This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
MPS; The Ship System with
(Seg K \t
ll4., ]7 ‘ ^*nkel and D. Manningham, pp.
'Il7 “uu lj. main:
’ ^arch 1979 Proceedings
Kv!Under RoSer p■ Unison, U. S. mU[tj lhe SH-60B Seahawk is a pf0Ve P^rP°se vehicle designed to im- antjjuj^ C ^ Navy’s capability in su^ . rnar’ne warfare and antiship
any 1 ance and targeting. Without . I cnang ■
°f executing secondary roles,
pable3^e ln configuration, it is ca
such
cal eVaVert'cal replenishment, medi- p ation, and search and rescue.
the Navy plans to pro- ttaftm"re t*1an 200 production air-
Th •
e entire program will cost
How
million, is it,
°e'n8 s ” <L’ t*len’ w*th millions that mSpCnt 0n a major weapon system signej st endure years of use and de-
the k ■ °r a combat environment that Ptirna
b,
ary system of self-defense has
'Snored?
kecnrnf,^r'rnary system of self-defense rr
Mio
'een Thg
'vben"tS 3 reality for the lamps hi
'24
We
** 'vhich
consider: the U.S.S.R.’s Hind” helicopter attack sys-
nia
bil
lor Can Hunched from any r shi
lties Of;
'Pi the coordinated capa-
ct>c>rf. '** a Na-25 “Hormone B” heli-
V , wh tak-a/r „
Craft) corger” (VTOL attack air- air.toUs'ng radar data link and an
^hich can conduct tactics with
hi
'ase<j ^Ufface missile; and the land-
atrp aSsets °f the U.S.S.R.'s naval air st‘arch IC^ *s capable of long-range ^klp anc^ employing tactical aircraft The ^ Severai hundred miles of land.
tl0spns'Ver is not, “There’s a carrier bv
tap
3y,
and we’ll employ the
ticj* 1
Tality aSC<^ a‘rcraft for this role.” In fully ’ ^• S. carrier aircraft will be cecti0t<a .'n major air strikes and pro- COr*ab °P Tattle group. Small Ux(psatants with their associated ^bejg . ehcopters can proceed any-
Nefor! tH? W°r.ld’ on their own. 'bey °te> when they are threatened, sclVesrriUst he able to defend them-
The first four phases of an Army/ Air Force J-CATCH (Joint Countering Attack Helicopters) evaluation have proven the devastating effects of the Soviet “Hind” attack helicopter and the vulnerability of high-speed fixed-wing aircraft and other helicopters.
Given the global requirements of the U. S. Navy, the carrier’s tactical air community is an aggressive weapon platform system that projects the naval military might of our foreign policy. Have we not learned our lessons from the Vietnam era concerning the requirement to rescue downed crew members? Have we already forgotten the national anguish caused by their capture? Our feeble efforts did, in fact, adversely affect the morale of the fighting men and our people at home. We now have the option to equip the LAMPS Ills with a defensive capability which will enable them to rescue downed crew members and survive as well.
The expanded self-defensive/of- fensive capability of the LAMPS would provide a weapons umbrella to the task force as an antishipping and missile interceptor. Our foremost developing weapon system is now the cruise missile, noted for its small size and invisibility to Soviet radars. That same principle, in reverse, is a threat to us at sea as well. The helicopter’s potential ability to seek out and kill missile-launching surface ships and to participate in surface sea warfare cannot be overlooked. In that role, the LAMPS III could relieve and even augment some of the CV TacAir assets. The spectrum and depth of defensive and offensive naval capabilities are enhanced when the helicopter is used to its full potential.
It has been stated that the LAMPS helicopter is the “eyes and ears of the ship." The helicopter has become such an integrated part of the ship’s systems that if the helicopter is grounded, the capability of the ship is
Contents:
LAMPS: The Ship System with Wings Lord Louis
Which Williamson Turn?
Treating Adults Like Children
Okean-80: The Russians Are Coming Again
Fitness Report Finesse
Whither the Soviet Navy?
An Alternative to Rotating Radars for Aircraft Carriers
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Forgotten Facet of Naval Warfare
Nuclear Weapons Capability? I Remember It Well
The Last Battleship The Big Ship of My Life Retention: Our #1 Goal
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can he exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
%
degraded. Therefore, if the helicopter is incapable of defending itself, we must consider the entire ship degraded before she is under way.
Therefore, I recommend that one of the following alternatives be developed for the LAMPS III.
► Procure the new 50-pound General Electric .50 caliber machine gun that has been demonstrated for the U. S. Army. Procure new Norwegian- developed .50 caliber H. E. ammunition. This ammunition has equivalent fire power of 20-mm. ammunition.
► Use air-to-air missiles such as the U. K. SRAAM or Israeli SHAFRIR. These missiles have self-contained sensors and require little support from the aircraft.
The time has come for the U. S. Navy to analyze the U.S.S.R.’s team threat, use tactics learned from J-CATCH in training LAMPS III crews, and add weapons to the LAMPS III. Then and only then will we have a truly formidable weapon system.
“Lord Louis”
(See Duke of Edinburgh, pp. 26-35, February
1980 Proceedings)
James D. Ferguson—I wish to express my congratulations on the dignified and responsible way in which the Proceedings recorded Earl Mountbatten’s passing. As a one time very humble member of the late Earl’s staff, I am sure that Lord Louis would have been highly approving of the subject’s treatment.
Commander Francis Poole, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Retired), ex-Royal Navy Reserve—The vicious murder of Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Mountbat- ten of Burma, was a terrible tragedy and a horrible and despicable way of ending the life of a brilliant and outstanding naval officer.
I met him when we were serving in the 1st Antisubmarine Flotilla in early 1919—then based on the naval port of Portland on the south coast of England—and preparing for a future war. He was then Sub-Lieutenant Lord Louis Mountbatten, Royal Navy, and
1st Lieutenant (XO) of HMS P31, an ex-convoy escort vessel, while I was a Sub-Lieutenant, Royal Navy Reserve, and 1st Lieutenant of HMS P39.
Then, at the age of 19, he was full of much more vim, vigor, and vitality than the average person. With a versatile brain, he had great ideas and even greater ambition. In fact, one day he told me that his greatest ambition was to sit in the chair at the Admiralty in which his father sat as First Sea Lord. As XO of P31, he had an opportunity to develop some of his ideas.
One night, he was a little too dashing for me. 1 had arrived back on board about 2100 after running a few miles from Weymouth to Portland. Feeling peckish and as the steward was off duty, I gave the quartermaster at the gangway a couple of eggs and some bread to make me poached eggs on toast.
Just as he brought them along to where I was standing on the quarterdeck, “Batten,” as I then called him, suddenly arrived on board. Seeing the poached eggs, he asked who they were for. “Me,” I replied, “would you like one?”
“Thanks,” he replied, “I would love one.” He then grabbed one and flung it at me. I dodged, and it splattered on the bulkhead behind me. He then ran back to his ship.
I went right after him, and on the way grabbed an old seaweed covered rope fender hanging from the dock. Arriving on board his ship, I called to him through the wardroom skylight. When he arrived in the line of fire, I shot the fender down, but he managed to dodge it. I then went down to the wardroom where we indulged in a gunroom-type battle with soda water syphons, gramophone records, and anything else handy.
One day, he and another sublieutenant, who owned a motor bike, had a bet on who could ride it toward the end of the wooden pier without falling off into the water. The one who got closest to the edge after three runs won the bet. A rather hairraising game—it is needless to mention who won.
A keen and energetic organizer, Mountbatten planned a supper dance
said to be sponsored by f ierjne lieutenants of the 1st Antisu rented Flotilla (a total of five). e ^ ^ a hall in Weymouth and ‘n',l^ps “county people” and the loca ^ On the big night, Mount rived in the naval mess u £f
which was not yet official- lS^e 0r- peeved the admiral who w°^0%veVer, dinary working uniform. nothing bothered Mountbatte just shrugged his shouI ^ thing laughed it off. And like e ^Q[e else he handled, the party, w'^esS than 100 guests, was a huge su ^ ^ One morning when chatting quarterdeck with my pjer
Mountbatten walked down e|.
with a very distinguished- o0^aS |iis derly gentleman. The man rtj,e father—Admiral of the e ^ t0 Marquis of Milford Haven P fg). 1917, Prince Louis of Ba an(J
They stopped alongside our s fof
we were introduced. After c ia a while, they carried on to 0ay
My captain and I felt t|e(naf ored to have met that fine ge^ ^ the and a true sailor in every sentllally word. When Mountbatten e|^ ic
did realize his greatest am must have been his proudest n atjy Those who knew Batten jJ5
admired him for his courage 0ver
“guts sticking out in no s him.”
Ven2ke
Eason,
PP- 86-87, January 1980; N, C. ' PP- 78-79, February 1980; B. B.
tiat^ratU'ate^ on his interest and ini- °f Scji departing from the demands
'n8s of
NavJnaint Jar»es E. Kale, U. S. teri:
hisUre lieutenant Sherman has found a^ ^ 0nt0 a carrier at some point c^e even made a visit to the
at6Utenant Sherman seems to forget
Jh0'ch Williamson Turn?”
J. A°Jlliaras. PP- 112-113, July 1979;
J. Stilwe'il ‘amSOn’ PP' 89'92, October 1979;
’ p- '02, March 1980 Proceedings)
P
(Retirj^0^ ^ Denham, U. S. Navy - e ^ Captain Stilwell is to be
a“‘ an essential of the business;
I 6 so inquisitive and concerned. [(.pttjU8&est, and I hope this is ac- rtiast ^ 30 atternPt to help, that ship agers similar tests on each voy- ajean rec°rd the data. After an haVfc '?te nurnber of scores (about six) theeen obtained, then determine from ea.n. t'rnes to conduct the tests tarrilnit‘al point to initial point re- (arg(!tC e escitnated distances off the der)tInit'al point, and any indepen- t.p Vafiables (wind, current,
rtiQ^i S’ dead-times, etc.). Soon, ship trend* will be evident. The
etrier,, Crew are now calibrated for ency recovery procedures.
Tr •
ttet^at'nS Adults Like Children’
j^8erman’ P- 80, February 1980
'ente
^.How can a 29-year old lieu- “e so bitter? As an aviator, I takes berthing. From the tack he itig re8afding making beds and pick- teall ^ a^ter one s self, I wonder if he Or ^oold want to live with 3,000 phjjos111611 W^° ^°b°we^ bis apparent bui|t1 e whole Navy way of life is S'SnecTr0Unt^ S^'PS—ships that are de- LqV(, t0 fight—not designed as the tour °at' Any°ne who has spent his Cat 'n crew s berthing can tell you e* a s*°b gets on everyone’s nerves, f0rm1 maybe another slob’s. What Sher Punishment would Lieutenant Hot an su8gest for people who can- c°nform, or does he believe discipline has no place in the military?
Regarding advancement, we do, or at least should, push hard on men who are capable to move up. Why? We need capable petty officers to keep the Navy going, to provide the needed leadership and experience in the future. Further, not everyone is capable of determining his own limits. Quite often, it takes a senior to show an individual the way until he builds selfconfidence. As a former white hat, I am very thankful that Navy seniors pushed me when I needed it, and I went to one of the best military schools in the country, which means that one does not bloom automatically regardless of background.
As a 22-year veteran, 1 concede that, on occasion, our adult sailors are treated like juveniles because of some shotgun approach policy, but on the whole, those who are punished probably need it. We have a long way to go towards returning the proper level of responsibility and authority to our petty officers, but we are well on our way.
“Okean-80: The Russians Are Coming Again”
(See H. J. Manthorpe, pp. 103-107,
December 1979; L. Seaquist, pp. 15-17, January 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander H. D. Connell, II, U. S. Navy—Captain Manthorpe and Commander Seaquist provide interesting conjecture as to the rationale behind the Okean series. Both offer credible answers to the question, “What, then, is Okean for?" Unquestionably, we must be prepared to learn as much as possible from any Soviet demonstrations of their developing operational art. With all the focus on exploitation and analysis, however, perhaps we are missing the boat with regard to a more serious aspect of the exercises.
Conditioning has been recognized as an ingredient of military deception since Sun Tsu analyzed warfare 2,000 years ago. Western dependence on time—warning time, reaction time, deployment time, reinforcement time, etc.—to counter Soviet military threats makes us vulnerable to a strategy of peacetime conditioning by our adversaries. The worldwide deployment of a hostile fleet, particularly in times of tension, should elicit more than academic discussion and professional curiosity. After successive opportunities to observe and debate the “routine” massive deployment of Soviet seapower, might we become conditioned to see only the expected and peaceful side of such enterprises?
History is replete with examples of how purposeful military deployment can be masked by routine exercise maneuvers. The result has often been overwhelming strategic surprise. One wonders if any precautionary increase in Western readiness posture will accompany the predicted 0kean-80 deployments.
By allowing ourselves to be conditioned into a routine response, we invite a much more dramatic demonstration of Soviet combat naval power than what is customarily offered to our operations evaluation group staffs. We cannot afford only an academic interest in Okean. Perhaps the Russians are coming again. What if this time they mean business?
“Fitness Report Finesse”
(See G. Haering, pp. 34-38, January 1980
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert A. FHegel, U. S. Navy—The primary thrust of the fitness system seems to be competition for promotion by limiting upward mobility to those who have demonstrated an absence of mediocre performance. In this sense, a poor FitRep, one reflecting either faint praise or adverse marks and comment, normally results from having committed some overt act(s) of mediocrity. Officers who can refrain from footshooting, and who are willing to follow (rather rigidly) the mainstream of their warfare specialty, will never be threatened by the vagaries of the current system, or for that matter, by any reasonable modifications to it. If this is true, and it is, why should we feel compelled to find ways of improving the system? I guess the answer is that there is something pleasantly cathartic about offering alternatives to imper-
in the detachment report a8aljlS^ven other officers in the comman though the latter are not being ujd at the same time. The ranking
eliminate the 1-of-l
specialty filling a “challenging competitive billet.” Maybe 1 luck of the draw (speaking
who’s served at Gackle), but t ^
Too.
acknowledged and measure.-. - ^ ^ certain billets are known to etjon absolute prerequisite for Pr° ^ (i.e., XO afloat for promotion
fection. So, let’s run some thoughts up the Fliegel flagpole and see who desecrates.
► The first question which ought to confront the rater in preparing a Fit- Rep is: to what degree has the officer accomplished the objectives set out for him? And there’s the rub. If one is to determine degree of success or accomplishment, there must have been a kind of contract between the rater and ratee which informs the latter what is expected of him. Such a contract, or statement of expectations, goes far beyond the billet description used by a detailer or found in a ship’s organization manual. The Civil Service is transitioning to an expansion of its position description (PD) system which includes such a contract. It makes the employee aware not only of the general parameters of his job (i.e., billet description), but also apprises him of the specific objectives he is expected to achieve within a stated period. Failure to meet these objectives on time will result in an unsatisfactory (not “excellent”) rating unless it can be shown that uncontrollable factors prevented or impeded their being met. Surely there is a way of adapting this approach to the evaluation of naval officers.
► The adjectival description for each performance level and the bases for percentile evaluation are catalysts to inflation. A more neutral premise would use the time-honored grading system of A+ through F and assign numerical equivalents (A+ = 4.0) for each letter grade. Weight the “mission contribution” grade at 1.5 and provide a block in the FitRep for the average score. Add a block to the officer data card (ODC) for the officer’s cumulative score.
► Disabuse the raters of the notion that they make or should make the decision of whether the ratee should be promoted. This false premise goes beyond a recommendation for promotion, which contributes more than anything else to the halo syndrome (i.e., if / want this officer to be promoted, / must do whatever is required to make that possible, namely, inflate his grades).
► Require that the rater rank all ratees—not just those recommended for early promotion—but provide for a separate ranking within the unrestricted line (URL) officers by warfare specialty (e.g., URL: 2 of 7; surface warfare officer [swo]: 1 of 4). Test a computer model which would determine the desirability and manner of weighting the warfare specialty ranking as against the overall URL ranking. Require, too, that the ranking reflect a comparison of the average numerical scores and, if there are ties, that the ranking reflect them.
► Devise a narrative format that would require supporting remarks immediately following each area evaluated, a block of about two inches wide after “goal setting and achievement,” “subordinate management and development,” "working relations,” and so on. This would force the rater to address each area and would, over the long term, reveal those areas not deserving of separate attention on the FitRep form. (This approach is essentially that used by the Foreign Service in its officer evaluations.)
► Replace the block “weaknesses discussed” with a narrative space entitled “recommended areas for improvement (discussed with ratee).” Where is it written that even a one-percenter (or an A-pluser) hasn’t room for improvement in isolated areas and why should a discussion of these “weaknesses” be permitted to blunt the effect of his otherwise high standing?
► Delete the language from the FitRep instruction that tends to discourage showing (and discussing) FitReps to lieutenant commanders and above (“. . . reports shall not as a matter of routine be shown to them”). First, it’s a sham in that one can obtain a microfiche copy of his reports by writing or visiting Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC). But more important, it creates an inference that the provision was intended to protect weak and/or inarticulate raters from confrontations with the more senior (and forceful) officers. Any officer who’s not willing or able to support his evaluations in a head-to-head encounter should not be a rater.
► Do away with the detachment FitRep unless six months or more have elapsed since the last regular report and require that the officer be ranked
-good-by kiss’ and the increased time span reports would result in a more ingful evaluation. .jghts
► Record and assign relative to decorations for meritorious s
and heroism in the FitRep. retaonjng the prohibition against rnen,^tj0ns. unapproved award recommen a.^tS This would have two positive e It would discourage end-o “gifts” while encouraging more ingful mid-tour awards that then be reflected in the b*t^eP, oar£|s ond, it would provide selection ^ with a valid tie-breaker, a 1 bonus that would be viewed a the performance grade. A cut^js re- “score” representing all a'va ceived to date might be recor
the ODC- . .
► Be more honest in ackno ^
the relative importance of tlC against general performance^ ^ though “fully competitive see „ jn
have replaced "career enhancin^^^ the lexicon of permissib e ^ jt buzzwords, the fact remains ^gi(ds in my bones!) that selection ^ £j,e must consider a combination two factors when making 1 e>^eyteve sions. I’ve never been able to ^ that a one-percenter special serVtpe ficer attached to the Center Rehabilitation of OpNav Actl( cer at ComNavBase Gack e, ^ Dakota, was in the same ^ea^U^arfare another one-percenter in his
one
off1'
cer who’s been a top performe ^ top billet should have an edge weight of that edge shoul
ed ■
SWO to commander, and °n£ ^ pet' not be under any illusion that ra formance in some other area ^ pensate or substitute). While ^ can suggesting that the FitRep ot^0{ild be adapted to this revelation, lC
acknowledged in published
> The Seryice
stud l'nderstand, some contemplated and l ?es a 5% from a well-known
°utw,
c«m
criteria.
degree to which the rank and inf]UerePutation (if any) of the rater l°ng ^ tke we‘ght of his reports has and , een a subject for speculation
M> l 1
I s /U 11UI1I cl WC11-M1UW11
• "marking captain equal or .U1I) “ 1 a 1% from a lieutenant long ^atlder who hasn’t been around tat'on n°U^k e‘tber to develop a repu- strjnge°r t0 bave disclosed a pattern of cajes j, CT °r indulgence? In many s°rnem sure it does, and although and, t^ay iud8e this unsystematic c°Urseere^ore> unfair (excluding, of salt‘s 5<y^C who gets the old
dqCj °'' there seems no way of re- ftlatiCal credlbiIity to a mathe-
devise °rrnu^a> nor should we try to °vetco[^ne ^ W0ldd be like trying to grad h 6 tke edSe an average Harvard Gacki aST°Ver a ^hi Beta Kappa from S What is important here
versus ’ bke the matter of “tickets” kn°wl ^er^orrnance, is an official ace fisrnent of the reality and effect of the phenomenon. In the end, of course, the complainers can be given the classic explanation: “It all counts on twenty.”
► Resurrect the “stigma” of being passed over, but this time make it official. The current head-in-the-sand attitude that seeks to conceal an officer’s fail-select status is like assuring a blind man that his blindness will not be made a matter of record. Commands which are reluctant to accept fail-selects into their midst, or which have a clear-cut, albeit unwritten, policy of not accepting such officers, have easy ways of finding out about an officer’s promotion status anyway. Burying the evidence leads the fail-selects to believe that the absence of scarlet letters ("PO”) just might compensate for their clearly non-competitive position. Not so (I’ve also been to North Gackle). If a URL officer has been passed over, competency in areas which lie outside the reason for his non-selection will be discounted and he should be so advised in clear terms. An example of this is the descreening of a proven sub-specialist who has been passed over by reason of performance in his warfare specialty, an action roughly equivalent to failing a student in German because his overall academic average is wanting.
► Stop being driven by the computer when attempting to improve the Fit- Rep form. Using the same or nearly the same number of performance levels (blocks) in converting from one form to another for the expresss purpose of providing “linkage” between, for example, high excellent and top 5%, acts only to preserve the criteria of the old system. Avoid this pitfall by operating two distinct FitRep systems in parallel: only newly commissioned officers would be graded under the new system, while officers who had once been evaluated under the old system would continue under that system until retirement. It would be a slow transition, but it would prevent the contamination of the new system by the criteria of the old.
extremely well-written and enjoyable book
This
fers the reader an intimate glimpse into the >scipiinary practices and social structure of the •S. Navy in the days of sail from 1800 to 1861.
. s Part of his research, the author has painstak- n8|y analyzed archival records of disciplinary ^ctl°ns and has extrapolated interesting data ,Uch as the racial mix of the crews of U.S. ships uring the period. This is a fascinating book that hcmld appeal to all those interested in the his- 0rV of the period and the development of the ^stoms and traditions of law in the U.S. Navy. $0/408 pageslillustrated
^ Naval Institute Press Book *st Price: $18.95 Member’s price: $15.15
(Pi,
ease use order form in Books of Interest section.)
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 25)
“Whither the Soviet Navy?”
<See T. A. Brooks, pp. 103-104, February
1980 Proceedings)
Hamlin A. Caldwell, Jr.—Captain Brooks convincingly traces the emerging outline of a balanced high-seas Soviet force reminiscent of Hitler’s contemplated naval Plan “Z.” Almost all of the pieces of an effective naval power projection capability, including a large conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft carrier, are beginning to fall into place.
The only important factor that is missing (or at least unobserved by the West) is the development of a balanced carrier air wing to go with the 60,000-ton CVN reportedly being built by the Soviets. This would be a major omission. The design, construction, manning, and maintenance of air wings with a composite all-weather strike, antiair warfare, and antisubmarine warfare capability in any threat environment may be the largest part of the expensive initiation fee to the very exclusive jet-era carrier club. The cost in design talent, industrial capacity, training, rubles, and time to place a complete and truly effective carrier air wing in operation from a standing start is awesome.
If the Soviets want the type of battle group capability still retained, thank God, by the U. S. Navy, they can probably achieve it. However, it would require a major reordering of their military priorities and significant cuts in other parts of their large but not limitless naval budget.
The "Flogger-D” (MiG-27) is mentioned most often by Western analysts as the probable first Soviet CTOL carrier aircraft. The Soviets are silent, but a recent issue of Morskoi Sbornik (roughly similar to the Proceedings) included a painting of Soviet Naval Aviation pilots standing in front of a “Flogger-D.” No jet and very few prop aircraft designed initially for land-based use have ever been successful in carrier service. A capable ground attack aircraft with variable geometry wings and respectable performance, the “Flogger-D” conceivably might beat these long historical odds. If the “Flogger-D” can be made carrier kindly, it would approximate the U. S. Navy’s A-7 in strike performance.
Sea-based “Flogger-Ds” would be a useful extension of Soviet seapower but would not alone constitute the balanced air wing that would permit effective Soviet battle group operations in the high-threat environment that we can still generate in the open oceans of the world. There is no indication that the Soviets are developing clear counterparts of the F-14, E-2, A-6, or S-3 to go with their CTOL carrier presumed to be building. This appears to be a major shortfall if the projected Soviet nuclear battle group is intended to directly challenge the U. S. Navy within the next decade in the G-I-UK Gap, the Indian Ocean, and in the Northern Pacific.
Soviet (indeed, Russian) naval intent has always been difficult for Western analysts to fathom or predict with accuracy. Their naval policy is driven by more non-maritime considerations than our own, and neither their objectives nor methods approximate ours. However, their naval moves occasionally seem illogical, quite simply, because they are illogical. There is no intent to denigrate the truly dangerous Soviet Navy, but the Soviets sometimes miscalculate. Yet, the world’s greatest navy, experienced in such mistakes as the Curtiss SB2C and the Zumwalt enlisted uniform, unaccountably persists in ascribing unerring naval judgment to the people who went to Tsushima.
With this background of qualifications, three mutually interlocking theories are advanced:
► The Soviet carrier is primarily in-
tended to exert naval suasion 0 ^
People’s Republic of Chin*1 ^ jts Chinese maritime interests, sue ^ growing merchant fleet, foreign merce, and possible offshore °j ’ ^ crease, so does their vulnera 1 Soviet naval pressure. An a n^ Soviet battle group would be a ^ ^ cellent deterrent to another ^
invasion of Vietnam or other ^
adventures. The Soviet CTOL Cya|c„
with a “Flogger-D”/“Forger
36)/“Haze” (Mi-14) air wing s H , mented by Da Nang-base j
“May” (11-38) aircraft lor early warning (AEW) and ASW stj,e could operate effectively 0 P.R.C. coast. Soviet naval ^
frankly admire the U. S. Navy s^ carriers in the wars in Korea a ^ nam, and the Soviet Navy 'j■ nljre<J
striving for the same usefu 1
i In rhe Russo-1*1
war capability, in tne * nUc!ear
ideological struggle, a Soviet ^
battle group in the Indian
could effectively and visibly *so a , j
P.R.C. from the African Third J
nations and revolutionary fJttl0 t0
► The Soviet carrier is ■nten^n
oeef up protection of the oc ‘ ^e[e tions” in Russian homewaters much of their SSBN force vU>L jnen" bavened for use in both intercoi ^ ^ :al and theater strikes and as < ^ Afield strategic reserve for use as , ^ gaining chip in war ternn' /j.
shore-based AEW and ASW ^ :ould compensate for the lac ’ 0 jsSjofl meed air wing in this limite rn general war role. As a withiC ^jet •elatively survivable asset, je-
rarrier could additionally ma e jfjc
ayed sortie into the Atlantic or
n the second phase of a war 1 j
bon of NATO forces sufficiently 1 :he naval balance. step
► The Soviet carrier is the ir^ ^
n creating the true naval P°'ve ^ lcome have
n8> technology, industrial capac-
and trainable manpower to arrier-cente
acCes caPahihty. Since Soviet Navy
achieve
;ion
fo,
its nascent carrier
'tce
n Alternative to Rotating
^ a.rs for Airrraft
ejctensive damage to our forces. theJnately’ the atomic bomb ended gre 'Var before our Navy suffered even ^ater losses. What would have flaps' J to the fleet if the enemy had 194 )6d C^e kamikaze tactic in
Na^' "^1C Sov>ets have seen the Royal anj 's CtOL carriers go by the boards (j ^Perceive the withering of the Cr ... carr'er force unreplaced by any the 6 a^ternat've means of securing rentS.?aS' their reading of the cur-
f0rCOrrelation of forces,” contesting be COntr°l °f the open oceans at last is feasible. Accordingly, the Pos x NaVy ‘s making the maximum cal i 6 'nvestment of its finite politi- fUrij.°ut and share of Soviet military
'ty, " jectj a carrier-centered power pro-
eSs .
(]e i C° national resources is limited, Velopment of bej’ ftust be piecemeal. It is also tab if alternative vertical or short •Pent an^ landing aircraft developed ' Success of their ultimate plan (j j,nc s 0n corresponding decay in the tj()ncarr>er force and national resolute 'n naval sector. In che mean- bc ’ any Soviet CTOL carriers would limextremely useful in the outlined the tp^~War r°le against the P.R.C. or in <; lrTllt:ed'mission general war role 0vfet homewaters.
“A
for Aircraft Carriers”
H)1 ^ filler and R. J. Biondi ■ January 1980 Proceedings)
'>Z Admiral Martin (Red) D. Car- ^ Navy (Retired)—Why do long-range search and air con- radars in carriers?
Bj()' e Admiral Miller and Mr. ^arV' ^ W'^ reach back to World rad t0 examine the history of ships' tRit ^ an<^ C^e r°fe they played. With- c0rif'UeSt'°n ’ fadars made a significant Seatr'huti°n to winning the war at f0r>0Wever, too many of us seem to of , r that during the waning months 6 War in the Pacific, ship radars Ka • Unable to detect the low-flying V?nt 'ka2e aircraft early enough to pre-
fQrtu
he
■ Clearly, we were not prepared to
handle the threat. And one must keep in mind that the Kamikaze pilot was restricted to daylight hours with only his eyes for detection.
Is our fleet prepared to handle the current Kamikaze, a supersonic missile that can attack from long distances from high or low altitude, guided by radar, infra-red, or home- on radiation eyes?
I agree with the authors that the developments in threat technology are outstepping the capabilities of shipboard radars and that the Soviet land-based “Backfire” with its supersonic missiles is the primary threat to the fleet. I also agree that sea-based air will continue to be the Navy’s primary counter to the air and submarine threat. I do not agree, however, that the high-powered SPY-1 will enhance the capability of our carriers. Actually, we should be developing techniques to reduce electromagnetic radiation in our ships, not increasing it; the most dangerous missile threat to counter is the one with the home-on radiating emission (HORE) guidance head.
Let’s review for a moment the threat the fleet is facing. The “Backfire” and “Bear” aircraft operating from either the U.S.S.R. or client state bases can interdict every sea lane of interest to this country. Their radius of action completely invalidates the assumption that there are “low threat” areas in the world and the notion that defenses can be arrayed along a predetermined “threat axis.” Future engagements at sea will require a 360° defense perimeter. These two aircraft can launch missiles with multiple guidance heads from high or low altitude at ranges in excess of 200 miles—day or night. Clearly, these aircraft, in combination with submarines, present a formidable challenge to our battle groups, underway replenishment groups, logistic train, and convoys.
Can the SPY-1 handle this threat combination effectively? Can the SPY-1 reliably control fighter intercepts outside 200 miles? What about attacks penetrating below the radar line of sight? Will the SPY-1 really provide the officer in tactical command (OTC) with sufficient unambiguous data?
Will the OTC really want SPY-1 radiation for all aircraft evolutions? Can the carrier self-defense system store enough ammunition to counter repeated HORE missile attacks?
Those who believe the SPY-1 improves the carrier survivability had better take another look at a few electromagnetic disadvantages that accrue from the use of high-powered radars:
► High-powered radiations provide a perfect beacon for space and air surveillance vehicles to pinpoint and continuously track the exact position of the carrier.
► To “manage” the air picture, the ship’s radar must radiate continuously during battle, thus inviting HORE missiles.
► The mandatory use of radar for search or air control before or during battle degrades the use of cover and deceptive tactics (C&D).
► High-powered radars provide continuous targeting information to the attacking aircraft and submarines.
► While electromagnetic counter counter measures (ECCM) help to reduce ECM clutter, they do not reduce the continuous radiating emissions.
► High-powered radars produce electromagnetic interference (EMI) that degrades other on-board electronic equipment.
► High-powered radiation can be detected at about twice the radar detection range, thus providing the enemy the tactical advantage for deploying his air attack units without the use of radar.
Why does the fleet need high- powered radars in carriers when it already has a much more effective off- board early warning and air control system?
The airborne early warning (AEW) capability that was developed by the Navy to see over the horizon (OTH) has been operational since 1947. There have been dramatic improvements made since the Korean War; during Vietnam, it proved its worth as an early warning and air control system as well as providing a variety of other control functions.
During Vietnam, a refined integration was developed between the AEW, flag plot, and the combat information center, and subsequent technology has
that
States.” We may no winners in a nuclear war clear that they share this belie • ,£t
It is well known that the Union lost some
not
It is
jwn u in
20 million pe°Pie,
OU1VV. L1UU -
may be valid but, while we ign
the
ve0'
nU'
tactical nuclear problem, what means we choose to solve our
as much offensive power as cram into it. This, incidents Y;
wimicvci
striving toward a perfect, ea ^t
conventional defense of our ^ n0t
and planned carrier task forces ^ can
significantly alter this picture. 0f only marginally increase the P admission. js to
The only effective countefeats at
eliminate Soviet nuclear t f
permitted the development of new concepts and techniques to provide the fleet with reliable OTH early warning and air control capability—especially during electromagnetic radiation control (EMCON) conditions.
Instead of pushing for expensive high-powered radars for carriers, why not continue to expand the AEW potential, and thereby reduce the electromagnetic vulnerability of our ships? It is significant that the U. S. Air Force is exploiting the AEW concept to its fullest; from reading the news, one would think the Air Force had invented it. Isn’t it also significant that most large Soviet combatants carry one or more “Hormone” AEW helos and that many of their long-range “Bear” aircraft are AEW configured?
Let’s examine a few of the benefits that would accrue by shifting early warning and air control to AEW, remembering that AEW aircraft are already essential systems in fleet operations.
► Active AEW emissions need not provide position information on the carrier.
► AEW assets can be positioned quickly to meet each situation, providing maximum flexibility for operations.
► The island structure could be eliminated in new construction, which would help reduce the carrier’s profile. The space gained could be used for additional AEW aircraft.
► Eliminating high-powered radiation would reduce the capability of the HORE missile.
► Self-defense systems could be left in standby until alerted by the AEW.
► Early warning of low-flying missiles would be acquired long before they pop-up.
► The mutual electromagnetic interference problems could be brought under control.
► The OTC could exercise meaningful C&D.
► Topside weight could be reduced, thereby allowing more critical areas to grow.
► Ships can monitor AEW using the bi-static principle.
Our Navy is facing the greatest challenge in its history, and it is time for a critical examination of the current concepts for fighting a war at sea. Clearly there seems to be a lack of understanding of the importance of, and the need for, manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum in this antiship missile era. An examination should weigh force electromagnetic vulnerability, the effectiveness and logistics aspects of hard kill weapons, the role of electronic warfare, cover and deceptive tactics, adequacy of current doctrine, general tactics, command and control, training, intelligence support, and the concept of AEW techniques as an alternative to ship’s radars.
“Tactical Nuclear Weapons:
The Forgotten Facet of Naval Warfare”
(See L. F. Brooks, pp. 28-33, January 1980;
C. S. Cook, pp. 20-25, March 1980
Proceedings)
Commander E. J. Ortlieb, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I share Captain Brooks observations that it seems incontrovertible that the Navy must study in detail the effects of nuclear war at sea. Hopefully, the thoughts expressed in his excellent and long overdue article will serve as springboards for discussion. If, however, anyone entertains the notion that such discussion will lead to serious and objective consideration by the U. S. Navy, I fear that he will be disappointed.
Some of the seeds of the problem can be found in the article. Captain Brooks interprets the preeminent position of the Red Army in Soviet military thought as follows: “This probably means that the use of nuclear weapons at sea would be considered unlikely, except when such weapons are also being used at the theater level in a land battle.”
Accepting the apparent preeminence of the Red Army doesn’t imply any self-imposed constraints on how the Soviet Navy will pursue its missions in support of the Red Army. It can be equally argued that the Soviet Union would be willing to offer up its navy in a nuclear war at sea in order to protect the Red Army.
The Soviets may be as anxious as we are to avoid superpower war, at any level. However, one of the things^ the evidence should tell t>s 1S -ng once in such a war, they are not ^ to voluntarily accept “terminatio^ terms acceptable to the
believe that there ^
World War II. What seems to be& gotten is that the Soviets die n t jt They won. No one knows wjet. would have taken to force them tie for less than victory. ^t-
In any event, it doesn t rea ter what we think they might ^ g national policy directs that t e^ at military be postured to deter ^
any level. To the extent that ^ gt gleet our posture for nuclear sea—we invite it. says>
There is an argument w
“Yes, but we have big prob em
yWg havc
our conventional posture. ^ j0g'ic solve that problem first. the
con
tional war problems invites Sov
clear threats? ■ clear
We have made it abun ant efJj to the Soviet Union what ou^e fot at purpose naval posture will £0ffen- least the next 30-40 years. ut j jn sive capability will be contai . ^ 10-15 crown jewels. These are , jstj- to be defended by the most s ^ £j,e
cated defense-in-depth system ' tajn
Navy can get. Next, each wi ^ can _ as Jn.
eludes the only naval nuc^e,a^aiiistic
(short of submarine-launche
missiles) to the Soviet home an
If the Soviet Navy can cop ^
this problem conventions T ^ ^j|l
probably will. If they can t, w ' aitet" they do? They have one eftecti native, called one burst-one caIT ve jn Whatever success we may aC, o0f,
source. This implies nuclear
soviets
^ishrn
> (or ten
h,,„. , w°uld prefer to accept severe
pishment
*0i
the ep,n Western Europe for? Doesn’t A. ,terature tell us that the Red
>y works >iv latej
hard on the problem of ln8 these weapons of the iso-
their
ctv^eS °n Soviet homeland. This
1 tosses ru ,
"hich Ule °ne esca^at'on boundary the ’ aS ^aPta*n Brooks points out, jji ^ Set'm to clearly recognize. It is a hit of a U. S. president to forcc.SUC^ a SteB to Protect U. S. naval homk 'h the threat includes
Soviet.ar<^rnerit of the carrier(s) by tand-based ballistic missiles?
NVe Preemptively attack the silos? ate s*10rt> it would appear that we IV attemPt'ng to structure our future Sov;„,°n t^le tenuous premise that the
from our carrier task
alternatively—accept our s) rather than resort to nuclear r « sea.
'I’h' .
raises an interesting paradox.
fnrr are the NATO theater nuclear °tces • ‘na|< concentrated targets which d0ese ^ticlear weapons effective? Why $(.a, e opposite approach work at
the U. S. Navy continues to ap- tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as we do when it comes to applications. If we look at their capabilities to deliver weapons rather than at our best guess as to their intentions, another scenario can be conjured up.
For instance, we are pretty sure that the Soviets have the capability to deliver some very large warheads. The SS-18 variant intercontinental ballistic missile is thought by many military analysts to be capable of delivering a weapon with a 25-megaton yield or greater. I am of the opinion that this is the kind of weapon the Russians would use to attack a carrier battle group, as opposed to the 125-kiloton weapons mentioned in the article.
Under optimum conditions of burst height, accuracy, and warhead performance, the effects of bursting a 25 megaton weapon over a carrier battle group would be roughly as follows:
► All surface ships within four miles of ground zero would be crushed and sunk (platform kill)
\ All surface ships within the next six miles would be immobilized (mobility kill)
► All surface ships surviving the first called tactical nuclear weapons? Certainly the time of flight for such weapons is not very great from central Russia to, for instance, the Sixth Fleet. And as to escalation, surely the oceans offer the one place in the world where escalation to nuclear weapons is conceivable, if only because there are no glowing craters left after the weapon has done its work.
Significantly, the Russians have the capability now to use such weapons. My only criticism of Captain Brooks’ otherwise first-rate essay is that we should focus our attention on the enemy capabilities and not on our perceptions of his possible intentions. In all other respects, Captain Brooks is right on the mark: it is time to take off the blinders on nukes.
two effects within 20 miles would sustain such antenna and other topside damage as to be rendered ineffective (mission kill).
If the Soviets hold true to our expectations that they would initiate a war with the United States by preemptive strike, wouldn’t it make much more sense to strike the major fleet formations with one or two monster weapons than to try for penetration weapons carrying smaller, so-
Hav,a,,der p, T. Deutermann, U. S. 1 do not think that the Soviets as great a distinction between
problem by first applying si'°nStra'nt that the bulk of our of- theT^e naval power and the bulk of I5 U(Jget will be concentrated in 10, iirCr°r 20, $2+ billion, 6,000-man ,r>ij t carriers (and their elaborate ^iscueXPensive entourafie)' then the ^ Ss>on will become academic.
Lieutenant Curt Orchard, U. S. Navy—Captain Brooks’ essay on naval tactical nuclear weapons was overdue in the pages of Proceedings. Nuclear weapons handling assist teams and inspections for the nuclear weapons- capable ships are the cause of only peripheral interest in nuclear, biological,
:nd to rely on soun.»‘ methods (which, Y Cn to good whatsoever). The rned is that the weap° played _safely, secure y.
:ty anu • ^gen
ay the fact that there e Mile Island in the Na >'
and chemical (NBC) defense. The emphasis is on handling and security. Refresher training may provide a test of a ship’s NBC defense, but not to the extent that real competence is established. And it’s easy enough for NBC defense training to slip a rung down the shipboard priorities ladder. The multitude of inspections and the time-sensitive operational requirements a ship’s crew contends with are enough to keep two crews busy.
