The Dilemma of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

the same sort of navy one needs to fight a war in the Pacific against the Soviet Union. The time seems to have arrived when a choice is necessary concerning what it is we want from the American Navy, and in particu­lar what we want from the Pacific Fleet.

American Naval Power in the Pacific: Navies have historically been used for one of three purposes: to defend coasts and coastal waters, to protect oceanic commerce, and to transport military power across the sea. The last of these three uses is the most pertinent for American purposes in the Pacific. In recent times, nuclear parity and notions of strategic deterrence have made an attempt by either superpower to “invade” the other implausible. To the extent that threats to either’s national integrity exist at all, they exist in outlying territories and with respect to one’s allies. One can, for instance, hypothesize threats by the mainland Chinese against Taiwan, by North Korea against the South, even by the Soviet Union against Japan, all of which American naval power helps deter, or, if necessary, can beat back.² But these sorts of contingencies require not forces structured to operate in home waters but a con­tinuing presence of American naval force in positions in or near the East and South China Seas and the Sea of Japan in order to be able to project military and naval forces into crisis areas to avert or limit untoward ag­gressive actions.

Long ago, Alfred Thayer Mahan contended that seafaring nations built navies primarily to defend oceanic commerce. In one sense, this was the extension of the idea of defending one’s “vital interests” taken to sea, since for nations which depend on oceanic trade the sea-lanes are unquestionably vital. But the specific capabilities desired for a mission of defending sea-lanes are substantially different from those of a fleet which has only to remain at home and deny access to a poten­tial invasion force. Moreover, according to Mahan’s reasoning, a fleet does not defend the sea-lanes by actively patrolling each mile, but by remaining “in being” and, when called upon, by fighting and destroy­ing the fleet of any nation which threatens one’s right to use the sea. In both World Wars, the mission of protecting the sea-lanes involved—for the most part—the escorting of convoys to protect them against submarines rather than employing battle fleets in titanic death struggles. What is significant is that the function of convoy escort was actively undertaken only in the Atlantic, where distances were less, where air power could cover large portions of both ends of the sea-lanes, and where the choice of sea-lanes was rela­tively restricted.

Such is not the case in the Pacific. There, the dis­tances to be covered are immense and the areas to be controlled cannot reasonably be covered by aircraft- Given the broad expanse of the Pacific, the option exists of routing merchantmen via alternate courses which can be sufficiently diverse that submarines cannot cover all or even most of them. Hence, the need to protect commercial sea-lanes by means of di­rect and immediate support does not exist in the Pacific as it does in the North Atlantic. Even if ^lt did, it would be an unrealistic requirement, for there are not enough surface escorts in all the navies of the world put together to do the job. This is particularly true if one includes the sea-lanes radiating outward from the Persian Gulf and across the Indian Ocean, areas which are within the sphere of responsibility the Pacific Fleet. In short, given that a finite level of resources exists to perform any task and that costs must be weighed against need, convoy escort simply is neither a realistic nor a necessary undertaking f°^r the Pacific Fleet.

It is the third classic naval function cited, that of transporting armed force abroad, which best suits the role the Pacific Fleet can play in supporting Ameri­can interests. In the earliest days of navies, this con­sisted only of carrying armies to fight other armies. But in an era of strike aircraft operating from aircraft carriers, of long-range missiles which can be launched from surface ships and submarines, and of accurate high-powered weaponry for shore bombard­ment, it is no longer just amphibious capabilities with which modern navies can strike ashore. Such adjuncts to naval power are useful for projecting power directly ashore, especially when coupled with the use or threatened use of marines. This sort of naval force consequently fulfills all of the three gen­eral purposes of navies: coastal defense by keeping the fighting away from one’s own shores, protecting commerce, and projecting military power abroad so that it can be used in support of national interests. I^£ performs this function in several ways: by being able to defeat an opposing force which might otherwise try to interfere with the pursuit of one’s own inter­ests, by being able to strike directly at the sources of another’s power, by serving as a tool which policymakers can use to contain and control the out­come of crises, and by establishing a continuing American presence with which to reassure friends and discourage others.

