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The Navy’s enlisted personnel assignment system is in chaos. The system is progressively deteriorating and except for rearrangement, nothing new will he accomplished until the 1980s. Even then, any hope of progress is questionable. Only hold and decisive action can overcome the indecision, duplication, and internal competition that are characteristic of Navy personnel management.
hotel reservation can be made in a few minutes for anywhere in the United States. But place a Navyman under permanent change of station orders and the transaction may not be reflected in the personnel information system for weeks. Why does the Navy not have a data system that will update files as rapidly as those used in civilian industry?
Make a purchase through a mail order store and availability and file updating can be immediately processed via a data terminal. But submit duty preferences for an enlisted person and several months may elapse before they are entered in the personnel system. Why are there no plans to automate this vital retention information?
Corporations use trend data to accurately predict the future. As incredible as it may sound, the Naval Military Personnel Command (formerly the Bureau of Naval Personnel [BuPers]) projection trends for the Navy’s 50,000 non-rated and non-designated personnel have been in error as much as 35% in a given month. How, then, are Navy manning plans (NMP) for these individuals determined in the computer system? They are not. NMP “fair share” manning percentages for individual commands are arrived at primarily by guesswork. Similar problems exist for rates. Why is it that personnel assets cannot be predicted more accurately with regard to total numbers, distribution in rates and ratings, and conformance with billet requirements?
Make an airline reservation, and in seconds it is confirmed. But make an enlisted person available for assignment from a correctional center, a hospital, or a school, and it may take weeks for orders to appear through the normal personnel availability system. Ironically, the normal system works as well as it does because commands are using alternate methods which reduce the work load of the normal system. Orders for available recruits flow so slowly through the automated system that handwritten enlisted assignment documents have been mailed to training centers to keep people moving when back-ups occurred. The man-day cost for back-ups in the pipeline has been estimated at $40,000 a day. Why is there no direct link to major distribution centers and schools so that orders can be transmitted faster?
Write a check, and in a few days it can be determined if it was charged against the proper account. But establish or revise enlisted billets at an activity, and there is no way to identify the persons assigned to those new billets. People are assigned against “requisitions” developed by the Navy manning plans. The NMP system may be the best that can be produced with available tools, but it is inadequate. The NMP is like a gravity-controlled orange sorter, and the hole sizes change with every revision. A person charged against NMP totals cannot be matched to a specific billet; thus billet requirements are often ignored. This system cannot even tell the detailer how long a billet has been vacant. Why are people not assigned against specific billets which reflect a command’s total needs?
Ship deployment cycles and repair periods can be predicted for years, but the planning period for enlisted people is seven months. This assignment “window” is too short. In practice, most people are detailed about the four months prior to transfer, and detailers often hold individuals even later in order to respond to the most recent “brush fire” or to wait for a better duty choice. This procedure negates the planning and stability of both the individual and the unit, and it often ignores the required specialized training needs of the unit. Why is there not a system to make long-range assignments, at least to stabili# key billets?
The Navy’s ability to mobilize within the existing enlisted assignment system is marginal at best. Tlv Naval Reserve and active Navy are two separate navies insofar as the enlisted assignment system |S concerned. The active side is not designed to handle the phased increases and deletions envisioned in the existing mobilization increments. The plan |S basically to “play it by ear” in case a mobilization takes place, for there is no consensus on how Naval Reservists should be assigned during a mobilization Why not integrate the Naval Reserve and active Navy into one personnel system?
All of these things are possible within the curren1 computer and management state of the art. Key pef' sonnel can be stabilized using a slating system^ which could also accommodate phased rotation, lonf lead time training, assignment and retention guaram tees, and rapid assignment of availabilities. Thes® improvements would also enhance the prediction personnel assets. Why not act now rather than w»l! until the 1980s or later?
Why is the system permitted to progressively <ie' teriorate? Or more painfully, who is responsible f°( allowing this to happen? The “why” is complex, bo1 everyone has had a hand in it, for everyone in thc Navy believes himself a personnel expert of sorts. For example, all command levels make billet decision5 without regard to whether people will have to mov^ or even whether people are available to fill new bil' lets. In some ratings the number of yearly change almost equals the number of billets. With so man! billets changing, the distribution system becomes in' capable of responding. If the impact of billet change on the people assigned is not assessed before change are approved, the Navy will continue to have hun' dreds of people “out of billet.” Keeping these peopl£ in excess of allowance at some commands means tha1 other units are not receiving needed personnel.
