Leadership Forum: The Changing Nature of Modern Naval Leadership

times replace man with machine, the manager has not kept pace with the more secular world of personal associa­tion. Technology has made it easy to centralize authority yet, at the same­time, diversify the function through­out the numerous echelons of Navy command.

Some examples of technical ad­vances which exist in the Navy today that encourage the centralization of management are: computerization, satellite communications, and, most dramatically, the Navy’s sophisticated command-control communications (C³) systems. An increasing amount of control of fleet units is being wrested away from the on-scene commander and placed in the hands of the force and fleet commander.

A fleet commander may possess more complete knowledge of a given scenario and may therefore have an overall advantage in control. But con­sideration must be made for the potential to be gained by encouraging the subordinate to exercise his judgment.

Many instances of military action justifiably require decisions to be made at the highest level of govern­ment. Granted, the centralized deci­sion is more apt to occur during a crisis, yet that tendency to act from the top has woven its way into the peacetime Navy, and the subordinate’s role has been grossly affected. How­ever, a true distinction exists between the management of a war and a peacetime Navy. Because of the ease with which the upper echelon can now exercise authority, that discretion is difficult to return to the middle man­ager when his talents are sufficient to execute the more common respon­sibilities of everyday Navy life. If we continue in this fashion, we are delud­ing ourselves in thinking that we arc- well prepared for our primary mission of war readiness.

With respect to the excessive detail in orders and instructions, Admiral King offered the following observa­tions:

“The reasons for the current state [1941] of affairs—how did we get this way?—are many but among them are four which need mention; first, the ‘anxiety’ of seniors that

everything in their commands shall be conducted so correctly and go so smoothly, that none may comment unfavorably; second, those energetic activities of staffs which lead to me­ticulous details in orders and in­structions and so to infringement of (not to say interference with) the functions for which the lower eche­lons exist; third, the consequent ‘anxiety’ of subordinates lest their exercise of initiative, even in their legitimate spheres, should result in their doing something which may prejudice their selection for promo­tion; fourth the habit on the one- hand and the expectation on the other of ‘nursing’ and ‘being nursed,’ which lead respectively to that violation of command princi­ples known as ‘orders to obey or­ders’ and to that admission of inca­pacity or confusion evidenced by ‘request instructions.’ ”² Today’s Navy has developed into a sophisticated and centralized techno­cratic community. In keeping with that advance, sound and professional naval leadership has not remained in step with the march. Leadership has lingered, perhaps out of confusion. Lines of accountability have dis­appeared or at least have become obscure in light of the exasperating number of echelons in the chain of command. There exists a seductive- impulse to sequentially defer responsi­bility to upper or lower levels if fault can be found or a formal procedure has not been promulgated which addresses the shortcoming. The room for error has become more narrow but so has the tolerance that allows the unini­tiated to admit failure or lack of knowledge with the confidence that positive guidance or instructions will result. The tendency toward cen­tralization is a synthesis which defies objective resolution. It is an attendant cost associated with bureaucratic man.

The impact of the Vietnam War on naval leadership has also been signifi­cant. For the first time on a large- scale, the “initiative of the (armed service) subordinate” was seriously undermined by political or philosoph­ical reasoning. Military leadership suf­fered its most severe test in modern times. Lamenting such changing times, a newspaper interview in The Washington Post, reports that Vice­Admiral J. D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Personnel, said:

"... better leadership is the long­term answer.

“The Navy was not prepared for ‘the . . . more competent, more mature, more inquisitive and more demanding’ young people who started coming in the service in large numbers in 1972, Watkins said.

“This new breed of sailor, Wat­kins continued, ‘seems to be less equipped to adjust to the military structure; less ready to accept au­thority without a rather significant rationale; well aware of his rights to counsel. All of these things have emanated from the difficult Viet­nam years.’

