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Leadership and Nuclear Power-”
R. H. Chatham, pp. 78-82, July 1978 Proceedings)
The Wartime Role of Soviet
SSBNs”
(See R. T. Ackley, pp. 34-42, June 1978; c- C. Holcomb, pp. 21-22, July 1978; H. A. Caldwell, pp. 23, August 1978 Proceedings)
q1 .
Clinton P, Harris, Consultant for Bain S C Company—While I do not dispute 2l Lieutenant Chatham’s assertion that j tny decision to abandon my four-year Career as a nuc and leave the Navy , rnay be a manifestation of a “serious L, Personnel problem on board our nu- “61 clear submarines,” I do strongly dis- n<J a8fee with his recommended solution VV/to chat problem.
No individual who has served in the naval nuclear power program will loestion that the Director of the Divi- S'°n of Naval Reactors (NR) exerts a lrect, powerful, and perhaps negative LK 'ofluence on the quality of life on a / d nudear ship, but when you consider the overall track record of the nuclear y 2 Pr°gram in the Navy, that influence jl aPpears to have been both necessary inand beneficial.
. The benefits, which include a re- C Markable nuclear safety record and an extremely reliable propulsion plant, 31 ‘ ave greatly contributed to the suc- rg;]Cessful deployment of perhaps the ^ost important weapon system in the, n'ted States’ arsenal. The Navy’s rtc°rd of practically errorless reactor °Ptration has kept a potentially explo- RL jIVe issue well out of the public JO "delight during a time when public rSt' c°ntroversy has hamstrung private in- )f Ustry’s efforts to develop nuclear Power. The safety record becomes re- nCaprkable when it is compared with j. ^ e operating problems that the uPlities have had with their nuclear ants> particularly since many of the . Ut|lities’ operators were originally utitrained by NR. And, from an engi- ntering point of view, the operating Stress seen by a shore-based generating
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facility is significantly less than that placed on a ship’s propulsion plant.
The value of our submarines’ propulsion plant reliability is particularly significant in light of the apparently poor comparative record of the Soviet nuclear submarine force. Commander Holcomb’s comment highlighted the relatively low percentage of the Soviet SSBN force that is presently deployed, very possibly due to the poor maintenance and operational reliability of the Soviets’ nuclear ships. As Commander Holcomb points out, part of our success is due to the generous share of the Navy’s maintenance budget that is allocated to the nuclear program. A second important contribution, however, is made by the very high standards for training, shipboard maintenance, and cleanliness established as part of an ongoing program by the submarine force. These standards have been consistently, albeit perhaps painfully, upgraded through the annual Operational Reactor Safeguards Examinations (ORSE); a lesson that was not lost on the non-nuclear Navy which instituted a similar inspection program to improve the operational reliability of its 1,200 psi steam propulsion plants.
Clearly the results of the naval nuclear power program have been noteworthy and beneficial, but has the "influence” been necessary? To an extent, the extraordinary success of the program provides the empirical answer. Yet the program continues to face the difficult challenge of attracting and retaining high caliber, technically skilled personnel. It must demand essentially zero-defect professional performance, long (three-to-six month) family separations, and it must succeed in spite of its inability to match the bid that private industry is willing to make for quality personnel, both in terms of pay and family stability. It appears unlikely that Congress, which presently seems to find large military budgets unpalatable, will sufficiently alter the pay scales, and in light of missions assigned as well as the con-
Contents:
Leadership and Nuclear Power
The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs
The Fraudulent Enlistment Caper
Twilight for the Corps?
The Naval Reserve: Separate and Unequal
The Violation of the “Liberty”
Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability
Gimputer Aided Operations Research Facility
’Cause a PBY Don’t Fly That High
The Breakdown in Naval Shipbuilding
Is There a Future for Naval Shipyards?
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
The Alcoholic Navy
What Ship Is That?
I
tinuous need for at-sea training, it is even less likely that the submarine force will see a decrease in its operational requirements. If the choice thus becomes one of continuing an unacceptably low retention rate or risking a relaxation of the pressure for nuclear safety and reliability as Lieutenant Chatham appears to recommend, neither option appears attractive. I believe the most practical alternative involves improving the quality of leadership on board our nuclear submarines.
When Lieutenant Chatham noted the overall low retention rate in the submarine force, he failed to include one key observation: rates vary dramatically from one ship to the next. Often, in fact, the ship with an exemplary nuclear and operational record will also have a very high retention rate. While many factors can influence retention, the plausible explanation for the long-term variations within the program is a variation in the leadership on board the nuclear ships. I would hope that the primary emphasis in solving the personnel problems in our nuclear submarines will be placed on developing a better understanding of the reasons why one commanding officer is able to both meet operating standards and retain his people, while another is not. NR should work toward a system that positively rewards improved retention as well as satisfactory operational performance, and not relax the high standards for safety and reliability that have so significantly contributed to the outstanding effectiveness of the submarine force.
“The Fraudulent Enlistment Caper”
(See T. C. Grzymala, p. 94, July 1978 Proceedings)
Commander Carl H. Horst, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy—In commenting on the cases of two sailors whose courts-martial were aborted based on their assertion that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction as a result of their enlistments which they claimed were facilitated by recruiter misconduct, Commander Grzymala observes that the "whistle should be blown on the military judges who are making these judgments in the sanctity of their hallowed halls.” He then suggests that jurisdictional issues such as these be determined by the Chief of Naval Personnel.
It appears from the recitation of events that Commander Grzymala believes the unsupported, untested accusation followed by a one-officer, informal investigation was sufficient to determine Lewis’ and Dennis’ guilt and that their courts-martial are little more than pro forma devices to validate the punishments which the command wishes to impose. To accomplish this end he wishes to remove any obstacles, such as a military judge, and to sub stitute a decision-maker who might be expected to be more attuned to the preconceived results desired, thereby avoiding adverse rulings which might frustrate the goals to be achieved. Such an attitude is among the principal reasons why the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was considered necessary. It is long past time when all of us in the Navy should have embraced the UCMJ and learned to understand it and apply it. The presence and availability of Navy lawyers does not, I believe, relieve the line officer of this responsibility. A continued ostrich-like attitude has not and will not serve the needs of the Navy.
More to the point, however, is a consideration of Commander Grzy- mala’s criticism of the manner in which Lewis and Dennis avoided being tried for crimes which it clearly appeared they had committed. It appears that at the pre-trial hearings the accused interposed bars to their trials. These bars were their claims that the courts-martial lacked jurisdiction to try them as a result of their void enlistments occasioned by recruiter misconduct. It appears the government couldn’t or wouldn’t bear the burden, which has been declared to be simply a preponderance of the evidence (United States v. Bobkoski, 1 M.J. 1083, 1087-1088 [NCMR 1977]; accord, United States v. Spicer, 3 M.J. 689 [NCMR 1977]), of establishing the requisite jurisdiction in order to proceed to trial.