Ironically, there has been a futile attempt to in1' prove, and the result has since become part of tbf problem. Since July 1976, the enlisted distribution system has experienced continual consolidation ar>^ revision. The three Personnel Accounting Machinf Installations (PAMIs) have been incorporated into th£ Enlisted Personnel Management Center (F.PMAC) i*1 New Orleans. As part of this consolidation, plaC were approved to move the enlisted assignment funO
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dons from Washington to New Orleans to he colocated with EPMAC unit monitors and computer facility. The fleets had also agreed to consolidate their EPDOs (enlisted personnel distribution offices) ‘nto EPMAC. After preparatory EPDO consolidation tQok place, the overall plan was reversed, and the assignment functions remained in Washington, separating unit monitors from the detailers and fleets. This separation has yielded excessive duplica- tlon of effort and paperwork, Navy-wide command eonfusion, and has greatly diminished the effectiveness of both unit monitors and detailers.
Computer consolidation met a similar unfortunate ate- The efficiency and centralized control valued by c°mputer managers means that the users have less and less to say about how things are done in automatic data processing, because it becomes much !?ore complex and subject to rigid schedule controls.
. e more integrated the system becomes, the more oicult it is to change and the less responsive it is to c e fleets, EPMAC, and the officer and enlisted dis- tr‘butors. The consolidation of data processing was to take place when the BuPers computer moved to PpMac, concomitant with an upgrade of computer |japability. From the very beginning, there was con- lct between BuPers and EPMAC on computer con- Another reversal ended the conflict when the er>eral Accounting Office (GAO) recommended consolidation in Washington to save a few billets.
u*crs concurred and, in essence, won the power ^truSgle. The ultimate loser was the enlisted distri- utlon system. The planned upgrading of computer Capabifity never materialized as BuPers failed to jus- ^ y the need for upgrading to GAO. Justification was ased on the narrow objectives of the data processing )r&anization rather than on the need to improve and e*pand service to the users, and the latter now suffer e consequences. The result? Development of new Cr>listed distribution systems has been deferred for years, and improvements to existing systems have een delayed or cancelled.
stand still in technology is to move backward.
" fee the consolidation, the responsiveness of the Cer>tralized system has significantly diminished. Response time on data terminals is estimated to be two t0 ^°ur times longer than before. NMP revisions now ‘ e several weeks instead of several days. File up- ‘ es are often weekly rather than daily. Reports are t^'xed up, lost, and incomplete because of confusing Production control. This deterioration adversely af- cts the morale of many unit monitors and detailers, nd indirectly the welfare of every Navy person. Fu- ^Ure Cuts in the number of Naval Military Personnel tornand (NMPC) researchers will permit a higher
percentage of errors in the master data base. In short, it is a mess.
The Navy is about ten years behind industry in personnel data processing. Isolated progress is being made in spite of the bureaucracy, but it is not without its cost. Many commands have acquired minicomputers to fill their needs or have made other computer arrangements. These independent efforts will only exacerbate eventual integration of the systems and in the long run cost the Navy more money, manpower, and confusion.
If the personnel system is to improve, there must be accountability. Where will it lie? The most specialized bureaucracies for personnel are in NMPC, but manpower claimants, program sponsors, and type commanders all have their hands in personnel. It is not surprising, then, to find these various organizations operating antagonistically toward one another. Each is seeking to achieve its own advantage and is following an independent zigzag pattern with no overall Navy base course. Some of these specialized bureaucracies, such as data processing, have disproportionate authority in comparison with their very narrow technical responsibility. When special roles are performed within the complex bureaucracy of Washington, accountability becomes impossible. Thus, computer operations have been consolidated in Washington under a guise of monetary savings, but the true result is an expenditure of funds and loss of man-years which far exceeds the small saving that consolidation achieved. Under these conditions, billets and people can be moved around at the whim of some manager, thus resulting in the Navy spending thousands of dollars for PCS personnel reassignments.
Is it, then, surprising that in 1976 the Senate Armed Services Committee described Navy personnel management as fragmented and piecemeal? Training, the committee said, suffers because the various warfare communities—aviation, submarines, and surface—have too much control over their own manpower planning. The committee’s evaluation is just as valid now as it was then. The Navy trains on the basis of needs in the ever-changing manpower authorization, yet this training may be ignored in assignments because the Navy manning plan looks primarily at rating and ignores the other requirements (of skill need) for a particular billet. Unless plans are changed, the committee’s evaluation will still be valid throughout the 1980s.
