This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Enlisteds Seek Job Satisfaction
I have read many articles in the Proceedings about the problems of the modern Navy: how morale is suffering, how undermanned the fleet is today, and how retention is growing more important. In working on solutions to these problems, it is my sin- cerest wish that I never forget my month as an enlisted man during midshipman summer training.
Struggling with a seabag and a suitbag, I made my way up the gangway, saluted the National Ensign, saluted the officer of the deck, and said, in the most military voice I could muster, “Request permission to come aboard, sir.” That’s when it started. I was halfway around the world, in the U. S. Navy, and was surrounded by eight other midshipmen as we all began a learning experience.
I was fortunate to receive a WestPac cruise assignment. I was to see not only the operational fleet, but also some of the better ports of call in some of the most exciting countries in the world. I studied hard during the academic year preparing for my First taste of the Navy.
My NROTC instructors gave me an
excellent overview of the information I would learn on cruise. I was well educated in the basics of the steam cycle, damage control theories, naval tradition, and the rules governing watchstanding. But the real learning I received from the cruise did not come from my classes or books.
Although my month of experience does not begin to qualify me to expound on the specific examples of officer-enlisted relations, my cruise did give me the experience of being a capable observer from the enlisted viewpoint and a member of our Navy.
As I listened, worked, and talked with the enlisted men on board my ship, I heard one recurring theme: each was searching for job satisfaction. The sailors I talked with were highly motivated men, eager to work for their ship, but discouraged because of a lack of job satisfaction. Few complained about the money they were making. Though some could make more money in the civilian community, the complaint I heard most was against the amount of hours spent working, most specifically, the standing of duty watches. This is a terrific contrast to the civilian jobs I have held, as most of my civilian coworkers were bitter about the amount of pay they received. In terms of motivation, I would rather work with, and have working for me, a single sailor compared to two of my civilian coworkers. I emphasize, however, that the enlisted men and women need the satisfaction of knowing they are doing a good job. While many sailors will never be happy standing a duty section watch, the attitude of a ship’s officers can make a difference to that watchstander. It was my impression, while participating in summer training, that some officers in the fleet still have a “boot camp” attitude toward their men.
I have a great deal to learn about the Navy, and my education will continue for years to come. By the same token, today’s officers surely realize their education is also continuing. I suggest that each officer complement his or her education by thinking about the difference between the leaders and the led. If we, as officers and future officers, can remember to reward excellent work, encourage development in our enlisted personnel, maintain consistent military discipline, and consider the problems from both officer and enlisted viewpoints, the problems we all share will be easier to solve.
Nobody asked me either, but . . .
Lieutenant Joseph S. Mahaley, U. S. Navy
The Shipboard Junior Officer:
Jack of All Trades, Master of None
Reasons cited for low retention figures among surface warfare officers include erosion of pay and benefits, lack of leadership, over-inspection, poor working conditions, and finally, the long separations. Not to minimize any of these factors, they apply to almost all the warfare specialities, officer and enlisted. However, after five years of service on board a frigate and a nuclear cruiser, it seems to me that surface warfare officer retention is aggravated by a unique factor: the typical junior officer’s shipboard billet is an ill- considered collection of tasks and an unnecessarily large burden. In short, it’s a bad job.
Today’s junior surface officer gets three jobs the day he steps on board: (1) principal assistant for a ship’s system; (2) personnel manager and administrator; and (3) watchstander/ trainee. In addition, his areas of expertise must include engineering, operations, and weapons, while the opportunity to specialize in any one of these areas will be limited by the need to acquire the well-rounded background necessary to be a future commanding officer. Soon after he reports, the junior surface officer realizes that even though he is giving a 100% effort, he is accomplishing only about
33% in each of his three jobs.
Why, then, are junior surface officers assigned in this manner? If this is some sort of way of weeding out people, the program has become tremendously successful. It is weeding out young officers at a prodigious rate. The problem is that a lot of those leaving are the officers who are the best watchstanders, are proficient, have common sense, and, best of all, possess a good sense of humor.
The present method of assigning junior officers hasn’t kept pace with the changes in our ships, and as a result it has become increasingly difficult to cope with the growing sophistication of every facet of shipboard life. I propose a change.
First, the junior surface officer would come on board his first ship as a trainee, not as a division officer. The first skill an officer would have to master would be his watchstanding duties—nothing else. This is basically what the nuclear-power officers have been doing for years with outstanding results. The chief petty officers could officially run the divisions and report to an officer department head. The watchstanding training for the young officers would give them the best taste of the surface navy and their seniors the best chance to evaluate their potential. In addition, COs would probably prefer a smaller cadre of officers to train as operators, rather than having to cycle all officers through all watchstations and evolutions.
Second, surface officers should be permitted to specialize in either deck, which would include weapons and operations billets, or engineering. This specialized training would take place at Newport, after the officer had completed his initial three-year trainee tour, had qualified on his watchstations as a surface warfare officer, and had been subsequently selected for department head school. Postgraduate training would be in an area complementing the department specialty or in a subspeciality area. The ability to specialize would give the Navy the officer expertise necessary to manage today’s complex ships. The goal of having commanding officers who are knowledgeable in operations, weapons, and engineering would be fulfilled by the initial three-year trainee tour, in which they would qualify as an engineering officer of the watch, a combat information center watch officer, and as an officer of the deck.
This plan would eliminate the ensign-division officer running between the department head and the chief. It would provide a greater challenge to our chief petty officers and would better use their years of experience. The department heads could concentrate on running their departments with their chiefs, without being preoccupied or diverted by watchstanding duties. The people and equipment managers could work an eight-hour day, providing a much more stable ship’s routine, while devoting their time exclusively to the administration of their men and equipment. For the junior officers, every ship would truly become a training ship. The trainees would report to a senior watch officer, or training officer, and be assigned to training sessions and duties. But training would not be coupled to management responsibilities. And officers standing midwatches would be allowed to rest the next day. This would alleviate the present tendency to tire out the watchstanding officers during underway periods. The captain would have a group of experienced watchstanders near the end of their tours who could teach the newer arrivals just starting their training assignment. After three years of operational shipboard training, the level of our officers’ practical skills should be very high, and the experience gained would be a bedrock foundation for the ultimate goal of command at sea.
1_____
Nome
Pleose send o gift membership/ subscription to:
Proceedings All Year
The
Perfect
Christmas
Gift
Express your thoughtfulness not just once, bur oil through the year.
Give o Novol Institute membership — including 12 monthly issues of Proceedings — to o special friend... neighbor... relative... or business associate this year.
Your gift will be announced by Western Union Mailgram to recipients in the United Stores, and by gift- cord to recipients with on APO or FPO address.
Be sure to send in your order before December 19 to guarantee delivery of the Moilgrom before Christmas Day. Or you can phone your order into our membership offices or (301) 268-6110.
Address
City/Sfote/Zip
□ 1 Yeor.. .$16 □ 3Yeors..S49
2 ____________________________
Nome
Address
City/Stote/Zip
□ 1 Yeor...$18 □ 3 Years..$49
ary/Srare/ZIp
Toral enclosed $__________________
Send fo: Ui. Novol Institute Annapolis, Maryland 21402
Address
My name
Implementation of this system would meet two important objectives: (1) the young junior officer on his first sea tour would be provided a challenging assignment that he could reasonably be expected to accomplish, a change designed to improve his morale as well as his skills; and (2) the shipwide operational expertise gained during the initial tour would allow the department heads to concentrate on their speciality area, and spend their time using that knowledge to the Navy’s best advantage.