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Put them on board their respective warships and one of the differences between our naval officer and theirs is that our tnan plans and manages to keep his hands off the increasingly complicated weapon systems, leaving maintenance and repair to senior enlisted technicians. Their officers accept a “hands-on” responsibility for maintenance. Which system—hands-off or hands-on—is better for all hands? Ours or theirs?
The Soviet Navy, having evolved from a coastal defense force into a wide-ranging, oceangoing, allweather fleet during the past 15 years, presents an impressive image. Indeed, recent comparative studies between U.S. and Soviet cruisers, destroyers, and frigates have led to speculation that because of major differences in design and engineering concepts, the operational capabilities of these Soviet warships may be superior to those of the U.S. Navy. The studies show that the Soviet naval equipment is intended for a specific mission or a single purpose and is designed to be simple, rugged, and functional. This approach to equipment design implies the advantage of shorter and less complex personnel training.
Past comparisons of U.S. and Soviet naval forces have paid only minimal attention to the capabilities of the officers and men w'ho serve in these warships- What are the comparative quality and skill levels of U.S. and Soviet seamen? How do their personnel practices compare? Does each navy meet its readiness requirements?
In an attempt to provide some answers to these questions, the Naval Ship Engineering Center near Washington conducted a comparative study of practices for the education, training, assignment, and use of personnel.1 While the study dealt with both the officers and men of the U.S. and Soviet navies, this article is limited to a discussion of the U.S. and Soviet naval line officers who man surface warships- A future article will deal with the training and employment of the sailors who man these ships. B should be noted that the information available on Soviet naval officers was often fragmentary and could generally be characterized as inconclusive and of questionable reliability. Obviously, additional information needs to be developed on this subject. Nevertheless, the highlights of the information available are worthy of reporting.
Education and Training in the Soviet Onion: Most Soviet naval line officer candidates are chosen from among secondary school graduates. Additional candidates are seamen, warrant officers, and the graduates of the small, selective Nakimov Preparatory School. There the sons of officers, former offi'
cers, other naval personnel, and senior party and government officials are educated from the age of seven onward. While the Soviet Union is comprised of a variety of ethnic groups and social positions, Soviet naval officers are primarily of Great Russian, Byelorussian, or Ukrainian origin.
The Soviet Union maintains a nationwide premilitary training program for virtually all male youths from age 6 to 28 through several paramilitary organizations. This training emphasizes military service as an honor. Extensive political and ideological training is an integral part of Soviet pre-military training. Theoretically, membership in the Little Octobrist (ages 6-9), the All-Union Young Pioneers Organization (10-14), and the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League (the Komsomol [15-28]) is voluntary and open to all Soviet citizens. Membership in the Komsomol can lead to Communist Party affiliation at age 18.
The All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF), a “volunteer” organization under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, provides 140 hours of premilitary training during the last two years of secondary school to a majority of Soviet males, including most future naval officer candidates. Membership is open to all citizens who are at least 15 years old. The 1967 universal military service law requires all male citizens to join a local DOSAAF unit two years prior to the mandatory conscription age of 18. Although DOSAAF engages in and promotes sports, civil defense, and Soviet nationalism, its primary purpose is to prepare Soviet youth for military service. It or-
Figure 1 Primary Sources of U.S. and Soviet Naval Line Officers (1975).
UNITED STATES______________________________________ SOVIET __
U.S. Naval Academy 17% Higher Naval Schools 85%
NROTC 29% Civilian Higher Schools 5%
College & OCS 54% Institutes & OCS 10%
ganizes training units at secondary and vocational schools, universities, collective farms, and in industrial neighborhoods. DOSAAF offers Navy-oriented courses in such areas as radio equipment, communications, radar training, ship maintenance, and ship handling. Its members are indoctrinated in Communist ideology, visit military units to observe the military life of seamen, and participate in practical training with student units. Through this premilitary training program most naval officer candidates are prepared for education as officers.
As shown in Figure 1, about 85% of Soviet naval officers are educated at one of 11 higher naval schools located throughout the Soviet Union. Five of these schools educate surface line officers, two are dedicated to line-engineering, and one each to shoreengineering, submarines, radio-electronics, and political affairs. Curricula are of five years’ duration, except for the political school which has a four-year curriculum. Graduates are awarded an academic degree similar to the U.S. baccalaureate. Although the period of instruction at the higher naval schools is longer than that of similar U.S. institutions, the level and prestige of instruction are comparable to the U.S. Naval Academy. There is no credible information available as to the quality of education
provided.
