consequently, will require certain individual and unit augmentation to sustain it in the field. The individual augmentation required will provide additional capability for the intelligence section, the special staff sections, and the headquarters supply, vehicle maintenance, and food service. When deployed, the RDJTF will also require support by some unit augmentation. Specifically, eight U. S. Army detachments and an Air Force weather detachment are necessary to provide the required operational and administrative support and physical security. If sent to a remote area, like rhe Middle East, RDJTF units may have to carry nearly everything that they need to fight w'ith or live on. The communication support for the RDJTF when deployed will be provided both by the Joint Communication Support Element, also stationed at MacDill, and service augmentation as required.
Ps. and a number of Air Force cal fig]
baseline designated force
«. * ’ “‘IVJ Cl UU1J1L/L1 l/I illl » V/1VV
, lca^ fighter w’ings. That’s sort of
the
f°r those contingencies that re- i re a larger force, that will then
at- . i • • r . i t • ^
f af the direction of the Joint ^-hiefs ■ ” • •
^trimt
at force would be. There’s no
of Staff
the National
th;
l>rr|rnand Authority on how large
UfTcr limit to the RDJTF capabil
ty.”
F0
0^ r Purpose of command, the JCS,
m, ^arch 1980, established a per antnt -
RDJTF headquarters as a sepa-
^ate c l * ‘
..^ordinate element of the U. S.
lness Command at MacDill. The h[t j. headquarters will be responsi- ^ °r the peacetime planning and for tuning the designated forces in pil(*lr RnJTF role. In the event of dell C^ot into areas lacking adecjuate ■ command structures, the RDJTF
F
mendous cu*tUf^c time-
cept U. S. presence lest it imply
render of political independence
break in Arab/Islamic unity-
these nations fully grasp the
help [1] thre®1’
the United States must accept the
Chiefs
assigned to the Office of the Joint
jlitah
degrading the disadvantage of slow- moving the heavy equipment by sealift.
Since timing is obviously the centerpiece of the rapid deployment strategy, the United States is undertaking major airlift and sealift enhancement initiatives to assure that the RDJTF can move rapidly to its objective area. Included in these RDJTF airlift and sealift enhancement initiatives are:
► Increasing the present tanker fleet to add mid-air refueling capabilities to the Air Force C-5 and C-14I aircraft. A new KC-10 tanker aircraft is two to three times as effective as the current K.C-135 tanker.
► Developing a new large cargo CX aircraft. The CX will be capable of carrying heavy outsized equipment (including tanks) over intercontinental distances.
► Lengthening the Air Force C-141 “Starlifter" fuselage by 23 feet and providing inflight refueling capability to the existing C-141.
► Modifying the Air Force C-5 aircraft to increase its service life by approximately 30,000 flight hours.
► Constructing a fleet of specially designed maritime prepositioning ships that will carry the heavy equipment and supplies of three Marine brigades.
The activity at the new RDJTF Headquarters since the first of March has resembled an Indianapolis 500 pit stop. General Kelley reviewed the fervor at an 18 June news conference:
“We’ve done a lot since the first of March; in fact, sometimes I have ' to look around to see where my shirt-tail is and see if it’s catching up with me. As an example, in April, we conducted a major employment command post exercise at Fort Bragg. This was a very large exercise. It included all of the component elements of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and these came from all four services.
“In May, we conducted what people in the Pentagon tell me was the most extensive Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed crisis action exercise in recent history. We were the ones who did all of the planning, all the field planning, all of the field organization, and all of the activities to come up with a final plan, which was ultimately approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“In May, we conducted a very extensive communication exercise, using primarily airborne command and control, at MacDill. And again, this proved to be a very successful exercise, which has-led me to the conclusion that today we have the capability of deploying an advanced echelon, which is not only organized, it is now trained and it has the command and control facilities to make it operational.
‘In June, we conducted a major worldwide JCS-directed deployment exercise, which on paper we deployed the entire Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to the Middle East, and I may say again, while we had some difficulties, which we anticipated, that the results, in terms of the procedures and the way we have interfaced with all of the members and all of the units of the
RDJTF, were very encouraging- ^ The greatest need for a special
to develop plans and tailored ft>rce r u rhe Indian
tor such remote areas as tne *
Ocean littoral grew out of an apPr tre climatic, and terrain diversities in Third World region. Also, over ^ the United States had grown so what dependent on the mutuality defense efforts with NATO where ^ are heavily reliant upon host n ^ support. Rapid deployment deman high level of mobility assets or PreP^ sitioned equipment and forces >n of that high level of host nation port. In the Indian Ocean rCS ^ both are a problem. Many of d[2] 1*- tions of the region are reluctant t ^
SovM
threat and the value of their help U. S. capability to deny that ^ ^ faults of distance and non-presen We must be clever and find vva'S^e get around the defaults. The mar^t* prepositioned ships are an examP ^ one way to lower the demand on assets by localizing bulky and weI^/e items in place in the region’s seas- ^ must find many more similar 5 tions. For example, desert and 1111 tain warfare require special skiHs ‘ ^ training and even an adaptation1 . equipment. The RDJTF speciallZ staff is needed to tend the watch-
c the
There are many questions r°r near and long term that need de But each step that increases our c ^ bility will reinforce the deterrr ^ value of the RDJTF and make ir a* j more likely that it will never be uS After all, that is our ultimate g°a '
• fesentty
Colonel Johnson is an infantry officer P ( 0[
Staff. He is a frequent contributor to r11 periodicals and is the author of six books-
^BS: The Angle Rate Bombing System
y C°mniander C. N. Sapp, U. S. Navy
^ilit ^ov‘et Union expands its
app^ary inventory, it becomes more tl)e ,^nt that in any future conflict be c, battlefield commander will
'nto allenSe<l with the task of wading thrn'3 tar8et>rich environment and r3pi^jnat‘ng the enemy forces as
as possible while, at the same
term’ f^nimizing his own losses. In
tverv
airpower, this means that
fir(.J ^ornb dropped and every missile th; tat;
must have the greatest possible
ance of In
tnise
destroying its intended no organization is this
more valid than in the “first
‘n, Iasi- „
0ut U. S. Marine Corps.
bee(|nce 1973, the Marine Corps has
Pro
th,
“n record as requiring an im-
close
* A-4
air support capability in
Skyhawk and the AV-8 Harrier.
C\"8le Rate Bombing System ' has met or exceeded all of the
lne Corps’ stated requirements. ttyQARBS concept was born nearly
The
\ decades ago at the Naval ^alif nS (“enter (NWC), China Lake, Wa$ °/'n‘a- Exploratory development feas., e8un in 1965 with concept Uity being demonstrated in
tC ^ughes Aircraft Company and , c Ma
«eVei,
attin Marietta Corporation each
A-4M Skyhawk, known informally as Smart Hawk, is scheduled to begin in 1982, and the system is to be incorporated into the new AV-8B Harrier.