It is in the Pacific that this method of employing naval force is most relevant. The requirement for some sort of “glue” to bond alliances spread over broad reaches of ocean virtually dictates the need for a capability to transport military power over those sea areas. The vast distances themselves generate the requirement for the extended mobility which naval forces provide. The need for adequate military strength of a very real, potent, and relevant sort to balance local power is provided by naval forces capa­ble of projecting power ashore. Finally, the lack of ^any real and immediate opposition suggests we should make our plans according to the circumstances which exist in specific theaters, and not against some worst case” which has not existed in the past, does not exist now, is not really predictable in the future, ^and in any case would not apply in the Pacific.

Losing Direction: The Pacific Fleet Since 1945: The strategic problem in the Atlantic has for many years been relatively easy to define. A planner had to con- ^S1der only American commitments to the NATO al­liance , the need for secure sea-lanes to support allies, ^and the threat presented by the three western Soviet fleets which consisted of submarines, long-range air­craft, and modern oceangoing surface forces. In the Pacific, on the other hand, commitments have tended to be sporadic, the relationship of naval force ^t0 treaty obligations has not been as clear as under NATO, “wrong” wars and crises have repeatedly cropped up, and the standard argument about de­fending commercial sea-lanes always seems to get lost somewhere in the vastness of the Pacific. With no specific threat to counter and without a familiar scenario to describe, the Pacific Fleet has had an in- ^0rdinately hard time articulating its policy, missions, strategy, and force requirements.

Although a residual U.S. fleet remained in Japanese waters after the war, it was not until the Communists came to power in China in 1949 that rhe Pacific Fleet had a threat with which to deal— ^even if that threat was not a naval one. After the Korean War, the Seventh Fleet (the component of the Pacific Fleet which is deployed to the Far East) Was kept busy with periodic crises in the Taiwan Straits and with providing visible support to the new Asian nations whose security the United States was underwriting. It was not until the Navy’s aircraft carriers were assigned a role in American strategic plans that the Seventh Fleet had its first specific combat-related mission since the Korean War.

Nevertheless, by the late 1950s the Commander in Chief Pacific had reverted to thinking about the fleet ^Jn terms of its more traditional missions, dealing With threats ranging from subversion and armed rebellion to the type of aggression North Korea had attempted.⁵ His thinking was prescient, for it was exactly this kind of low-level threat which arose shortly thereafter in Southeast Asia. It was to deal With this sort of threat that the Seventh Fleet moved into the South China Sea in 1961 in order to be ready if needed during the Laos crisis. Thereafter, it maintained a relatively constant presence in the area because of the deteriorating situation in Vietnam.

Ironically, during this same period, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, had an­nounced a new U.S. naval policy. This policy em­phasized that the real threat for the U.S. Navy was not of the diverse low-level sort with which the Pacific Fleet was already involved; it arose instead from the newly emerging Soviet Navy. Thus, exactly when the Pacific Fleet was becoming embroiled in Southeast Asia, Washington planners were turning their attention to the problems of the Atlantic. As a result, the Pacific Fleet was caught on the horns of a dilemma. Despite the fact that it was involved in a real war which required extensive patrol, blockade, shore bombardment, and air operations against land targets, it was being institutionally obligated to ac­cept the CNO’s idea that what was needed was sophis­ticated antisubmarine warfare forces to counter the Soviet naval threat. It was the continuation for over a decade of this dichotomy between what naval leaders in Washington were saying and what the fleet in the Far East was actually doing that eventually caused the Pacific Fleet to lose its way.