Over-centralization in Washington has created a computer system that is unmanageable and unresponsive to the needs of the fleets and shore establishment. Other forms of control must be established which allow policies made at one level to be carried
out at decentralized levels where they can be more efficient and responsive to the users.
Management’s reliance on computer people to do the planning and to tell management how to do business has facilitated the deterioration. The blind are leading the blind, as computer experts have experienced the same incapacity as personnel managers to follow a consistent course. The military management of personnel data processing has been transitory, with officers arriving with new ideas and short tours. Many of these ideas are the same old bones being moved from one graveyard to another. Civilian computer personnel, though constituting a more stable population, lack initiative and force because they have had to change direction and speed so many times for lack of comprehensive planning. Civilians also lack user experience and are geared to deal with inputs rather than providing service.
A major reason for the Navy’s lack of coordinated direction is the absence of a management system that can direct a widely accepted long-range personnel plan. Consistent plans are often thwarted by the amount of personality cult that is permitted. Each time leadership changes, plans change. Acceptance of the idea that a new boss means change indicates a lack of confidence in the existing programs. Consider the Legion of Merit medals that are given for major accomplishment in personnel at the end of many flag officer tours. Does lack of direction cause the Navy to value change more than consistency?
This lack of direction has become worse since 1974 when the fleet and type commanders gave up control over personnel assignments through consolidation of EPDOs into EPMAC. By not insisting on accountability for personnel policy actions which directly affect fleet performance, these commanders watched passively while the responsiveness and quality of the enlisted system deteriorated. By accepting, without regard to retention, readiness, or morale, the computer manager’s edict that there would be no major change to the distribution system for years, the fleets must also shoulder the onus of blame. At no time has a senior commander demanded reevaluation or challenged system degradation. The bureaucracy must either be regarded as magic, or else it is perceived to be in such hopeless disarray that no amount of objection would help. Perhaps no one speaks up for fear that he may be asked for a solution, or ordered to Washington to help.
Retention is the primary objective of the Chief of Naval Operations. Yet management decisions are made daily which work against the stability of operating units and the individual Navy person. Many retention ideas are rejected because they are too difficult to be managed within the existing personnel system. Why are personnel managers not accountable for a system which inhibits fulfillment of the CNOS objective?
The chaos in personnel management can be corrected by <i comprehensive long-range distribution plan, a management system to carry it out, and no compromising on content of priority. Before discussing such a plan, it must be emphasized that many will insist that the Navy s hands are tied and that no major changes can be made in the personnel distribution system for years- They will cite GAO findings, congressional restrictions, and emphasize the traditional way of doing things. But, too often, tradition has meant that we continue to treat dead ideas as if they were still alive. Those in control seek progress in small, safe, precise, and rewardable steps. But the result is likely to be more patching of the old system and adding a neW label.
It will be argued that the Advanced Information System (AIS) of data automation is the Navy’s long- range plan. But AIS ignores or avoids the enlisted distribution system. The AIS plan may convince GAO or Congress that it provides “total force management,” but it does not fool those familiar with the personnel system. AIS is a plan developed by computer people to serve the narrow goals of data processing. It is not responsive to users (fleet and type commanders and those in the personnel distribution business), and it overcentralizes and creates nev' management layers that will frustrate users who wan1 to benefit from technological advances. The GAO recognized this when noting that there was insufficient user participation in the AIS development. How true' Users must shoulder their share of the blame for no1 insisting on participation in AIS development. Al- goals contribute little to the CNO’s objectives. Tbc AIS goals into the early 1980s relate only to improving accounting, the planning systems, and recruiting support. No attention is given to enlisted distribution until 1984, and the plan is already behind schedule.
What, then, must be done to develop a long-range plan for distribution? First, the Navy must acknowledge that personnel work is too costly to perm'1 amateurs in the system for one-time tours at hig*1 levels. Line officer tours in personnel early and <p mid-career must be a prerequisite to duty as a seniu' officer. Incentives for repeat tours are needed (°l those who show exceptional promise or interest More military direction at the middle manager levc in data processing is needed to ensure these systerf>! are user-orientated. A mandatory training prograU1
for key people reporting to the Naval Military Personnel Command is needed to ensure that everyone is pulling in the same direction. People are our most Valuable resource, and more professionalism, experience> and cooperation are required in their management if we are to retain people in the Navy.