Built around the triad of “reliability, maintainability, and accuracy,” ARBS is more than a four-letter acronym. It is a Tv/laser dual-mode tracking unit coupled with a digital computer and a cockpit-mounted head-up display (HUD) unit.
The ARBS TV sensor is similar in principle to the electro-optical system used in the Walleye glide bomb but enjoys greater sensitivity to contrast. The TV image is presented through an IP936 Sonyscope unit mounted in the cockpit. A 7X magnification feature aids in target identification at extended ranges.
In addition to the TV unit, a laser spot sensor has been incorporated to allow the use of the system in cooperation with either a ground or an airborne laser designator. The simple push of a button on the throttle allows the pilot to switch rapidly between the laser and the TV modes. The laser spot tracker also enables the system to be operated at night.
The TV/laser tracking assembly is gimballed so that once lock-on has been achieved, tracking of the target is possible over a wide field of view. The system is then able to accurately
measure the target line-of-sight angle and that angle’s rate of change.
This information is fed into the computer where inputs from the AJB3 All Attitude Indicating System and the Air Data Computer are combined with the weapon’s ballistic data to provide a solution to the weapon delivery problem. Appropriate steering and release symbology is simultaneously displayed on the HUD to guide the pilot to the proper release point.
The reliability of the system was demonstrated by a 191-hour mean time between failures (MTBF), certified by the U. S. Navy during the formal reliability demonstration and more than 525 hours of operating accumulated during operational and technical evaluation (OpEval/TechEval) programs. During OpEval/TechEval only one failure was recorded. As of October, ARBS is still flying at NWC China Lake, has clocked more than 1,100 hours of operating time, and still enjoys an exceptional level of reliability.
Being located in the nose of the aircraft, the ARBS components are readily accessible to maintenance personnel. The built in test (BIT) and the fault isolation test (FIT) functions have been incorporated to assist in maintaining the system and reducing the requirements for flight-line test equipment.
The proof of the pudding comes in the accuracy of the system, the ability to consistently put the ordnance where the pilot wants it. In this area, ARBS has truly excelled.
From high-angle dives to level releases, both day and night, against targets moving and stationary, some often obscured by the latest camouflage and deception techniques, the Angle Rate Bombing System’s accu-
assumed management domestic (U. S. Navy/U. S. Marine Skyhawks as well.
Corps'
racy has consistently stayed well below ten mils, often exceeding the performance of the accepted light attack standard, the A-7E Corsair II. Small visual targets with very low optical contrast have been easily acquired and accurately tracked even under low ceilings and limited visibility conditions.
ARBS has proven to be equally as accurate delivering bombs, rockets, and gunfire and even has a superb air-to- air capability. Since the system actually locks on the target itself, it acts independently of target velocity, ambient wind, and target elevation. Because it requires no ranging information, the system is totally passive. Once locked on, the system “remembers” the target’s location and provides reattack steering information to guide the pilot back for a second pass.
ARBS weighs 128 pounds, is extremely compact, and has been fitted into a pod configuration for use on other aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom. And, since the system requires neither ranging information or inputs from an inertial measuring unit (IMU), the resulting simplicity and low cost have made this a prime candidate for use by our allies.
Another added feature is simp of operation. For a squadron ? mander concerned with bring10? , new pilot from the training com ^ up to peak combat efficiency 10 shortest possible time, ARBS is swer to his problem. ARBS has^^ for the inexperienced and me j bomber pilot what the Colt • for small cowboys—i.e., it has him competitive with the best.
Commander Sapp has served as Weap°n Manager at the Naval Air Rework Facility* ^ sacola, Florida, since July 1978. sponsible as program manager for T-28, ^
T-2B/C, T-39 and U-ll aircraft, *n 19' ;1||
responsibility 1 ^ ^ 4
The Impact of New Ship Construction on the Great Lakes
By Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Kennington, U. S. Army (Retired)
deep-water port, Burns Harbor capacity is in the 58,000-ton rang1^ The next giant to appear 1)0 (
scene was the Presque Isle, a 97 „
barge propelled by a nose-in's 152-foot tug, which came °lR 1973- This combination was also ^ by Litton and carries a 250-f°ot unloading boom forward of her
house. Her initial load of °re
tiy
A revolution in ship construction is taking place on the Great Lakes. In the past eight years, 11 American- owned and operated 1,000-foot bulk cargo vessels have entered service in the iron ore and coal carrying trades, and several more are under construction or on order. Construction of even larger vessels is under consideration.
Although large self-propelled ships have been common sights on the Great Lakes for many years, the size of ships was restricted to less than 800 feet because of the capacity of existing locks.
In 1969, after eight years of construction, the Poe Lock at Sault Sainte Marie, Michigan, opened. It is one of five locks at the Sault (four American and one Canadian) which permit ships to bypass the St. Mary’s Rapids en route from Lake Superior to the other Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence Seaway. It is 1,200 feet long, 110 feet wide, and 32 feet deep over the sills. Although two other locks, Davis and Sabin, are both 1,350 feet long between their inner gates, they are only 80 feet wide and 24 feet in depth. Therefore, the Poe Lock is the only one which can accommodate vessels up to 1,100 feet in length by 105 feet in beam. It is the immense size of the Poe Lock which has made possible the construction of the new breed of lake vessels.
The first 1,000-foot lake cargo vessel, the Steuart J. Curt, entered service in 1972. She was built at Litton Industries’ Erie Marine Yards, although her bow and stern sections were constructed at Pascagoula, Mississippi,
esse|
and joined together to form 3 ^
named Stubby. This odd-looking was then sailed to Erie, PennsyH ^ where she was disassembled, an bow and stern were fitted to the ^ ^ ing midsection. She is operate Bethlehem Steel to transport nesota ore to the company s D >s dollar steel mill located at ^n^Iilj^er
51,083 tons. Although apParc^t[S successful, similarly designed vt
'»ner
°ay, Wi '978,
ber
isconsin. On 26 Septem-
Dulu ^8,553 tons of Montana coal at
ci " c
that ’^iv'llchigan, a record cargo as of
rna<jee' Her immense capacity is
" P°ssible by her depth of 56 feet.
1 wo — 1
kes built
constructed at Ship Building. In 1979,
ing a’ u"c by American Ship Build- proci \ °ra*n’ and the Belle River, a 8e°n g Bay Shipbuilding, Stur-
loacj rthe Belle River took on a .lajrth;SuPeri<)r for delivery to St.
, ■ Michi
ha' date
de L
Ukes0 rnore were added to the Great K , Heet 'n 1978: the Lewis Wilson tar at Shipbuilding, and the ^e 'd- Stinson,
Bay Shipbuilding completed the Edwin H. Gott and Indiana Harbor. The Burns Harbor followed in 1980. American Shipbuilding put the Edgar B. Speer into the water in 1980.