When the Vietnam War ended, Pacific Fleet plan­ners turned their attention to what Washington had long been espousing as the Navy’s real mission: anti­submarine operations in the furtherance of sea-lane protection. It was only then that they found that that mission simply did not match their own problems. Yet by then it was difficult to buck the logic of the Wash­ington analysts who had been using “Europe first” as a planning base since at least 1961, and it was particu­larly difficult to reverse the momentum built up over 15 years. As a result, the Pacific Fleet is now threatened with further cuts in favor of an Atlantic Fleet for which the sea-lane-protection mission has been both natural and essential. In the bureaucratic battle for dwindling resources, the Pacific Fleet has been thrown on the defensive. It is the one battle that the fleet cannot win, at least not if it continues to accept the hypothesis that the U.S. Navy exists only to fight the Soviet Navy or primarily to defend the sea-lanes.

For Pacific Fleet planners to make their case clearly, they will not only have to differentiate the essential elements of good American naval strategy in the Pacific from those which pertain in the Atlantic, they will also have to deal explicitly with the subtleties inherent in the natural rivalry which exists between the two fleets.

A World Apart: Despite the fact that it operates two major and relatively autonomous fleets, the U.S. Navy is, after all, one navy. For the sake of efficiency, policies

and so forth.”⁶

The usual alternative to operating a logistics train is to establish advanced bases. But in the Pacific, with im- distances even between adjacent bases, both the

mense t

made in the Pentagon tend to be applied equally to both fleets. Yet in many respects the needs of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets are not at all alike, any more than are the theaters in which they operate. The most obvious way in which the Pacific theater differs from the Atlantic is in terms of size. It is slightly more than 3,000 miles from the East Coast of the United States to any point in Western Europe. But it is 2,400 miles from the American West Coast to Hawaii, 1,300 more miles from Pearl Harbor to Midway, and another 2,500 miles from Midway to Japan. It is as far from Japan to the entrance to the Indian Ocean as it is from the United States to Europe, and it is another 4,500 miles across the Indian Ocean.

Distance is a major factor in naval planning because of the logistics problems created. The enormous ex­panse of the Pacific consequently influences naval strat­egy in that region in two ways. The predominant of these is that a means of continuously supporting for­ward operations is absolutely essential. The problems of operating a fleet in the far Pacific were well described by Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, President of the Naval War College before the House Naval Committee as far back as 1916:

“Ships break down . . . The supplies needed to maintain the fleet would be very extensive. . . .The bottoms of the ships would gradually get foul. They ought to have the docks where the bottoms can be cleaned. They are subject in their progress over that 7,000 miles [to the Far East]... to the possibilities of attack from the [enemy]. . . . Their lines of communication, after they get to the point 7,000 miles away, are constantly liable to interruption an would inevitably be interrupted; and yet they de­pend on those long lines, stretching away back to the home ports, and for very vital things necessary to their life—for coal and supplies and reinforcements. ... A fleet going out there would be accompanied, necessarily, by a tremendous attendant fleet, a train ... of auxiliary ammunition ships, hospital ships,

advanced bases and the logistics support train are necessary.

Still, the ultimate purpose of the bases and the logistics train is to maintain an effective combat fleet. This leads us to the second major consideration m developing a sound naval policy for the Pacific. Effec­tive combat power relates to the ability to project pain.⁷ In terms of naval force, that translates into mobile and potent striking power such as that of planes operating from aircraft carriers and marines embarke in a mobile amphibious task group. In the Pacific, where the likelihood of all-out war is considerably l^eSS than in the Atlantic, the warships which are of most utility on a continuing basis need the ability to trave far, to strike firmly across the spectrum of conflict, and to provide the perceptible power that can affect a situa­tion even without the actual employment of force. 1° sum, because of the distances involved, proper Ameri­can naval strategy in the Pacific is different from the

Atlantic, where defending sea lines of communication ^ls both essential and feasible. In the Pacific, appropri­^ate naval power is fundamentally dependent on mobile ^Sea and air power used in an offensive manner, on the ability to protect the ships and aircraft which carry that Power, and on the ability to maintain the forward bases which support them, rather than on the direct support °f sea-lanes. In missions as well as geography, the Atlantic and Pacific fleets are a world apart.

