This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
I’ #
Ss*>ig depth charges over the fantail sec^ against the slou’-moving ^erged U-boat in World War II. But
snf)^ *°day’s nuclear-powered {r^arines can outrun even the
nehhticated sPruance (DD-963). The a thy Spruance and her sisters, with
^eir I . ■ r i
fa lar&e> active sonars, may in fact be less effective for ASW than aircraft
H}Jo/ J
attack submarines. Why, then, are ^ laundering resources on cruisers,
Jfoyers, and frigates whose day is r^e'J ^sn’t it time to salute and sink (by s*n8 to replace) an outmoded surface vy before Congress or someone else does?
JL he noted British military historian Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart once commented that, “Military services are temples of ancestor worship.” The naval force planner, military or civilian, is responsible for ensuring that “ancestor worship”—the tendency to structure future naval ship procurement to reflect past Navy force structure—does not have undue influence. He must ask whether the types of ships and aircraft—surface combatants, aircraft carriers, attack submarines, land-based ASW aircraft, etc.—which now comprise the Navy are sufficiently effective in comparison with various alternatives so that more should be procured. Since each type of system has its group of adherents, some with strong emotional ties to their warfare specialty within the Navy, the force planner is seldom a popular figure.
Nevertheless, the “surface navy” of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates must be analyzed in comparison with its potential alternatives. In a time when money is short and the Soviet naval challenge is growing, the United States cannot afford continued procurement of any type of ship with less than optimum cost-effectiveness. The effectiveness of the surface navy can best be studied by examining its role in its main missions: antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antiair warfare (AAW), and surface warfare.
Antisubmarine Warfare: We must first ask whether the Navy’s definition of the antisubmarine mission is realistic. Navy presentations sometimes leap from the existence of a large and powerful Soviet submarine force to a “Battle of the Atlantic” scenario, in which the main ASW task is protecting Europe-bound convoys. But as an increasing number of defense authorities have recognized, a war in Europe, which is likely to begin with little or no warning, would be decided in a matter of weeks while convoys Were still being organized in U.S. ports. This suggests that convoy escort, the ASW mission for which many of our surface ships are best suited, may not even exist in a NATO conflict.
Other ASW missions will exist: hunting Soviet submarines in their home waters north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap* and pro-
*For the purposes of this article, "Soviet home waters” are defined as the area north of the G-I-UK Gap, including the Norwegian Sea.
tecting carrier task forces, underway replenishment groups, and amphibious task forces. Do these ASW missions require cruisers, destroyers, or frigates? Major surface combatants do have some capability for the purely defensive missions, such as task group or replenishment group protection. But if we are looking at future investments, there appear to be better ways to do the job.
Even at present, the most effective ASW tools are aircraft and submarines. A brief examination of the history of antisubmarine warfare helps illustrate why this is so. Despite Hollywood’s portrayal of World War II duels between destroyers and submarines, aircraft accounted for more than 70% of all German U-boats sunk by U.S. forces. This was true even under conditions in which surface escorts were five or more times faster than submerged submarines. Moreover, surface ships could usually detect a submarine (with high-frequency direction finding, radar, code-breaking, etc.) before she was aware of their presence.
Today, the surface ship has lost these advantages. Many nuclear-powered attack submarines are faster than the most modern destroyers, and they can almost invariably detect a surface ship before she detects them. With cruise missiles and long-range homing torpedoes, the submarine can strike from beyond the range of the surface ship’s on-board weapons.
In contrast, the capability of the ASW aircraft appears to have kept pace with the modern submarine. While World War II aircraft could seldom attack submerged submarines, the U-boats had to spend most of their time on the surface. Today, although submarines need no longer surface, aircraft can attack them while submerged. In one key area, the aircraft has even improved its relative position. While a surfaced U-boat could often detect an attacking aircraft, the submerged submarine seldom knows an aircraft is present until an ASW weapon enters the water.
In addition, we have today an ASW tool essentially unavailable in World War II: the submarine. During that war, some surfaced submarines were sunk by other submarines in chance encounters, but only one submerged submarine was sunk by another submarine. Since that time, submarines have become highly effective ASW systems, performing better than surface ships in barrier patrol and, increasingly, in escort roles.
Aircraft and submarines perform ASW more effectively than surface ships because the limited range and effectiveness of shipboard sensors and, especially, of weapons restrict the surface ship to a defensive role. The surface escort must, as a rule, wait for the
submarine to approach the force being escorted. Surface ships are themselves too vulnerable to submarine attack to “go in harm’s way,” seeking out enemy submarines in their home waters. Like surface ships- submarines and ASW aircraft, especially if sea-based, can provide effective escort. A combination of these systems could effectively protect Europe-bound convoys in the unlikely event of a long NATO war. In contrast to surface ships, aircraft and submarines can also undertake offensive ASW in enemy home waters, making them useful assets even if there are no convoys to escort.
Thus, real mission requirements and the current state of ASW technology seem to suggest disinvestment in cruisers, destroyers, and frigates in favor of other systems. These other systems should include new types of surface ships designed primarily to carry aircraft. Land-based aircraft suffer two serious weaknesses: slow response time and poor initial detection capability. Small aircraft carriers overcome both these weaknesses by carrying sensor systems for submarine detection and by providing a local “air base” f°r quick-reaction aircraft.
Investing in certain types of new technology surface ships for ASW may also prove cost-effective- High-speed vessels, such as hydrofoils and surface effect ships, promise improved ASW effectiveness through sprint-and-drift tactics which enable them to move very slowly or remain completely motionless (hence noiseless) while using their sensors. This reduces self-noise to a minimum, permitting maximum sensor effectiveness. Between listening periods, the hydrofoil or SES takes advantage of her speed to sprint ahead to a new search area. Meanwhile, the escorted force can move at a high speed of advance, * complicating the concentration of hostile submarine “wolf packs” and forcing enemy submarines to reveal their presence by running at noisy high speeds.
Antiair Warfare: The Soviet air threat is serious and growing. Missiles launched from a variety of surface ships, submarines, and airplanes pose a serious threat in the event of a massive shootout. The air threat to U.S. shipping in the Atlantic has increased with the addition of “Backfire” bombers to Soviet Naval Aviation.
Currently, the U.S. Navy relies heavily on surface ships to counter this threat. The Aegis system planned for cruisers and DDG-47-class destroyers is intended to defend carrier task forces against the missile threat, even at saturation levels. The Tartar air defense missile system on board escorts such as the Brooke (FFG-l)-class and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)- class guided-missile frigates provides much of the air
defense potential for replenishment groups, amphibi- °us groups, and convoys.
Questions can be raised about the wisdom of proving the Aegis system. Although program development began in 1964, the first Aegis-equipped ship "■'H not join the fleet until 1982, and the Navy Probably will not meet its stated requirement for , ^egis-equipped ships until after 1990. In that interVal. the Soviets can develop and deploy several new generations of antiship missiles which can be op- 'urnized to defeat Aegis. Experiments with a ballistic antiship missile, the SSN-X-13, illustrate one possible ^°viet approach to this task.
Despite this fundamental weakness, some Aegis SuPport may be desirable for carrier task groups in the 1980s. However, instead of building new ^egis-equipped cruisers, the existing nuclear cruisers should be converted to carry the system. The four ^lrginia (CGN-38)-class cruisers could provide one Aeg‘s escort for each nuclear-powered carrier, and inverting the Virginias rather than building new ships would save more than $4 billion in life-cycle c°sts. Aegis conversion of the remaining five nuclear truisers would also seem justified, even though more txpensive to accomplish, since their existing AAW armarnent is ineffective against saturation missile attacks. Nine nuclear-powered Aegis cruisers should ^IVe considerable AAW support to a 12-carrier force. Three ships of the DDG-47 class could be built to Pr°vide Aegis escorts for the other three carriers.
The funds diverted from new-construction Aegis sh]ps could, instead, go to developing potentially rn°re effective counters to the Soviet missile threat.
The present situation—in which the Soviets attempt to hit a 90,000-ton carrier moving at 30 knots, while we must attempt to hit numerous missiles approaching at the speed of sound or faster—suggests that there must be better approaches to missile defense. For example, the addition of a significant number of small aircraft carriers in any tactical situation would greatly complicate the targeting command-and-control problem for the Soviets. Acoustic deception and electronic warfare also hold considerable promise, as does active warfare against Soviet reconnaisance and command, control, and communications. Cancellation of plans to build new Aegis ships besides the three DDG-47S mentioned would release substantial funding for these other possible new approaches to missile defense.
In defending high-value targets, the Tartar-armed escorts suffer the same basic disadvantage as Aegis—the opponent need only hit a ship with a missile, while we must hit a missile with a missile. And we have the added disadvantage of greatly reduced defensive firepower. The small Tartar systems (Mk 13 and Mk 22) on board convoy escorts can probably handle individual or sequential missile attacks, but they cannot shoot down all or even most incoming missiles in a saturation strike.
If the vessels being protected are merchant ships other than supertankers, the loss rate may be acceptable. But as we have noted, there may not be any convoys in a NATO war. In the more likely event that the Tartar escorts are protecting fleet oilers or troopladen amphibious warfare ships, the results may be catastrophic. It appears doubtful that existing guided-missile frigates, which can provide adequate air defense only in a low-threat, environment, represent a cost-effective investment.
While the Tartar-armed frigates now in service should be retained, small aircraft carriers, coupled with the deception and electronic warfare measures already mentioned, would seem better future investments for defending amphibious warfare and replenishment groups or convoys against air attacks. AV-8B advanced Harriers, operating from ships as small as the 8,000-ton "Harrier carrier” proposed by Vosper Thornycroft, could, with adequate early warning, intercept attacking “Backfires” and other
In the 1950s, the heavy cruisers Salem (CA-139) and Des Moines (CA-134) took turns as Sixth Fleet flagship. Now in mothballs at Philadelphia, their 8-inch guns could provide useful fire support for amphibious landings.
missile-armed units before they can launch their missiles. Land-based surveillance aircraft such as the AWACS (airborne warning and control system) or aerostats can supply the necessary radar early warning for the interceptors.
The embarked aircraft give the small aircraft carrier an offensive AAW capability similar to her previously mentioned ability to perform offensive ASW. Unlike surface combatant missile systems, embarked aircraft can threaten the attacking bomber beyond the range of its antiship missiles. This reduces the number of targets by half, and the bomber itself is an easier target than the missile. Most important, the Soviets can now lose as well as win. Tartar frigates can intercept only bomber-launched missiles. They cannot destroy the bombers themselves, which will return home safely to rearm for another attempt. In contrast, Harriers or other V/STOLs (vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft) can eliminate bombers.
Surface Warfare: In a sustained conflict, the Soviet surface fleet does not appear to be an important threat. Submarines and land-based aviation, not surface ships, give the Soviet Navy its sustained-conflict capability. The Soviet surface fleet presents a significant threat only in a preemptive attack against U.S. warships when both forces are deployed within range of each other before hostilities commence. The antiship missiles of Soviet surface ships can play an important role in such a confrontation.
U.S. surface ships could also play an important role in such a situation, provided they could stay close to Soviet ships through the period before hostilities. This might put them in position to strike Soviet missile ships before they could launch all their missiles. At very least, it would disrupt the timing of a Soviet missile attack, which depends on coordinated, sequential launch from several ships to achieve simultaneous arrival at high-value targets in the U.S. force. Unfortunately, almost all Soviet surface ships are faster than their U.S. counterparts. An Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, with a 28-knot sustained speed, has little hope of maintaining close station on a 36-knot Soviet missile destroyer. Like the frigates, U.S. destroyers are also inferior in speed to most major Soviet combatants. Moreover, the Soviets’ advantage increases in a high sea state; Soviet ships generally have better seakeeping capabilities than U.S. surface warships.
The U.S. surface warships that could pose the greatest threat to Soviet surface ships in a shootout are small, fast combatants such as missile-armed patrol hydrofoils (PHMs). With a speed of more than 40 knots and good seakeeping characteristics, PHMs can remain close enough to Soviet missile ships that their Harpoons may be able to disable the Soviet ships before they can launch their full missile loads at an American carrier. Critics of the PHM point to her relatively small fuel load, hence limited time on station. However, the current time on station is adequate for, say, the Mediterranean theater, and larger hydrofoils and surface effect ships will soon offer improved endurance.
Given all of the foregoing, are there secondary missions which might justify new investment in traditional surface combatants? Two such missions suggest themselves: naval gunfire support for amphibious landings and naval presence in the Third World- If an opposed amphibious landing is possible at all against an opponent equipped with modern forces, R will certainly require substantial naval gunfire support. The growing capability of front-line air defenses has made close air support less effective, while Marine Corps artillery must first get ashore and set up before it can provide fire support.
Although effective naval gunfire, in quantity, will be needed, current cruisers, destroyers, and frigates with only a few 3-inch, 5-inch (or possibly in the future, 8-inch) guns, do not appear cost-effective for this mission. Recommissioning several older gun cruisers, (e.g. the Salem (CA-139) class, each of which carries nine automatic 8-inch guns) would provide a more effective approach. If manning these older ships proves prohibitively expensive, new landing fire sup' port ships—in effect, monitors—could be substituted. Either approach would be more cost-effective than building a minor gun capability into new cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. This small capability does not meet Marine Corps needs.
Surface warships can perform a presence mission, as can support ships, research ships, and—as the Soviets have demonstrated—merchant ships. But the most useful ship for a naval presence role is one that can project power ashore. The ability to project power gives the greatest support to a threatened nation. For this, as for other missions, the small aircraft carrier is a better investment than a traditional surface ship. Even the few Harriers on board a Harrier carrier could help support a threatened minor power. The 25 aircraft on board a 25,000-ton V/STOL support ship (VSS) would impress most Third World governments as a serious presence. In contrast, the few guns or missiles on a cruiser or destroyer give ic little projection capability.