With the exception of the Stewart J. Cort, which has a pilot house located forward, and the Presque Isle, which is tug propelled, these vessels' deck housings are motor driven and are located aft. They incorporate selfunloading capabilities by means of coordinating endless belts running beneath the cargo holds and transferring the material carried to shore-based equipment. This permits the use of smaller hatches than were used in the older vessels which depended on unloading by shore-based buckets. This innovation greatly expedites the operation. Unloading rates of up to 20,000 tons of ore per hour are quoted for these ships, although a rate of 10,000 tons per hour more closely approximates the norm.
The Canadians have not yet entered the monster ship contest, because their vessels are limited to the 730- feet overall lengths to transit the Saint Lawrence Seaway and the Welland Canal, between Lakes Erie and Ontario. H owever, Canadian maritime representatives have shown interest in conducting studies preliminary to construction of shipbuilding and maintenance facilities for maximum-sized vessels and canal enlargement necessary for their operation in Canadian waters.
The increased ship capacity produced by the new vessels will be extremely important to our industrial potential in the event of a national emergency. It has been stated that eight of these giant vessels can carry in one trip more than the total tonnage carried by 35 freighters during World War II, when most bulk carriers on the Great Lakes were less than 600 feet in length, and can do so at great savings in manpower and energy. H owever, it has taken one of these loaded vessels as long as two hours to transit the single supership lock at the
traffic until a ship reached the approach walls of the locks, where the assumed control of the vessel, telling her when she could come into a which one to use. Because of the narrow channels, sharp turns, and sWi „
in the St. Mary's, there were in the days of visual communications, aS
today, parts of the river where ships cannot meet and pass—i.e., the ships’ transits being coordinated by the lockmaster and Sault Contr1 In an age when the electron and the equipment allied with it reassuring to know there are simple, straightforward operations still m
By Captain Joseph H. Wubbold, U. S. Coast Guard,
Commander, U. S. Coast Guard Group, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan
gj by
Interest in vessel traffic control and separation schemes has been sharp -eS collisions in heavily traveled areas. Masters, pilots, and the shipping sllb- have not been universally enthusiastic about vessel traffic services, an ject has been discussed frequently, and with feeling, in the Proceeding^.lt There is, however, at least one vessel traffic service in the United ^ gtefr operates with the full cooperation of shipping companies, pilots, and 11tfie The Saint Mary’s River connects Lake Superior and Lake Huron, and thfl ^c-
Straits of Mackinac, Lake Michigan. Besides performing the "connecting tion, the Falls of Saint Mary’s also drop Lake Superior water the 21 feeC)t the to reach the lower lakes. To get around these falls, the United States Sault Locks, operated by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers; built one lock, which is now operated by Parks Canada. The U. S. l°c^ )()5
four, of which one, the Poe, is capable of handling vessels 1,000 feet t(iC
feet wide, and drawing 30 feet. However, since the controlling dePf jjyflf Great Lakes waterways system is 27 feet, at charted datum, the depth caP‘ the lock is not fully used. To manage shipping in the St. Mary’s Rivlf Control was established long before radio was used in merchant shipP,nf . tht
At first, lookout towers were built at critical turns and narrow plaCt <- u|r-
the
river. These towers were connected by primitive telephone systems where Sault Control is still located. As ships passed the lookouts, were passed to Sault Control, which maintained a plot of the ships ^strjcte<J. Visual signals were used to close segments of the river when weather rL
of
visibility, or when some casualty occurred. Sault Control maintained
c nJ
the
nce'
ollefS
in
on
1^
The minds and the reasoning power of masters, pilots, and the contr1 ^ watch in Sault Control are this system’s computers. No electronic c°mP any part in this system. Vessels are tracked by the reports of pilots an iS as they check in at the various checkpoints along the river. No Option- used to perform this function. The whole system is one of control by eX^[} traffic flows in both directions under the command of individual ^ .e S0&\ pilots, until it becomes necessary for Sault Control to intervene becauanJ exception to normality occurs. Thick fog can roll in quickly in the sP fall. When that happens, Sault Control can close all or part of the some or all vessels in the system to anchor, or have vessels check dow event that will trigger positive, no arguments control (control oft*1 _ g( tbe not of individual vessels as to headings to steer) is an accident in
locks, especially the Poe, which will make it necessary to change the ^ which ships are presented to the lockmaster, or to put some against
Sault. This can result in a dangerous bottleneck in the supply line. Because of the increasing numbers of saltwater freighters navigating the Great Lakes, it has been predicted that America’s inland sea, to include the Saint Lawrence Seaway, will reach its maximum traffic capacity about 1990. The vulnerability of the system of locks and canals to sabotage and missile attack emphasizes the need for construction of alternate routes and facilities of maximum size to ensure uninterrupted navigation between the ore and coal docks on Lake Superior and the Saint Lawrence River, and the steel mills of the Great Lakes. This lifeline to America’s industrial heartland must be maintained.
The economic effects of this revolution are far-reaching. Certainly, the ship operators and their industrial customers will benefit from reduced transportation costs. However, maritime union officials are expressing alarm at the decline in employment opportunities for their members, claiming that each supercarrier will replace seven normal-sized craft. Older vessels are being laid up or towed to the scrappers at an increased rate. Small, marginal harbors can expect to lose their maritime trade. Manitowoc, Wisconsin, for example, was the site of a shipyard which launched hulls for 70 years, including 28 fleet submarines in World War II. Because the winding river on which the plant was located could no longer accommodate modern vessels, the yard was shut down, and the operation moved to Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, where navigation is no problem.
Demands for canal and harbor deepening are to be expected at all active ports. A new ore dock at Two Harbors, Minnesota, has been completed. It will be capable of loading 150-foot-wide vessels. The Army Corps of Engineers has announced a $4. 1 million dollar study to determine the cost of permanent year-round navigation improvements, deepening of connecting channels to 32 feet, and a 1,500 foot by 150 foot lock at the Sault. The controlling depth in the system from Duluth to Montreal is now 27 feet.
For many years, iron ore could not be shipped efficiently in winter weather conditions because of its tendency to freeze and make cargo handling difficult. This problem was resolved by the development of taconite pellets, the form of ore cargo presently
,_Sault Control.
carried. With this innovation
the desire to lengthen the s *P ^ season from 8 months to 1 ' months in order to derive rna)tin^ [() usage of ships and equipment reduce traffic congestion. Exper"11
to 1
their
ction an"
tin1 •ol- reign' exi*tel
one
1 achie
„„tleve this end have been carried ^aVt t>tr ^ ^3St ten years' hovercraft CaPab'|ten teste<^ f°r their icebreaking P.„ 1 ‘t'fs, and the Canadian Coast
«ut
G
Pan
'Uard h •
- (nas several in operation. Pro-
®as explosions under the ice were
tried in the harbor at Muskegon, Michigan, and a system of air bubbles was used to retard ice formation in the Saint Mary’s River and in Duluth harbor. The U. S. Coast Guard experimented with having a cutter fol-
-uses Poe Lock.