It is estimated that 5% of Soviet naval officers are educated in four-year civilian higher schools. They receive military training that is apparently mandatory for most eligible males attending these schools. An additional 10% of Soviet naval officers are estimated to be procured from two- and three-year technical institutes that do not conduct military training programs. The graduates of these institutes who er*ter the Navy are subsequently given ten weeks of officer candidate training.
Each Soviet naval officer is educated in a highly specialized field which the majority pursue throughout their career. Formal classroom instruction is conducted for approximately nine months of the year. The first two years are primarily devoted to basic, naval-related topics and undergraduate studies. The remaining three years emphasize areas of specializa- rion. Advanced education is available only to exceptional students. The majority of officers serve an initial three- to six-year tour before becoming eligible f°r additional study.
As a result of their system of specialization, the Soviets report that more than 50% of their naval offiCers have engineering diplomas. It is estimated that the figure may be as high as 80% among surface line officers. Although this indicates the importance attached to formal education—particularly to technical skills—it gives rise to speculation that the product °f the system may be a technically competent officer 'Vlth undeveloped leadership ability.
During the training of young naval officers, motiVation is reported to be almost as highly emphasized as the achievement of technical expertise. The following comment was offered by a ship’s political officer to illustrate the Soviet attitude toward motivation: “Motivation comes first, the technology can come later . . . without motivation, technology is worthless.” This helps to explain why the Soviets spend an estimated 20% of their training time ashore on political and ideological motivation.
Higher naval school graduates have been criticized in the past for inability to put theory into practice. A significant portion of the schooling of candidates is now devoted to this problem, so that by graduation recent graduates will have spent about ten months in active naval units at sea during summer training cruises. Also, a dramatic change in the ratio of practical to theoretical training has taken place in the last few years, with time spent in practical training being more than doubled. The quality of practical training is suspect, however, for many Soviet commanders still consider school cadets a nuisance to be avoided if at all possible. It has been reported, for example, that cadets have been assigned to inactive ships for their training periods. To correct this, commanders have recently been charged with ensuring a more vigorous implementation of the training program.
During their five years of higher naval school, officer candidates are trained to adhere strictly to rules and regulations and motivated to demonstrate political reliability. Hence, as a group, Soviet naval officers suffer from an inability to innovate or handle unusual situations. They appear at times to be inflexible and almost afraid or unable to take the initiative required to deviate from preplanned routines or es-
tablished procedures. They seem to suffer from a fear of failure or an apprehension that their innovative action would be outside the accepted norm.
Of major importance to the Soviet Navy is the omnipresent political infrastructure. Ships and commands have a political officer whose specific duties are associated with crew morale and welfare, political ideology, training, and promoting socialist competition. The political officer plays an important role in an aspiring officer’s promotions, specialist qualifications, and assignments. It is estimated that 95% of all Soviet naval officers—a much higher percentage than in the civilian population—are members of the Communist Party or the Komsomol, i.e., the Young Communist League. Although party membership is theoretically voluntary, it is believed that a great deal of pressure is exerted on officers to affiliate.
The Soviet Navy has a broad and comprehensive postgraduate educational system administered through a number of institutes. Also, most higher naval schools offer graduate resident and correspondence courses. The postgraduate course of study varies in length from 12 to 18 months, depending on a student’s specialty, and in some cases may require up to three years. A postgraduate degree is usually earned by more than half the Soviet naval officers. Little is known about course content at the graduate and pre-command schools. It is known, however, that prospective commanding officer courses of about one-year duration have been established for officers between the ages of 27 and 32.
Indications are that professional military education refresher courses of high quality are offered at the
lieutenant commander and commander level at the Order of Lenin Naval Academy in Leningrad, the highest level educational institution operated by the Navy. Graduation from this institution appears to be a prerequisite to flag rank and promotion to captain. Attendees are nominated for command based on the prestige of the school and report to a two- to four- year command tour upon graduation. The postgraduate instructional staff at the Order of Lenin Naval Academy appears to be of high caliber; equipment and facilities are of better quality than those used in the higher naval schools. Attendees are under 36 years of age and have served from six to ten years in the fleet or with other active units. The time devoted to independent research and the course length indicate that the academy is a naval “think tank” devoted to operational, tactical, and technical research. A few selected officers remain for up to five years to work for a doctoral degree.