Captain Brooks correctly emphasizes defense against the effects of naval nuclear weapons as the first step in his nuclear preparation plan. Blast hardening provides significant benefit in conventional damage control as well. A whole new generation of “passive” defense against NBC warfare should be pursued.
Consideration of “active” nuclear defense presents more expensive options in terms of weapon systems design. However, task force/group tactics in antiair warfare and antiship missile defense can more appropriately address defeat of nuclear weapons at virtually no cost.
Incumbent with this “fresh look” at nuclear defense should be an effort to upgrade the shipboard delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. Soviet military strategy and the Soviet Navy clearly have integrated the use of nuclear weapons, tactical and strategic, in counterforce/combined arms missions. Their use is entirely “thinkable” to the Soviet strategist.
The U. S. Navy’s concentration on fighting and winning only one kind of war (conventional) continues to provide tactical advantage to the Soviet Navy. Emphasis on the “passive” and “active” NBC defenses and a new generation of naval tactical nuclear weapons could eliminate that Soviet tactical advantage.
“Nuclear Weapons Capability?”
(See C. F. Walton, p. 88, January 1980;
W. A. Bracken and R. D. Gano, pp. 17-20, March 1980 Proceedings)
Captain J. B. Streit, U. S. Navy, Commander, Nuclear Weapons Training Group, Atlantic—As in most every other area, there are differences between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets in the administration of the nuclear program. As a case in point, the nuclear weapons assist teams (NWATs), working for the type commanders (TyComs), in the Pacific perform preinspections , whereas the Atlantic Fleet NWATs perform assist visits. The difference is important because anything smacking of “inspection” automatically puts the players in an “adversary” role (unfortunately!). It was Lieutenant (junior grade) Walton’s fate to be initiated into the nuclear community in the Pacific Fleet. He expected “help,” and he received an inspection at the hands of a “senior attacker.” It is unfortunate that his misperception only taught him not to trust assist teams.
Here it should be noted that the Nuclear Weapons Training Group, Atlantic, acting for the fleet commander, provides technical assist visits (TAV) to non-certified nuclear capable ships prior to their nuclear weapons acceptance inspections (NWAIs). These assist visits are made by the same personnel who give the inspections. There is absolutely no difference in the standards expected between the TAV and NWAI. (More about this subject later.) It is fleet policy that the results of a TAV go only to the commanding officer of the visited unit and his next senior in the chain of command.
As long as humans are involved in interpreting policy directives, there will always be times when different standards are applied by different people. In order to minimize this problem in the exacting areas of nuclear safety and security, the visit and inspection teams meet at least once a week to guarantee they are “on the same page in the Hymnal.” They are also in continuous contact with the TyCom’s NWAT personnel. And finally, the command sponsors an annual seminar in which fleet, TyCom, systems command, and other representatives conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear weapons program specifically to ensure standardization.
But I have digressed from the saga of Lieutenant Walton. He reported to an Atlantic Fleet, new construction Spruance-cliLSS destroyer as ASW officer and nuclear handling officer. He stood
first in his class during P^_ commissioning schools at ,olirs mand, and spent many e*aa getting ready for the mitia «: tion of his ship in nuclear w With a new weapons officer. pressed schedule, and no esta ^ nuclear program, the weaP° uphiH partment was faced with an _ ^ battle to qualify. During the jatjoD ship had a major security vtj,e which could only have increa jepart' anxiety within the weapons se.
ment. However, because of t ^ verance of the crew, the ship outstanding NWAI. An adjecti of SAT was assigned. that
So why would an inspector fC.
the ship had “come close. ^uCieaf mark was not made by at0r, Weapons Training Group 10 ^ but by the chief inspector, 1
the destroyer squadron corntna^^ of can only surmise as to the g the offensive remark. The s jeCt
scheduled to become a s0rt>e
ship. There was a feeling „c0lild crew members that the ship not” be allowed to flunk t e C[S[0'5 tion at the expense of 11 ^
schedule. Perhaps the comrn° alluding to an attitude Pr0 ^ nUclear Attitude is important in tie ,s eX" program. It has been this the
perience that ships which aPPr 'tive nuclear weapons program in ‘G ^r£ly manner and on a daily aS y
have problems with inspecti°n^^ re- pass—and they do it in a re at laxed manner. On the ot ein$peC' those ships which appr°aC ^ (for tions on a last minute, eras i ^n0jd whatever reason) are near y P tj,ey ahmir inspections. Invariai ^
ch inspectors as adversari :nd to rely on souther ^y)
air] if it is done on a cottW"
illy, the Nuclear to
ag Groups ate ded.caabiiity security, an .jjity °f
hout the fleet. The
n
^odore
L- Mason—“Old Navy”
sailo^
Jjj must have appreciated, as I De' 6 ty>ree battleship articles in the
rettii"m^Cr 'ssue- The Pearl Harbor ^jc^llScence of former shipmate John roe °ran brought back many >na ')ries °f life on board the Califor- Stin in 1941. Commander
JersWe^ S hie recollection of the New reminded me again that, the 6 t'le a8e °h the battleship is past, stiu ITlyst'clue of the dreadnaught is hat P<>Wer^uL Nothing better illus- Photo t^3t myst'clue than the moving h'ar/'f<P Captain Peniston brushing ^ / '!mchiS.eyeS as he leaves the
Th^ *r°r r^e 'aSt t'me' oth. 0u8h reason persuades me
Wit|*rVV'se’ Mr. Stillwell observed Pient hCr'laPs deliberate understate- vj„ ’ U Wou^ be difficult to con- hay . 1X16 ^at the New Jersey did not apersonahty.-
(he p Serving in the California and
difp enrtsylVc>nia (BB-38), it would be
‘icult -
th; sft-tn
to convince me, too. If houses
have been lived in for a long time
to take on the personalities of hai;t| Wners, how much more so with tere(jtSPl'PS these! They have quar- 8enerations of men of all sorts theirC°ndltions; horn mute witness to
is.
and tragedies. They have gone way” in far oceans; seen cowardice and deeds of valor;
th,
eir
duties and concerns and ambi- itjesanth yes, their quarrels and vari
es
., es
'n harm’s
> of
°6en w •
ah. °unded in action in defense of dlit r|ons some men hold dear:
Stinhonor’ country.
- a Navy ship is only steel and
Uty,
Sti]
e0t1lnery and guns and electronics, Ufed to float: a thing designed
and fabricated by men. That is all she is, at least, until the men come aboard. Then, slowly, she seems to acquire something of what they, collectively, are. If they are dedicated and skilled and brave, as the crews of California and New Jersey were across the decades, she seems to reflect those qualities. If they are slack and negligent and lacking in valor, she becomes an “eightball” ship, such as we all have known. It occurs to me that perhaps the title of Arnold S. Lott's excellent book about the Aaron Ward (DM-34) should have been, not Brave Ship Brave Men, but Brave Men Brave Ship.