>
Sv
>8h
, e ^lockage is being cleared.
‘nter, the St. Mary’s River is ice-clogged, and traffic is moved with % nCe 'tt'breakers. Vessels move in groups, with a breaker often taking y down, releasing the vessels from the convoy on reaching open water
stiff
tee, and turning around and bringing up a convoy through the
-gi/o^es and sharp turns of the lower river, staying with the convoy Uk. 5 locks, and on up through Whitefish Bay to the normally open water
iTj;, Verier.
f,it f.'s traffic
control and separation scheme works efficiently and safely, and has
,\in ^ years. The decisions for safe navigation of individual vessels always shoulders of the masters and pilots. At the same time, the manda- I t lc*pati°n feature of the system ensures that it is no halfway operation.
Ofj ^art °f the system that makes it work is mutual trust—i.e., the control- ,/slq^h knows that a particular vessel is where her skipper says she is, and g er’ *n turn, receives and obeys directives from Sault Control when one options occurs.
low an electric cable on the bottom of a narrow channel in zero visibility. Cutters have been fitted out with pipes to send air bubbles up on the hull to "grease” it with air.
The purpose is to keep the hull from sticking to the ice, when the icebreaker has pushed up on top. The bubbler also helps the cutter move through the thinner ice at greater speed—i.e., any fuel savings from this are offset by the fuel consumption of the prime mover for the bubbler pump. The prime mover, pump, and associated piping are contained in a detachable van on the fantail.
The Coast Guard has been extremely active in icebreaking activities on the Great Lakes, and has home ported the USCGC lVestuind (WAGB-281) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. She breaks Lake ice in the winter, and goes to the Arctic in the summer. The initial icebreaking tugs of the Coast Guard’s new Katmai Bay class have been assigned to operate on the Great Lakes. The result has been increased winter shipping in spite of extremely severe winters.
Construction of support vessels for the new generation of giant lakers began with the Reiss Marine’s entry into service at Duluth-Superior in 1978. She is a 150-foot bunkering tanker with a capacity of 350,000 gallons. Her hull has been strengthened for icebreaking. The need for this size vessel grew out of the fact that the supercarriers require 80,000 to 120,000 gallons of fuel at each servicing. In addition to sparking the construction of specialized support ships, the supercarriers have brought new business to shipyards’ repair facilities.
The past ten years have seen a great change in the profile of the Great Lakes cargo fleet. This change has generated much reaction both afloat and ashore, with much more to come. Despite the recent—and temporary—slowdown in the economy which has reduced ore traffic on the Lakes, the 1980s will witness vast expenditures of public and private funds to continue the revolution.
Colonel Kennington served in the U. S. Army for 25 years. He is now fully retired.
Future Antisubmarine Weapons
sociated ASW weapon sys
tems-
would appear that the AL'*1 . 0f
burden
system inaccuracies
3UlS‘
superior speed and target acqu capability. This kind of need e(y ognized by the Chief of Naval tions in his statement before 1 ^g5e power Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee in
By Thomas B. Buell
Soviet submarines are the principal threat to U. S. seapower. This fact does not need elaboration. What is of interest is the U. S. Navy’s response to that threat. Current thinking was reflected in the March 1980 Proceedings. a special ASW issue. Authors highlighted strategy, tactics, ships, aircraft, and their sensors. Antisubmarine weapons, however, were conspicuously absent, perhaps tacitly inferring that the battle was over once the enemy’s location was known: our present weapons presumably would then dispatch the enemy. Such assumptions, if they exist, are wishful thinking.
The competitive development between submarines and the weapons used against them was first accelerated during the Battle of the Atlantic and has been an endless process ever since. ASW weapons have in recent years evolved into torpedoes, nuclear depth charges, and mines. Nuclear depth charges will have a limited application, especially in terms of the will to use them. The effective use of mines is a complicated topic in itself, most recently examined in the Naval Institute’s 1980 Prize Essay.1 Consequently, this discussion will deal only with the torpedo, the sole ASW weapon upon which our nation must primarily depend in order to survive at sea against Soviet submarines.
Those torpedoes currently in the fleet are the lightweight Mark 46, launched from surface ships and aircraft, and the much larger submarine- launched Mark 48. Given the capabilities of the newer Soviet submarines, the chances of success using these two older torpedoes are diminishing.2 Consequently, the Navy is incrementally improving both torpedoes: Near-Term Improvement Program (NEARTIP) for the Mark 46, and Advanced Capability (ADCAP) for the Mark 48.
ADCAP will replace the present front-end electronics with new, compact components that reduce weight and volume and improve performance. NEARTIP provides better electronics for the torpedo’s guidance group (receiver and transmitter) and the control group (power unit, computer, and autopilot). Another addition is a two- speed controller to the fuel pump. As a result of these changes, the NEARTIP torpedo (designated the Mark 46 Mod 5) will be able to search deeper with greater sensitivity to acoustically smaller targets. Other improvements include a better capability against such antitorpedo countermeasures as noisemakers, frequency modulation sweeps, echo repeaters, and transponders.3
Despite these Mark 46 improvements, they are still “near term” as the program name implies, intended to help boost a torpedo more than 14 years old against submarines of its own generation. The Soviets meanwhile are designing and building submarines, from the keel up, for the future. With tough titanium hulls and imaginative damage-resistant construction features, these new submarines could well survive torpedo warhead explosions which would sink or at least disable older submarine classes. And with publicly reported Soviet submarine speeds of more than 40 knots, a torpedo must be swift indeed to close and kill such a submarine from afar.4 '
In an effort to respond to the Soviet threat, the U. S. Navy has begun a development program for an advanced lightweight torpedo (ALWT),. for use with surface ships and aircraft. This torpedo program will differ from earlier ones in a major respect: torpedoes heretofore were designed, developed, and tested by Navy laboratories and then manufactured by industry. The ALWT program breaks precedent: private contractors will develop the ALWT from scratch under the so-called “A-109” concept. This means that each contractor will have broad latitude to create his own unique torpedo in his own way so long as it conforms with the Navy’s operational requirements. Two competing contractor teams with contrasting designs have been chosen for the program’s advanced develop-
tric/Raytheon. Their prototype ^ pedoes will enter the water 111 early 1980s to begin an exhaustive^ and evaluation. An engineering ^ opment phase will follow 111 . n
1983, during which pre-pr° U^nj- models will be taken to sea forte ^
cal evaluations (TechEvals) and °P • t— i ^ produt
tional evaluations (OpEvalsg jn
tion ALWTs should enter the ee the mid-1980s. g to
The ALWT project is a challenS ^ systems engineering because rbe ^ pedo cannot be considered as a rate, independent entity. It rnUSt’.;1|ly example, be physically and elee compatible with the platfom1 je which it is intended. These >nCa(1() fixed-wing aircraft (P-3C and S-3 ^
helicopters (LAMPS III and ^jp gether with every class of ASW 'V f5e in the fleet, all with their Iaunchers, fire control systems, ^eSe zines, and handling systems. ^g(
ships and aircraft were designc ^ the Mark 46 torpedo, it foll°wS the ALWT must be similar m weight, and configuration t0 aJts) expensive ship alterations (Ship and ordnance alterations (OrdA The ALWT must be compar* e
•i its ^
tically and operationally wltn ]t muSt
-W *
shoulder a larger part of the bur< ^ destroying the enemy submarine the Mark 46. Soviet submar*neSo(ii. going faster and deeper (thereby plicating the fire control Pr° jr while becoming less susceptible r^aj| tection. Furthermore, the fleet^£tec- rely increasingly upon passive tion, with its concomitant range
certainties.