In one case the recruiter was not present to testify concerning his recollection of the events of the enlistment. In this regard, it has been this officer’s experience (developed over the span ol five years as a surface line officer and 11 years as a Navy lawyer) that the reason for such a failure of proof is, more often than not, the refusal of the convening authority to spend the money necessary to bring the needed witness or witnesses to the site of the trial, or to seek additional funds foi this purpose. Thus, in truth, good order and discipline are only word1 maintaining when it can be done without expending O&MN (operation and maintenance, Navy) funds.
Even where the recruiter testified, it was the military judge who personally heard and observed that testimon) and could thereby judge the credibility of the respective witnesses. Commander Grzymala’s unwillingness tc accept that officer’s professional judgment as an impartial determination ol the issue is equally regrettable for i' further underscores Commandei Grzymala’s failure to understand < crucial part of naval administration Where a commander believes a member of his command has conducted himself in such a fashion as to warran1 severe punishment, Congress has declared that that member shall be afforded a fair and impartial trial conducted according to the principles o: law. An independent judiciary is crucial to the fulfillment of the congressional mandate. Although one ma! not agree with the decision, basi‘ principles of leadership require it to b1 respected and not met with urgings o! recriminations.
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One final comment. The U.S Court of Military Appeals’ decision if United States v. Russo, which Com mander Grzymala decrys, involved ; classic case of recruiter miscondud where the recruiter enlisted Russ( knowing full well he was unable 0 read due to dyslexia and was therefor* disqualified. We have closed our eye: too long to this type of recruiting practice, excusing it with cynica laughter and a wink of the eye, con gratulating the recruiter for his “c»{ do” attitude. I suggest that Corf mander Gryzmala should be callfof for the whistle to be blown on thos1 recruiters who engage in fraudule11
1 recruiting practices or whose perform- rs ance is derelict in failing to determine of those factors which disqualify an apPlicant and those who tolerate such he malperformance. Invariably we find iS' that those of our members who are he unwilling to adjust to military life and he to conduct themselves in a responsible ed fashion are those who did not measure h£ up to the standards for enlistment in oi the first place but were permitted to jd slip past those standards for a variety tf of reasons. In cases such as these, n< Prosecution for fraudulent enlistment 0(1 should certainly be pursued, but the first person to be tried ought to be the
d recruiter.
n- ____________
n) (
if' Twilight for the Corps?”
T1 (See w. S. Lind and J. Record, pp. 38-43, tC July 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Fred J. Frank, U.S. Army (Retired)—1 am shocked that Lind and Record put a dollar and cents value on the 82nd Airborne Di- v*sion, equating it with the ability to supply the Marine Corps with adequate equipment to mechanize it ln 0ne year, or to furnish ten modern transports. Unfortunately, in time of Peace, this is the type of thinking that che military has to contend with. Neither Mr. Lind nor Mr. Record apPears to have any combat experience, °nly paper experience.
I agree with the authors on the need 0r the Marine’ Corps and wish that rn°re of our knowlegeable people in government would speak out for the Services. I admire the Marine Corps an<d its achievements and have spent Part of my lifetime as an Army officer SuPporting both Marine Corps ground a°d air units in combat. We need the Ratines. We also need airborne Army divisions.
The Soviet buildup in Europe con- tuiues to cause much alarm in the est. Will the next battle be conven- tj°nal or nuclear? Will there be a bate- In either event, the availability of a*rborne divisions can change the ®ntire fighting picture on the
attlefield. One airborne division can tie i • •
, UP an entire enemy army while
be*ng held in reserve. Think of that! 0rnmitted, it has the ability to reinforce, take, and hold positions over considerable distances. No, we need both the airborne divisions and the Marine Corps.
Incidentally, I suspect that my battalion made more landings in the Pacific than the average marine battalion. But, we always were happy when they were around.
Harry Noyes—The Lind-Record article is a good one which should be read and heeded. However, in these United States we had better not eliminate the U.S. marine, for, as Voltaire said of God, if he did not exist, we would have to invent him!
“The Naval Reserve: Separate
and Unequal”
(See R. W. Lyons, pp. 44-51, July 1978
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Charles N. Dragonette, U.S. Naval Reserve—As a drilling naval reservist and a survivor of the repeated turmoil of our passion for reorganization, I cannot agree with Lieutenant Commander Lyons’ proposed solution for the Selected Naval Reserve problem being full integration by elimination.
It appears that Commander Lyons has not addressed two of the most significant factors affecting the existing reserves: the reserve structure is not designed solely to elevate ships now in service to full combat manning, but rather to provide for the augmentation of these and some unmanned posts and also to provide a cost-effective nucleus that cannot in the present climate be funded as an active body.
There are many areas of reserve concern which have no real active duty counterpart. One is the Naval Control of Shipping Organization. The only active duty attention paid this area is as a collateral duty. This is probably entirely correct. The recognition, however, of how quickly in an emergency the naval forces may be called upon to guide and protect U.S. and NATO maritime interests has led to the conclusion that a body of trained individuals experienced in the methodology of naval control and specifically designated for that role is necessary. Other reserve components could equally well be cited. For example, reserve members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps whose services are not needed in a slower moving environment of near-peace but would be essential to the unravelling of the myriad of problems that occur with combat situations and long separations from home.
Ships now in a reserve status would likely have to be reactivated and the full combat manning of existing units would soon evaporate, anyway.
To either return reservists to full active duty status or turn them out to pasture would of course cost money—much more money than is now spent keeping the contingency forces in that status. The most significant example of this cost would probably be in the payment of additional medical coverage for the people who came back on full active duty— particularly in the cost of caring for their dependents, not to mention the care given active duty personnel and their dependents in other areas such as housing and base facilities which can easily be strained to capacity.
What the Navy has obtained with its reserve program is, in effect, what it wants without the encumberments of what it does not want. It has and maintains access to a body of significantly capable men and women without the necessity of maintaining a paternalistic and expensive control over every aspect of their lives. The Navy is aware that reservists will not step into full active duty without some adjustments, but then it has already learned to live with that whenever an individual is transferred from one active command to another.
If the Naval Reserve suffers from problems of a significant nature, then they relate to lack of a clearly defined mission for each unit and the ability to train in that mission. To propose a solution that in effect denies the existence of the mission cannot be the answer.
