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For more than a generation, the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean has been built around aircraft carrier striking power. The fleet has been a deterrent shield in times of peace and has remained at the ready for the possible outbreak of war. Along with the rest of the U. S. Navy, the Sixth Fleet has dwindled in size during the past decade, and now it is down to one carrier battle group. Where does that leave the fleet in relation to the Soviets?
More than eight years ago, on the pages of the Proceedings, Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., provided an overview of the status of the Sixth Fleet.1 Now, with a new decade under way, it is time for another look.
U. S. Naval strength in the Mediterranean is spread thin and operating temporarily with only one carrier battle group, but overall the Sixth Fleet is of higher quality than it was at the beginning of the 1970s. We have begun to see some optimistic signs concerning age and capabilities of our ships in relation to those of the Soviets. For example, in 1979 the average age of Sixth Fleet surface combatants was about 10 years, while the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron’s surface combatants had an average age of about 12 years. The U. S. Navy all-nuclear-powered submarine force is a higher quality one with an average 1979 age of 9 years compared with about 13 years for the predominantly diesel Soviet submarine force. The 1970s began with the Soviets having the only tactical missile equipped submarines; the Sixth Fleet submarine force enters the 1980s armed with Harpoon missiles.
Force Structure: While numbers alone do not indicate unit or combined task force combat capability, the numerical comparison is the most used and abused method of attempting to measure the strength of navies.2
As can be seen from Table 1, the number of ships in both the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has tended to level off since the mid- 1970s. Averages of 45-50 Soviet ships and 35-45 Sixth Fleet ships have been maintained in the Mediterranean since about 1970. It is also clear from Table 1 that in times of major crisis, such as the 1970 Jordanian Crisis or 1973 Arab-Israeli War, both Soviet and Sixth Fleet forces can be significantly
‘“View From the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," February 1972, pp. 18-29.
2See Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, “The Naval Balance: Not Just Numbers Game,” Foreign Affairs, January 1977, pp. 339-354.
Enforced. The number of Soviet Navy ships did not upward in the late 1970s crises, but the mix of le Soviet fleet did change with larger and more ca- ^‘l^le ship types adding new challenges for the Sixth fleet. Table 2 shows the general mix of ships which the ®viets normally assigned in the Mediterranean in e 1970s. About half of the Soviet Mediterranean SUadron is composed of supply and auxiliary types. . ls means that the number of combatant type ships both the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet squadron is ^ out even. Nor does Table 2 tell the whole story of et capabilities. The tactical air power of Sixth Fleet Carfiers was far superior to anything the Soviets had ln the 1970s. On the other hand, an example of the ^*°re sophisticated and capable Soviet Navy was ero°nstrated in the Mediterranean in March 1979- | At that time, several Soviet Navy firsts included the maiden deployment of the carrier Minsk; first dual carrier task group operations (Kiev and Minsk); maiden deployment of the “Kara”-class guided missile cruiser Tashkent; and the first chance to see major use of the large supply ship Berezina for alongside underway replenishment operations. The large amphibious landing ship Ivan Rogov completed the March 1979 parade of growing Soviet open ocean capabilities. In 1979-1980, we have temporarily deployed Sixth Fleet forces to the Indian Ocean to augment the Seventh Fleet and Middle East Force ships there. This has been done without major problems and is a tribute to the dedicated people in the U. S. fleet and their families. The Sixth Fleet has continued to meet its peacetime commitments, but it is obvious that |
jl °c©edingrs / September 1980 | 53 |
Table 1 Number of Sixth Fleet and Soviet Navy Ships in the Mediterranean Area, 1969-1979
The Sixth Fleet's drop from 40 to 35 ships in 1978 reflects the withdrawal of a squadron of four Asheville-class patrol gunboats and their mother (LST) ship. After the Soviet Navy lost naval facilities access in Egypt (1976), its number of ships went down slightly. The numbers in this table are annual averages.