Consequently, the ALWT able to compensate for these * n
by itS:,;tioa
btt
Point
in We have reached the
I-).,,/’ said Admiral Thomas B.
age'Vartl. ‘‘where there is more lever- n,^. n lrnproving the weapon — n,0r;n« ‘r smarter, longer-legged, and inCapable of self direction—than thro>"n« t0 achieve equivalent results improvement of the launch
siZ(, <>V\’ fhen, within a hull similar in
Me
su
arid shape to the Mark 46, can we M ALWT “smarter,” as the CNO Pot(.rrtS|/ ^ne way *s with microcom
cers , .
U|traan<J microprocessors. These
tf'niature electronic circuits can
«ata
thei
n‘PUl;
at
ate enormous quantities of extremely high speeds, yet
ey r .
Wj^. Muire a relatively small volume
of
the
ALWT given the magnitude
°tm.
computations that they per-
t‘m
For
'Pat,
to cJisc
example, the sonar uses
riminate between legiti-
ciai a,lti false targets. They are cru- troj 45 *ell, for the guidance and con- brajnStction (G&C)—the torpedo’s to j G&C first sends the ALWT
0i()St Fr°per depth and then into its tett) ^ffcctive search speed and pat- tiro,. tarning with the sonar's signal Cac° h°r' lf ^e*Ps to separate the ft()rr) °ny of ocean sounds and noises hu|j |^e acoust‘c returns from the the 3 suhmarine. Having verified the Prt‘sen« of a hostile submarine, tat„ orders pursuit speed and fr ^osure.
/\S f-k
tatgttne torPcdo enters the water, the
the a ^'^ht turn tail and run, but
taf, ■ 1 will be fast enough to over-
it c l .
Win l octotnarine evasion maneuvers tfiarie matched by ALWT counter- Uvers, ajj <jjrectecj by ,-ne g&c's
Mro. .
ordtrcomputer. Finally, the G&C will tl'e ALWT to swoop in for the
kill, the warhead will rupture the submarine’s pressure hull, and progressive flooding will send the submarine to the bottom.”
Given relatively large CEPs*, the ALWT will have greater distances to overcome as it closes a fleeing target. In the words of the CNO, it will have to be “longer-legged.” This requirement translates into a combination of speed and endurance: speed considerably greater than the enemy submarine’s top speed, and endurance for an extended tail chase if the target is detected at the sonar’s outer limits. Two kinds of engines are under consideration, one using steam power and the other battery electrical power.
Battery systems are not a new concept, but battery designers are constantly developing new materials and methods to increase power and performance. Naval Underwater Systems Center Aluminum (NUSCAL) is an important example. Using aluminum and silver as a high-energy couple, together with potassium hydroxide as an electrolyte, this advanced design has many potential advantages over earlier batteries.
Steam torpedoes are not a new concept either, but the technology has radically changed: Stored Chemical Energy Propulsion System (SCEPS), developed under Navy sponsorship by the Applied Research Laboratory of Pennsylvania State University, combines molten lithium with sulfur hexaflouride vapor to generate intense
•Circular error probable, defined as a circle with radius centered at the target, within which half of the lightweight torpedoes statistically will enter the water when delivered by air.
heat within a boiler reactor. Water flashes into superheated steam to drive the engine, whose speed can be varied to conform to the tactical situation. As the propulsion system is self contained and independent of exterior pressure, its performance is unaffected by depth.
The CNO spoke also about the need for weapons to be “more capable of self direction.” This means that the torpedo must be able to do its job with little or no assistance from the launch platform. (Older torpedoes need outside help. The Mark 48 uses wire guidance, for example, and both the Mark 48 and the Mark 46 require such presets at initial search depth.) In the heat of future ASW combat, the attacking ship or aircraft could be so busy dodging hostile fire or cornering an elusive submarine that there would be scant time to think about fire control presets or external guidance. Neither does an ASW aircraft commander want to be unduly restricted on the courses, speeds, or altitudes he must fly in order to launch his torpedo. In a rapidly developing encounter, the submarine may be “in the crosshairs” only momentarily, and the weapons control officer, whether airborne or on the surface, wants to squeeze the trigger without delaying for further knob twiddling.
The ALWT—being a smart
torpedo—needs few, if any, fire control presets from the launch platform. Indeed, the only input it would really need would be range to the target if it had to swim a significant distance to get there, as in a tube launch. In that case, the ALWT could calculate how far it should sprint to close the target before slowing into a snake search. But if the torpedo could be delivered by air into the target’s general vicinity, fire control presets would be nice to have but not a necessity.
Nevertheless, as we learn more about the torpedo during its development, it is conceivable that certain presets could be advantageous just be-
ne*ef work
penditures associated with it l1‘lV
that Put
meaning if the weapons
not
are
‘Robert H. Smith,
Deferred.” United States Naval Institute ings (April 1980), pp. 26-33- . p 0lJ
2Morton O. Heinrich, "New Tricks l°r ^(). Torpedo.” Surface Warfare (April 1980)- 1 3Ibid., pp. 20-21. .ffecfi^'
4For a discussion of Mark 46 warhea c ^ jp
ness, see Banks Chamberlin, ‘‘The T,rP ,x . a Anti*uf , the World of Antisubmarine and .fUiti"’lJ
Warfare.” Armed Forces Journal
SI'
fore launch. As manual presets are susceptible to human error, a better way would be to establish a flow of digital communication between the launch platform’s fire control computer and the torpedo’s command- and-control computer. Such data as target characteristics and water conditions could be continuously transmitted to the torpedo until launch. This kind of fire control system does not now exist in the fleet, however, although those ships and aircraft with digital computers have the potential to be adapted to such a function through an OrdAlt. Ships and aircraft with older, analog fire control systems would be much more difficult to modify for a digital ALWT. Unfortunately, OrdAlts are rarely inexpensive. In any event, the ALWT will be more capable of self direction and can fend very well on its own if launched within range of a submarine target, so the introduction of the ALWT into the fleet need not depend upon the concurrent completion of any major OrdAlts.