(Continued on page 91)
• W Truver—Dr. Smith recounts
°f rh‘C detad £^e orc*ea* °f crew (A *Te S. intelligence ship Liberty
Tr-5) during the Six Day War of hi l.. *967. His discussion rightly rif *8^tS the acts of heroism and sac- fatej t*le men on board the ill- jc ? . S^'P> a°d is of significant histor- the *nterest because it clearly describes tie /^ents the attack. But his arti- hta ]■S S^ort offering proof that the dia^ * government knew in advance . the ship its aircraft and torpedo
bo.
knou,f°7ernment t0 s“PPtess any
sion
was made—to attack the Liberty
^ears c “utnorityr Arter 11
°f dispute, these critically im- CTt unknowns remain. At best, a -- rn't*1 offers us the chronology of
Stat*d his
iiOpijes *S contention more clearly. He go tCs fbat the Israelis were ready to
Comment and Discussion 91
The Violation of the ‘Liberty’ ”
pj R; K- Smith- PP- 62-70, June 1978 headings)
thetS attac^ec* was American and that the 3ttac^s were indeed intended by
KnowleHr> c V
a&e °* Israeli successes against
Weif ' C to inform us at what .. the decision—if indeed a decidudiK ine L.iDeriy tjjereached. Does the blame lie with Copll°ts of the warplanes or the ^VjthmfiR<^ers °f the torpedo boats, or C e *°cal commanders, or at some v " ievel of authority? After 11
l tr us me cnrunoiogy or
littie8edy ’ a chronicle which provides SoJ**tional insight into the rea- fhe T e"‘nc* the horror and shame of is uS^ae*‘ attack on the Liberty. This ^alJ1 °rtUnate ^ecause an objective latio Sl^°f the future course of the rear^ T ketween the United States Wonid^6^ ‘n which their interests Only b 6 servec* best can be achieved review ^ 3 comP*ete and dispassionate ^here available information.
tainecje ,nf°rmation cannot be ob- ni2e V SUch an analysis must recog- dtawn3t Certa‘n conclusions cannot be b°th W^‘*e conjecture could damage 0 c°Untries’ interests. ne wishes that Dr. Smith had
QO Jq v ajifltiw WC1C ltduy IU
ti°n fny *engths to prevent informa- a ut their successes during the
opening days of the third Arab-Israeli war from being publicized. He argues that the Israeli government feared U.S. and Soviet pressures for a ceasefire before Israel could assure its security through victory. His observation that “Any instrument which sought to penetrate this smoke screen so carefully thrown around the normal 'fog of war’ would have to be frustrated” implies a conscious Israeli governmental decision to curtail all U.S. intelligence efforts by whatever means were available. Yet, he gives no evidence that this indeed was so.
Dr. Smith’s argument that the jamming of U.S. communications frequencies was "proof” of official Israeli knowledge of, and culpability for, the attacks against the U. S. ship is suspect also. Were the Israelis jamming Egyptian or Soviet frequencies as well? Was the jamming specific to the Liberty attack, or was it only part of a general practice carried on throughout the short conflict? Again, Dr. Smith’s discussion does not consider many of the difficult questions that have remained unanswered even after the official Israeli apology and explanation.
Finally, his curious juxtaposition of the Panay incident with the Liberty tragedy shows an insensitivity to the distinct cultural heritages of the Japanese and Israeli people and a misuse of history to draw questionable parallels. And, there is little recognition of the vastly different politico- military milieux pertaining in 1937 and 30 years later. The result is that this comparison provides little understanding of the point Dr. Smith has tried to make and indeed is peripheral to his thesis.
At the time of the Panay incident, imports from the United States figured importantly in the plans of the Japanese government, much like U.S. assistance to Israel has since 1948. But Dr. Smith shows slight recognition of the importance of U. S. public opinion to the future of this trade for both countries. In 1937, U. S. public opinion was running 59% against Japan,
1% for, and the rest undecided, according to Thomas A. Bailey’s A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofrs, 1969). Faced with cries from Congress and vocal pressure groups to do something in response to the Japanese involvement in the July 1937 "China Incident” at the Marco Polo Bridge in Peking, President F. D. Roosevelt, shackled by the Neutrality Act, threatened to impose economic sanctions against both China and Japan, although China’s trade with the United States was but a trickle compared to what Japan imported. Given this background plus the plausible explanation offered by the Japanese that hot-headed pilots had defied Tokyo and on their own attacked the clearly marked U.S. gunboat, it is easy to understand the Japanese government’s haste to apologize and pay full monetary reparation.
On the other hand, Israel in 1967 was clearly the public favorite, enjoying its "underdog” status and the sympathy of the American people. The threat, much less the possibility, that U.S. assistance would be cut off could not have figured prominently in the minds of Israeli leaders. When the Israeli government offered its apologies, Washington and many Americans accepted, although the official Israeli explanation met with criticism and rejection by some. Nevertheless, the historical and cultural heritage of Israel and the selfconfidence and chauvinism of the Israeli people may have precluded the massive national outpouring of grief that was the reaction of the Japanese people in 1937 and 1938, perhaps shamed by the reckless behavior of unthinking pilots. Dr. Smith points with some disdain to this lack of a national reaction to the Liberty attack, as if to imply that such callousness could have permitted the attack to take place.
The ordeal of the Liberty unquestionably has been the “Navy’s bloodiest ’peacetime’ international in-
century.” Dr.
much." we can eliminate low
°ment. We can get strict with
g ent_ °f che twentieth 01 . s article provides an important service in that the events of the actual ttack on the Liberty have been clearly t tonicled. But his discussion of the auses of the attack, much more im- t^ant *n the long run than the at. , ttself, is deficient; he leaves many J'tical questions hanging fire. At a me when the traditional U.S.-Israeli ationship is being closely
elseUt,n‘Zed ‘n Washington and ta^ nere, this shortcoming is regret- •i ,e' (>The deafening silence as to k ’■ and “how?” creates an am- cr nee for conjecture and possible re- taitI|lnat*ons» a result which will cer- , n y fail to serve the best interests of
oth countries.
Tk
e Alcoholic Navy
(j Ut*nant Commander H.G. Redmon, jtljp —There is no doubt that
°p h- avT has an alcoholism problem 0Ur magnitude. Statistics prove it, i * ^ocks prove it, and if there are 0n,v^° don’t believe it, they need mirror^ Dext ^oor or Pefhaps in the
^ 197^'^ Commander Cloward (April ™^ave J*rocee^'n£s> P- 21), however, I in t, e answer to the problem. It lies , mentC att'tude reflected by the state- /10C ^°mmander Cloward attributed ; yand Sen‘0r officer, “I drink that much • heatd^ doesnt bother me.” I have horn * .Same srarement many times SeniorSenior and iun‘or officers, and
|tyeand junior enlisted personnel. Everar\jeducatecf *n alcohol problems. Cer 1 NavV supervisor or division office)^ 3S ^ad plenty of instruction to defjo^11 ex'stence of the problems, symptoms, and identify the ti0ntnt- The solution lies in prevents
Ptob°p! do We prevent alcoholism? We bUt;/ can never prevent it 100%, fhose ..Can make a start by convincing that Sen’°r officers" not to “drink to/ much...
haVeanc* package stores. We can |'0g Party or two without depend- etitettan afc°hol to provide the
officers and enlisted personnel who bring liquors and beer aboard ship (which is against Navy directives in the first place). We can prohibit transport of liquors, wine, and beer on board Navy ships and aircraft and get out of the liquor business at foreign bases where prices are cheap. We can outlaw those Navy traditions which use liquor as a reward or gift, for initiations, or as toasting mediums. We can remove beer machines from BOQs, BEQs, officer and enlisted messes and from Navy exchange snack bars and cafeterias. We can make alcohol totally unavailable through Navy sources, discourage its use at Navy- sponsored social functions, and require specific comments on fitness reports and evaluations concerning an individual’s attitude and performance regarding the use of alcohol.