“Although we now have ‘a very complicated individual to deal with,’ Watkins said, ‘I would have to say that our leadership and man­agement programs to deal with that complex individual have not kept pace with the changes.’ ”³

As a result of over-centralization and the Vietnam War, highly visible- conditions exist in today’s Navy. With respect to over-centralization, some of those conditions are: a top- heavy Navy command structure, ex­cessive direction and inspection from higher authority, an increased ten­dency to rely on established proce­dures and standardized operations, and increased emphasis on upper echelons instead of the middle management to solve problems. Concerning the Viet­nam impact, those conditions include: increased desertion and absenteeism, marginal success in the retention of junior officers and chief petty officers, increased drug abuse, and increased institutional dissatisfaction. These combined conditions are indicative of a need to reassess the role of leadership in the exercise of command.

A specific example of these condi­tions exists in a comparison of the size of the fleet and the number of flag of­ficers on active duty. Table 1 illus­trates the comparison.⁴ Between the years 1970 and 1978, the fleet was re­duced in size by a factor of 40%. But

Table 1

only 12% fewer admirals are on active duty today than was the case in 1970. So, although fewer admirals are man­aging approximately the same budget expenditures, more flag officers exist in relation to the size of the fleet.

The U.S. nuclear submarine force provides another example of the man­ifest conditions which emanate from both the over-centralization and Viet­nam factors. Admiral H. G. Rick- over’s purview, control, and influence is legendary. There is also evidence in the personnel area, Navy wide, which exemplifies the extant conditions. Junior officer retention has been an area of great concern, particularly within the nuclear-trained officer ranks. A shortage of middle grade of­ficers does exist and is best illustrated by the need to offer nuclear-trained of­ficers financial bonuses as incentive to remain in the naval service. Such re­tention problems could also lead to the manning of middle grade billets with officers who are more senior than the billets require.

Two other examples are the 1977 record-high desertion rate^r> and the departures of Navy chief petty officers with 8 to 12 years of service. Worried about this record-high departure of CPOs, Vice Admiral Watkins said that these chiefs "are ‘really the guts of your leadership.’ ”⁶

Today’s Navy management faces the problem of predicting the material and personnel requirements for our fu­ture naval mission while being cir­cumscribed by today’s budget and manpower constraints and limited by our continued subscription to yester­day’s management and leadership per­spective. To maximize our potential in meeting the demands of our future mission we must reemphasize the role that leadership plays in our complex naval structure. Furthermore, we must better understand the forces that in­fluence the leadership role and its ef­fective application in the military. That understanding cannot be pro­grammed or divined. It must come as an enlightened attempt to excite and develop an individual’s trust, belief, potential, wisdom, patriotism, imagi­nation, and dignity.

The social awareness of the individ­ual entering the Navy today is not apt to change, so the manner with which the Navy attempts to lead that indi­vidual must. The changing leadership requirement must be learned through acquired knowledge and not dispensed in the form of a petty officer’s crow or an officer’s collar device. It must be stressed that our spiraling technology and the associated tendency to cen­tralize decision-making pose signifi­cant threats to our leadership equilib­rium. Leadership is the personal aspect of personnel management.

Returning to Admiral King’s re­marks of 1941 concerning the “essen­tial element of command—initiative of the subordinate,” we find the same leadership deficiencies that we are ex­periencing today. It seems that the overall spirit of naval leadership has not changed significantly in the past 37 years; while the environment has changed drastically. The "initiative of the subordinate” is the focal point for altering our stale leadership role.

The task at hand is to at least at­tempt to enlighten the upper military echelons that the rules of leadership have changed with respect to the per­suasions which are necessary to stimu­late the “initiative of the subordi­nate.” There exist four major leader­ship principles which require the greatest degree of reemphasis: first, the therapeutic practice of delegation of authority; second, the realization that failure can lead to growth if post facto guidance is positively applied; third, leadership by example; fourth, the value in the recognition of an in­dividual’s worth and dignity.

There exists no simple or singular approach to raise leadership conscious­ness. The answer will not be found in revolutionary management techniques or mandatory UPWARD (understanding personal worth and racial dignity) training seminars. The solution can be found in a tone of temperance, but the impetus must start at the highest level of command.