Table 2 U. S. Sixth Fleet and Soviet Mediterranean Squadron Normal Forces Assigned in 1970s
SIXTHFLT | TYPE(s) | S0VMEDFLT |
2 | Carriers (CV/CVN/CVHG/CHG) | 0-1 |
3-4 | Cruisers (CG/CGN/CL) | 1-3 |
10-12* | Destroyer/Frigate (DDG/DD/FF/FFG/FFL) | 8-10 |
15-18 | Surface Combatants | 9-14 |
4-5 | Submarines (SS/SSN/SSG/SSGN) | 8-12 |
5 | Amphibious (LPH/LSD/LPD/LST) | 1-2 |
24-28 | Totals of Above Ships | 18-28 |
9-10** | Auxiliary (AO/AE/AOR/AOE/AS/AD) | 15-20 |
0 | Minesweeper | 1-2 |
0 | Misc., Survey, Research, Intelligence Collection | 3-5 |
33-38 | Grand Total | 37-55 |
*In 1979, two Sixth Fleet destroyer/frigate ships were deployed to augment the MidEast Force. See Harold Brown, DoD Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981, p. 172.
••Figures include Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (MSC).
Note: Sixth Fleet forces also included 1.5 land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft squadrons.
the U. S. Navy now has less flexibility than it did eight years ago in augmenting deployed fleets without adversely affecting the ships’ long-term maintenance and the stability of fleet deployment cycles. For example, in 1972 the active Navy Fleet comprised 197 guided missile destroyers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts. The current total for comparable destroyer/frigate types is 151.
Numbers of ships is one area in which allied navies are most important to the Sixth Fleet. There has been a great deal of combined training during the past ten years. For example, in the NATO exercise Dawn Patrol 79, (12-24 May 1979), there were eight nations with 85 allied ships participating. Of that number, 68% of the ships were non-U. S. Of the three carrier battle groups in the exercise, one was French, led by the Clemenceau. France and Greece, although not part of the integrated NATO military command, joined in some of the exercise along with forces from Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This type of maritime cooperation is the rule, not the exception, with allied navies in the Mediterranean.
During the 1970s, several of our allies took actions which have enhanced the conventional naval posture in the Mediterranean. France moved its major surface combatants from the Atlantic to Toulon in 1975 and is pursuing an important force modernization program. The Royal Navy, despite the final withdrawal from Malta on 31 March 1979 and the final Mediterranean deployment of the carrier Ark Royal in 1978, has continued to make periodic Mediterranean deployments. For example, in May 1979, a ten-ship Royal Navy Task Force, commanded by Flag Officer, 2nd Flotilla embarked in HMS Norfolk, took part in Dawn Patrol 79. In January 1980, six Royal Navy ships—three guided missile frigates, an amphibious assault ship (LPD), and two logistic support ships—deployed to the Mediterranean to augment other Western forces.
Last year, the Italian Navy and the Sixth Fleet conducted a major exercise called National Week- Sardinia 79 (26 February-5 March 1979). Half of the ships participating were from the Italian Navy. The well-known Italian San Marco Tactical Group (Marines) landed alongside the U. S. Marines in the amphibious landing phase of the exercise.
State of Modernization: A summary of the major new classes of ships, aircraft, and other weapon systems introduced to the Mediterranean in the 1970s by the U. S. and Soviet navies is shown in Table 3- One important aspect of the U. S. Navy’s modernization during the 1970s was the increase in the
U. S.
(b Asheville (PG-84)**
(1970)
u>Knox (FF-1052)
(1971)
(3) N>mitz (CVN-68)
(1976)
' California (CGN-36)
, (1976)
0) Los Angeles (SSN-688) (1977)
'b) SPruance (DD-963)
, (1978)
1 Vtrginia (CGN-38) fR (1979)
1 0l,ver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) (1980)
(1) A-7E
Harpoon SSM (1977) Standard SM-2 (1979)
Table 3 New Combatant Ships, Aircraft and Weapon Systems deployed to the Mediterranean, 1970-1980*
USSR
SHIPS
(Year first deployed)
(1) “Kresta IF' (CG)
(1971)
(2) “Grisha” (FFL)
(1971)
(3) "Krivak” (FFG)
(1972)
(4) “Victor” (SSN)
(1972)
(5) “Nanuchka” (PGG)
(1973)
(6) “Kara” (CG)
(1973)
(7) “Tango” SS
(1975)
(8) “Kiev” (CVHG)
(1976)
AIRCRAFT
Corsair II (1971) (1) “Backfire” Bomber
, (1975)***
[ ) F-14A Tomcat (1975) (2) YAK-36 “Forger”
V/STOL (1976)
7 S-3A Viking (1975) f AV-8A Harrier (1976)****
OTHER
(1) SS-N-14 (1971)
(2) SS-N-9 0973)
(3) SS-N-12 (1976)
A-
*,//Tied classes of older ships not shown on table.