Sound harsh? We take this exact approach with drugs. Yet we continue to condone alcohol’s use, encourage its sale, refuse to hold drinkers responsible for their actions while under the influence, and generally promote alcohol as standard Navy equipment. Could it be we really don’t want to stop alcoholism in the Navy? Of course we do; we just don't want to stop drinking!
“What Ship Is That?”
(See E. J. Mathews, pp. 61-73, July 1978 Proceedings)
Chief Hull Maintenance Technician Robert F. Sumrall, U. S. Naval Reserve, Curator of Ship Models, U.S. Naval Academy Museum—Commander Mathews has presented an interesting account of the preparation of ONI recognition manuals during World War II. It is a prime example of how the Naval Reserve has been able to meet specific needs of the Navy almost instantaneously.
at "happy hours,” “beer The small drawing of the Yamato was prepared in 1944
from photographs taken during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Chief Sumrall’s drawing, prepared from information assembled after World War 11, suggests that the Navy has a latter-day Commander Mathews in “reserve” today.
Considering the information with which the section had to work, its output must be considered outstand-
ing, both in quantity and quality. One of the most closely guarded secrets of the Japanese Navy in World War II was the size, appearance, and gun caliber of the Yamato-class battleships. It is quite remarkable that Commander Mathews' people, in cooperation with the BuShips and BuOrd, were able to determine the Yamato s characteristics as early and as closely as they did.
The Naval Reserve continues to support activities of this nature with some of the finest expertise available and is prepared for whatever roles it may be asked to assume.
“Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability”
(See J. L. George, pp. 31-40, October 1977;
S. L. Morison, pp. 22-23, January 1978;
J. R. Eckelberry, p. 79, March 1978; N.
Polmar, pp. 93-94, June 1978; R. J.
Ghiradella, pp. 88-89, July 1978; C. D.
Davies, pp. 88-89, August 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) B. E. Kuhse U.S. Navy—I object to the casual dismissal of dipping sonar (i.e. the helicopter antisubmarine squadron—HS) in the projected future development of the medium-size carrier (CVM). Lieutenant Eckelberry’s article contained many points with which I could agree, but this is not one of them.
Many recent various exercises and scenarios (RIMPAC 78, READIEX 78, etc.) have demonstrated that the HS assets with dipping sonar are the most effective ASW units for localization and attack of high-speed, nuclear submarines. The unique capability that dipping sonar provides is, of course, the immediate, accurate fire control solution which can be used to vector other airborne units for attack or (preferably) for a hover-launched torpedo attack. There is no greater feared airborne/surface ASW unit to the sub community than the dipping helicopter. The S-3/SH-3 combination is a proven winning team in the modern ASW conflict. The S-3/LAMPS III combination has yet to be tested.
The nuke sub of today and tomorrow will remain a very difficult ASW problem. The S-3 and P-3 are excellent platforms to make initial detections at long ranges from the task group, but from localization to attack it is an entirely different problem. Once the area of probability is established, let’s bring an SH-3 and a LAMPS III on the scene. The LAMPS III will do nothing that the SH-3 can’t already do—use MAD, sonobuoys, and radar—and will have the same problems obtaining an attack solution. The SH-3 already has the ability to use the same systems (except for radar), plus it has the dipping sonar. The SH-3 dips in the area and upon gaining active sonar contact has an attack solution and is capable of tracking a high-speed, very evasive sub fairly easily. The most obvious use of a dipping sonar is in the high-noise environment. Shallow water with high levels of ambient noise degrades passive systems to the point of being useless against a quiet, slow sub. The same weakness applies in close to the task group; a sub can hide in the noise created by surface ships (especially carriers) and can never be found passively. Active buoys are not the answer owing to their fixed positions, limited lives, and frequency/channel restrictions. The dipping, active sonar is the system with the ability to effectively "delouse” the task group and work in high ambient noise conditions. So let’s discuss the CV/CVMconcept with HS assets instead of LAMPS.
A single airframe system would greatly simplify the maintenance and supply requirements for the helos in the task group, and the helos could just as easily be the new SH-3H with a tactical navigation system and the AQS-13D sonar instead of the LAMPS III. In terms of size and gross weight, the LAMPS III could not be considered a “light” helicopter by any stretch of the imagination—20,000 pounds for the Mk III vs 21,000 pounds for the SH-3H. The proposed Mk III will have improved electronic warfare/radar capability, but cannot these systems also be included on the SH-3 or, better yet, a new airframe designed from the start with a dipping sonar capability? Considering the requirements, perhaps HSL and LAMPS are terms that will become obsolete and HS detachments will be spread through the task group (as HSL units are now) with a CV/CVM as the mother unit.
But back to the SH-3H and fut# developments in HS aircraft. The n( “Hotel” models (not those currently use on the East Coast and recently1 troduced to the West Coast) can ! expected to have the AQS-13D sot with 1,500 feet of cable (vs the p1 sent 500 feet in the AQS-13 A/B). ’ll improved capability will greatly ( pand the search area for those su seeking to take advantage of df layers and sharp negative water (f\ dients by going deep and fast. It >1 has improved signal processing caf bility for better detection/ranging *•' faster reeling machine speeds wh; reduce the “dip cycle” times and all1 for quicker repositioning while tra( ing a fast sub. The tactical navigao computer with cathode ray tube <1 play will greatly enhance the navif tional capability of the SH-3 with s'1 sequent gains in dip-to-dip tracks planting sonobuoy fields, etc. I1 proved on-board sonobuoy process11 is also in the cards for the HS comU1 nity in the near future.
In short, how well does the LA>’
III compare to an aircraft with a ® [ ping sonar capability? I think the ^ swer is obvious and hope that ip 1 q future, the HS “dippers” are not wf - ten off so casually. ^
--------------------------------------------- 4
“Computer Aided Operations )
Research Facility”
(S"J.E. Manning, pp. 113-115, January
1978 Proceedings) J (
if
K. Merl, Vice President and Gefl^Q Manager, Sperry Systems Manoi ment—Readers of Commander ning’s excellent article might be 1 terested to know that the Comp11® Aided Operations Research Faci|M (CAORF) was designed and built by '■ Sperry Division of the Sperry R® Corporation. As the article not® CAORF is being used by the U- J Maritime Administration primarily® basic and applied research. Ano® innovative marine simulator, one t®| as a commercial shiphandling trait® was also designed and built by SpT’ for Marine Safety International LaGuardia Airport in New York is now operational.