What kind of accuracy will be required to get the ALWT close enough to the target to achieve a reasonable chance of success? Consider the situation from the air ASW view. Improvements in U. S. sonobuoys will be offset by the increased depth, speed, and quietness of Soviet submarines. Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) tactics have the potential to reduce CHPs, but there are many situations when MAD might be unable to provide target location. A very deep submarine may be beyond the outer limits of magnetic anomaly detection. In other cases, the mission commander may choose for tactical reasons to remain at higher altitudes, thereby reducing his MAD capability.
Why fly higher? Soviet submarines may one day be able to shoot missiles at ASW aircraft flying on the deck nearby, which would be compelling incentive for a high-altitude, longdistance weapon launch.Another reason to fly higher could be to maintain data link communication between a LAMPS helicopter and its mother ship. In still other cases, an aircraft near the end of its mission may have detected a submarine by sonobuoys and it might lack fuel for a prolonged MAD search.
The result is the same: an ALWT that can still find the submarine regardless.
The requirement, therefore, is for an ALWT that can tolerate these specified CEPs. One feature is to have an ALWT sonar so powerful and sophisticated that it can detect and acquire the target at ranges far beyond that of current torpedoes. A passive capability is also required to detect the target’s radiated noise. Multi-beams, generated by a sophisticated sonar beam- former, might provide wider coverage and better target resolution. If the target decides to run for it, there may be a very long tail chase. As discussed earlier, another ALWT feature needs to be extraordinary speed and endurance to close the gap. A fast, responsive, and long-legged propulsion system is therefore a vital and obvious requirement to cope with the larger CEP.
The situations described here imply a search plan using a circular or polygonal pattern at point of entry to achieve 360° coverage. Another kind of pattern is a snake (or directed) search. This is most commonly associated with a surface ship Mark 32 tube launch. The tube method might still be appropriate for a dogfight between destroyer and submarine when the ALWT is needed for close quarters. It might also be useful if the destroyer has a bearing-only passive contact and an ambiguous range. In this case, it might be profitable to launch the torpedo on a directed search down the target bearing. Still, when considering the long passive-detection ranges that can now be achieved, the tubes are fast becoming an anachronism. The ALWT should not be forced to expend its fuel swimming out to a remote target. An air delivery is obviously preferred, whether by rocket or aircraft.
Thus, we are led to consider future air delivery systems. Many possibilities are being examined, all dealing with the need to fight enemy submarines at long distances. ASROC ranges are certain to be increased, probably concurrently with the development of vertical launch systems. Meanwhile, the Navy is developing an ASW standoff weapon which will eventually replace SUBROC;. It would not make sense to use the Mark 46 because it would be approaching
f|ie
obsolescence by the late 1980s. s ALWT is a prime candidate as the system’s payload. nt,vV
The ALWT is the only entirely ^ torpedo now being planned ^ mid-1980s and beyond. It W'H t ^ only lightweight torpedo that match the capabilities of the Soviet submarines. It has to The consequence of the ALWT n°c^n, forming would be the relative jn ity of advanced Soviet submarin the presence of ASW air and slJ platforms—assuming non-nu ^ warfare. The appropriate Pr'orltfalT)l the ALWT development Pf0^ tj,e therefore, becomes self evident. f words of one analyst, “It goes ^ saying that ASW and all cno
" the
teeth into an engagement ' jn adequate or, if adequate, don t e >ig sufficient numbers to do the )° '
, . PtO<n'Se
'Mine Warfare- ^
(May 1980), p. 61. On Soviet sub^syi':
capabilities, see Gowri S. Sundaram.
The Key to Sea Control.” lnternati,ltia ^ ^jso
Review (Vol. 13, No. 3. 1980). P- 367’
Jean Labayle Couhat, Combat Fleets "i ‘ ^ pp
1980-81. Annapolis: Naval Institute PriS '
539. 545-546. . &
■’For a discussion of ALWT tapabil‘t11 . cs
i, rofl11
T. E. Douglass, ‘‘Advanced Torpedo ^g()). Development.” Surface Warfare (Apr'^
PP- 22-23-
^Chamberlin, p. 62. 3
7See William J. Ruhe, "Missiles New Game,” United States Naval Insttt ceedings (March 1980), pp. 72-75- ^Chamberlin, p. 62.
- „ S. rJi,v
Tom Buell, a graduate of the u^ $y5' Academy, is with the Honeywell D<-‘ L terns Division. He has written two ^ of
biographies—The Quiet Warrior: A Bi'k ^0f$d Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and ^aSt ^ )■ Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral King—and numerous Proceedings feature
l90°
Appraisal of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic
CUtenant Commander M. J. Fisher, Royal Navy
Th
rr,0re6 ^orth Atlantic Ocean covers the t^an ^ million square miles of A„iee;rths surface, yet the Supreme one Commander Atlantic has only ajSj rtla^ 8r°up of ships permanently ^ t0 ^lm ‘n peacetime. The N(av 8r°up of ships is the Standing a re ^orce Atlantic (StaNavForLant), in j a^e ar>d unique NATO squad-
ron
c°nsists of ships from eight nations, each ship retaining her
nati,
gether, and there was an “It will be alright on the night" attitude towards tactical cooperation. Standardized NATO procedures existed, but they were practiced infrequently. Inevitably, national procedures, which were evolving all the time, grew on and away from those of NATO. The emergence of the Soviets as a major maritime power changed all that. It became clear that a permanent group of ships was required to counter Soviet presence in the Atlantic and that group would be more effective politically if it was made up of ships from different nations. It also became clear that defense of the Atlantic was going to depend increasingly on greater international cooperation in war, and so much greater emphasis had to be placed on the use and improvement of common NATO procedures and tactics.
In February 1965, several navies began extended joint exercises which were called Matchmaker 1, 2, and 3. These lasted for periods of up to six months and were designed to determine whether international squadrons would work. The results were very encouraging. Consequently, the proposal to form a permanent NATO force was approved by the North Atlantic Council at a ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1967, and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic came into being at Portland, U.K., on 13 January 1968. There were only four ships then: the British frigate HMS
Brighton, the Dutch frigate HNLMS Holland, the Norwegian frigate HNOMS Narvik, and the American destroyer USS Holder. Soon, ships from Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Portugal became regular members of the force. The first ship from Belgium joined the force early this year.
Although the force is permanently in being, ships join and leave regularly, and the number of ships fluctuates between four and nine. Each ship spends about six months with the force and is fully prepared for NATO operations when she arrives for duty. This approach allows the force’s ships to concentrate on cooperation rather than basic training, and allows new ideas and advanced tactics to be tried and developed.
The force exists to fulfill four basic objectives which have remained unchanged since 1968.
