The success of our nation’s aviators results in large measure from their superior training. It has enabled them to do well, despite some acknowledged aircraft performance inferiorities. The basic game plan the fighter crews train for is to capitalize on their own aircraft’s strengths while attempting to exploit opponents’ weaknesses. This intention is not so readily achievable as one might like, especially when fighting over hostile territory. There the fighter’s edge is attainable through good fortune and excellent preparedness. Since luck may be regarded as the meeting of preparation and opportunity, the best assurance of success lies in readiness and training.
The problem regarding deployed fighter aircraft comes about because their stringent requirements often preclude adequate at-sea training. As the result of funding limitations and aircraft carrier operating practices, the fighter crew is placed in an ironic position: fighter squadrons are least proficient for the role of fleet air defense when deployed on board their carriers. This need not be so. Responsible people in positions of authority must decide whether to merely “show the flag” in terms of fleet air defense or to spend enough money for fuel to develop highly effective, truly combat-ready deployed fighter units. Most combat scenarios show carrier aircraft opposed by very large numbers of hostile fighters. Success and survivability under these conditions demand a high level of proficiency. Combat readiness is the finished product of the armed forces. As Admiral Stansfield Turner stated in a Proceedings article (July 1977, page 31): “Once the war has started, it will be too late to train, to develop tactics, or to explain options.”
Aircraft squadrons receive what are referred to as “primary mission readiness” funds on the basis of two factors: the number of flight crews attached to the squadron and an average cost per flight hour (determined largely through experience for each type of aircraft). The crews are required by current Navy directives to fly a minimum number of hours per month to remain “combat ready.” There is a certain amount of flexibility in the system to allow for additional funds for additional missions. The minimum requirements remain. To those unfamiliar with fighter aircraft it would appear that the more hours flown, the more combat ready a unit would be. For most other aircraft, this might be a reasonable indicator, and unfortunately the emphasis is placed on amassing large numbers ol flight hours. However, because of the nature of fighter aircraft, it is extremely important to know what was accomplished on each mission. A fighter crew can launch for a mission and remain airborne for more than two hours on an extended navigation flight or return to the field after 30 minutes of intense simulated air combat maneuvering. It would use exactly the same amount of fuel in each case. The cost per flight hour in the latter case is around four times greater than the former. The differences in combat readiness training are inestimable. With the emphasis and funding criteria based on flight hours, training sometimes takes place in other than optimum conditions. Training for combat in suboptimal conditions—under fuel and flight hour constraints—emphasizes a type of flight largely unrelated to the fighter mission.
Shore-based units have much more flexibility in training routines and in the duration of missions than their deployed counterparts. While based ashore, a flight may return at will to the airfield and, in most cases, have reason to anticipate landing with minimum delay. These squadrons may vary the duration of any given flight and so accomplish the training objectives anywhere within the extremes of the 30-minute and two-hour missions.
At some point before a carrier deploys, fighter squadrons attain desired levels of air combat proficiency. Then, all squadrons preparing to embark shift the majority of their training emphasis to carrier landing practice, both day and night. This phase may last as long as three or four weeks. After that come carrier qualifications and training evolutions with the ship. These are necessary, but combat training is on the back burner for some time. After workups and operational readiness exercises, the carrier departs, and no one flies at all for perhaps one and one-half to two weeks. When the crews again commence flight operations, they will have been removed from any degree of active air combat training for at least a month. For the duration of their deployment, fighter crews will never regain the level of combat proficiency they achieved before going to sea. There are several reasons for this.
Carrier flight operations are generally based on a “cycle time.” This is the total time between the launch, recovery of aircraft from a previous launch, respotting all the aircraft aft for the next launch, another launch, and respotting all the aircraft forward to clear the landing area before recovery commences. All this takes time. While cycle times may vary from ship to ship, they usually last about one and one-half to one and three-quarters hours. The result is that the duration of each flight is firmly established prior to launching. Obtaining airborne tankers dedicated exclusively to fighter aircraft training missions has been a long and constant struggle—East Coast and West Coast alike. The result for the fighters is the two-hour flight conducted at the most economical airspeed attainable. Practice intercepts are run under these conditions, although closure speeds between aircraft are relatively slow and aircraft performance is seriously degraded. This is, in fact, negative training because it causes aircrews to become accustomed to operating at speeds far slower than are realistic for combat. Reactions are geared for leisurely intercepts. Slow analysis and inadequate initial actions may be tolerated and often overcome. In a high-speed environment assessments must be quick and actions rapid and accurate. Anything less will lead to failure for the intercepting forces. If the fighter aircraft were able to take on fuel while airborne, there might be occasion for several minutes of serious, hard-fought dogfighting. If no gas is available, then no dogfighting is possible. Under these conditions, emphasis shifts toward proficiency in aerial refueling procedures (without actually transferring fuel) and carrier landing techniques.
The purpose behind any training program is to form habit patterns and establish a high degree of familiarity with whatever system one is training. It enables one to fall back on these habit patterns when suddenly thrust into a demanding situation. Often people have found themselves unconsciously reacting in stressful situations. Those trained in advance have an excellent prospect of responding in a desirable manner—hence, the value of realistic training.
Another factor which directly affects the proficiency of fighter crews is the length of time since they last engaged in air combat training missions. Highly experienced air combat crews can notice a definite decrease in proficiency after a three-day weekend. One can imagine the degradation of reflexes and responses after weeks or months without necessary training.
There are several aspects of an aerial engagement: the intercept, the dogfight, the weapons employment, and the disengagement. Each element suffers with the lack of realistic training. The aggregate sum of each individual deficiency may result in a totally undesirable, quite possibly disastrous encounter. A brief discussion of each aspect will help in providing an understanding of what is required and serve to illustrate the negative effects of improper training.
Once a target is detected by air-search radar, an interceptor has the advantage of knowing where his enemy lurks in the vastness of the sky. During practice intercepts at low, fuel-conserving speeds, closure speeds between aircraft may be about 600 knots. Realistic engagement airspeeds provide closure rates of approximately 1,000–1,200 knots, or aircraft rushing toward each other at closures of 16-20 miles per minute. The difference may be compared to that between a Sunday drive in the country on one hand and the Indianapolis 500 on the other. The slow-speed intercept may be identical in “path over the ground” with the high-speed intercept. The degree of difficulty in rapidly and correctly assessing the latter situation is far greater.
All this is the job of the radar intercept officer (RIO), who is responsible for target detection, threat analysis, and ensuring the interception of the target. He accomplishes the intercept by directing his aircraft’s heading and altitude. In addition to making judgments for his own plane, an RIO may also be required to control and direct another fighter aircraft to assist in the destruction of the target. Unless practiced routinely, the prospect of both planes being properly positioned at the crucial instant is doubtful.
The dynamic and demanding environment of air combat maneuvering (the “dogfight”) encompasses a wide range of extremes. Speeds may range from zero to more than 650 knots, while aircraft accelerations from turning (G loadings) may vary anywhere from several negative to seven or eight positive Gs. It is absolutely essential for aircrews to be familiar with and accustomed to operating throughout this spectrum. The heat of battle is the wrong environment for learning to operate effectively under these exacting conditions. Relative closing velocities are every bit as important in the dogfight as they were in the intercept phase. In this instance, it is the pilot who must rapidly and accurately assess closing, crossing, and opening velocities.
To employ effectively the expensive and sophisticated missile systems currently in use, an almost instinctive familiarity with the lethal range of their weapons is also vital. This can be achieved only through repetitive exposure to possible firing situations. If one is not at home in the air combat maneuvering environment, he will not be able to assess his kill probability accurately. If he is not familiar with estimating favorable launch envelopes, hesitation will result in missed opportunities; premature firing will result in useless missile expenditures. Just as the radar intercept officer requires training to control a section of aircraft during intercept, the pilot also requires considerable practice in maneuvering his own plane while coordinating the maneuvers of his wingman. In addition, the coordination between the pilot and RIO must be established. Crews must decide who is keeping track of which friendly and hostile aircraft at any given instant and when the RIO should be “inside the cockpit” operating the radar.
The experiences of aircrews in Vietnam clearly indicated the need for familiarity with sophisticated weapon systems and acceptable launching conditions. It was determined that many crews grossly misjudged acceptable firing situations, and many missiles were uselessly expended (exclusive of those fired solely for effect or psychological impact). Fortunately, the Navy recognized the need for more effective training. The development of the Air Combat Maneuvering Range near Cape Hatteras has subsequently provided a tremendous asset for reconstruction and analysis of an aerial engagement. Instrumentation carried on board each participating aircraft relays data to ground stations which store the information on tape. Computer symbols portray the aircraft as they appeared during the engagement, complete with virtually all information pertinent to the fight on an accompanying digital display readout. This tape may be replayed and examined at leisure by flight crews and the analysis of tactics and weapon firing conditions studied. The system is expensive, but the training value is inestimable.
Having recognized that current practices and policies prevent Navy fighter readiness from being as good as it should be, let’s examine some possible remedies. For one thing, a revision of the fighter squadron readiness criteria to reflect the number of sorties rather than flight hours would eliminate the pressures to build up flight hours. Training could then proceed with definite goals delineated for each sortie of an air combat maneuvering training cycle. Funding would also have to be increased to allow for the greater operating costs per flight hour. Also available are several options that would increase air combat proficiency while deployed: increasing the number of airborne tankers, variable and/or shorter shipboard cycle times, quick turnaround flights, and operating from carrier to shore and back.
Dedicating more airborne tankers to fighter training is highly desirable for current carrier cycle times. Extensive use of this procedure, however, would undoubtedly meet with considerable resistance from the attack squadrons which must supply these planes. A tanker version of the S-3 Viking antisubmarine aircraft would prevent such a robbing from Peter to pay Paul. The S-3 would have the necessary fuel supply as 'veil as the ability to remain airborne for significant periods of time. An S-3 tanker is not the ultimate solution, but it is a step in the right direction.
Carrier cycle times should not be regarded as sacred or inflexible. As aircraft with greater fuel capacities have evolved, the cycle time has also lengthened. This negates some of the benefits of the greater fuel capacity aircraft and precludes them from operating as they would like to from the carriers. A combination of shorter cycle times and more airborne tankers would permit the types of flying necessary for fighter proficiency. Alternately, thought should be given to a variable system wherein fighters operate on an hourly cycle while others operate on multiples of an hour. Such a variation would enable fighters to operate without the otherwise ever-critical constraints of too much time airborne and too little fuel to accomplish their objectives. The one way to get around the present carrier cycle time is to launch fighters at the commencement of a launch or slightly earlier than normally scheduled. They could then proceed to intercept and engage designated units of the ship’s air wing and return to land at the end of the same recovery (around 20 to 30 minutes after being launched). This “yo-yo” or “quickspin procedure, currently employed, is extremely effective training and very popular among fighter crews. It requires no airborne tankers and incorporates most of the aspects of realistic air combat training. Frequent use of this type of flight would provide tremendous training benefits to deployed aircrews. These “yo-yo” missions, however, are unpopular with the flight deck personnel because of the increased number of aircraft that must be handled on each cycle.
Another possibility exists when suitable airfields are within operating range of the carrier. Crews could launch from the carrier and proceed with their mission. As fuel dictated, they could then fly to these fields ashore to refuel and return for their normal recovery time aboard ship. A modification to this would be to fly an additional mission from the beach and return to the ship on the subsequent recovery cycle. In addition to the air combat training, such options would reduce the requirement for airborne tankers, could ease the deck handling requirements, and would have the added benefit of familiarizing flight crews with the airfields ashore. This alternative is not applicable to Mediterranean Sea operations, because no suitable airfields exist in that area for use by carrier-based fighters.
It has been proven time and again throughout history that inadequate preparation can spell disaster. The rapidly changing and violent arena of aerial combat demands preparation in reflexes and judgment. To accomplish this while deployed, Baron Manfred von Richthofen's words have lasting value: “. . . fighter pilots have to rove in the area allotted to them in any way they like . . .” As is true with many other things, training for air combat maneuvering is never completely forgotten, nor is it ever completely mastered. Constant realistic training is vital. Currently, those units tasked with the first line of fleet defense are not permitted to train adequately for their assignment while deployed. Can we afford to risk denying deployed fighter forces the preparation which will ensure that they can confidently proceed into combat with every expectation of survival and success?