3"nd
lSp0rt- With
CnPh an*j With a top speed of 205 'his twja ferry range of 1,200 miles, *r°dUCtn en8'ne aircraft remained in ervic6 i°n Until 195 L It is still in •&ypt c* t^*e United States, Canada, "e^an'd n^an^> Indonesia, and New
[Cause a PBY Don’t Fly That hgh”
ee W P c I
■ 97„. ' . Yarborough, pp. 59-73, April , q ’ , K- Wildman and G. O. Boles,
’ ^Uly '978; J. T, Hayward, pp.24-25, ‘“gust 1978 proceeding5). PP
<Ustenam Colonel Harry lV. Eduards, [ej y!ne C°rps (Retired)—Rela- y ew pilots had the opportunity arnphibian aircraft during
Lugh.raar buiCaptain scar_
Je ■ , S artlcle and pictorial do a ,sJ° telling the Consolidated
I. story. However, many Navy, rrtine Corps, Coast Guard, and vi/ ir Corps aviators also have hibsrnernor'es °f the Grumman am-
[r ’ which were extensively used.
its first Navy contract > lo W*t^1 an amphibious float, and lUn(jn^ *'ne °f amphibian planes was e four years later with the pro- °f the jf, a utility biplane. ~F> or Duck, quickly followed ouilt continuously into the ocks were used for target tow- P otographic missions, re- 'ssance flights, and as utility otts.
:t Carne the Navy JRF or Goose, established an international record for amphibians of 186.07 'p 19^9. Powered by two 450 ratt & Whitney Wasp Jr.
’ Goose had a range of 650 ifie Srna^er J4F version called the °o was built to yield a speed of q 0Ver a 750-mile range. From ■ 19 q^0 i94l, Grumman produced /ere u °S.C arnphibians. These aircraft iC^ast q6 ^ the Fleet Marine Force, 3f!'r°l, aer,Uar^’ an<f Navy for coastal pa- Of'f tish rfai Survey work, and, with the ,jO,;avigati0<>rCeS ^un<^er Lend-Lease) , as lO:0ys. p°n tra'ners and coastal con- ;$fhich ber°^UCt'0n t^le Widgeon, ’rcraft6carne a very popular executive ' g Afte’ ^as cor|tinued until 1949.
'On fe0r^ War II, further evolu- I Su ted in the Mallard which tansJXtensive use as an executive
From this amphibian technology, the Grumman Company produced the last and greatest of its amphibian line, the HU-16 Albatross in 1947. It proved to be one of the most versatile amphibian aircraft in the world, and Grumman built a total of 464 of them for use by U.S. forces and the flying services of 15 foreign governments. Its various missions included: search and rescue, antisubmarine warfare, cargo and personnel transport, space vehicle recovery, patrol and surveillance, and training. Albatross are powered by twin engines providing speeds up to 205 knots, a ferry range of 2,800 nautical miles, and a takeoff gross weight of 35,700 pounds. In 1962 and 1963, pilots of the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force established nine world records with Albatross for speed, altitude, distance, and load-carrying ability.
Many of these amphibian aircraft are still performing various jobs in many parts of the world, but the
largest operational fleet is now part of Antilles Air Boats. This ten-year old organization has established itself as the world’s largest amphibian airline. In addition to a fleet of 19 Gooses, two Mallards, and four Albatross, two British four-motor Short S-25 Sandringhams have been added to the airline’s service. In use initially, but now retired, were two PBYs and a Sikorsky VS-44—the last of its kind and recently given to the Navy for its aircraft museum at Pensacola.
Skipper of this amphibian armada is Captain Charles F. Blair, a pilot of heroic stature, w'hose interesting career has spanned more than half a century in civil and military aviation. Blair was born in Buffalo, New York, was a 1931 graduate of the University of Vermont, and received Navy flight training in Pensacola in 1932. Having transferred from the Navy in 1953, he holds a Distinguished Flying Cross from the Air Force and a reserve commission as Brigadier General in
the Air Force.
In May 1951, Captain Blair flew a single-seat P-51 Mustang fighter across the North Pole to demonstrate the feasibility of polar flights. Flying 3,300 miles from Norway to Alaska using celestial navigation with the aid of a sun compass, bubble sextant, and wristwatch was no mean feat. This daring exploit earned for him the Harmon Trophy for the first singleengine solo flight and the Thurlow Award for "outstanding contribution to the science of navigation.” That particular aircraft, named Excalibur III, is now a part of the Smithsonian collection on display at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D. C. Capitalizing on his polar experience, Blair led the first flight of jet fighters across the Arctic and the North Pole in Operation Julius Caesar in 1959—a flight that required two airborne refuelings.
After military service, Charlie Blair resumed his career in civil aviation as a Pan American pilot. He continued until his retirement as a senior Pan Am captain in 1969, accumulating more than 35,000 hours of flying. Yet, his aviation pioneering spirit did not leave him upon retirement. He had an idea that led him back to that which continued to hold a great fascination for him—seaplanes. Well before retirement, he had tested the commercial possibilities for an amphibian airline in the Virgin Is
lands by using his spare time to fly passengers out of St. Croix in a refurbished Goose that he had acquired in
1963.
From this small beginning, he began the search for the necessary amphibian aircraft. A prime source proved to be the Alaskan Airlines, which had converted from amphibs to land planes on several of its routes during the late sixties. As a source of flight personnel, Captain Blair sought retired military pilots who had a continuing passion for flying. Nearly all 25 pilots employed by Antilles Air are retired military officers from all services: Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Royal Australian Flying Corps. These pilots have amassed thousands of flying hours as captains for Antilles Air Boats. Adopting a policy of hiring pilots who have about 20 years of experience, Blair assigns them to a check pilot to fly 200 landings in a seaplane to familiarize them with the aircraft and operating conditions. This high degree of experience and training has paid off in an excellent safety record for the airline.
For his personal co-pilot, Blair chose his wife, the former Hollywood screen star, Maureen O’Hara. In her new role as executive vice-president of the airline, Maureen has devised a color scheme for the planes and flight personnel using the red and black colors that Captain Blair adopted many years ago as a part of his individual crest. Featuring a hawk in flight, his insignia traces back to an old weather vane on his Vermont farm. Pilots, emphasizing the informality of the
entire operation, frequently don muda shorts for comfort in the tf, cal climate.
One who has the good fortune t;, the first aboard may sit up front if co-pilot’s seat. There is but a si1, pilot on these relatively short and the cockpit visibility is excd as the plane comes in for a land
. r . ..]r»f.
weaving its way through a flotw sailboats, tugs, merchantmen, jT boats, and an occasional steatf which ply the busy harbors of md these colorful islands.
The seaplane ramp for flight of, tions at Santurce on San Juan originally part of the former
rat
1
Kr
'r
Ten
isf
to!
apa
fgn
or
Naval Air Station. It offers at1,^ cellent downtown location, similj^ other convenient facilities in
i^d
ers
throughout the Virgin Islands. ^ waterfront landing areas at dowfl!j locations, passengers are spared^ long journeys to and from di*. airports and as a result, the amf have become the favorite vehid{ residential inter-island traffic.