Thus, for virtually every mission, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates seem questionable investments compared to alternative systems. For many missions, Srnall aircraft carriers offer the best alternative. They can incorporate useful surface ship systems such as sonars and towed arrays. The embarked aircraft can exploit the capabilities of these systems and contribute new capabilities not possessed by traditional sur- foce ships.
Congress has acted to speed the development of several promising alternatives to traditional surface svarships. It blocked the administration’s move to terminate the PHM program after one ship. Six will ke completed, providing a full squadron for areas such as the eastern Mediterranean where confronta- tlons with major Soviet surface ships are most likely, ^he Senate added funds to the fiscal year 1978 procurement bill to continue development of the VSS, vv*th the intention that the program proceed so as to Permit authorization of the first one in fiscal year 1979. Most significantly, the Congress added $310 million for the procurement of one air-capable bD-963—a Spruance-class destroyer modified to carry che maximum number of aircraft (LAMPS helicopters ar>d later Type A V/STOL). Consultant studies indicate that minor modifications would enable the ship t0 carry six-eight LAMPS or four Type A V/STOLs.
Unfortunately, while congressional action follows rhe suggestions of alternatives analysis, which point away from traditional surface combatants, U.S. Navy leadership is moving toward greater emphasis on cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. The five-year shipbuilding program presented to the Congress in 1977 c°ntained only two aircraft carriers and only nine 8eneral-purpose submarines but 68 surface ships— frigates and ten DDG-47 destroyers. In addition, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has reportedly aPproved construction of four additional Virginia- dass nuclear cruisers (with Aegis), raising the five- year surface ship total to 72.
Since World War II, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates have claimed, on the average, 36% of the Navy shipbuilding and conversion (SCN) budget. The highest relative appropriations for surface combatants ln ar>y five-year period since World War II occurred lu fiscal years 1958-1962 when 46% of SCN went to surface ships. In no other five-year period did the surface ship percentage exceed 40%. Now, the cur- rC‘nt five-year plan proposes to expend 57% of SCN on surface combatants, nearly 20% more than in the Previous five-year period, and over 10% more than che previous postwar high!
Moreover, the Navy leadership has repeatedly dis- rouraged development of more cost-effective alternates. The Navy testified in Congress against the pHm program. The five-year shipbuilding program presented in 1975 contained seven VSSs, but the program presented in 1976 contained only one, and the 1977 program had none at all. The Navy has indicated that it prefers a DD-963 air-capable design with only three-four LAMPS and no Type A V/STOLs. Only in the case of the sea control ship did the Navy propose a small aircraft platform which could have served as an alternative to surface warships. Congress blocked the SCS program, partly because of an unconvincing Navy presentation and partly because many members of Congress preferred the more capable V/STOL support ship.
The Navy leadership’s attempts to put new emphasis on the procurement of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, while blocking the development of promising alternatives, are neither justifiable nor prudent. It is unlikely that the Congress will stand idly by if its initiatives, moving toward new concepts and ship types, are thwarted. There is a grave risk that the interaction of a Navy program emphasizing procurement of traditional surface warships with congressional attempts at innovation could leave us with virtually no naval shipbuilding program.
Instead, the Navy leadership should openly acknowledge that it is time to sink the traditional surface navy as far as future ship procurement is concerned. We should retain the surface ships we now have, modernizing them where possible with more effective weapons or with greater aircraft-carrying capability. Three DDG-47S should probably be procured, and perhaps we should even recommission a few older types of surface ships for special purposes. But the future of the surface navy lies in new types of ships: small, fast combatants such as hydrofoils and surface effect ships, and small aircraft carriers. The sooner the Navy acknowledges this, the better will be the surface navy’s chances of success both in the battle for SCN funds and in combat on the high seas.
Mr. Lind received his A.B. from Dartmouth College in 1969, graduating Phi Beta Kappa, magna cum laude T — -JML with a history major. He received a master's degree in 3BF history in 1971 from Princeton and is working on a Ph.D. dissertation in the field of 18th century Euro- pcan intellectual history. From October 1973 to Janu- ■■I ary 1977, Mr. Lind served as legislative assistant to Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. He assisted in the preparation of the Taft White Paper on defense and in the senator’s development of the concept of a new technology Navy. In January 1977, Mr. Lind became the legislative assistant for the Armed Services Committee to Senator Gary Hart of Colorado. Mr. Lind's publications include “Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army" in the March 1977 Military Review; proposals for restructuring the Marine Corps in "Mission and Force Structure," in the December 1975 Marine Corps Gazette', and a guest editorial entitled “Should We Shoot an Admiral?” in the 25 July 1977 issue o(The Washington Star.