lta]^Ua^ron toar Asheville-class PGs had been forward based in Naples,
. 7, but departed Sixth Fleet in 1977 and subsequently decommissioned.
Jntr°duced into Black Sea Fleet Soviet Naval Aviation.
deployed in the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) in 1976.
U. S. NAVY (JOHN R. LUCAS
number of nuclear-powered ships. The Sixth Fleet Submarine Force (Task Force 69) became a completely nuclear-powered force, and since the 1976 and 1979 maiden Sixth Fleet deployments of the USS N^imitz (CVN-68) and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) battle groups, there has been a nuclear- powered battle group operating in the Mediterranean about a third of the time. This is not surprising, since the number of U. S. Navy nuclear-powered ships in 1979 stood at 125, about 40% of the active fleet combatant ships (23% of our deployable carriers). In 1972, only 15% of the active fleet combatant ships (7% of our attack carriers) were nuclear- powered .
While the Soviets maintained the modernization lead during the 1970s in both types and numbers of surface-to-surface missiles deployed in the Mediterranean, the Sixth Fleet’s 1977 introduction of the Harpoon missile signaled the end of the almost total Soviet domination of the field. The USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968) demonstrated the effectiveness of the missile with the first Sixth Fleet Harpoon firing exercise in July 1979. The missile scored a direct hit on the ex-USS Lansdowne (DD-486) at a range of about 60 miles. Also, the 1979 Sixth Fleet introduction of the Standard surface-to-air (SM-2) missile was an important step in antiair warfare modernization.
In sea-based air power, while the Kiev and Minsk deployments with embarked Yak-36 “Forger” V/STOL aircraft made the headlines in the 1970s, the two Sixth Fleet carrier battle groups, armed with such superior aircraft as the F-14 Tomcat, maintained the edge in the Mediterranean. In land-based naval aircraft, the introduction of the “Backfire” bomber to the Soviet inventory represents a formidable threat.
Italian “Marines" from the San Marco Tactical Group land to scout the beach just prior to an amphibious landing during a Sixth Fleet-ltalian Navy exercise in 1979. Part of the potential effectiveness of U. S. naval forces lies in their ability to work with friendly nations. Maritime cooperation is the rule, not the exception, with allied navies in the Mediterranean.
Fleet Readiness: The Sixth Fleet operating tempo of more than 40 days a quarter and the generally adequate flying hours for our pilots give our combatant forces the operational edge over the Soviet squadron, which spends long periods at anchor and relatively short periods in high-tempo operations. The main manpower problem (and key to fleet readiness)
is retention of our hardworking sailors. During the 1970s, our people had to work harder to take up the slack for some spot manpower shortages. Because ol that, no Sixth Fleet unit missed a commitment because of a manpower shortage.
Since the question of women in the fleet has been a topic of news media coverage, it should be noted that on 22 September 1979, the USS Vulcan (AR-5) joined the Sixth Fleet with 55 women in the ship’s company. Reports from the Commander Service Force Sixth Fleet (Commander Task Force 63) indicated that the Vulcan's September 1979-February 1980 deployment was a successful one, reflecting the professionalism of our Navy men and women.
Sustainability: One of the most important events in the 1970s, from both a logistics and operational point of view, was the Soviet loss of access to Egyptian air bases in 1972 and naval facilities in 1976. The initial Mediterranean deployment of the large Berezina-class underway replenishment ship in 1978 signaled a large jump in the Soviet capability to sustain open-ocean forces.