Second, the Navy Manpower, Training, and Personnel Plan (ManTraPers, OpNavInst 5310.13) is t0° general and lacks priorities. The plan sets forth Navy goals and objectives in terms of manpower requirements, authorizations, acquisitions, and classifi- eation, training, distribution, management of human resources, and mobilization. Because each of these Was developed somewhat independently, there is con- S|derable overlap and some conflict. To be viable as a long-range plan, it must be more precise, contain •mplementation schedules, specify accountability, llnd rank needs in the priority established by users.
Third, clear responsibility is required to ensure that the ManTraPers plan is followed and that all Programs meet the total needs of the Navy, rather rhan the g0als 0f a specific office or individual. The NanTraPers plan specifies coordination responsibil- 'ry, but goals are so general that accountability can- n°t be enforced effectively.
Finally, fleet and type commanders must actively Center the arena of personnel policy and management. To tolerate system degradation into the 1980s ls ro ignore responsibility for the negative consequences of such inaction. Fleets cannot continue to Watch transients stack up while waiting for orders when those people are needed on board ships. Fleets Cannot ignore billet revisions when they create per- s°nnel turbulence. Fleets cannot continue working ''uth an assignment system that does not relate directly to billet requirements, permit personnel sUtilization, or handle long lead time training. Each 0 these areas is too important to readiness and reten- tlon to ignore.
As a minimum, fleets should insist on a distribu- tl0n system that will carry out the ManTraPers plan g°als. The system should have computer-supported °n-line detailing directly to billets, with unit Monitors on line and located nearest to the com- rriand, possibly at the type commander level. The |system must accommodate phased rotation, consider
unking constraints, incorporate long lead time tra’ning, and permit the management of a wide range of retention options. Availabilities should be a^S|gned in hours rather than weeks. The display of
ese personnel actions, with statistical trend and
anning data, must be available to managers on data terminals with a minimum of delay. Such systems lre not idealistic. They are clearly within the Navy’s existing capability if their accomplishment is given the highest priority and a policy of maximum centralization is reversed. If not, many of the CNO’s objectives will not be achieved. The Navy cannot hope to operate advanced weapon systems with an antiquated personnel system that is tied to obsolete technology and thinking.
A facelift on the current system will be ineffective. The system is too old, too inflexible, and too prone to breakdown as the result of years of patching. While we should draw from past experience, we should ensure that experience is used as a guidepost, not a hitching post. It is time the Navy retired the existing system and initiated a personnel management system with the potential for growth and success in the accelerating pace that will be demanded in the 1980s.
The suggested system will save transient man years, reduce permanent change of station costs, reduce accounting redundancy, eliminate manual input errors, improve training utilization, and cut administrative costs Navy-wide. Considering all levels of personnel activity, a definite saving will result. The Navy can then demonstrate to Congress and GAO a real “total force management” objective and a plan for its accomplishment.
The quantification of these savings in terms of dollars, man years, and personnel stability will pay for required computer support many times over. This is particularly true if the Navy uses smaller subsystems that can operate independently from the current overtaxed centralized computer system. Combined with a total management plan to implement the changes, this approach should adequately justify an immediate start on a new system rather than waiting until the mid-1980s. Does the Navy have the will to be this bold and decisive?
Commander Pursel enlisted in the Navy in 1952 and served as a yeoman in submarines and on submarine staffs until appointed to warrant officer rank in 1959. He was then stationed in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, responsible for the management of Personnel Accounting Machine Installations (PAMls) in the field. In 1962, he was appointed a limited duty officer (administration) with the rank of lieutenant (junior grade). Subsequent duty has been with Submarine Force Pacific Fleet; Submarine Squadron One; Naval Support Activity Saigon and U. S. Naval Forces Vietnam; Naval Amphibious School, Coronado; Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam; Naval Station Pearl Harbor; and Enlisted Personnel Management Center, New Orleans. Since April of this year, Commander Pursel has been administrative officer at the Trident Training Facility, Bangor, Washington. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in political science from the University of Hawaii and a Ph.I). in leadership and human behavior from U. S. International University, San Diego.