But even ships manned by brave men differ in personality, one from another. For example, the California and the Tennessee (BB-43) were sisters, nearly identical except for the more spacious flag quarters provided in the former. Yet to step from one to the other, as I have done when they were moored together, was to become immediately aware of a change in ambience. The California was cold and austere, resonant with the measured tread of three- and four-star admirals long gone from her decks, taut with the overwhelming presence of the current Commander Battle Force and his ambitious and driven staff. The Tennessee, rating only a division flag (and that nominal, being in Battle Division Two with the California), had no such burden of command: she was relaxed, for a battlewagon, and happy-go- lucky. Even the paint schemes in the crews’ compartments bespoke the difference: stark white in California, pale green in Tennessee.
Now the New Jersey lies forlornly in mothballs at Puget Sound Naval Ship-
The California and Tennessee were sisters, but they had different personalities.
yard, bereft of the personality that moved Captain Peniston to tears and Paul Stillwell to his prose tribute. Now the California is nothing but a tarnished ship’s bell in Capitol Park, Sacramento, hostage to the honor of politicians. Now it is the duty of the men who served in them to try to recapture, in words that seem as opaque as a Long Beach fog, what they were in their days of glory.
EDITOR'S Note: Air. Mason is writing a reminiscence of his service in California as a young third-class petty officer from 1940 through the attack on Pearl Harbor. It will be published next year by the Naval Institute Press under the title, "Battleship Sailor. ” Former shipmates, officers and men, are invited to correspond with Mr. Mason (do Proceedings (about their memories of duty in Battleship 44.
“Retention; Our #1 Goal”
(See R. T. Anderson, pp. 82-85, July 1979;
J. S. Jones, p. 23, August 1979; J- S. Siembieda and R. E. Galles, pp. 79-81, September 1979; J. J. O’Connell, pp. 11-12, October 1979; B. E. Blair, p. 89, November 1979; C. S. Campbell, p. 23, December 1979; L. M. Bub, p. 27, January 1980 Proceedings)
Commander H. A. Seymour, Jr., U. S. Navy—When I arrived in Washington from a fleet unit several months ago, I did not realize the extent of the effort being exerted in Washington in behalf of Navy personnel. From the articles and commentary appearing in
; of what gton-
around—e.g., improved e01^111 jn. tions (junior officer counse "^onS, creased recognition (sea duty deployment ribbons, an ^ j0S Achievement Medals awar e ^ rep- by COs), working hours (ma in^rj0Js aration for overseas movement P ^ and post-deployment Pefl? n|<i as rosanct), etc. Lest anyone t n
apparently some do, that as ^ ^jr- feels that the commercial air fe. ing slowdown will solve the ^
may
tention
climate
than we are now. That is multi-faceted retention issue given such serious attention. ^jt There are things that can an be done better at the unit-
being
un
less
i teaf11’
Proceedings, it is obvious that many others are equally ignorant of what the fleet’s representatives in Washington are doing. A key point is that those on duty in Washington are extensions of the fleet. While there are “politicians” to be found, the majority are proven fleet sailors who volunteered for the demands of Washington duty in order to work the problem in the policymaking arena. I mention this because the “we-they,” “two different Navies,” etc., accusations are not only unfounded in reality, they are counterproductive and do not contribute to curing what ails us. Only through the combined effort of those in the operating forces ahd their spokesmen in Washington will we mold the Navy we want and need.
In 1979, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward established the Navy Retention Office (OP-136) which functions to monitor retention, communicate with Navy personnel, articulate their concerns and needs, and improve the quality of life for service personnel and their families. If successful, pride, morale, and performance should be enhanced, and improved retention should follow. Since its inception, a strong dialogue has resulted between the Washington retention office and the fleet. A communications hotline has been established by which anyone desiring retention-related information can call autovon 224-3722. A three- minute recorded message, updated regularly, explains what is happening in behalf of Navy personnel and their families—e.g., status of legislation on the Hill affecting service personnel, status of the OSD pay study compensation recommendations, and status of efforts to extend the 31 December 1989 G.I. Bill termination date. The hotline information is expanded in a monthly retention newsletter sent to all fleet and type commander retention officers for their use and further dissemination to their units. Contained in the newsletter is a section on retention programs and ideas successfully implemented by individual fleet units.
Visits to fleet units and by fleet personnel, written correspondence, etc., have been useful in formulating the recently approved Navy Retention Plan. This working document addresses issues such as compensation, recognition, communications, and quality of life at both the unit level and throughout the Navy. It was developed after hundreds of hours of discussion with fleet personnel, from responses to enlisted and officer separation questionnaires, and from the numerous personnel surveys conducted during the past year. Almost no retention recommendation appearing in Proceedings is missing from the Navy Retention Plan. The plan is used daily to review present policy and formulate new approaches to the issues affecting people and therefore retention. It is a dynamic plan of action designed to effect needed change.
Compensation is the key for our enlisted and junior officer personnel. The CNO is personally involved in the fight to ensure that we are paid adequately. Simply because the OSD pay study proposals were not adopted into the present budget does not mean that our service representatives in Washington have given up the fight. It is not mere chance that more and more of our congressional representatives are becoming aware of the needs of our people. No Washington service representative will rest easily until service personnel receive adequate and just compensation.
There are many other issues of concern to our people which impact upon morale, retention, and therefore readiness. Crisis management, working hours, recognition, and communications are high on the list. They are being addressed. For example, CinCLantFlt has enacted an innovative new policy in the engineering area linking operational excellence with inspection “validation.” In LantFlt, ships awarded the Red Engineering “E” are exempted from the next regularly scheduled Operational Plant and Propulsion Examination (OPPE). A question that naturally follows is, “Can such a policy be extended to other areas and other fleets?” Why inspect a unit which is at the “top of its game,” and has, in addition, a CO and commodore responsible for her readiness? Another policy which should positively affect working hours and crisis management addresses the area of surface warfare officer personnel
qualification standards (PQS)- 11Qn of spending hundreds of man- the theory and systems portion as has been the case up to now ^ which could be better spent exe division officer duties beginn ^jateS early 1980, surface warfare can ^ will be taught theory and syster^atCh clusively at basic school. On y ^ ^ station qualifications will remain^ ^ attained upon reporting to one command. ,
The above are just examples 0 is being addressed in Was ^ t|,e Much more has to be done t0 tUr;0n disastrous retention
problem, such is not the
The present
buy us some time to - hangeS
lem, but unless substantive ^veral
are enacted during the next ^ajtS months, we will be in wors^^
Washington levels. However, we respond to this real crisis as^ the prognosis is not good. ovativ’e discuss ideas, concerns, and lf^s(. be new policies together; we afld supportive of each others e ° e0ple we must communicate to ou js-
that Washington understands^ f0
sues and is doing all in its P^ange effect the required changes- 0f
may come more slowly than m us desire, but it will come^ tb»t To give our people the ee i jjt- those in Washington comprise ically motivated, hand-wring1^^ a insensitive clique does our ^ t(je great disservice and contribute ^ f0 problem. We owe it to our Pe^ [0 take a more thoughtful appr the situation.