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Technology, ASW, and the Coast Guard
By Lieutenant Commander Bruce B. Stubbs, U. S. Coast Guard, and Lieutenant Richard R. Kelly, U. S. Coast Guard
If the United States were to go to war today, the 12 Hamilton (WHEC-715)-class cutters—the largest and most modern Coast Guard combatants—would immediately be pressed into service with the Navy. Unfortunately, their value as modern antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships is doubtful. The rapid pace in weapon and sensor development has rendered this class cutter an anachronism in the current multi-threat environment.
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“uring both World Wars, the Coast Guard performed convoy escort and antisubmarine warfare patrol duties. As a result, ASW has remained a primary military readiness mission for the service. Title 14 of the U. S. Code directs the Coast Guard to “develop, establish, maintain and operate with due regard to the requirements of national defense” facilities for specialized “service in the Navy in times of war.” As such, the Coast Guard is not a reserve component of the armed forces. It is an active duty source of strength, ready to function immediately as part of the Navy.
In a high-intensity war against the Soviet Union the Navy would race to protect the sea lines of communication from the United States to Europe or to the Far East. The requirement for sealift to provide reinforcement is a certainty in a high-intensity war. In early 1978, Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., said that “. . . an estimated 1000 cargo ship transits of the Atlantic would be necessary in the first 30 days of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict.” The Air Force’s 77 C-5A aircraft can carry only two M-60 main battle tanks apiece. But more importantly, the Vietnam War showed the minor role airlift plays; more than 90% of the logistics went by sealift. Fast convoys to transport Marine Corps and Army divisions and war replenishment stocks are required.
To protect carrier battle groups and the military convoys and to prevent interdiction of the sea lines of communication, the Navy would conduct an extensive blue-water antisubmarine warfare mission against the Soviet threat. In addition, the Navy would also have to maintain a presence in the unengaged theaters. Though the actual numbers of vessels needed for a high-intensity conflict are presumably classified, Navy plans undoubtedly include use of the Coast Guard’s ASW-capable cutters. A Navy that has diminished from more than 900 ships 12 years ago to about half as many today cannot afford to do otherwise when the large Soviet threat is considered. Coast Guard cutters would go to war, because the Navy needs combatants and because the cutters are readily available. In fact, the needs of the Navy probably far exceed what the Coast Guard could provide. To believe that our cutters would operate in low-threat missions, such as escorting convoys carrying raw materials or other nonmilitary cargoes, is to misjudge the nature of the Soviet threat and the U. S. Navy’s plans for meeting that threat.
Unfortunately, Coast Guard cutters are no longer suited to operate in a high-threat environment. Aircraft, ships, and submarines no longer require visual means to launch main battery weapons. Standoff weapons such as television- and laser-guided “smart”
bombs, projectiles, and cruise missiles are today
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and tomorrow’s main threats; faint electronic signi may be the only indication of their presence. AS'1'' has also undergone a major transformation because
technology. The primary emphasis has shifted fr0tl1 surface ships to aircraft—P-3 patrol planes, ^ carrier-based jets, and SH-3, LAMPS I, and LAMPS 1,1 helicopters—and to nuclear-powered attack sub marines. Instead of active sonar, there is an increa5 ing tendency toward the use of passive technique*
which have greater detection capabilities. The laun1
ch
range of Soviet submarine weapons is often bey°n the limits of U. S. active sonar, making its us£
to
highly dangerous, because it might draw attention the ship using it. If the target is detected passively’ the first indication of an enemy missile launch shoul
come from an alert electronic warfare watchstandef- Assuming that a Soviet SS-N-7 missile travels at ® minimum speed of Mach .9, a surface ship wom have around three minutes to react between detectin'1 and impact.
Consequently, the Navy intends to prosecute the Soviet submarine threat using the LAMPS-ship tea111 and carrier- and land-based aircraft. The tactics afe predicated upon the extensive use of passive tech niques:
► SOSUS (an underwater sound surveillance system!’ long-range P-3 and S-3 patrols, ship-borne, hull mounted, passive-mode sonars; and towed passive arrays for initial detection
► Air-dropped passive sonobuoy patterns data linked to acoustic processors for classification of tbe platform and evaluation of the threat
► Passive plotting techniques and magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) for localization
To aid in localization, the Navy has issued HP'(’ programmable calculators to its LAMPS-capable ship5’ They are used to perform the complex passive pl°c ting computations, thus reducing the time facmf which is often crucial in ASW operations. While mittedly a stopgap measure until mini-compum'5 become widely available, this step is indicative of seriousness with which the Navy is pursuing pass'vt ASW. The final objective is to localize the threat at the greatest possible distance from the surface com batants. Because LAMPS (light airborne multipurp°SL system) helicopters and other aircraft are now 'l16 primary weapons of choice for ASW attack, eve" ASROC (antisubmarine rocket) has been relegated to 11 secondary role. “Over-the-side” shots are almost ** measure of desperation, indicative of the failure 0 localization attempts.
In this environment of diminished surface sh'P importance, the Coast Guard can contribute little'
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In World War II, Coast Guard cutters were able to score successes against U-boats in the North Atlantic. Unfortunately, even the most modem cutters have gotten so far behind technologically that in the next war they might he more of a liability than an asset in antisubmarine warfare.
"p * t^le new medium-endurance cutters (WMEC 270 shi 010115 c^ass) are in service, the Hamilton-class Cllttare only true combatants; the remaining \^TS are combat-support vessels. The Hamilton’s capability is based primarily on her hull- ]j . te<a sQS-38 sonar, which is active mode only and th lte^ *n ranf>e to approximately 12,000 yards. Al- det^^. eac^ chese cutters has a helicopter flight ■ 1 lc is not Navy-certified. There is no helo
So u’ nor 's r^ert associated equipment such as a Hay0 U°^ acoust‘c processor or TACAN (tactical air ’Sation system). Consequently, the ships cannot noi;USt^ w>rh LAMPS. Additionally, the Hamiltons do khaVC an standoff weapon capability; the
the-.
Pos Pro:
U. S. COAST GUARD
' 46 torpedoes can be launched only in over- S)de fashion. In short, the Hamilton-class cutters Sess none of the capabilities necessary for passively Routing a submarine contact.
Pe remaining combat systems of the class are fla- ntly obsolete. The antiair warfare and antiship •j,^Ss|le defense systems are of World War II vintage. ^ ere is no air-search radar capable of detecting low- Ving cruise missiles. There is no combat direction ter that can assimilate vast amounts of sensor in- arrriation and automatically assist in the selection of "capon to counter the threat. Instead, there is a hat information center (CIC) based on sound tj ered phone talkers. It is manpower intensive, k e delayed, and dependent on plexiglass display [p)ar^S an<^ plorrers. (The CICs in the Navy’s Garcia f . '*040], Knox [FF-1052], and Blakely [FF-1072]-class ‘Sates are very similar. However, they are physi- “y laid out for rapid data assimilation and
decision-making by the evaluator against all threats.) The Hamilton’s Mark 56 gun fire control system was designed for use against propeller-driven aircraft flying at less than 300 knots. A single, manually loaded 5-inch/38 gun, designed in the 1930s and capable of firing 17 rounds per minute, is the main battery. With an air-search radar that has a very poor low-flier capability and an outdated fire control system, a Hamilton-class cutter would not survive a single cruise missile attack.
The electronic warfare system of these ships is also restrictive. The only electronic surveillance measures equipment is the WLR-t, a passive device to detect emitters in A through I bands only. Coast Guard WLR-ls have no J-band capability, and bands A through D have no direction-finding capabilities. Consequently, the WLR-1 can detect the presence but not the bearing of some emitters. These cutters have no chaff dispensers (except 5-inch/38 chaff rounds) or infrared decoys for self-protection to confuse an incoming cruise missile. Moreover, the Coast Guard has no electronic warfare specialist (EW) rating, only cross-trained radarmen. The electronic warfare officer (EWO) is an ensign, not the warrant electronics material officer whose greater experience and knowledge make him more qualified to be EWO. The woefully limited capability of the Hamiltons indicates that the significance of electronic warfare is not fully understood in the Coast Guard.
On the other hand, far from being obsolete, the SQS-38 sonar may be extremely advantageous for some missions because of the excellent shallow water (200 meters or less) capability its operational characteristics yield. Defining the ASW possibilities in a major war is difficult at best. It would seem that Soviet submarines would want blue water in order to exploit thermal layers and have sea room. However, to operate in deep water expands their area of search and makes target detection correspondingly more difficult. Therefore, it may be tactically more beneficial for the Soviets to concentrate at choke points and the ends of sea-lanes rather than deploy over the whole ocean. Surprisingly, the motive for a shallow-water ASW capability may not necessarily come from this need to protect the sea-lane terminuses. For the Navy’s battle groups to launch aircraft against Soviet mainland targets, the aircraft carriers must steam in
shallow water for 98% of all targets (unless launching a one-way nuclear strike). The Navy’s active surface ASW capability is geared to blue-water operations; moreover, the Navy has not been able to mathematically model sound propagation in shallow water. The Coast Guard’s shallow-water capability may well make a valuable contribution to the Navy, despite the other antiquated sensors and weapons.
Even so, the antiquated sensors and weapons impose a severe handicap on operations. Without adequate means of self-protection, these cutters can
not function in the multi-threat environment- Hamilton-class cutter needs to be integrated into a larger force merely to survive, because she has l*111' ited survival capability on her own. Yet, if she lS integrated, the WHEC has a restricted ASW role be' cause of her sonar limitations. She may, in fact, be more of a liability to the Navy than an asset in some situations. It would seem unlikely that these cuttef* would operate with a carrier battle group compflsej of widely dispersed ships because of the Coast Gn^r ships’ limited self-protection capability and because they have had little operational training exposure t0 Navy battle group operations. More than likely, t*l£ Hamiltons would screen and escort fast convoys whefe their limited self-protection capability is not qult£ the handicap it would be with the battle groups’ mutual support would be available from other escofc ships. Possible specific convoy ASW roles would be t0 sanitize individual ships to detect close trails (snoopers) or to act as a pouncer in a close-in AS^ screen action. It is unlikely, though, that a Soviet submarine equipped with cruise missiles would sur
tj" tr ^tr tactical advantage by operating within ac- plojetect*on ranges without sufficient depth to ext ,lt: c^c thermal acoustic layer. Consequently, the V() ‘tal employment of WHECs in shallow-water con- °P6rations needs further investigation. NavY does not decide to use these cutters for clas ntrt art ot^et useful missions. The Hamilton- s s^ip does have some advantages. She is SPS w‘th an excellent surface-search radar, the tj (Raytheon Mariner’s Pathfinder) and an effec- adt ^<m8'range SPS-29 air-search radar. There are C()CR’.ate command and control facilities, and the cutt lnat'on diesels and gas turbines gives these |ars sPeed, endurance, and maneuverability. If the pr(^e d'ght deck is Navy certified, it will be able to ajj v‘de services to most Navy helicopters. Addition- f() ’ r^e dight deck provides extensive open spaces sibl ° P'88y-backing of vans and modules. One pos- C()n(>n-ASW role for the cutter in a major war is Parable to that performed by the Royal Navy in ttrsr d War II—combat search and rescue. The cut- SUrvVw()uld be included in convoys in order to rescue rri(.^1Vors of convoy ships sunk by submarines. A q dkely mission is operational deception, f^^dt'tational deception is a very important compo- Th ( t()day’s Navy strategic and tactical planning. ctea nee<^ t0 con^use fde enemy over intentions, to ^ te targeting misinformation, and to cover fleet Stements are vital and real concerns that are con- t^dy being addressed. The Hamilton's flight deck is cuttemeIy su‘tabR for specialized modules to prose- tq ■ e^ectfonic and acoustical warfare. Cutters so tny ^Pe<^ would mislead the enemy by radiating Var1Ssl0ns electronically and acoustically similar to the'°US cyPes Navy combatants. Conceivably, Cutters could screen dummy convoys. There are in ^ fusibilities for use, but all have the same end- discovered—destruction of the cutter. How- cjer> ^r°m an operational commander’s point of view, tjj Ptlon missions are an excellent choice, because Pr f draw the enemy from the more valuable assets. abl ■ 3 crew s point of view, though, being expend- ls not a welcome choice. q f next year, the first of a new class of Coast ( -d cutters will be operational. This is the Bear 2 HC-901)—also known as “Famous”—class of na|j'^0ot medium endurance cutters. The class nomi- f c°rrects the deficiencies of the Hamilton class by Co r°^UtmS state-of-the-art weapons, sensors, and ^j^rnand-and-control facilities. These combatants tc°me equipped with the Mark 92 gun fire con- Scasystem (which can track up to four targets while for others) and the 76-mm. Oto Melara ’ capable of firing 85 rounds per minute. Addi- | tional equipment will include the SLQ-32 Suite One (automatic passive electronic surveillance detection and identification equipment, super rapid blooming overboard chaff (SRBOC), and Navy tactical data system (NTDS) interface for its own computer system (COMDAC). The cutters will have active fin stabilization and will be LAMPS-compatible. There will be space and weight reserved for the Vulcan-Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS), Harpoon antiship missiles, and the SQR-I9 passive towed array (TAC- TAS). Thus the “Famous” class is potentially almost as capable as the new Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class, minus the Standard 1 surface-to-air missile, SPS-40 air-search radar, SQS-36 sonar, and speed advantage (the new WMEC will be limited to 19 knots). Three critical questions arise from the introduction of these new' cutters. Since they will have no organic sonar, ASW weapons, air-search radar, or CIWS for self-protection, the Coast Guard will rely on the concept of retro-fitting. The first critical question—w ill all this equipment be on the shelf gathering dust at some Coast Guard support center, peacefully awaiting some future war? Or is the Coast Guard trusting in the belief that there will be time for production lines to gear up to provide the equipment? Meanwhile, will the unequipped cutters be allowed to remain pierside w'hile the Navy fervently hunts elsew'here for combatants in a major war? A U. S.- Soviet war may provide minimal advance notice and be of short duration. Even if the weapons and sensors are in storage and being maintained (rather than gathering dust), there will be insufficient time for installation prior to deployment and then to train personnel in their use. The Coast Guard’s concept of retrofitting equipment is impractical in view of Soviet surge strategy. The second critical question is this: will the Coast Guard be able to dedicate the substantial amount of resource hours that are needed to maintain this complex vessel and the proficiency of her operators? If some vital equipment is kept in storage for contingency situations, how will the Coast Guard train and become proficient with the equipment? In the June 1979 issue of Surface Warfare, Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Jr., then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare), stated that a Spruance (DD- 963)-class destroyer’s crew requires 800% more training than the crew of a FRAM modernized World War II destroyer. It is not difficult to guess that the crew of the new 270-foot WMEC will also require much more training than a FRAM destroyer crew (a FRAM destroyer is somewhat similar as a weapons platform to a Hamilton-class cutter). Is the amount of training required compatible with the peacetime missions— |
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environmental protection, search and rescue, general law enforcement, and fisheries protection—which enjoy higher visibility within the Coast Guard?
The third critical question: will the Coast Guard make a total commitment to military readiness that the introduction of this technology requires? For instance, it is the potential of the passive towed tactical sonar that is so revolutionary for ASW and for its operational impact on the Coast Guard. No longer is submarine detection defined in thousands of yards but in tens of miles. A combatant with TACTAS operating against a noisy nuclear Soviet submarine is a priority threat to that submarine’s existence and therefore becomes a priority target also. Compounding the problem is the fact that a TACTAS vessel operates most effectively where there is a minimum of background noise; hence great separation distance from the main body is required. Consequently, mutual support is impaired. The timely availability of combat air patrol may be questionable, and the TACTAS vessel may be outside the antiair missile range capability of the task group. The 19-knot “Famous”-class cutter would be a liability with a battle group or fast convoy. Thus, this new class of combatant is mission limited. Conceivably the ships could be used in barrier patrols in places such as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap. Other potential barrier missions could be in protecting the amphibious objective area (if the U. S. Marines land in Norway, for instance), the Aleutian passes or the Valdez, Alaska, oil route. The prevention of very quiet Soviet diesel submarines from entering the North Atlantic via the English Channel is another example of their potential use. If not within range of a submerged-launch cruise missile, the 270-footer will probably be in range of a cruise missile launched by a “Backfire” bomber. The TACTAS ships, which will of necessity be operating semi-independently, will need a close-in weapon system to destroy the inbound cruise missile, whose presence is detected by the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. The need for self-protection is crucial for survival. Like the Hamilton class, the Bear class without self-protection becomes readily expendable. The new 270-foot cutters will not have the passive towed array or the LAMPS ASW helicopter system (including data link and stations for the various operators) until the late 1980s. At the outset, these ships will have no ASW capability. A flight deck alone is not sufficient to operate the LAMPS system.[1]
If the next war is one in which the Navy needs a the assets possible, and if the cutters are not tot a ) suitable for wartime missions, what are today choices for the Coast Guard? The first is to mainta,n the status quo and make no changes to the mil>tar^ readiness program that reflect the evolutionary deve opments of technology. In short, continue to bel>eVe that future wartime roles can be determined by trapolating from the historical duties of two Wars and projecting them into the future, essentia ' predicting more of the same. This method is 1 advised and misleading since it ignores the influeni:e of technology. ASW-capable cutters will quickly ? to war, however poorly equipped. Without a(4 realistic means of self-protection from tomorrow s (°r even today’s) threats, they will be expendable.
The second choice is to terminate the C°aSt Guard’s ASW military readiness program. If the C°aS Guard cannot make the commitment to mil'taf^ preparedness that today’s technology demands, the(1 the service is dangerously jeopardizing the lives of|tS crews in future conflict. These cutters cannot operaCf in the multi-threat environment without adequate self-protection. In the face of the Navy’s needs >° surface ships and the large Soviet submarine threat’ these cutters will not be idle. Unless the combat sys terns are totally removed, the very existence of these cutters dictates their use.
Other factors complicate this controversial choi^ Assuredly, the Navy would strongly object to ^ loss of these cutters, because the ships constitute Par of the resources planned for wartime use. Addition' ally, the loss of the ASW portion of the military tea iness program may seriously cripple this program aS whole. Though some would like to see a more civl ianized Coast Guard, a strong military readiness Pr° gram is the glue that keeps the Coast Guard intact' A weakened military readiness program makes Coast Guard very susceptible to dismernbermeIlt' OSHA, EPA, the Corps of Engineers, Customs, and NOAA covet many peacetime Coast Guard t°lS sions. A strong program would seem fundamental rt the Coast Guard’s continued existence. ,
The third choice is not to send the Coast Guar cutters directly to war, but to distribute their cre^’5, composed of many directly transferrable ratio? among Navy combatants to bring them to wartiol£ complement. The Coast Guardsmen constitute trained, disciplined, and experienced reservoir of Pe^ sonnel. As readiness exercises have demonstrated an General Accounting Office studies have pointed °ut’ the Navy has insufficient reserve personnel 1 mobilization. Unlike the reserves, active C°aS Guard personnel do not require mobilization; ^
y delay is travel time. Confederate General mo$ an ®edford Forrest’s dictum, “firstest with the cest> succinctly sums the need to quickly natjnter ^ov*et battle of the first salvo” tactics. The n needs to use its assets in the most meaningful jjj- ner Possible; either more ships or better manned q pS' Once there are sufficiently mobilized Coast in ar ^eservists, cutters could be manned and used ^on-Asw roles.
f/ e fourth choice is to marginally improve the Co 'll ^'c^ass cutters by making them LAMPS- acpatlble with the addition of TACAN and an ad* Stl<" Processor- Though still without any t'tat^Uate se^"Protect'on' the ships could at least op- LA^PS helicopters. Possibly, Navy ships com- rK, Cln^ fongthy overhauls could be cannibalized of stall Uose~ln weapon systems, which would be in- tj0^e on Coast Guard ASW-capable cutters for dura- tjj n the yard periods. With approximately 30% of chis S sur^ace ships in overhaul at any one time, the r°°* concept could conceivably benefit not only T^0aSt ^uar<^ but the Navy as well.
Hit 6 anc^ f‘naI choice is to make the total com- tec^ ent to ASW military readiness that today’s Ce^n°fogy demands. This means recognizing and ac- cal ^ tbe need to remain current with technologi- dea<^Vancements in sensors and weapons. It means tltl8 more Coast Guard resources to place the *tary readiness program on the same priority as tj0n ^‘Sh-value peacetime missions. This could be t[ine by installing weapons and sensors equivalent to th §01ng into the new “Famous” class: replacing j*'inch/38 with the 76-mm. Oto Melara gun, the the ^ gunfire control system with the Mark 92, StalJSP^~25> air-search radar with the SPS-40, and in- dit.'ng the SLQ-32, SRBOC, and infrared decoys. Ad- uCnally’ tbe Hamilton class should be made tfa- S'COrnPatible. This major first step has an at- $at^tlVe side benefit. Two classes of cutters with the Slle c°mbat systems would greatly simplify logistics j* °rt and personnel training requirements. f0astly, both classes need a close-in weapon system Caetense against antiship cruise missiles. A CIWS *0 u0t be considered a follow-on item to be installed 0f e event of hostilities; it must be considered part ae total package, not separate and distinct. Such the',Stem neec^s to be installed on these cutters for „elr basic survivability in the multi-threat environ- J11, ^ is not a question of funding for these im- ^ments but a question of the Coast Guard’s re- r e' Funding can be found for an improved Coast °Ut ^ m'htary readiness program. Actively pointing sh Potential of a properly equipped Coast Guard Ufo produce a favorable response during this time of the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force, the Iranian/Afghanistan crisis, and the suspension of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) ratification in the face of the massive Soviet arms buildup.
According to an unclassified 1978 study by the Naval Ocean System Center, the cost to improve each Hamilton-class cutter is only a few million dollars. Admittedly these costs do not include follow-on support or personnel training. However, when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown says “. . . destroyer and frigate levels remain two of our most serious naval weaknesses,” surely the case for the Coast Guard is much stronger. These cutters already exist; there are not years of delay for new construction. The quick addition of 12 capable combatants to the multipurpose surface force would definitely be most welcome at this time, especially in view of the low cost for DoD. This message needs conveying to the Secretary of Defense, the Navy, and to influential people such as Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. The funding can be made available.
The existence of these cutters with their combat systems is the Coast Guard’s ticket to war. If one accepts the premise that—regardless of their qualitative ASW value—the U. S. Navy will use Coast Guard cutters in an active combat role in harm’s way, then the Coast Guard must reequip and continue training for war. Introduction of the Bear class and upgrading the Hamilton class will require a commitment to the military readiness program that is unparalleled in the Coast Guard’s history. No longer does the Coast Guard have the luxury of being in the military readiness business for a nickel’s worth. Technology has changed that. Today, to be in for a nickel means in for a full dollar.
Lieutenant Commander Stubbs is a 1970 graduate of the U. S. Coast Guard Academy. He has served in the USCGC lVachusett (WHEC-44) and the USCGC Mellon (WHEC-7 17). While in the crew of the USS Badger (DE-1071), he qualified as a Navy surface warfare officer. He has been on the staff of the Thirteenth Coast Guard District and while there earned an MBA from the University of Washington in 1978. Lieutenant Commander Stubbs has been assigned to Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington since May of this year. He lives in Springfield, Virgina.
[1]See Rear Admiral Raymond N. Winkel, USN, and Dan Manningham, ‘‘LAMPS: The Ship System with Wings,” Proceedings, March 1980, pp. 114-r17.
Lieutenant Kelly is a 1976 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy. He has served in the USCGC Steadfast (WMEC-623) and the USS Harold E. Holt (FF-1074). He earned his Navy surface warfare officer designation in October 1979. He is now a student at Georgetown University Law School.