Members of flag selection boards, command screening boards, promo­tion selection boards, et. al., must be­come more acutely aware that a naval technician or intellectual may not be a sound military leader per se. The offi­cer fitness evaluation system must continue to emphasize the importance of realistically evaluating the leader­ship capacity of all Navy officers. The importance of the chief petty officer must be stressed.

Examples of how to return the em­phasis to exercising the “initiative of the subordinate” are easily cited. As the engineering officer during a sub­marine overhaul, this author per­mitted the engineering department CPOs to completely control liberty hours and leave requests for all enlisted personnel. A concerted effort was made to include CPOs in produc­tion and planning meetings that were normally restricted to senior shipyard officials and the engineer and/or com­manding officer. Several CPOs ex­pressed appreciation for the shared “visibility” and sense of contribution. On several occasions, meritorious cap­tain’s masts were convened to recog­nize outstanding performance of routine tasks by enlisted personnel. This type of recognition resulted in formal entries in the service member’s personnel record and his evaluation. More CPOs, particularly chief quar­termasters, should be allowed to qual­ify as OODs underway during certain types of operations. This could also apply to submarines when operating on the surface and surface ships during independent steaming.

Junior officers require similar atten­tion. Junior officers could be invited to attend meetings involving members of the upper echelons, even if it re­quires non-contributing participation.

Admiral King’s philosophy of command (CinCLant Serial [053]) enunciated five guide­lines for maintaining the “ini­tiative of the subordinate.”

►  “adopt the premise that the echelon commanders are com­petent in their several command echelons unless and until they themselves prove otherwise;

►  “teach them that they are not only expected to be competent for their several command eche­lons but that it is required of them that they be competent;

►  “train them—by guidance and supervision—to exercise foresight, to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves;

►  “stop ‘nursing’ them;

►  “finally, train ourselves to be satisfied with ‘acceptable solu­tions’ even though they are not ‘staff solutions’ or other particu­lar solutions that we ourselves prefer.”

Commanding officers of ships, units, and staffs must realize that naval lead­ership can be taught and that it should be their personal responsibility to actively train junior officers accord­ingly. Officers must be evaluated on the basis of overall merit and not sim­ply on his or her proficiency at ac­complishing standardized procedures. The flag officer aide system could be expanded to include junior officers in a more executive assistant-like capac­ity in addition to his or her personal aide function.

We are in need of a spirit among military leaders that recognizes the value of and thereby stimulates the “initiative of the subordinate.' To underestimate the need for that spirit will prove Admiral King’s prediction: "If subordinates are deprived—as they now are—of that training and experience which will enable them to act 'on their own’—if they do not know, by constant practice, how to exercise ‘initiative of the subordinate’—if they are reluctant

(afraid) to act because they are ac­customed to detailed orders and instructions — if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves in their several echelons of command—we shall be in sorry case when the time of ‘active opera­tions’ arrives.”⁷

Conditions exist in today’s Navy that cannot be eliminated and they adversely affect the application of sound leadership in the exercise of command, but the Navy’s leadership capacity can be improved.

The precepts are simple.

►  Delegate authority.

^ Permit failure to an acceptable ex­tent which allows for the exercise of initiative.

^ Provide a good example.

^ Maintain a respect for what is proper, legitimate and honest.

►  Recognize individual worth and dignity.

►  Lead.

Lieutenant Morgan received his commission in 1972 through the Regular NROTC program at the University of Virginia from which he graduated with a B.A. in economics. After graduating, he attended the Officer Basic Submarine School. He then reported for duty on board the USS Barbel (SS-580) where he served as supply officer, weapons officer, and engineer during his three-year tour. From November 1976 until last month, he served as a staff assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence. He is now attending Surface Warfare Officer School in Newport, Rhode Island.

¹Naval War College Review, Winter 1976, p. 93. ²Ibid., p. 94.

³George C. Wilson, "Navy, Citing Changing Times, Combats Personnel Problems,” The Washington Post, 25 November 1977, p. A9. ⁴The New York Times, 19 February 1978, p. E4 The number of admirals cited was provided upon the author’s request by Naval Bureau of Personnel, Washington, D.C.

⁵Ibid., p. E4.

⁶Post, p. A9.

⁷Review, p. 94.