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Soviet Expansion and Control of the Sea-Lanes
By Mickey Edwards
Americans felt the pinch some years back when an Arab embargo cut down the flow of oil to U. S. shores. Consider how much greater the impact might be if the expanding Soviet Navy were to cut the sea-lanes which bring oil and many other vital resources to our shores.
FROM “THE BEAR AT THE BACK DOOR” COURTESY OF DESTINY PUBLISHERS
Soviet expansion is a growing threat to the unhindered use of the world’s sea-lanes, the vital threads by which nations are linked in a web of interdependence. Anything less than global access to the world’s waterways places the United States in serious jeopardy. Let us, then, consider specific examples of Soviet expansion and the likely consequences for the West if it goes unchecked.
Middle East: The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan compels us to recognize anew the centuries-old Russian desire for warm-water ports. With the southern border of Afghanistan 350 miles from the Arabian Sea, Soviet aircraft based in southern Afghanistan are now some 500 miles closer to the sea-lanes serving the Persian Gulf. At present, the Soviets are moving to upgrade the airports at Herat, Shindand, and Farah to the south into full-fledged advance air bases. In fact, Soviet aircraft are now closer to strategic points in the Persian Gulf than they would be if based in Tehran.
The ports at Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan and Chah Bahar in southeastern Iran beckon the Soviets enticingly. Naval bases in this area would provide ready access to the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, which lies at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. The strait is a vital “choke point” through which about 60% of the oil destined for Western Europe moves every day. About 77 ships a day (roughly one ship every 19 minutes) negotiate the narrow strait. Most of them are oil tankers. Since both the eastbound and westbound shipping channels are located in Oman’s territorial waters, this conservative, pro-Western country is responsible for guarding the increasingly vulnerable waterway. The Omani Navy numbers around 15 ships.
The Soviet Union could obtain a corridor to the Arabian Sea if political instability grows in the area adjacent to Afghanistan’s southern border. The key area is Baluchistan, a volatile and disputed territory which straddles southeastern Iran and southwestern Pakistan and whose inhabitants spill over into Afghanistan. Throughout the last decade, the Baluchis have tried to form a separate state that would be independent of both Iran and Pakistan. The separatist movement on the Iranian side has been picking up steam in recent months.
An independent Baluchistan would almost certainly need the support of an ally powerful enough to guarantee its security against Iran and Pakistan. In such an event, the Soviets could present themselves as a logical choice, possibly under the guise of a legitimate Afghan Government. The southern flank of a separate pro-Soviet Baluchistan would contain the port towns of Gwadar, Chah Bahar, Pasni, and
Warns that radical Afghan expatriates now living lri Iran are in a position to play the role of Soviet surrogates in the event of a civil war in Iran.
Eerhaps the situation would not be quite so omi- n°us if Afghanistan represented the only staging Point for Soviet aspirations in the Middle East. But, ln fact, the Soviet Union is resolutely involving itself ln countries all around the perimeter of the Persian Gulf. For example, there is evidence of a growing
Perhaps Karachi. As much as 700-800 miles of sea- coast would thus be included in the new state. Advanced air bases in southern Afghanistan coupled v'',th access to ports on the Arabian Sea would give !Le Soviets a double-fisted threat to Persian Gulf oil.
e Soviet Union would also possess greatly enhanced ability to neutralize U. S. naval forces in the area.
Considerations that make a drive for autonomy in aluchistan more likely are beginning to receive care- attention in Western intelligence circles. A guerilla organization among radical Baluchi nationalists as been forming for at least a year. In addition, * ere have been reports, so far unconfirmed, that the 0viets have been using Afghan intermediaries to s^Pply arms to Baluchis in Iran. To the extent that . e regime of President Babrak Karmal strengthens control over Afghanistan, it will be increasingly e to give attention to exploiting separatist move- rnents south of its border.
When we turn our attention west of Afghanistan, picture is just as bleak, for that way lies Iran. >thin weeks of the invasion, Soviet forces were concentrated in western Afghanistan, along the Ira- n‘an border. The strongholds of the anti-Soviet Af- ° an rebel tribesmen are located in the north and east> away from Iran. The air bases previously men- tlQned are within 100 miles of the Iranian border, an<J they are being rapidly expanded. Hundreds of tanks—perhaps as many as 3,000—have been reported in the region. Soviet troops there are supported y sophisticated weapons, including armored personal carriers, multiple-rocket launchers, self-propelled artdlery, and mobile antiaircraft guns. Clearly, °viet forces are in position and equipped for a thrust lnt0 Iran should Moscow give the word. The justification available to the Soviets is the same they used 0r Afghanistan—that political instability in a bor- cring country threatens the security of the U.S.S.R.