► "Improve multi-national naval teamwork by providing continuous squadron experience and training:" The force most certainly achieves this objective since it always operates as a group and rarely does anything else but train for war. A cycle of operations covering a period of about three months would
•onal
characteristics and customs Com °Perating entirely under NATO anJ an^ an<^ using NATO procedures '''Ult80''”- ^ WaS r^e ^lrst Permanent in penat|onal naval force to operate (>Us . etlrne and has been in continu
b,
ut
al
l0ubt
e*a.
ati,
^Peration for 12 years. Without " has been a highly successful
of i
'on
nternational naval cooper-
to t^as WeH as a manifest statement
ns.
st'P What NATO wants?
fioi
'Vorld of the unity of NATO na- a changing world, however,
». . v‘
aNavForLant was formed as a di-
rect j. -----
SoVj esP°nse to the rapid expansion of llnjjj1 Seapower in the early 1960s. t'1en> the Atlantic had been a
'On
>„tern domain and
yvas
no Eastern na-
PoSe Powerful enough at sea to •^AT(jd t^lreat t0 Western shipping, foil,, nav*es were free, therefore, to Davaj nat*onal policies, and Western Pri0rCo°peration was given a low
ty- 1° theory, all NATO navies
%
be, for example, work-up, followed by a national exercise, straight into a major NATO exercise, and then moving on to independent operations with a NATO country providing the “services” (submarine opposition, target aircraft, etc.). There are harbor visits, of course, but the force spends more than 60% of the time at sea, and nearly all sea time is spent in weapon and tactical training. The danger of ships becoming stale while working with such singleness of purpose is mitigated by the sheer variety of operational scene. Periods set against fast patrol boats and coastal submarines in the fjords of Norway are balanced by carrier operations off the East Coast of the United States, or anti-SSN exercises off the coast of Portugal. As a result of this constant and varied practice, StaNavForLant is probably the most versatile and operationally ready group of warships in the world.
► "Demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance:” The force’s ships aim to achieve 'this by showing their flags in a single force in visits to about 30 ports a year in 10 countries. There are many differences among ships. Each navy maintains its uniforms, traditions, and personality and for good reason. Such obviously different nations working willingly and efficiently together demonstrate their common purpose to the outside world. Also the variety and color, friendly rivalry, and the intense esprit de corps are impressive and reinforce the purpose of the mission to the men serving in the force. An estimated 40,000 men have served in StaNavForLant since it was formed, and few have moved on unconvinced of the bond which unites navies of the Alliance.
► "Be capable of rapid deployment to a threatened area in times of crisis or tension:" This is the most difficult of all to achieve since the sheer size of the area for which the force is responsible imposes such a major limitation. Obviously, if ships are exercising on one side of the Atlantic and are suddenly required to deal with a problem on the other, the deployment is not going to be rapid. Fuel provision is another limitation. If no oiler is part of the force, fuel has to be secured on short notice either from ashore or by passing
tanker. This limitation hampers ships following a carefully planned program, and thus, could add significantly to deployment times in a crisis. Once the force does get to a trouble spot, however, it is a powerful deterrent not only from the physical capability of eight ships armed with modern weapons, but from the political and psychological effect on any aggressor of being confronted with the combined wills of all the nations of NATO encapsulated in one determined and well-trained force.
► "Provide the elements for the formation of a more powerful NATO naval force if required:" This is achieved in two ways: first, by taking part regularly in major NATO exercises where StaNavForLant either forms the nucleus of a task force or acts as an independent task group within a force; and second, by providing a constant training base for officers and enlisted personnel so that knowledge and experience of operating with large and complex international groups is absorbed and passed on by each of the NATO navies.
The four objectives are clear, straightforward, and appropriate, and within its limitations, StaNavForLant fulfills those objectives supremely well. How, then, can it be improved? One important requirement has already been mentioned: the need for a tanker to be assigned permanently to the force in order to reduce those mobility limitations. Another concerns the fighting capability of the force. Having deployed in a period of tension, ships must then have sufficient firepower and the right balance of weapons to give them the flexibility to deal with the unexpected. The force is well armed with modern weapons, but there are periods when a long-range antiair warfare (AAW) capability is lacking. This condition could drastically reduce the force’s chance of survival should the war turn hot. When ships with long-range AA missiles are part of the force, the increase in effectiveness is remarkable. Therefore, if the force is to realize its maximum potential and survive a hot war, every effort must be made to ensure that an AAW-capable ship is permanently assigned to the force.
The greatest improvement of all to
Id be t0
StaNavForLant, however, wou
have more squadrons. The Pr
cover
■sent
the
the
iles
an
single small squadron has whole of the North Atlantic chances of it being thousands °
° . 1 ifl
away from where it is require emergency are fairly high. Incre u, the size of the existing squadron ^ beyond eight ships would ma ^ force unwieldy, increase the Pr0 ^ of its administration, and make 1 ^
efficient. Curiously, groups w|C j [0 than one ship from each nation ^ work less efficiently and hapP1'^ g^.
to
so
those with just one each. So timum way to increase the aval ^ of StaNavForLant would be t0 ^ two or three separate squadrons.^ ^ operating in a different part or lantic. Since there is unre^,1Lilti' enthusiasm for the concept o ^|
national naval forces in NATO* nations agree that any future gration will demand their
labile
form
nunip
of StaNavForLants would seem - ^
strength, the increase in the
. log1'
cal and progressive step. N°
would be involved because
the
ship5
d f°r ^
and crews are already budgete tionally. Although the loss of a ship from national duties may ^ the resources of smaller navies. • »
of*'
dividual and corporate benefit 1 part of an international f°rce seem to be worth the strain 011 resources. e0cly
In practical terms, a perm*1 ^jps assigned oiler and AAW-capab e ^ are necessary to make the f°rc£T|jty, effective and give it greater ^eXljt,,nd' The expansion of the existing^ ^
(0e
ing Naval Force Atlantic is
won
>t>
Id
logical step in international nl‘* lfl- cooperation to counter a gre‘ pgsi'
creased and improved Soviet
i - - - stm1
tion. Such a move would dem°n je. to the world the reality of termination and willingness and fight together.
to
,a, N»v
A 1962 graduate of the Britannia pi
College, Dartmouth, England, ^,c ^ Jr Commander Fisher has served in cfUlof stroyers, and frigates in stations
all °ver,
„ r the
- ff O'
world. He joined the operational sC tyt
Standing Naval Force Atlantic m f 1978, and served as the Staff ASW Of 1 * November 1979.
19e°
Int,
“y r,
egrated Simulation____________ :___________
USSel Vorce and Chief Petty Officer Frank N. Griffith, U. S. Navy
The
concept of the “integrated,”
°r "embedded” simulator is new
pQ
'n8 all*1 ^aSt 3 ^eca^e’ people operat- p|aya nnanner of electronic data dis-
°n el an<^ Ptrl°rming functions based
sibiljtCtr°n*C ^ata ^ave Seen c*le Pos~
sim .>es °f using their machines for tyjth atl0n training when not occupied fer • Problems. The technology late(jntef’rate<f simulation, directly re- W^jch t0 automatic test equipment Cajj^ Uses simulated signals to test or bee„rat.e electronic equipment, has
0r8anic
not
with
us even longer.