Ours
Education and Training in the United States: As in the Soviet Union, most U.S. naval line officer candidates are secondary school graduates. Additional candidates are selected from seamen and warrant officers. There is no reported shortage of qualified candidates. As shown for a typical year in Figure 1, the education of officer candidates is accomplished primarily in four-year civilian universities and colleges. In 1975, 54% of these candidates graduated from schools without military training but subsequently received 19 weeks of officer candidate training in OCS, AOC, NFOC, ROC, and AVROC programs.2 These candidates were commissioned as reserve officers and obligated
to three years of active duty. Another 29% graduated from 58 schools with military training in the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) programs. The majority of NROTC graduates were commissioned in the regular Navy with a four-year active duty obligation. The remaining 17% graduated from the four-year course at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis.
U.S. naval line officer education is based upon the development of a well-rounded generalist. The military aspects of officer candidate training, i.e., military science courses and summer training cruises, provide both initial familiarization with many functional areas of the Navy and opportunities for later specialization. Political indoctrination and party affiliation play no role in the education or career development of U.S. naval officers.
Approximately 17% of naval officers on active doty in 1976 were graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy. Nearly 70% of these officers were edu- eated in one of 16 engineering or science-related dis- C1plines, with the remainder devoting at least half of their academic time to engineering or science-related disciplines The military training of the majority of active-duty naval officers who are graduates of civil- *an institutions is similar to that of the Naval Academy graduate. However, whereas in the 195060 period nearly 75% of NROTC and Officer Candidate School graduates were educated in engineering 0r science-related disciplines, by 1974 this had dropped to less than 40%. An attempt is currently Under way to reverse this trend.
Most subspecialization training of line officers is accomplished through postgraduate education. In addition, there are more than 500 short courses in specific, functional areas available to officers, with 150 of these lasting six weeks or longer. These courses play a significant role in U.S. fleet training readiness. Much of the Navy’s advanced education program is conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. The school conducts an engineering and science preparatory course to help students qualify for graduate-level technical courses. Additional graduate education is also received at civilian colleges and universities or is obtained through voluntary, off-duty programs. In 1974, of 15,000 naval officers holding advanced degrees, more than half had obtained them during off-duty study. Advanced professional military education is conducted at the Naval War College, National War College, and the staff and war colleges of other armed forces and nations.
Officer Assignment in the Soviet Union: The Soviet Navy’s emphasis on specialized training and technical performance in its officer corps is reflected in duty assignments. Upon graduation from higher naval school, a new Soviet naval officer is qualified in a broad specialty area that equates to that of a department on board ship, i.e., navigation, weapons, antisubmarine warfare, radio-electronics, or engineering. When he reports to a ship, he is assigned to that department and spends! his initial four to six years attaining a third, second, first class, and master specialist qualification and moving up to division officer and assistant commander (department head). The
Figure 2 Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Navy Rank Structures
UNITED STATES SOVIET
Fleet Admiral | Admiral of the Fleet |
Admiral | of the Soviet Union Admiral of the Fleet |
Vice Admiral | Admiral |
Rear Admiral | Vice Admiral |
(upper half) | |
Rear Admiral | Rear Admiral |
(lower half) | |
Captain | Captain 1st Rank |
Commander | Captain 2nd Rank |
Lieutenant Commander | Captain 3rd Rank |
Lieutenant | Captain Lieutenant |
Lieutenant | Senior Lieutenant |
(junior grade) | |
Ensign | Lieutenant |
Midshipman | *Junior Lieutenant Midshipman |
•Seldom used rank since most graduates of higher naval schools are commissioned as lieutenants.
length of time depends on his ability. Soviet line-engineers and radio-electronics specialists generally spend their entire careers in these specialty areas. It is worthy to note that, unlike the U.S. Navy, failure to serve in command does not mean a limited promotional career because a career specialist can continue to receive promotions up to and including flag rank in his specialty. This policy frequently results in rank inversion and it is not uncommon to find officers of superior rank working for well-qualified juniors. The Soviet system also allows for rapid assignment to positions of responsibility for those individuals who excel. For example, a number of recently observed Soviet destroyer commanding officers appear to be only about 30 years of age.
The Soviet Navy’s rank structure is shown in Figure 2. There are average time-in-grade requirements for promotion and maximum age-in-grade standards. Officers who have reached the maximum age-ingrade and who have not yet been promoted, or are not eligible for retirement, are transferred to a reserve status.