The Sixth Fleet, while terminating forward basing of a destroyer squadron near Athens in 1975, still maintains access to the NATO bases in Italy, Greece and Turkey. Also, Sixth Fleet units still have access, on a bilateral basis, to Rota, Spain. The only naval facility closed entirely to the Sixth Fleet was Malta u1 the early 1970s. The Sixth Fleet can and has operate^ without Mediterranean bases, but the access to allied bases has enabled the U. S. Navy to sustain its presence at the lowest possible cost in fleet assets. Also, fleet morale is enhanced with rest and recreation breaks at the various ports ranging from Spain t0 Romania. If there is not a major fleet exercise going on, the Sixth Fleet has an average of 18-20 slups visiting ports on any given day. These port visitS bring economic benefits for the host city. For eX' ample, a Virginia (CGN-38)-class cruiser with a cre^' of about 500 men will spend about $50,000 during i seven-day port visit. A carrier with 5,000 men will
spend $500,000. The Sixth Fleet also does some routine ship repair work in the Mediterranean. N 1978, the Navy spent about $9 million in Meditef' ranean shipyards and in 1979, about $12 million- Again, access to the major shipyards in the Mediterranean allows the Sixth Fleet to maintain a high state of material readiness.
Geography can both favor and detract from the sustainability of the Soviet or Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet can rein-
. center for three continents—Europe, Asia, and rica. Each day, 75 huge oil tankers enter the 300 *terranean with 9,360,000 barrels of oil. About clo tan^ers are at sea every day. Southern Europe is p°Sely linked with the vital needs of Central Europe, ern tXarnP^e’ Italy accounts for about 20% of West- Europe’s oil refining capacity.
Table 4 Major Political-Military Events in the Mediterranean Area 1970-1979 Year Event Sixth Fleet
reaction
* 1970 | Jordanian Crisis. | Presence |
1972 | Egypt expelled Soviet Military Advisors and closed air bases to Soviet Military. |
|
*1973 | Arab-Israeli War. | Presence |
*1974 | Cyprus Crisis. Greece withdraws from NATO integrated military structure. | Evacuation of civilians and Presence |
* 1975 | Suez Canal reopens (Sixth Fleet Flagship present). U. S. Navy homeporting of destroyer squadron in Greece ends. Turkish Arms Embargo passed by Congress and U. S. bases in Turkey closed by Turkey. | Mine clearance Operations |
1976 | Egypt abrogated the Friendship & Cooperation Treaty with Soviet Union and ended Soviet Navy use of Egyptian Naval Bases. |
|
# | Lebanon Crisis. | Evacuation of civilians and Presence |
1978 | Turkish Arms Embargo lifted by Congress and U. S. Bases in Turkey reopened. |
|
* | Horn of Africa Crisis-Ethiopia- Somalia War. | Dispatch of Sixth Fleet frigate to Mideast Force |
1979 | Egypt-Israel Sign Peace Treaty. Last British Forces depart Malta. |
|
# | Yemen, Iran, and Afghan Crises. U. S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, attacked-burned. Libyan-supported rebels attacked Gafsa, Tunisia. | Dispatch of Sixth Fleet ships to ' Mideast Force & Seventh Fleet Presence Presence |
* Direct Sixth Fleet Role.
rce t^le Mediterranean forces in a shorter ______________
lrne t*lan we can. However, if the Turkish Straits ^ere cMsed, there would be no reinforcement from e Black Sea. The importance of this fact was ac- ented on 15 November 1979 when a Romanian oil er collided with a Greek freighter in the Bosporus. The tanker burst into flames, and traffic was e<J in the Bosporus for several hours. At one nt’ more than 80 ships, including some Soviet th elS' Were kackecl UP awaiting passage. Of course, same ‘choke point” problem can be applied to e Strait of Gibraltar.
on °^ItlCa^'Economic Realities: The Mediterranean is the most important trading “crossroads” in
tracie
world. This sea is the common highway and
. e Political chessboard in the Mediterranean lit- countries is complex, uncertain, and some say ^solvable. Both the United States and the Soviet ^m°n have had their political ups and downs here, k e Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean seem to ^le focal points of political instability. The 1970s Tli P^'fical instability can be seen in Table 4.
Sixth Fleet was called upon on seven occasions „ r'ng the decade to render assistance or, through its rcsence,” t0 help stabilize a crisis, not only in the sia lterranean’ but also in the Indian Ocean and Per- pj ° f^ulf by temporarily augmenting the Seventh Iq^ or Middle East Force. Our first case in the Pl s came in January of this year when the Sixth ,.Cet nuclear-powered battle group, composed of the N,nitz (CVN-68), USS California (CGN-36), and USS Xas (CGN-39) was sent to the Indian Ocean to ree rhe Seventh Fleet battle group led by the USS
Kitty Hawk (CV-63).
The major political event of the 1970s in the Middle East was the signing of the historic peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Even with that significant step for peace, we will probably continue to face many of the same problems as in the 1970s: Turkish economic problems, Greek-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and EuroCommunist Party influence in Western Europe. The Middle East is still a tinderbox.
There will be little slack in Sixth Fleet commitments in the 1980s. The threat will not always be directly from the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Based on the Soviets’ use of surrogates in the past decade, it is uncomfortable to watch North African events wherein Algeria and Libya continue to receive modern Soviet arms. News stories speculating on possible use of Libyan ports by Soviet warships and the future military role of Malta indicate the troubled nature of the Mediterranean area.
Summary: The Sixth Fleet has entered the 1980s with a more modern and capable fleet than it had ten years ago. We have maintained the edge over the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. While political' military events are hard to forecast, one factor can be predicted. In the Mediterranean, as elsewhere in the world, the Soviet Navy will continue to narrow the U. S. Navy’s superiority edge. Such an adverse trend must be checked in the coming decade.
A 1963 NROTC graduate of Northwestern Uni' versity, Commander Baker served in the US$ Okinawa (LPH-3) before being designated a pub' lie affairs officer in 1965. He holds a masters degree in journalism (1970) from the University of Wisconsin. He has served in public affairs bib lets with Task Force 77, First and Third Fleets. CinCLant/CinCLantFlt, CNO, and for the Director, Joint Stab of the JCS. From 1978 until June of this year, he was PAO f°r Commander Sixth Fleet. He is now Director for Plans and Opef' ations, Navy Office of Legislative Affairs.
In 1979-1980, the U. S. Navy ended the use of large cruisers as numbered fleet flagships because of the age and high cost of manning and maintaining the older cruisers. For example, the crew of the USS Albany (CG-10) was 1,200 men, compared with the USS Virginia1! (CGN-38) crew of about 550 men. On 28 May 1980, Vice Admiral William N. Small ordered his flag hauled down on the 54-year-old Albany and shifted to the destroyer tender Puget Sound (AD-38). She was chosen as the Albanys
replacement because of a lack of room for a numbered fled staff on the smaller but newer cruisers. Unlike other tenders, the Puget Sound is scheduled to spend about 50% °S the time away from the forward home port of Gaeta, Italy■ The tender will steam where the majority of the Sixth Fled units are and provide normal tender services in variotd Mediterranean ports of call. In addition, the Sixth Fled Commander will continue to have the option of embarking in Sixth Fleet combatants when deemed necessary for operational or other reasons. During the shift in flagships, V'd1 Admiral Small noted that the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron Commander was also embarked in a tender
Brent Bake1
The first Commander of the Sixth Fleet (or Sixth Task Fleet, as it was then known) was Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, shown welcoming Secretary of State George C. Marshall to his flagship Albany in 1948. At left, Sherman’s helicopter lands on the heavy cruiser's turret two in March 1949; below left, the flagship anchored at Villefranche in 1948.
The last Sixth Fleet commander to use the Albany, by now a guided missile cruiser, as flagship was Vice Admiral William N. Small, shown observing an underway replenishment from the USS Detroit (AOE-4). At right, the cruiser is tied up in her Sixth Fleet home port of Gaeta, Italy. At left, Admiral Small arrives aboard the Albany in a much different sort of helicopter than that used by Admiral Sherman.