■ nar r
f’toper ■
inte>arena with which to introduce ty0rpjr,ate^ simulation. In 1979, the mil- s first such device went into
TVy service-
l5G2|e S. Navy’s training device the fi n?W entering service on board On[y S a'rcraft carriers, has not itig ^a(ie strides forward in maintain- ttoj e slc'lls of carrier air traffic con- tie,^ enter (CATCC) teams, but also is tegr rating the possibilities of into,^ command, control, and etCjs^'Un‘cations (C3) simulation ex- 8anjcS *°r an entire combat team. Or- OicheSlrnulation's rapidly developing is u ln t^le military training universe 0lOst to its ability to provide the operreal'stic exercise on the actual irient.t'0nal system, while on deploy- S'thul ant^ away from conventional tant |'°n trainers and, most impor- peri0(j Ur‘n8 stand-down or dockside
at remained was to discover the
Historically, CATCC teams have participated with embarked air wing squadrons in an extensive workup period prior to deployment. This included using the team trainers at Fleet Combat Directional Systems Training Center Pacific and the Navy Air Traffic Control Center (NATCC) Memphis, fleet carrier qualifications, cyclic operations, and evaluation during operations readiness exercise and inspection (ORE/ORI) reviews. These periods provided ample opportunities for training and sharpening skills required to perform air control functions safely and expeditiously during an extended deployment.
In February 1977, the USS Ranger (CV-61) was chosen to be the evaluation platform for the “stand alone” capability required by the ATC environment. The installation of the new CATCC direct altitude identity readout (DAIR) radar was complete in March 1978. This system has almost totally divorced CATCC from the Navy tactical data system (NTDS) employed by the combat information centers on board ship. The DAIR system has not
only proven itself with a 100% equipment availability, but also has brought the fleet in step with shore- based counterparts, the radar air traffic control centers.
Having proved the viability of the DAIR, the Ranger was used for the test and evaluation of the 15G21 simulator used in conjunction with DAIR for the purpose of proficiency training of controllers. To accomplish this the simulator had to be able to create identical simulation of virtually everything that could happen in the highly complex and dynamic evolution of flight operations at sea.
The trainer, built by Gould Inc., Simulation Systems Division, is a compact system which interfaces with DAIR and the automatic carrier landing system (ACLS). The simulator inStudent air traffic controllers on board the Ranger practice skills during extended non-flying hours while on deployment. The 15G2I shipboard simulator makes limited certification possible at sea, in shorter time and with fewer training sessions ashore.
ate r°(ficiency
Erectly
levels of CATCC teams proportional to the er of air traffic control situations to the team on a regular aint ^nc^er current funding con- hlerjt ’ deluding reduced deploy- ati°ns0perati°ns schedules, these situ- §ua.S not occur often enough to
numb
h^Sented
bas,s
Stt;
avadeployed,
>tw
‘au
all
nch
and
^at hi
ier conditions is reduced.
lc<*ecl
i ■ Febr^ on board the Ranger began in r ^
1979. Reports indicate that vir‘^9|
all simulations presented were -n. in all respects and virtually in 1 ^ guishable from real-world open1 ^ Situations tested included not straight-in marshal and appr°‘lC ’ 0[ bolter/wave-off (aircraft which 0 ^ land on the first attempt) Patt ^ in-flight refueling, ship turns, ^ marshals, and section appt0^^ Launches and recoveries sim ^ ^
ally
teams certainly contributed to air wing capabilities.
0vera“
ifl-
The most marked efffoienC^vjc£ during evaluation of the
"Pilot" of four simulated aircraft directs his planes through keyboard inputs and communicates with student air traffic controllers in the Ranger's carrier air traffic control center. A similar keyboard on the 15G21 shipboard simulator allows instructors to change training problems, or create new ones as needed.
eludes built-in maintainability features which simplify service and repair. Its components take up very little space and can be set up in a matter of minutes. The typewriter-sized target control consoles (TCCs) can be operated anywhere within a radius of 30 feet from the central computer, and the problem control console— controlling problem parameters such as ship’s speed and course, wind direction and speed, and other weather factors—mounts within reach of the carrier control approach supervisor.
The computer permits operation in three modes: complete simulation, mixed traffic (actual and simulated aircraft together), or actual live control. During dockside or stand-down periods, the complete simulation mode is used to greatest advantage.
The 15G21 generates its own radar sweep, ship’s heading marker and final approach heading line, 24 simulated aircraft targets, and all other functions associated with the DAIR radar. The simulated targets appear on radar
scopes exactly as do real aircraft, showing Mode II IFF squawk (an electronic means of aircraft identification) altitude readouts and raw radar video. Targets are created on the TCC and stored and replayed using a built-in cassette-style recording system.
Four aircraft are flown by each TCC operator using keyboard inputs. In addition to complete manual control of each aircraft, features include automatic fix holding, fly-to and fly-from fix, and automatic internal approach (pilot navigating approach using aircraft systems). TCC operators are in two-way communication with controllers, and aircraft flight data are continuously displayed to operators on TCC readouts.
When operating a maximum 24 targets, additional targets may be introduced to the scenario to replace landed aircraft. Supervisors can change problem parameters such as ship factors, weather factors, and even IFF squawks during an exercise by using the problem control console.
The mixed simulation mode can be used to enlarge an actual launch or recovery operation, or to add complexity to an operation in which only a few aircraft are airborne, such as antisubmarine warfare exercises. A built-in feature in the mixed and live modes prevents the ACLS radar lock-on of a simulated aircraft unless purposely selected at the supervisor’s console.
Operational evaluation of the 15G21
creases
came in CATCC i^u^ dally after long non-flying P ^ ^
teamwork effort’ e P
when the ATC team and air wing
most prone to make mistakes- ^ logical to expect the same r^s
rford
similar functions in similar c,r
other shipboard teams Perl stances, such as air defense read
id
the combat information center- tigation is presently trying
to
InveS"
det£r'
■r/lC
mine if both air defense and air ^ ^ control radars can be simulan-^.^ the same, or a similar, I5G2 1 to
Further, the 15G21 has a capafc>‘llf'
well as
air-
simulate surface targets as w«> - ^ craft, also providing the oPP0ltUnls. to exercise anti-surface warfare ‘
It takes little imagination
to
visa-
able
alize an integrated trainer cap* exercising a ship’s total fighting fj{ bility and providing true ream^^t training to operators of various .
systems. If such a device shoul to pass, it will undoubtedly the organic simulator s 11 strength: stimulate operations } tronic systems realistically vvi11 c, stand-down or dockside environ01
Mr. Vorce works at Naval Personn- and Development Center, San Dieg0.
iel *esC'
CA-
-jR"
Chit-f Griffith is the air traffic control sop on board the USS Ranger (CV-61)-
,erv'!
isof
19
00
of t|,C
Commander Barrett, a 1965 graduate U. S. Naval Academy, is also assigned ct ^ Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff- He