By now, the amphibs and boats have become a familiar and come sight among the islands Caribbean. And the Sandring1 have even ventured to distant poOj, Ireland and England for open*1^ during summer months. With 40 flights each year and nearly twO"'( a-half million satisfied customers' pilots of Antilles Air Boats proved that the jet has not taken V(,a completely. There are still people eager to rediscover the j°> the piston engine and the ageless phibians.
'gn
tew
‘'ea
nee
igfe
0'k;
is
flu
itej
her
Oty,
[rea
hia
■Afy
J
1978
newer ships are not as good as
lediat,
T,
e post-war era
many specs, too many inspec-
Fo„t0° much PaPer
50 Sh' r°tat'on naval officers 5 tl'ratesI^^ar^S ta^en over by conglom- I "pL
ie/1Cre 6 |0SC ship construction has c ,r ^ *n an unexplainable way
Jes
he Breakdown in Naval upbuilding”
\ J 3' Newell, pp. 24-31, January
, A»/jPennypacker. P- 25, June 1978 C nceedings)
'*faJv Admiral J. r. Lisanby, U. S. f ^omrnander, Naval Ship Engineer-
[re'Uer I would like to address
' teakrl eWe^ s seven causes for “the °wn in naval shipbuilding:”
1 Ou^ ^ac^a8e Procurement
UUL AS iTUl
e of World War II and the
00
°ns.
i-h lnadequacies in the Navy’s
1 "i To |Se S^'P design activity area
^achage Procurement was ini- inntil ’n *965 and remained in effect c^njp cj ^*• The Navy bought two ’ Ha C ajSeS us*ng this approach—the all,ieritanc Dd-963. While the procure- nal,‘slikej>^r0aC^ used f°r these ships is r0kj6 because of some inherent
^Pab'r1''’ t^lt sbips exceed by far the Affined *tleS °f previous ship classes der ^ to accomplish similar missions. a^>D-96*?rnP*e> we have chosen the 1* laSStsasit ship for a number of new ‘%d D ’ Such as the I1N-993, DDG-47, ['ersatil ^"7’ ‘c not been for the ^‘Sned an<^ innovative features de- ea^avvmt0 the original DD-963, the ^i,exv .T°U*d ^ave bad to design brand ’Ps for different and newer
cle ^0n suites.
:signsNewe11 hails our World War II fliieetjnand implies that we are not (8fee ^ tb°se standards today. I dis- ^his poSjtron8ly with Mr. Newell on ^ .tjuion Today's warships are better
°i'rePow and carry more effective
^act, jj-er Per displacement ton. In 1 nenfCurtent research and develop- Osvecj ac<ltusition programs are al- 5freate t0 fUn tBeir course, we will tiallg 3 new> powerful, although n/eaPon' Warsb'P fleet. The close in •11 nt%S'VStern (CIWS) is designed into warships and the
5 aPabiiite*'C°Pter ^ a Potent a‘r y on even our smallest surface
warships. Gas turbines have been adopted for the DD-963, FFG-7, and DDG-47 classes. The number of people manning a typical larger destroyer is down from 400 to 250 and in frigates from 240 to 175. Many new ship hull forms have been brought to a stage in development that they can be adopted for full-scale fleet testing. These hulls (including the surface effect ship [SES], air cushion vehicle [ACV], and hydrofoil) can travel faster than 80 knots on the ocean’s surface.
I agree that we have a problem with our specifications. From a designer’s standpoint, most such problems appear to result from loosely worded specifications. The Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding at Newport News recently supplied 40 examples of specification and contract wordings which have created problems in ships built there. The following extract from one shipbuilder’s directive clearly illustrates the problem:
“Rewrite future specification in the light of possible adversary relations between the government and the shipbuilder, recognizing that the shipbuilder is only obligated to meet, and will only meet, the minimum requirement of the specification.”
For example, when specifications require a 6'6" overhead clearance and state that in no case shall the height be less than 6'3", the contractor generally makes little effort to increase height over 6'3". It should be noted that it is no longer the Supervisor of Shipbuilding’s principal job to continually check the shipbuilder’s detail design and the construction of the ship. Several years ago the Navy made an explicit decision to no longer provide free inspection service to shipbuilders, making the shipbuilder assume responsibility for correct work.
We must, however, make certain that the approach taken in writing specifications reflects this modified inspection philosophy and provides the Supervisor of Shipbuilding with the contractual leverage necessary to carry out the intent of the specifications. For example, replace “where practicable” with words such as . . unless a waiver is granted on the basis of physical impossibility or excessive cost in
specific areas.” The ship specifications are the ultimate products of the design effort. Flawed specifications can destroy a creative effort, for if the shipbuilder is permitted to build something other than what the Navy intended, we (the ship designers) have failed to fulfill our responsibility.
I disagree with Mr. Newell’s statement that we rotate naval officers so frequently that it has an unfavorable impact on the new ships we build. In fact, we kept the program manager of the FFG-7 in the same job for five years, i.e., from the time the requirements were set for the FFG-7 until the launching of the first ship in the class. And, since award of the LHA contract to Ingalls in 1969, three officers have been directly involved in the program, by having them rotate between the ship project office in Washington and the supervisor of shipbuilding office in Pascagoula. Such continued coverage by alternating tours is now the norm rather than the exception.
With regard to Mr. Newell’s complaint with respect to the takeover of shipyards by large diversified firms, all I can say is that the Navy, of course, does not influence the ownership of the shipyards. And the fact that many of the private yards are now part of conglomerates is only a result of free enterprise upon which the U. S. economy has been built. The inference may be drawn, however, that a significant change has taken place in the Navy/contractor relationship, primarily due to the conglomerates’ total dedication to profit center management versus the partnership relations which once characterized the ship acquisition scene during the days of contract allocation.
Turning to the issue of cost, I have plotted on Figure 1 the relative cost- per-ton of post-World War II U.S. Navy escorts using “follow ship” costs in fiscal year 1977 dollars. It is interesting to note that during the last 25 years the shipyard part of the shipbuilding cost-per-ton has not increased at all, and it’s the government- furnished equipment costs that have dramatically increased in the ten years between the previous escort procurement and the FFG-7.
£
.of,
minor design changes were expe1
Several places in the article, Mr. Newell suggests that the Navy lost its capability to design ships when compared to World War II and the immediate post-World War II period. I strongly disagree with this allegation. The Navy maintains a substantial inhouse capability for ship design because modern warships are much more complex than commercial ships and because technology is expanding at an explosive rate. We retain this core of naval engineering talent in spite of continuing restrictions on employment levels of government workers because they are essential to preserving the superiority of our naval forces. This is true because our naval design force provides engineering support through the research and development, test and evaluation, and construction phases and on throughout the life of the ship.
Mr. Newell has charged that our recent ships have suffered as a result of our no longer having the technical expertise to guide and influence the complexities of naval engineering and ship acquisition. On the other hand, others have charged us with almost the opposite, i.e., too strict in-house control of our warship designs resulting in inadequate introduction of in- . novative concepts into our new warships because industry is not allowed to inject its innovativeness freely. I strongly disagree with both charges and even more specifically with the charge that our warships lack adequate- innovative concepts.