Traditionally, the Soviet Navy provides officers with the technical know-how needed to keep a ship on the line. The Soviet officer is not only a planner and organizer, but he is also the direct “hands-on” contributor to the successful completion of most technical undertakings. These include the maintenance and repair of equipment. His training is devoted to this concept and, in this respect, the Soviet Navy closely resembles most other naval and merchant marine services of the world. It has been reported that the Soviet policy of narrow specialization
Ours causes difficulties in evaluating young officers for command and promotion potential because of the time devoted to becoming qualified as third, second, first class, and master specialists. Articles in the Soviet press have criticized the specialist system as hindering the development and assessment of leadership potential for command. On the other hand, while most newly commissioned lieutenants are assigned to minor billets on board cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, many of the better qualified graduates are assigned as department heads, executive officers, °r commanding officers of the more than 950 Soviet minor combatant patrol craft and mine warfare craft. These officers are given an edge in preparing for more demanding positions since many commanding officers of destroyers have usually had command of a minor combatant and been executive officer of the same type destroyer. By tradition, the executive officer of a ship usually becomes her commanding officer. The commanding officer of a Soviet ship often selects or at least approves the selection of his senior assistant commander (executive officer) and assistant commanders (department heads) from among his ship’s officers. His part in making these selections can strongly influence an officer’s advancement opportunity. Command tours are reportedly two to four years long.
There does not appear to be a standard fleet-wide system to govern the selection of officers to key billets or for advancement, and it appears that youth, ability, certain leadership characteristics and potential, political reliability, and personnel influence play a significant role in determining which officers will be given an opportunity to command at sea. Experience does not appear to be a necessary prerequisite. This means that eager, energetic, and highly educated younger officers who do not appear to overshadow the commander in either drive or ability often have a distinct advantage over more experienced, but less dynamic, senior officers. Officers who are department heads on board ship often find it difficult to prepare for command selection because their narrow specialization and “hands-on” participation occupy such a great amount of their time. Preparation for advancement requires special effort and the program of training is so vigorous that only those officers who are already qualified as master specialists or specialists first class can successfully pursue it. It is generally at the captain lieutenant rank that it is decided whether an officer will become a watch officer and a ship’s commander or will remain a specialist.
Figure 3 outlines a typical career pattern for a line officer of each navy. It is of interest to note the regular inclusion of advanced schooling into the Soviet pattern, the relative rank assignments, and the fact that shore duty assignments are not a normal part of the Soviet line officer’s career. Advancement to captain 3rd rank is reported to be essentially automatic in the Soviet Navy. Selection to captain 2nd rank, however, is by a selection board. Those officers failing this selection generally remain on active duty until age 45. Promotions in the Soviet Navy are based on standard minimum periods of service in each rank. However, the key to promotion appears to be that a job requiring the next higher rank be available and that promotion occurs only after assignment to that job.
The Soviet Navy’s rotation policy for seagoing line officers features less frequent transfers than that of the U.S. Navy. Four- to five-year tours on board ship between reassignments are normal, and sea tours of up to nine years are not uncommon. Generally, when an officer is transferred, it is normally to another ship of the same type, in the same department, and gen-
Figure 3 Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Career Patterns
SOVIET
UNITED STATES
Years Rank Duty
1 2 | Ensign | Surface Warfare Basic Course Division Officer (Destroyer) |
3 | Lieutenant (jg) | Shore Duty |
4 | ||
5 | Lieutenant | Surface Warfare Officers School |
6 |
| Department Head (Destroyer) |
7 8 | ||
9 |
| Postgraduate School |
10 | Lieutenant | Executive Officer (Destroyer) |
11 | Commander | Shore Duty |
12 |
| War College |
13 14 15 | ||
16 | Commander | Prospective Commanding |
17 |
| Officer School Command |
18 |
| (Guided-Missile Destroyer) Department Head |
19 |
| (Aircraft Carrier) Shore Duty |
20 | ||
21 | Captain |
|
22 |
| Command |
23 |
| (Guided-Missile Cruiser) Shore Duty |
24 |
| Squadron Command |
Junior
Lieutenant
Rank
Duty
Sea Tour
Lieutenant Assistant Commander (Patrol Craft)
Prospective Commanding Officer School
Senior Lieutenant | Assistant Commander (Patrol Craft) Command (Patrol Torpedo Boat) |
Captain Lieutenant | Assistant Commander (Destroyer) Command (Destroyer) |
Captain 3rd Rank | Assistant Commander (Guided-Missile Cruiser) Command (Guided-Missile Destroyer) Postgraduate School |
Captain 2nd Rank | Command (Guided-Missile Destroyer) |
| Naval Academy |
Captain 1st Rank
Command (Guided-Missile Cruiser)
Division Command Military Academy
Soviet assistant commander is the equivalent of U.S. Navy department head. Shore Duty could include a variety of assignments ashore not necessarily related to subspecialty qualification. Duty assignments are grouped by rank and not necessarily performed in years shown.
erally in the same geographic area. If transferred to another type ship, it usually is for duty in the same department, responsible for similar equipment. If transferred to another department, it is normally via an appropriate specialist training course that could be up to two years in length. The end result of specialization, as practiced by the Soviet Navy, coupled with infrequent rotation, is that only a limited number of officers in any ship are in the initial stages of a learning process.