Even apart from a military strike against Iran, the 0v‘ets are now in a more favorable position than be- °rc to support subversion in both Iran and Pakistan ar*^ to hasten the destabilization of the progressively ragile Khomeini government. One analyst who ^amed of the possible invasion of Afghanistan last fall military presence in South Yemen, a completely Marxist, pro-Soviet country strategically located near the mouth of the Red Sea and bordering Oman. Intelligence reports have indicated that a number of Soviet surface warships and nuclear submarines have docked in South Yemen. In addition, Soviet destroyers, based in Yemen and outfitted with sophisticated electronic listening devices, have been prowling the Strait of Hormuz. East Germans virtually run the internal security system of the South Yemeni Government.
Furthermore, some analysts have assembled evidence to support the chilling contention that there are already three Cuban battalions in South Yemen. A possible role for these troops is indicated by intelligence reports that the Soviets have been shipping first-rate armored equipment to South Yemen— equipment that is much too sophisticated for their Arab clients: combat carriers, battle tanks, and antiaircraft vehicles. This is precisely the same kind of modern equipment the Soviets have introduced into Cuba. In the wake of the Afghanistan situation, we seem to have forgotten about that infamous Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, but this is equipment the Soviets have been training the Cubans to use.
A mobile armored force in South Yemen, manned by trained personnel, is well suited for a quick strike against Oman. The size of the Omani Army is such that it could not reasonably be expected to resist such an attack. Additionally, Oman has already been plagued with insurgency problems of its own. Chiefly with British help, the Sultan of Oman was able in 1974 to defeat guerrillas in Oman’s Dhofar province along the frontier it shares with South Yemen. These guerrillas were trained and armed in South Yemen and so indirectly supported by the Soviet Union. A renewed Dhofar insurgency, aided and supported by the South Yemenis, could set the stage for an attack by Cuban-manned armored divisions. Obviously, a Soviet or pro-Soviet presence in Oman would be an excellent staging point for more ambitious Russian projects in the area. One must bear in mind that many of the regimes in the Middle East are politically very fragile and vulnerable. The destabilization of the region around the Arabian peninsula could very well contribute to the destabilization of other moderate Arab governments, such as the one in Saudi Arabia.
That this is not mere speculation can be appreciated by taking a careful look at the attempted takeover of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia in November 1979. For understandable reasons, the Saudis have tried to put a calm face on the episode. But European intelligence sources state that 70 to 80
of the 500 attackers received training from both Cubans and Russians in South Yemen and that Yemenis participated in the assault. Units of the South Yemen Army, supported by Soviet bloc advisors, were mobilized along the Saudi and North Yemeni borders. Large stockpiles of Soviet arms were established just inside the border. A prominent British analyst has gone so far as to say that all this was part of a large-scale plan that was to involve similar uprisings in other Saudi cities.
Africa: The Soviets have also been busy on the African continent. They have established a presence in three strategically located countries: Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. In Ethiopia the Soviets are pushing toward completion of their base complex at the port of Massawa, just inside the mouth of the Red Sea and directly opposite Saudi Arabia. Combined with the Soviets’ base at Aden, the one at Massawa puts the U.S.S.R. a significant step closer to being the dominant naval power in the Red Sea area. Obviously, the ability to disturb the flow of maritime traffic in the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf goes with this achievement.
Mozambique possesses airfields capable of handling Soviet “Backfire” bombers equipped with antiship missiles. The same is true of Angola. The introduction of such aircraft into these countries would clearly upgrade the Soviets’ ability to interrupt or even stop the flow of shipping along the Cape of Good Hope route which hugs the coast of South Africa. The sea-lanes along this route have the third largest concentration of maritime traffic in the world and could very well move to second place in the early part of this decade.
As we view the growing encroachment of the Soviet Union on the sea-lanes stretching from Africa into the South Atlantic, it is disturbing to note that the United States has found its own potential reduced in this area. Despite the admirable goals of President Carter’s human rights emphasis, his program has brought about the termination of the long-standing U. S. naval mission to Brazil and a diminished enthusiasm for cooperation with the United States on the part of other Latin American nations. The U. S. Navy still participates in UNITAS exercises, but in the event of a threat to South Atlantic sea-lanes, we might well wish for more wholehearted support from South America than we are likely to get in the present political climate.
The Republic of South Africa is an enormous source of many minerals critically important to the industrial nations. Western European nations in particular depend almost totally on imports to meet their mineral requirements. Although the United States is in a better position than Europe, we nonetheless import 90% of our chrome ore, to cite a particularly vivid example. Chrome ore is an essential component in the production of several alloy steels and cannot be substituted for. Of the chrome ore imported by the United States, 38% comes from South Africa; the only significant alternative source is the Soviet Union.
The United States, Western Europe, and Japan will, in all probability, continue to rely on imports to meet their need for minerals and precious metals. But these countries face increasing problems in light of the reluctance of most mineral-producing nations to permit Western investment in their mineral resources. And there are few alternative sources. South Africa s liberal mining policy and enormous mineral potential place it in a position of unquestionable importance to the industrial nations as a source of strategic raw materials.
The Soviet Union at this time has two client Marxist states, Angola and Mozambique, which flank South Africa. These countries provide the Soviets with docking facilities for their naval vessels and airfields for their aircraft. They could also furnish the Soviets with platforms for encouraging guerrilla incursions into South Africa. Of course, the Soviets would take the precaution of camouflaging their own involvement and support of such “popular” liberation movements. With convenient and strategically important naval and air bases in Angola and Mozambique, the Soviets are thus in a position to isolate South Africa progressively by controlling, under appropriate conditions, the flow of shipping around the South African coast. In addition, it would be foolish to discount the possibility that the Soviet Union would participate in some form of direct intervention.
Such intervention would, no doubt, be prepared for and helped along by stepped-up terrorist activity in the area, leading to great civil unrest and the establishment of a Marxist, pro-Soviet regime. These events could then pave the way for an influx of Soviet technicians and military advisors, who would participate in and support a takeover of mine operations and processing plants. This analysis is familiar to and appreciated by Soviet strategic planners. They are perfectly aware of the advantages flowing from political instability in the Third World, especially as they relate to the availability of raw materials. In 1974, a Soviet analyst observed that “Africa holds a leading position in the world both in reserves and output of many kinds of raw materials. The deposits of some of
fhe minerals in Africa are unique . . . most of them c°ncentrated in Southern Africa.” Another Soviet strategist has argued that ”... trade in raw materials, particularly fuel ... is the epicenter of the crisis shocks and the weakest link in the system of capitalist international economic relations.”
The message should be clear: the Soviets themselves see economic interdependence as a weak link chat can be exploited to their advantage. Preparations must, of course, be made if they are to do this. But jTis is just the path they seem to be embarking upon.
0 the extent that the Soviets increase and expand their influence in Southern Africa, they will be in a Position either to deprive the West of strategic raw rriaterials or to make their acquisition dangerously ^Pensive and difficult. The Director of the Institute °r Energy Studies at the Rand Afrikaans University offers these sober words of warning:
“Soviet domination of Southern Africa would provide a strong impetus to efforts to revitalize existing producer organizations and to form new cartels under Soviet leadership. ... In other words, the Western nations must consider the possible elimination of South Africa as a major supplier of strategic minerals, not so much for its effect on costs, but for its effect on the security of their supplies.”
Caribbean: It used to be said, with great assurance and self-confidence, that this area was “an American lake.” But a close look at recent Soviet activity in Cuba disturbs such assurance. Obviously, the matter of the Soviet brigade is cause for serious concern. In addition, Cuba has been, for some time, the focus of Russian naval and air presence. MiG-23 “Flogger” fighters are now in place on the island. Much has been made of the fact that these aircraft are not outfitted to deliver nuclear warheads, and therefore they are there only for defensive purposes. The fact remains that these same planes can be quickly and simply modified to achieve nuclear capability.
Moreover, the Cubans are building an excellent deepwater port, capable of servicing nuclear-powered submarines, at Cienfuegos Bay. In recent months, there has been a continuation of secret Soviet activity at Cienfuegos. Thus far, it has been difficult to penetrate the secrecy and determine precisely the import of all this activity. In any case, a program of submarine transfers from the Soviet Union to Cuba continues. The submarines which the Soviets have supplied to Cuba are capable of operating not only in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, but also, to some extent, in the Atlantic Ocean. Soviet naval vessels have operated in the waters off Cuba and have stayed at anchor for as long as 60 days. In fact, the frequency of Soviet naval visits has reached the point that, as some analysts have put it, the Soviet Navy is now “. . .an increasingly normal and persistent feature in the Caribbean.” Soviet naval task forces almost always combine their visits to Cuba with training maneuvers with the Cuban Navy. Between July 1969 and May 1974, the Soviets undertook 20 deployments, involving at least 24 submarines, to Cuban ports. These deployments involved both
The carrier Kiev and her energetic sailors have given the Soviet Navy a substantial new capability for using sea-based aircraft.
diesel-powered and nuclear-powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. While the United States has fiddled with friendly gestures toward Fidel Castro, the Russians have been busy turning Cuba into the dominant military power in Latin America.
Cuba’s attractiveness to the Russians is twofold. First, it provides naval bases from which Cuban or Soviet warships can threaten the sea-lanes in and around the Caribbean. Second, a militarily well supplied and armed Cuba can provide, and in fact has provided, a staging area for the encouragement of political destabilization in other Latin American countries. To this end, Cuba has been honing sophisticated methods for assisting other Communist guerrilla groups in Central America, including the use of other countries as intermediaries in providing arms. An example of this strategy is the use of An-26 ‘‘Curl” medium transport to deliver military cargo to Costa Rica in the summer of 1979. The cargo was subsequently delivered to Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua. An assault aircraft with a range of 600 miles, this plane was made available to Cuba by the Soviet Union. Guatemala and El Salvador have also emerged as important target countries for Cuba.
Oil that is shipped from the West Coast of the United States passes through the Panama Canal and the Caribbean on its way to the eastern seaboard. On the southern periphery of the Caribbean Sea lies Venezuela, a major oil exporting country which uses the channels just east of Puerto Rico to send its oil to the United States. It is estimated that by 1985 approximately 50% of our total energy requirements in the form of imported petroleum will come through the Caribbean route.
The point is not that Cuba is becoming a major military power capable of seriously threatening U. S. territory. Rather, by a series of steps taken over a period of time, the Cubans are accumulating a military presence and capability that will, if allowed to increase, pose a significant threat to the shipping lanes in the waters off the southern and eastern shores of the United States. Even apart from the problems the Cubans could create for materials coming into this country, there would be the threat of interfering with our ability, in an emergency, to quickly resupply Western Europe by sea.
Asia: With the final withdrawal of U. S. personnel from South Vietnam, the Russians inherited the excellent port at Cam Ranh Bay, a key deep-water facility in the South China Sea. The port sits astride a major shipping route linking the Sea of Japan to the Indian Ocean. Submarine tenders are now emplaced at Cam Ranh Bay, and nuclear-powered attack submarines have begun to operate in the area- Japan’s vulnerability to Soviet naval power is thus increased. One student of Soviet naval capability in the Pacific theater stated bluntly: “The Soviet Navy has the ability to threaten Japan’s survival.” This assessment is underscored by the fact that Japan imports about 90% of its oil from the Middle East and is becoming progressively more dependent upon imports to meet its need for strategic minerals.
In a major naval exercise in April 1975, the Soviet Navy deployed four task forces around Japan. Two of these task forces were very pointedly deployed astride major Japanese trading routes. Understandably, the Japanese were disturbed. Two years later, the Soviets reinforced their point with maneuvers that sent warships into the Sea of Japan and reconnaissance aircraft down both sides of the Japanese islands. This show of strength comes at a time when the Soviet-Japanese dispute over four islands north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido remains unresolved. The importance of these islands comes into view when we note that:
► Soviet naval presence is growing there.
► They guard the important straits between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific.
► They contain an excellent, secluded anchorage site. The latter, at Hitokappu Bay, permits large naval groups to be formed in secrecy, in preparation for missions in the Pacific Ocean. Hitokappu Bay provided the staging area for the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor.
Conclusion: The only area in which the Soviets have received a major setback is the Mediterranean, where President Anwar Sadat threw them out of Egypt. Recent events in Yugoslavia, however, have required us to attend again to the prospect of Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean. If the death of Marshal Tito earlier this year should give rise to political turmoil in Yugoslavia, the Soviets might see intervention as a risk worth taking. Secure bases in the Mediterranean would enable the Soviets to remedy their current disadvantage in submarines there. It would also provide bases from which the Soviet aircraft could more effectively threaten shipping. If Yugoslavia were absorbed into the Soviet bloc, Moscow would achieve a “quantum increase in its Mediterranean naval strength.”
In an astonishingly short time—about two decades—the Soviet Union has built a formidable blue water navy. It is only logical that it should seek the means to use it, and this clearly means the establishment of forward bases to support missions and maneuvers. In the large-scale, worldwide Okean naval
exercise held in April 1975, the Soviets simultaneously deployed forces in the major ocean theaters. " addition, and of crucial importance, they
were
a le to provide air cover for these vessels by using airfields in their client states of Cuba, Guinea, omalia, and South Yemen.
In addition to a rapid buildup of warships, the oviets have achieved a parallel buildup of an “ancil- ary fleet” of merchant ships, fishing vessels, and °cean survey vessels. As is fairly well known, many 0 these ships bristle with electronic eavesdropping ecJuipment. Soviet merchant ships are fitted with special hatches which enable them to carry military ec]uipment, inciujing tanks, artillery, and nuclear rn,ssiles. In fact, Soviet military equipment used to ^ecure Russian expansion in Vietnam and Angola was ehvered to Haiphong and Luanda with the Russian merchant fleet.
Military power is clearly a prominent tool of "Vlet foreign policy. There is every reason to believe at *t will continue to be. And there is every indica- tl0n that the Soviet Navy will continue to be an im- ^°rtant element of Soviet military power. Admiral of t e Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, °mmander >n Chief of the Soviet Navy for more an 20 years, has stressed that the navy must be str°ng enough to “counter the oceanic strategy of "imperialism.” Properly interpreted, this means the
the present geographical and political configurations and alliances, to see new patterns emerging. To be surprised in today’s world of global interdependence, because we’ve failed realistically to take into account the geopolitical situation and what it portends, is to invite our own disaster.
Congressman Edwards was first elected to the House of Representatives from Oklahoma’s Fifth District in 1976. He received a journalism degree from the University of Oklahoma and a juris doctor degree from Oklahoma City University Law School. He has worked as assistant city editor of the Oklahoma City Times, as law professor at Oklahoma City University, and as editor of Private Practice magazine. He is author of the book Hazardous to Your Health, a case against national health insurance. In the 96th Congress, Edwards serves on the House Education and Labor Committee and on the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
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‘ty to deny Western forces control of or access to toajor sea-lanes.
Bibliography
Atlantic Council. Securing the Seas: Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.
Bagley, Worth H. "Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade.” Adelphi Paper No. 139. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1977.
Dismukes, Bradford, and McConnell, James. Soviet Naval Diplomacy. New York: Pergammon Press, 1979-
Harvey, Mose L. Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba: Implications of the Carter Solution for the USSR. Miami, Florida: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1979.
Hill-Norton, Lord. "World Shipping at Risk: The Looming Threat to the Lifelines.” Conflict Studies No. 111. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1979.
Luttwak, Edward. "Cubans in Arabia?” Commentary. December 1979,
pp. 62-66.
Moss, Robert. “What Russia Wants.” Neu’ Republic, 19 January 1980, pp. 23-25.
Phillips, James. “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan." Backgrounder No. 108. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 9 January 1980.
Rees, David. “The Gorshkov Strategy in the Far East.” Pacific Community, January 1978, pp. 143-155.
Stewart, Richard A., Captain, USMC. “Oman: The Next Crisis?" Proceedings, April 1980, pp. 97-102.
Van Rensburg, W.C.J. "Africa and Western Lifelines.” Strategic Review, Spring 1978, pp. 41-50.
Wh;
at can the United States do? In the first place, strengthening of our Navy must be a top priority ar,fl proceed with all possible speed. Second, our in- te *gence capability must be upgraded. Third, we r"Ust resolve to think in a truly global way. A good ess player knows how important it is to survey the e"tire board and size up quickly the full range of ^fves his opponent is capable of making. If he con- CerHrates on only one part of the board his narrow- "ess focus may well cost him the game. The world ls l*ke a chessboard, and we have to be able, given
the
Chief Antagonist
Ifc worst part of boot camp was the feeling of complete isolation. However, by the tenth week our company was a lowed to buy a radio. No group of men anywhere ever enjoyed anything more. Even when our chief warned us that we'd Se the set unless we passed the next general inspection, no one was particulary concerned. We had checked with ^•quarters and knew that he couldn’t take the radio from us.
^en came the inspection. Only when we failed it did we realize what the chief had up his sleeve. His order: “This 0lT1pany’s radio is filthy. Take it apart and scrub it!”
Joey Livingston