In response to the charge that the Navy stifles innovation by too much in-house control of design, we should recall that about a decade ago at the behest of its civilian secretariat the Navy broke with tradition and asked industry to design three of its ships from some very general sets of requirements. After three designs, the experiment was halted because most agreed (including the shipbuilding industry) that this approach failed to live up to the hopes upon which it was sold. In retrospect, this experiment in innovative defense systems acquisition lies as the cornerstone of today’s major shipbuilding problems. When Litton Industries, the largest of the shipbuilding conglomerates stumbled, the remainder of the industry was inextricably bound to repeat the pattern.
The reasons for the failure arc- numerous, but some of the more important issues were:
► The design phase for a new ship class is not the time for the discovery and implementation of untried technology. We should, instead, be integrating existing technology. Major, unproven technological innovations (including major new developments in production techniques) should not be accepted in an acquisition program for the fleet but rather tried on an experimental basis on| or two existing ships to assure tha1 performance of the new concept | indeed work.
► Whereas in the space pro# technological breakthroughs necessary and cost was almost n1 ject, these conditions do not ex1* conventional surface ship progt* Therefore, the argument for the technical innovation through competition of private enterpn- not applicable.
► A stable work force that can the problems of integration is far valuable than the supposed invt-n1 ness of an organization haphazard sembled for a new ship design.
Warships are an amalgamati1'1 many different systems—a huj contain the other ship compon* propulsion machinery to move ship, and a combat system for 1,1 sive capability. Continuous restf development, and test and evaluj in all these areas are vital, if vli new options are to be available h ship designer.
Unlike the aerospace or electi industries, the shipbuilding ind1 traditionally maintains only engineering capability necessary detail design. Some shipyards h11 independent design agent for function, for no one shipbuilder tains a large, talented design without a constant design worklo* circumstance which has proven fl impractical in light of the vagaf1' our five-year shipbuilding progri1 j
After each of the three ship struction awards of the late when the Navy had industry p£l the early stages of design, there * gap of a few months before the competition. During that period- shipbuilder—other than Litton winner)—disbanded its design because it was too expensive to 11
tain without government supp°ll because the company decided n°j compete in another program. Eve11. Litton design team, the three' winner, had nearly disappeared h) 1973 because the ships it h^ ■ signed were in production and
Considering the recent upsurf* naval ship design activities.
enough programs exist for long enough periods (years) to sustain even three private organizations in competition. This points to a single center for naval ship design.
Early in 1971 we considered what organizational and contractual method and policies could sustain a large, constant, competent, experienced, costconscious, and unbiased design work force in view of overall reductions of government personnel. Our answer was a design partnership of government and private industry.
Next to be considered was a definition of the partnership which met the following objectives:
► All early program planning done by the Navy
► Major technical decisions made by the Navy
► Parts of the pre-contract design work done by the Navy (to maintain expertise in such work)
► The bulk of the design work performed by independent design agents
► The design agents to be located near the Navy’s designers to facilitate daily face-to-face communication
► The Navy’s planning to support a stable work force for the design agent
To achieve these goals, the Naval Ship Engineering Center increased its capacity to handle the large volume of new ship designs by shifting some of its fleet maintenance work force to new design work, leaving more of their fleet maintenance tasks to outside concerns. Incentives also were provided to foster the establishment of a stable, competitive community of design agents near NAVSEC which could be tasked on a quick turnaround basis through proper contractual channels.
Today, NAVSEC is responsible for the execution of all U.S. naval ship designs. It has dedicated the equivalent of 400 men per day to new ship design work along with a private design agent work force of about 800 more people, resulting in even more private sector participation in the early stages of warship design.
In further recognition of the importance of the ship design function in creating new and innovative warships for our future fleet, the Naval Sea Systems Command plans to elevate the function of new ship design organizationally from a division of a field activity to a deputy commander level in its Washington headquarters organization. The impact of this decision, though as yet untested, may be expected to reinforce the strong technical excellence once the hallmark of our ship acquisition community.
In conclusion, I believe we have evolved over the last few years an arrangement that is producing the best product that the state of the art in the field of naval ship design offers, and the results substantiate this claim.
“Is There a Future for Naval Shipyards?”
(See C. H. Whitehurst, Jr., pp. 30-40, April
1978 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral E. H. Batcheller, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I will not comment at any length on the claims problem. There is blame enough in that sorry mess for all of the parties concerned. The size of the problems can be attributed to the procurement procedures instituted by the Department of Defense under Secretary Robert McNamara. I must, however, pick up the gauntlet that Dr. Whitehurst has thrown down on the need for naval shipyards.
Dr. Whitehurst calls for complete reliance on the private sector to build and to maintain the Navy’s ships. He states he based his case on economic analysis rather than political consideration, observing that work in private shipyards costs less than similar work in naval shipyards. He finds only two persuasive arguments for maintaining naval shipyards: first, ready availability in times of peak workload in the private sector, and second, that by definition a naval shipyard will give priority to naval vessels.
From July 1959 to September 1961, I served as Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Naval Inspector of Ordnance at the Fore River Shipyard of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in Quincy, Massachusetts. When I reported to this duty, the yard had Navy contracts in excess of half a billion dollars in addition to contracts for several merchant tankers. These Navy contracts were for:
► The conversion of the light cru1 Springfield (CL-66) into a fleet flag si armed with guided missiles (CLG-7)
► The construction of the guid missile destroyer leaders Farm (DLG-6), Luce (DLG-7), and MacDonC' (DLG-8)
► The construction of the nudf powered, guided-missile cruiser I Beach (CGN-9)
► The construction of the nud( powered, guided-rnissile destro leader Bainhridge (DLGN-25).
In July 1959, contracts between company and several of its unions out and, unilaterally, the comp put into effect the provisions it 1 been offering for a new agreement the time a steel strike was in progP Apparently local union leaders waf' to see what sort of a settlement wd be reached in that dispute since, though threatening to go out strike, they took no action. The slt strike was settled mid-January 1” and between the 22nd and 25^ that month local union mend1 walked off their jobs.
The Springfield had run succe* sea trials and was 96% complete. prospective commanding officer j most of her crew were on board. * a little bit of luck and a lot of pefi* sion we were able to get the ship1 of Fore River and into the Bos* Naval Shipyard early in the strik( she could be completed. This trap enabled her to join the fleet only 3 tie behind schedule. All of the ships lay dormant for almost months.
By the fall of 1961, the Fore yard had delivered the Long B& Farragut, and Luce. The McDor followed soon after, and the Bainfr was delivered in 1962. Unsucce** in obtaining further Navy Bethlehem then dosed the ship) which eventually was bought by ^ eral Dynamics Corporation.
In April 1963, I assumed comP1' of Charleston Naval Shipyard, sefV at the same time as Industrial ^ ager, Sixth Naval District. In add'1 to managing the operation of the P* shipyard, my responsibilities ind111 contracting for, inspecting, and proving naval ship repair work I]
formed in private shipyards from Charleston south to Savannah, Georgia, and north to Wilmington, North Carolina.
When I arrived in Charleston the naval shipyard was gearing up to change from a workload made up of World War II-type destroyers, diesel submarines, auxiliaries, and mine craft to one in which nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines and missile-armed destroyer types would predominate. To support this change, a number of projects were under way and were in various stages of completion. They included:
► A module repair facility—needed to overhaul and modify or update components of the various black boxes of the fleet ballistic missile system
► A multipurpose building—fitted with offices, shops, and storerooms to permit crews of fleet ballistic missile submarines, displaced with much of their gear from their ship during overhaul, to carry out their necessary administrative, logistic, and maintenance tasks
► A noise measurement facility— used to determine the level and sources of radiated self-noise in submarines
► A new dry dock—longer and deeper than any others in the yard with higher capacity cranes (Not long after I reported, we decided we had to lengthen and deepen one of the older docks and to acquire a heavy lift floating drydock.)
► A nuclear repair facility—equipped and arranged to safely handle repairs to machinery components from the reactor compartment
► Refueling modules—a complex of large enclosed structures that can be arranged over and alongside a submarine for removing highly radioactive spent fuel elements and installing fresh elements
► A program of upgrading machine tools, utilities, and test equipment in the already existing shops and laboratories and on the working piers
These improvements cost well over $25,000,000 in mid-1960s dollars.
aia
They could not be duplicated &c: for under $100,000,000. Pr>pri shipyards will have to be given a fori deal more than time to aC<P^ facilities equivalent to those alreaptc place in naval shipyards suctyai Charleston. 1113
External to Charleston Naval lat yard but contiguous to it or in1111 immediate vicinity are a naval st*mf with barracks, BOQs, a commwPj an exchange, a dispensary, and a v° ety of recreational facilities, a ,tu hospital, a naval supply centersta FBM training center, several 'Pe schools, and government-subsid'tai low-cost housing for enlisted $ families. It would take a good more than time for the Navy to pF'a<^ ". . . in locations where they be lacking,” on even an austere 1" support facilities remotely equi'1 as to what the Navy has in its own * ^ yards. In
If we go the private sector f1’ n‘ the troublesome questions arise '■st which shipyards would acquire 1 necessary facilities and how. Gr9
What about the end of your towed array £
Heading data is in the torm of serial Gray ! ! Code on two wires with a transmit range i i of 15,000 feet. Resolutions of 10 and j .35° are available.
DigiCOURSEVemote magnetic heading sensors will help you know where it is.
DigiCOURSE underwater heading sensors spaced along a towed array provide accurate directional data to the towing vessel for monitoring and processing.
Heading sensors for this purpose are optically scanned magnetic compasses in cylindrical form that withstand pressures to 10,000 psi and are gimballed for 360° continuous roll and ± 60° pitch.
Two available dimensions are 1,75"D. x 3.70"L. and 2.75"D. x 4.87"L.
The format is easily multiplexed to provide individual data from up to 100 sensors on a single twisted pair buss.
Ask about DigiCOURSE Sensor Models 31 5, 318, 319, Binary Control Unit Model 350 and Data Acquisition Unit Model 290.
Write or phone Bob DeRoche:
DIGICOURSE, INC.
P.O. Box 50699, New Orleans, La. 701 50 Phone: (504) 733-6061 • TWX 810-951-5073
ttany of the highly specialized d racilitieS are already in place in a few Pr'pnvate building yards, and, for the i a. oreseeable future, most of these will icq e needed for the Navy’s shipbuilding reajptogram. To bring other private ship- uC ar^s *nto the major combatant ship ;a^a'ntenance t>us*ness would require, il-at the very minimum, a firm com- inmitment on the part of the govern- stffnent to furnish the shipyards with an niss Ppropriateworkload of ships in a 3ftu Urne W^*cb would make the ven- 3 re attractive from a profit tet| tan^P°int- I question whether a com*; , etlt*ve environment could be main- ’i 1 under such circumstances.
11 tu n sb°tt, I fail to find, in analyzing ,6 c°urse of action Dr. Whitehurst
A , Vocates, the economic benefits he rf bairns for it
'. n the other hand, my experience
thaT* 'n^ustr‘al manager convinces me n im brivate repair shipyards have an
P°rtant place in the Navy’s mainte- rc nance
* . Program. For conventional,
° • t^°nvar^ hull rnachinery and
rf etrical work, providing the amount id demanded of them is appropriate to their size, private yards do an excellent job and at lower cost than naval shipyards. They do well also on World War II-type ordnance and on the less sophisticated electronic systems. With more complicated systems they have problems, unless, as was the case at Charleston, they can hire moonlighting naval shipyard-trained mechanics.
Setting aside economic considerations, the overwhelmingly compelling reason for the continued existence of naval shipyards is that they are part of the Navy, thus subject to military command. They are and must be immediately responsive to the demands of the operating forces. Just as fleet units are required to maintain a high state of operational readiness, naval shipyards are required to maintain a high state of industrial readiness. They must have at hand not only the facilities and equipment required to meet any maintenance need of the ships for which they have assigned responsibility but also personnel with the technical knowledge and specialized skills demanded by that responsibility. These facilities, knowledge, and skills must be available without regard to frequency of need or to the expense of having them in constant readiness.
Naval shipyards have no choice. They must accept emergent or late work despite the disruptive effect such work may have on schedules or on the allocation of manpower and other resources. Cost becomes a secondary consideration. Priority is called out on the basis of military exigency and not on considerations of profit.
I think it important we recognize that our military establishment, by its very nature, is non-economic. We maintain it to ensure our national survival. Any contribution it may appear to make to our national economy is incidental and on vigorous analysis illusory. To attempt to structure any important component on purely economic grounds is to lose sight of the fact that effectiveness is no less important than cost in the term cost effectiveness.
BRITISH VESSELS LOST AT SEA 1914-18
A reprint of the original official publications Navy Losses and Merchant Shipping (Losses) first published in 1919 by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London
In August 1919, less than a year after the First World War ended, His Majesty's Stationery Office issued two important House of Commons papers. One was entitled Navy Losses and the other Merchant Shipping (Losses). Not surprisingly, original editions of both these reports are extremely scarce today but, although prepared so soon after the cessation of hostilities, they are still invaluable reference sources for anyone interested in 20th-century military affairs.
Now both these indispensable papers have been combined into one casebound volume. Apart from a minor alteration in the order of the contents, they are reprinted exactly as they first appeared, but in a smaller, more
practical format. .
All the information is presented in clear and concise tabular form for ease of reference.
This faithful reprint of two rare collectors' items will be eagerly sought after by naval historians and shipping enthusiasts throughout the world.
1977/184 pages
A Naval Institute Book Selection
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