Soviet naval officers are paid on the basis of position as well as rank. Standard rates of pay are established for each rank and position, and they are coupled with allowances for hazardous and special duty, quarters, and subsistence. The pay for rank, however, is not as significant a portion of total compensation as that for position. Soviet naval officers are normally allowed 30 days leave per year. It is usually taken all at one time when the ship is in the shipyard for overhaul. Senior naval officers and those on remote or arduous duty are allowed 45 days pet year.
Reportedly, the Soviet Navy retains an estimated 90% of its initial officer input. This rather remarkable rate of retention is largely attributed to the fact that, except for special circumstances, an individual entering the naval service does so voluntarily, know- *ng that he is committed to a career of at least 25 years. Frequent cases of nepotism, the social prestige enjoyed by a naval officer, an ingrained feeling of service to the motherland, and the lack of comparable opportunities in the civilian community combine to influence career motivation. In addition, the Soviet naval officer’s privileges and pay scale afford a rather comfortable life in Soviet society. However, recent reports indicate that the status of a naval career has declined somewhat in recent years.
Officer Assignment in the United States: The employment of surface line officers in the U.S. and Soviet navies differs greatly. The U.S. Navy has developed and pursues the concept of the general line officer, with emphasis on managerial skills developed primarily through on-the-job training. Until recently, formal military and technical training has occurred more as the result of the reluctant release of an officer from an operational billet rather than of a commitment to a sequential pattern of education essential to overall development. Naval officers are rrained in short-duration functional courses to fit the short-term needs of specific billets. The establishment of Atlantic and Pacific Surface Warfare Officer Schools now provides for the programmed development of a line specialist throughout his career from first sea tour through command. The typical surface fine officer can now expect to serve about three years at sea upon completion of his basic surface warfare officer training. He can thereafter expect to rotate regularly from two or three years of shore duty and schooling to two years of sea duty.
Officers are generally assigned to billets in accordance with rank. A review of past performance plays an important part in the assignment of commanding officers, executive officers, and department heads.
With very few exceptions, the U.S. Navy’s surface line officer remains a generalist and manager, not a “hands-on” technical expert. Total monetary compensation for the U.S. naval officer is based primarily on his rank and time in service, with additional compensation for quarters and subsistence, hazardous and special duties. He is allowed 30 days leave per year regardless of rank, position, or duty station location. Retention of officers in the Navy has been low in recent years. In recent years, about one-third of eligible surface line officers were retained after completion of their obligated service. Other categories of officers, such as aviators and submariners, had somewhat higher rates. The current goal for retention of surface line officers is 45%.
Summary. Because of the scarcity of detailed information on Soviet personnel practices and the inability to quantify the results of comparisons, the conclusions of this study are tentative at best. In many instances they merely present interesting insights that suggest the need for additional study.
The most obvious conclusion is that basic differences in U.S. and Soviet naval mission requirements and social environments have led to substantially different approaches to the education, training, assignment, and use of naval officers. In general, although Soviet naval officer personnel practices are markedly different from those of the U.S. Navy, they appear to be more than adequate to meet unique Soviet requirements. Soviet practices appear to be well conceived, carefully planned, and competently executed.
Figure 4 summarizes the major differences between U.S. and Soviet surface line officers. The differences in practices employed appear to reflect the cultural, social, and political environments of the two countries as well as the mission requirements of the two navies.
P‘
rigure 4 Major Differences in Line Officer Training and Utilization
Pre-military Training Political Indoctrination Scope of Education Sources
Shipboard Assignment Maintenance/Repair Party Politics Rotation Shore Duty Retention Rate
UNITED STATES
None
None
General
Naval Academy 17%
NROTC 29%
College & OCS 54%
Semi-specialized
Managerial
None
2-3 years
Extensive
SOVIET___________________________________
Extensive
Extensive
Specialized
Higher Naval Schools 85% Civilian Higher Schools 5% Institutes & OCS 10%
Very specialized Hands-on Extensive 4-6 years
Minimal (for Schooling) 90%
33%
Just as Soviet ships and equipment are designed for a specific mission or a single purpose, similarly Soviet naval officers are trained as specialists in specific areas of expertise. This contrasts to the U.S. Navy’s practice of designing its ships and equipment for general missions or multiple purposes and training its officers more as generalists. The study showed that the assumption that the Soviets’ relatively simple approach to equipment design should require only a short period of comparatively unsophisticated training is not valid for their naval officers. The information available indicates that Soviet naval officer training is primarily engineering oriented and of longer duration than that of U.S. naval officers.