Despite these obvious differences in the respective operating milieu and in the requirements of each fleet, to a great extent the two fleets do serve as mirror images °f each other. Clearly, some degree of standardization is desirable. For example, it is reasonable to expect that ^cbe administrative and operational organizations of both fleets would be virtually identical. But ^s‘rnilarities between the two fleets seem in some in­stances to have been carried to excessive lengths. For °^ne thing, despite the fact that the geographic area to be covered by the Pacific Fleet is much larger than that °f the Atlantic Fleet, the numerical balance between fhe two fleets has remained essentially constant (and approximately equal) over the last 30 years. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, 55% of the Navy’s ships were in the Pacific, including all of the aircraft carriers. By 1948, these percentages had been almost exactly reversed so that the Pacific Fleet had about 45% of all units with the aircraft carriers evenly distributed. This 55-45 split in favor of the Atlantic fleet has remained steady ever since, with only aircraft carriers varying very far from the norm. Variations between 500 and 1,000 ships in the overall size of the D-S. Navy, as well as wars in Korea and Vietnam, have ⁿ°t affected the basic allocation of ships between the Atlantic and Pacific. In this regard, the allocation of ^tbe Knox (FF-1052)-class frigate is revealing. Using the ^sea-lane-defense mission of the NATO scenario as the planning base, 46 ships of the class were ordered, built, and delivered. However, the first six ships of the class ^Went to the Pacific Fleet, and, in the end, 21 of the 46 (exactly 45%) were allocated to the Pacific. Little won­der that even the casual observer is driven to conclude chat there must be something in the way the Navy’s ^sbips are allocated that transcends prevailing political conditions and strategies.

Both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets support one numbered fleet” of approximately equal size in a forward-deployed status. But the rationale under ^which those two fleets are maintained varies consid­erably. The Atlantic Fleet can point to fixed commit­ments to justify the force level of the Sixth Fleet de­ployed in the Mediterranean. Referred to as "DPQ” (officially standing for Defense Planning Question- Oaire, but more often understood to mean “days per quarter” in the vernacular) the U.S. Navy’s commit­ment to NATO has been unchanged for almost three decades and shows no sign of slackening in the foresee­able future. Added to the DPQ are formal commitments to periodic NATO exercises in the North Atlantic and to Pan-American exercises off South America (UNITAS), and obligations to maintain forces in the Persian Gulf (Middle East Force) and the Caribbean. In contrast, the Pacific Fleet has tried to point to a rather untidy collection of bilateral defense pacts with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Republic of the Philippines, Aus­tralia, New Zealand, and various Southeast Asian countries in order to justify the need for the continued presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific. These pacts do not even begin to approach the NATO treaty either in tidiness or firmness of commitment. In reality, American force levels in the Far East seem to have had little to do specifically with these formalistic agreements, having instead functioned more in the role of supporting political stability and general economic relations. The problem is that this sort of intrinsic and ephemeral value of the political utility of naval force has not translated well within the rigidly analytical Ameri­can defense planning process. As a result, the most realistic argument of all for the continued existence of the Seventh Fleet—that it exists to maintain regional stability and promote good economic relations—is possibly being overlooked simply because it "does not compute.”

Rather than resulting from an explicit consideration of the variant milieus in which they operate, those differences which do exist in the nature of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets seem to be more the product of tradition, self-images, and organizational inertia in­herent within the naval establishment. Such differences are most apparent in the attitudes of Pacific Fleet sailors. The most distinctive of these attitudes is their propensity to think of themselves as being the operators” while seeing their Atlantic Fleet counter­parts as belonging to the “show” fleet. While this tendency may be comforting to Pacific sailors, it is not without its drawbacks. Among these has been that part of the Pacific Fleet’s ethic is to refuse to accept anything the Atlantic Fleet has done as being of much value. For example, although the Atlantic Fleet spent a decade developing new tactics to deal with the growing Soviet naval threat during the period in which the Pacific Fleet was absorbed with the Vietnam War, the latter still was reluctant to accept any of the lessons the Atlantic Fleet had learned. It has chosen instead to stick with outdated tactics evolved in the course of a very different war. This has had several results, includ­ing a growing disparity between official preachments made by Pacific Fleet leaders on the one hand and the perceptions held by those at the operating level on the other; a built-in resistance to any concepts marked “made in the Atlantic;” and a consequent period of drift in the policy direction of the Pacific Fleet.

The Pacific Fleet and Atlantic Fleet also differ in the perception each holds of its relationship with Washing­ton. Here again, the difference primarily is one of image, but in this case it also stems from a feeling of remoteness. One result of this is that Pacific Fleet sailors feel themselves to be free from the sort of “harassment” to which they believe the Atlantic Fleet is subject because of its adjacency to Washington. But along with this goes a long-standing feeling that the problems of the Pacific Fleet are neither understood nor appreciated by those making policy back in Washing­ton and that Washington policymakers tend to confer more frequently and perhaps sympathize more with the problems and desires of the Atlantic Fleet commanders because of their adjacency.

In all, the Pacific Fleet revels in its remoteness from the daily travails which can be caused by official Wash­ington but resents its relative exclusion from the policymaking process and its relegation to a secondary role because of that detachment. The Pacific Fleet’s point of view tends to be ignored, overlooked, or not even asked on some issues. Its problems remain either misunderstood or unrecognized in far-off Washington, and it continues to be politically and bureaucratically a step or two behind the fast-paced events back in the nation’s capital.

A Fleet in Search of a Purpose: Most commentators on 20th century American policy in the Pacific have taken note of the results of this remoteness. Of the period leading to the outbreak of World War II, for instance, one analyst wrote:

“One is by no means simply an apologist for the military if he observes, as did the admirals and generals, that from the time of the Open Door notes to the attack on Pearl Harbor, American foreign policy in the Far East suffered from the discrepancy between, on the one hand, its political commit­ments and obligations, and, on the other, its mili­tary ability to support them in the face of an ultimate challenge.”^[1]

Many observers agree that since the end of World War II, American foreign policy in the Far East has been, if not one of drift, at least one of resistance to change.⁹ This has occurred successively under the aus­pices of the containment policy, in pursuit of a favor­able conclusion in Vietnam, and under the general heading of President Ford’s Pacific doctrine. During the past ten years, however, events have occurred and relationships have developed in the Pacific theater which have—or should have—overturned many of the fundamental premises of U.S. security planning. Nevertheless, American naval employment policy m the Pacific has stayed remarkably stable. In all, Ameri­can policies, doctrines, strategies, and wars have come and gone, and still the U.S. Seventh Fleet maintains essentially the same posture it assumed in the late 1940s. One concludes then, either that naval policies have been more enduring than specific premises of U.S. foreign policy, or that naval forces are not linked as directly to declared policies as is often assumed.

Of late, the continuation of America’s naval posture in the Pacific has come under heavy fire from several sides. On one side stand the economy-minded analysts who advocate development of military forces only for specific worst cases and see these worst cases as apph- cable only in the Atlantic. On another side stand those who maintain that since the self-declared mission of commerce protection for the U.S. Navy is not operative in the broad reaches of the Pacific Ocean, little need exists for a sizable U.S. Pacific Fleet. On yet another side are those who argue that the United States neither faces a threat to its Asian interests from any rival, nor has any treaty obligations there which make forward- deployed forces essential. As Barry Blechman wrote:

. even more than elsewhere, the function of U.S. forces in Asia is largely political. . . . The question is whether these forces can be reduced without creating doubt among Japanese . . . and

. . .Chinese. . . [since] it seems evident that forces

maintained in the United States as backup for those deployed in or near Japan have little political impact on either Japan or China. ... it may be safe to reduce the Seventh Fleet, which operates in the western Pacific and now consists of two aircraft carrier task groups. In a situation in which there is no specific military threat, one aircraft carrier task group in the western Pacific should meet U.S. political needs for Japan. The second carrier task group now in the western Pacific would be of greater use in the protection of U.S. interests if it were redeployed elsewhere. [Emphasis added]”¹⁰ Blechman goes on to recommend that the Third Fleet, which provides the assets and resources as well as the backup for the Seventh Fleet, might be eliminated or redeployed elsewhere than in the Pacific. In short, he is suggesting the abolition of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in favor of returning to a single U.S. Fleet based in the Atlantic with one squadron deployed to the Pacific, as was the case before 1922.

Perhaps because they have felt themselves being closed in upon by such arguments, Pacific naval spokesmen recently have been particularly strident in attempting to define their fleet’s mission in terms of a

^worst-case war with the Soviet Union. The problem, as has been noted, is that there are unique features of the Pacific which make the strategic problems there vastly different from those which exist in the Atlantic. It may not after all be that the Pacific Fleet needs to counter specific military threats” but that it has broader ob­jectives such as helping to maintain the tripartite power balance in that region, deterring outright ag­gression, reassuring allies, and helping to assure that local problems do not upset the amenable situation which currently exists.

In all, it seems clear that the United States still is reasonably satisfied with the conditions which prevail *n the Far East. Its interests are not jeopardized, its allies are strong economically if not necessarily militar- 'ly, and no immediate major threats to stability loom °n the horizon (North Korea of course being the nota­ble exception). It seems altogether proper that Ameri­^Can military forces be structured to best support the continuation of these stable conditions. This suggests that minor factors which might upset existing stability should be dealt with before they can escalate into major confrontations. Such a construct does not call for a fleet armed and trained primarily to handle a Soviet sub­marine force, or even against the Soviet Navy at all. Nor does it require a fleet designed for sea-lane defense operations. What it does require is a fleet optimized for operations across the spectrum of naval activities, from showing the flag through power-projection operations ^t0 maintaining peace and stability, to projecting American influence and promoting American inter­^ests. In this way it can help deal with threats to stability at a level well below the threshold at which they involve direct confrontation between major powers. Now, just as one analyst of American seapower in the Pacific ⁿ°ted more than 50 years ago, “It is clearly in our power to compel the strategy of the Pacific in time of Peace in such a way as to avoid the possibility of war. ”ⁿ In conclusion, the U.S. Pacific Fleet seems clearly to he at a crossroads. The extent to which it is maintained as a viable force for peace and stability in an area of major concern to the United States will in no small part he determined by how effectively its leaders are able to appreciate and articulate that the policies the fleet supports and the purposes for its existence as well as its geographical and political environment are substan­tially different from those of the Atlantic. The Pacific is unique, and consequently the needs of the Pacific Fleet are unique; Serving as a mirror image of the Atlantic Fleet is just not good enough.

Despite the pressure to generalize in developing force structure—due in large part to the long lead time and lengthy service lives of modern naval ships and Weapon systems—it may in the longer run be ineffi­cient to size and design American naval forces only against unitary worldwide threats and contingencies. It seems much better to approach the Pacific Fleet's strategic needs not by thinking in terms of universal concepts, but rather in terms of specific tasks. In its tasks as well as its environment, the Pacific Fleet differs vastly from the Atlantic Fleet. Recognizing and factor­ing those differences into force structure decisions and strategic plans will contribute to the development of a Pacific Fleet which is best suited to execute the mis­sions which it will be called upon to perform.

Lieutenant Commander McGruther graduated from Dartmouth College in 1965 and received his master’s degree in political science (strategic studies) from Brown University in June 1978. He has served in the USS Loyalty (MSO-457), USS Hissem (DER-400), USS Roark (FF- 1053), and USS Leahy (CG-16). He has also had a tour with the Office of the CNO and graduated with distinc­tion from the Naval War College in 1974. He recently served on the Naval Force Planning Study before reporting to his current assignment as execut­ive officer of the USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) which is part of the Pacific Fleet. Lieutenant Commander McGruther was the first winner of the Admiral Colbert Memorial Professional Prize Essay and has had articles published in the Naval War College Review and the Proceedings. ^{[2] 8}