The majority of U.S. naval officers on active duty are reservists. Their education is based on the development of a well-rounded generalist with training in a speciality area occurring later in the career pattern. Differing from the U.S. Navy practice, the initial shipboard assignment of a Soviet line officer is generally for a period of four to six years. He qualifies by examinations as a specialist and does not normally rotate to shore duty except for advanced schooling. When Soviet officers do rotate it is generally to the same department in the same type ship in the same geographic area.
The U.S. Navy generally assigns a line officer to a ship for an initial tour of about three years where he qualifies as a semi-specialist in several areas. On board ship he is responsible for planning and management, leaving the responsibility for “hands-on” maintenance and repair to senior enlisted personnel. U.S. naval line officers regularly rotate ashore for shore duty and schooling. On sea duty he is generally rotated between departments and ships of the same or different types.
The Soviet Navy, with its practice of specialization and minimum rotation, appears to achieve a more intensive shipboard utilization of its officers than does the U.S. Navy. It seems that the specialized education of Soviet naval officers in higher naval schools, their “hands-on” responsibility for maintenance, extensive period of sea duty, minimal rotation, and career retention rate should provide the Soviet Navy with an officer qualified to ensure the training and readiness of Soviet ships for war. In the current environment of increasingly sophisticated weapon systems and chronic shortages of career technicians, the U.S. Navy could benefit from increasing the “hands-on” employment of naval officers.
Both navies appear to provide officer training that would be effective in a short war. However, given the attrition and cross utilization associated with a protracted war, the Soviet dependence on officers who are highly skilled specialists could have an adverse effect on their sustained capability. This situation could be further aggravated by their officers’ inability to innovate or handle unusual situations with flexibility and initiative.
Which is the better system? The U.S. Navy is forced to be more liberal in such areas as shore duty and promotion opportunities because of the alternative careers available in the civilian world. In the Soviet Union, with its more limited opportunities, the system described here apparently offers a relatively attractive way of life. Theoretically, the ultimate test of system effectiveness would be direct combat between the two navies. Short of that, we can probably conclude that each system is the best for the particular society it serves.
EDITOR'S NOTE: “The Officers and Men of the Soviet Navy/' by Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., will appear in the May 1978 Naval Review Issue of the Proceedings.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Commander Carl Shipley, USN, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Philippines, and Mr. James W■ Church, Naval Ship Engineering Center, Washington, D.C., and Mrs. Rebecca Snider, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., in conducting this study.
Commissioned through the ROC program in 1952 after receiving a B.S. in mathematics from Stonehill College, Massachusetts, Captain Kehoe holds an M.A. in education jfrom San Diego State College. He has served in three aircraft carriers, most recently as engineer officer of the USS Wasp (CVS-18), and on board three destroyers, most recently commanding the USS John R- Pierce (DD-753). Ashore, he has had duty in nuclear weapons, the Polaris missile program, and instructing in project management. He is now serving at the Naval Ship Engineering Center, Washington, D.C.
‘Information for the study was obtained from available Soviet open literature, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Naval Recruiting Command, the Office of the Chief of Naval Education and Training, and the Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic. Extremely useful in providing many insights into Soviet Navy personnel practices was a 1975 U.S. Naval Postgraduate School thesis by Lieutenant Gloria J. Darnstaedt, USN. Entitled “Training and Education of Soviet Naval Personnel and the Impact on Readiness,” it was based entirely on Soviet open literature. Also helpful were the personal observations of Captain William J. Manthorpe, Jr.-, USN, former assistant naval attache to Moscow, and those of Mr. Allan M. Shore of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence. An invaluable source of information on U.S. Navy officer personnel practices was Dr. William L. Maloy, Office of Naval Education and Training, including his article “The Education and Training of Naval Officers: An Investment in the Future,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1975 (Naval Review Issue), pp. 134-149.
2Officer Candidate School, Aviation Officer Candidate, Naval Flight Officer Candidate, Reserve Officer Candidate, and Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate.