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Some Thoughts from an Unrepentant Nuc”
J. D. Jones, pp. 86-87, November 1977; ^■ W. Estes, pp. 21-22, February 1978 Proceedings)
Run Deep? Yea Run Silent? Nay”
E. R. Callahan, p. 90 January 1978; k. W. Estes, pp. 21-22 February 1978;
^ H. Toepfer, pp. 88-89, April 1978 Proceedings)
^■ H. Russell, retired Naval Academy Professor—Captain Estes’ letter emphases a parallel between our current naval transition toward nuclear power and the 19th century transition to steam. Among them, Lieutenant J°nes, Commander Callahan, and Admiral Steele (“Naval Formula,” as described in the March 1977 Proceed- tngs, pp. 80-82) sketch factors implicit in adapting a balanced naval force to either of those revolutionary, sophisticated, and dangerous systems.
Curiously, prolonged controversy about the transition to steam called °nr Naval Institute into being, and dominated its Proceedings for a full generation. Three clear schools of thought stand out in that 19th- century forum of naval opinion. Hard-nosed engineers fought hard for Safe, efficient power plants, tended by trained specialists. Frequently they came into conflict with deck officers 'vho insisted upon living space and tfanning tables consistent with mis- S'ons assigned their new warships. And both of those groups felt pressed by the occasional officer who perceived even those good, well-manned ships as tforse than useless—until their Navy generated the tactical teamwork essen- t'al for winning a military objective. Through that open forum for all vari- et*es of opinion, those Proceedings fos- teted three decades of evolution toward the solution that served us well through three 20th-century wars.
In 1899, when the Congress enacted that solution, it created an
elite officer corps rather than a loose confederation of elites by requiring that each officer who aspired to command must understand the rudiments of steam engineering as well as of deck seamanship, and also fill billets of sufficient variety to acquaint him with the spectrum of naval problems. Captain Estes and Commander Callahan imply that a similar solution will produce a new team, as capable as those of 1917-1918, 1941-1945, and
1950-1954. By airing the whole range of opinion on that issue, today’s Naval Institute forum can serve tomorrow’s Navy as well as its century-old forum served ours.
“The Navy’s Clouded Amphibious Mission”
{See R. S. Salzer, pp. 24-33, February 1978;
R. Peet, pp. 23-26, March 1978 Proceedings)
“Marines for the Future”
{See F. J. West, pp. 34-42, February 1978 Proceedings)
“Wanted: Czar for Amphibious Force”
(See R. A. Smaldone, pp. 94-95, July 1977;
R. A. Komorowski and R. D. Owen, pp. 73-74, November 1977 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Carl Douglas, U.S. Navy—Amphibious warfare is the most neglected of any of today’s warfare missions in the Navy. The CNO’s office has acknowledged the amphibious mission is the lowest in priority, but the highest in probability of occurrence. Both Admiral Salzer and Professor West have done us a service in highlighting the problems of the amphibious forces.
Collectively, the Navy and Marine Corps constitute the naval or sea services of the Navy Department. In practice, they are two separate services. Most articles on amphibious warfare examine either Navy or Marine Corps participation in the mission. Both authors tend to take this approach. The necessary integration of parts of the
Contents
Some Thoughts from an Unrepentant Nuc
Run Deep? Yea Run Silent? Nay
The Navy’s Clouded Amphibious Mission
Marines for the Future
Wanted: Czar for Amphibious Force
Should Military Unionization Be Permitted?
Crisis in Leadership Training
Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability
The Nimitz-Class Carrier
Finding the Best Among Us
NROTC: Quo Vadis?
Vietnam: Winnable War?
Managing the Shore Establishment
“Get off my Back, Sir!”
Vertical Assault:
The Proof Is In the Doing
The Time Has Come To Revamp the Naval Reserve
Apartheid: Shadow Over South Africa
Run Deep? Yea Run Silent? Nay
two services to accomplish the amphibious mission is seldom discussed.
Professor West errs when he puts all his eggs in the helicopter basket. He fails to mention landing craft and their part in the success of the amphibious mission. Both helicopters and landing craft are required to conduct the ship-to-shore movement. The preponderance of a marine amphibious force (MAF) assaults the beach by surface means. A recent compilation by the Marine Corps of MAF assault echelon requirements shows that landing craft transport 64% of the troops and vehicles and 97% of the cargo to the beach. Helicopters lift only 21% of the troops, 7% of the vehicles, and 3% of the cargo to the beach. LSTs deliver the remainder. In addition to non-helicopter-transportable heavy equipment, bad weather and precision-guided weapons mitigate against the use of helicopters under some circumstances.
The air cushion landing craft, which Admiral Salzer mentions in but one sentence, could have as great an effect on amphibious warfare as Professor West attributes to helicopters. Use of these 50-knot craft enables the assault ships to stand off the beach at distances greater than 20 miles, thereby significantly decreasing amphibious warfare ships’ vulnerability from the shore-based threat. Potentially, these craft can revolutionize amphibious warfare.
Admiral Salzer’s thesis that the amphibious forces are too expensive lacks credence without some comparative costs of other naval warfare mission areas. The Navy’s amphibious forces account for less than 3% of the Navy Department budget. If the total Marine Corps budget (including many non-amphibious items) is added to that, the figure comes to about 10% of the Navy Department bud_get. The amphibious force budget of the sea services represents about 10% of the DoD outlay for general-purpose forces from all four services.
The $250-million replacements for the Thomaston (LSD-28)-class are identified as too expensive by Admiral Salzer. Too expensive compared to what? Certainly not the other new ships proposed in the Navy’s shipbuilding program. New ships are costly. The average cost for each of the 18 new ships in the Navy’s fiscal year 1979 budget is $261 million.
Neither author deals adequately with the central problem in planning for the amphibious forces: there are two services involved, two chains of command, and seldom in the Washington arena do the twain agree. A recent Rand report identifies the problem: “On touchy roles and mission issues, the [Joint] Chiefs tend to compromise and avoid hard choices, with the result that important issues are submerged and seldom resolved.”
A ship can have only one captain. In all organizations, there must be a single, ultimate decision-making authority in order for progress to occur. Rarely do the Navy and the Marine Corps concur on amphibious issues. Too often, they become involved in a tremendously wasteful, time-consuming arbitration process that seldom results in clear-cut decisions. To the credit of both services, a Navy/ Marine Corps board, co-chaired by the Vice CNO and the Assistant CMC, has been created to deal with some of the more important amphibious warfare issues. Although a step in the right direction, it has not corrected the problem.
Lieutenant Colonel Smaldone’s call for an amphibious czar came close to identifying the internal Navy problem. On the Navy side of the house, there is little high-level interest in maintaining the current amphibious capability. Most of the Navy power- brokers in the Pentagon regard amphibious warfare as an anchoritism and a ripe candidate for the shifting of resources to their favorite project. Due to the lack of amphibious warfare flag-level experience, the Secretary of the Navy has specifically requested such officers in his letters to the last three rear admiral selection boards. Of the almost 1,500 officer billets in the CNO’s office at the Pentagon, less than 15 are involved full time in amphibious warfare matters. Marine Corps officers fill seven of those billets. A few years ago, the Navy consolidated the amphibious, cruiser, and destroyer forces in each fleet. One reason given was to upgrade the Gator Navy within the surface warfare community. Re" cently, in CNO’s office, the Amphibious Warfare Division was removed from the Surface Warfare Division and put into what was formerly called the Ship Acquisition Division. It seems for every one step forward in amphibious planning, the Washington bureaucracy has taken two steps backward.
Over the years, the Marine Corps has fought to maintain the amphibious warfare image in Washington- But, this has involved a great expense on its part. Traditionalism, a parochial insistence on dogmatic doctrine that is not discussable much less changeable, stereotyped concepts a la World War II, and a lack of innovative thinking permeate Headquarters
Marine Corps policy. Rather than using judgment in the application of doctrine, Marine Corps planners opt for automatic rote.
The system analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense make up another element of the Washington bureaucracy that contributes to the amphibious warfare morass. The new (1977) group appears to be trying to outdo McNamara’s whiz kids. The press has reported that this group lS out to “scuttle” the Navy. The decimation of the amphibious warfare forces has not escaped the attention of these analysts. A 27 January 1978 San Diego Union article reported on their proposal to decrease the amphibious ship lift capability from its current
133% MAF level to 115% and to cancel the LSD-41 ship construction pro' gram.
For years, the Washington planners have been mesmerized by one dominant scenario—the employment of a large MAF-size force in a mid- to high-intensity assault. A 1977 Senate Armed Services Committee report bluntly stated, “Marine ground forces . . . are demonstrably undercap' italized for combat in mid to high intensity environments.” Exclusive consideration of the worst-case scenario precludes examination of more likely cases. Of the approximately 300 amphibious operations conducted by U.S. forces since the end of World War II, only one (Inchon) has involved a MAF-size force against opposition. Most modern amphibious warfare operations have been small presence and crisis-control operations. However, Admiral Salzer states that the utility of such operations is clearly on the wane.” The Washington planners, immersed in their worst case” myopia, would do well to examine some of alternative cases proposed by Professor West.
The chasm between the haphazard planners in Washington and the amphibious fleet operating forces is great. One can take great pride in the Gator Navy and the Fleet Marine Force troops. The esprit de corps of the average fighting man in the Marine Corps is better than that of a mythical counterpart composed of all the rest of the services put together. Even cursory contact with marines in the field reveals highly dedicated and professional fighting men.
The Gator Navy has been a “can do” outfit. It had to be to get the job done. Prior to the advent of the new 20-knot ships in the late 1960s, amphibious warfare ships were held together by bailing wire, and officer assignments to amphibious billets were often regarded as dead-end jobs. The Gator Navy still gets the job done even though it’s low on the Washington admirals’ priority list.
The solution to the myriad problems facing the amphibious forces calls for innovative thinking. The Marine Corps needs to break out of its self- deluding shell of traditionalism and realistically face the modern world. The Navy must recognize that balanced blue-water forces—carriers, submarines, combatants, auxiliaries, and amphibs—are the answer to the challenge of the future. If the Navy is going to support amphibious forces, then a reasonably proportionate share of resources will have to be allocated ro them.
Perhaps the Navy’s amphibious ships and landing craft should be shifted to the Marine Corps, with a commensurate budget increase. While I don’t believe the Marine Corps would welcome this option, some new measures must be initiated or Washington bureaucratic bungling will result in the demise of the country’s amphibious warfare capability.
“Should Military Unionization
Be Permitted?”
(See C. J. Parnell, pp. 18-24, July 1977; G. J.
van de Griendt, p. 70, October 1977;
W. J. E. van Rijn, p. 75, November 1977; J.
Caldwell, pp. 23-24, January 1978; W. W.
Erikson, p. 115, March 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Richard S. Clo- ward, U.S. Navy—First, I had the opportunity to observe and work on the Dutch Navy during a tour of duty in Belgium and again during two sea tours on Norfolk-based ships. Based on this background, I believe that their seamanship and naval tactical skills exceed ours in many areas. The quality of their ships is excellent, and the Dutch Navy is maintained with obvious pride. Perhaps if we operated with them more, it might dispel the feelings of “lost confidence” insofar as the Dutch Navy goes.
Second, I would like to suggest that one point in Captain Caldwell’s comment deserves much more discussion: alcoholism. Having just completed a tour as the XO of a Norfolk-based LST, and although I approached the job with the usual admonitions about “dopers, druggies, and the like,” I believe our real problem is alcohol. Picture these scenes: an 18-year old, newly reported E-2 who, after listening to the XO and DAPA (drug and alcohol program advisor) talks, approaches the DAPA and says, “I think I am an alcoholic,” and he is (and has been for three years); the CPO who must “dry out” the first couple of days at sea, but whom everyone is reluctant to seek help for because “he’s a damn wizard in the hole”; or the OS (operations specialist) E-3 who reports on board having been discharged from the Air Force a few years previous for—you guessed it—alcoholism. And where is he now? When I left the command, he was in the “dry dock.”
Unlike “dope,” problems relating to alcohol do not break down into the “we against them” syndrome. Alcohol problems exist throughout any command. The same senior officer who will convulse at the thought of “reefer madness” will many times lightly dismiss the alcoholic’s problem because “I drink that much, and it doesn’t bother me.” We are almost universally undereducated in alcohol problems and their solution, with the prospect for. improvement slim. 1 have always felt that the Navy is not a social rehabilitation organization—and as members of the organization our job is warfare and development of the tactics and skills to successfully conduct that warfare. Yet, in many cases, our attitudes have encouraged or subtly “pushed” the potential alcoholic into alcoholism. And to these men we owe at least the chance to rehabilitate themselves. The way things stand now, on any given day any ship could send enough alcoholics or nearalcoholics to the local ARC (alcohol rehabilitation center) to load them up for a month.
I don’t know what the answer is, but I truly think alcohol and the problems it is causing our Navy deserve investigation and discussion in the Proceedings.
“Crisis in Leadership Training”
(See D. L. Evans, pp. 76-79, January 1978
Proceedings)
Ensign M. W. John, U.S. Navy, Precom Detail, John Young (DD-973)—I was nodding my head in approval of Lieutenant Evans’ article until 1 got to the part that indicated that division officers are usurping the responsibilities and authorities of their petty officers.
Wow, I am sure glad my chief petty officer does not feel that “they took all his authority away and gave it to the officers.” If my divisional chief petty officer retired to the chief’s quarters with a coffee cup, I would lose the vital link in my division’s chain of command.
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Comment and Discussion 79
(Continued from page 21)
Ceived a great deal of attention in reCent years, and Lieutenant George’s afticle appears to be a summary of the ^est thoughts on this subject.
Marketing the CVM is indeed the Critical issue. As Lieutenant George Points out, nuclear propulsion could I'nait the design’s acceptance in NATO
Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability”
®ee J. L. George, pp. 31-40, October 1977; S- L. Morison, pp. 22-23, Janaury Proceedings)
The Nimitz-Class Carrier”
®ee T.E. Connolly, pp. 83-85, July 1977; ^•M. Stever, pp. 78-79, November 1977;
Sonsignore, pp. 30-33, March 1978 Proceedings)
lieutenant (junior grade) John R. Eckel- berry, U.S. Navy— The subject of ^dium-size carriers (CVMs) has re- and other Western navies. Gas turbine 0r steam propulsion is the answer for Maximum sales. A conventionally Powered, twin-screw CVM with two catapults should be built and marketed by NATO as a joint venture. Standard weapon systems such as Oto Melara, NATO Sea Sparrow, Harpoon, k^ocet, and Standard missiles would kelp make this vessel an international enterprise. Undoubtedly, each CVM buyer would use its own aircraft depending on mission requirements.
A 40,000-ton CVM easily could Support a 40-aircraft detachment. The dumber of different types of airframes Must be kept to an absolute minimum to reduce maintenance facilities and support manning levels. A U.S. CVM Used in an escort role should carry a Mix of air defense and ASW aircraft Such as 12 F-14s, two E-2s, ten S-3s (two tanker versions), and 12 LAMPS 'hs. The F-14/E-2 combination is undoubtedly the best air defense team a0oat. No other navy has mustered anything comparable to it. The S-3 hikings would enable this CVM to c°nduct some long-range ASW. Additionally, the S-3 has the flexibility for Missions such as Harpoon strikes, Mining, surface/subsurface coordina- tlon, and tanker operations.
The CVM would be a big organizational asset for any nation using helicopters based on destroyers and frigates. The CVM could provide maintenance, administrative, technical, and command and control support for all LAMPS-type helicopters in the CVM task group. This task group would then include frigates or destroyers with identical embarked aircraft. The CVM ASW helo force would provide an ASW coordinator with tremendous flexibility, and a tactical support center (TSC) in the CVM would maximize the effect of the helo force in conjunction with other ASW assets. U.S. CVMs equipped with LAMPS III could perform all helo-associated missions except for heavy vertical replenishment and dipping sonar, the latter not intended for future use anyway. U.S. CVM task groups with four new frigates or destroyers would have an impressive ASW air group with S-3s and as many as 18 or 20 LAMPS helicopters.
A CVM built along these lines would require no new technology. All of the necessary aircraft, weapons, electronics, and engineering systems are currently in use and have been proven to be successful. As Admiral Holloway indicates in the CNO Report, this class is intended to replace CVs at greater than 1:1 ratio. This will then provide a mixed-carrier force of CV/ CVMs to give us a better ability to influence the use of the seas. A class of super carriers (CVNs) coupled with a not-so-super class of CVMs will give us the flexibility and the numbers we need.
A major sales effort among NATO and other Western-oriented navies should be aimed at creating a demand for perhaps 12 ships in the first class. The United States, Canada, Great Britain, West Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Iran, India, Australia, Japan, Brazil, and Argentina should all be considered potential customers for the CVM. Most of these nations have operated aircraft carriers, and they all have a vital interest in maintaining lines of communications across vast stretches of ocean.
“Finding the Best Among Us”
(See M. E. Soper, pp. 35-39, November 1977; A.E. Overfelt, p. 26, March 1978 Proceedings)
Captain John V. Noel, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—At last someone has had the perception and the courage to propose an obvious improvement in our methods of personnel evaluation. Captain Soper has done so with skill and restraint.
There have always been too many officers and petty officers who in doing their jobs disregard unnecessarily the feelings of their men. Despite the apparent conflicting demands of combat readiness, it is always possible in leading a naval unit to achieve a reasonable level of consistency, fairness, and a basic regard for human dignity. This is what the current agitation for unionization is all about. Men who have no other recourse when they feel abused will certainly turn to unionization as a means of expressing their grievances. It is the Navy’s job to prevent grievances insofar as is humanly possible and one way to do this is to discourage and, if necessary, separate those leaders who offend and abuse.
Measuring a leader’s effectiveness by asking his subordinates to evaluate him is an obvious procedure that our military instincts at once find repellent. Perhaps this is because we are not sure what sort of questions the subordinate will be asked in the proposed evaluation. Certainly, we do not especially care if the subordinate likes his leader. What we are interested in is does the subordinate respect him, both as a human being and as a professional.
I was particularly impressed by Captain Soper’s last paragraph in which he makes the point that: “The Navy must always be a true reflection of the greater American society we have sworn to serve.” We cannot be a profession apart from the mainstream of America; our people come from civilian life and return to it. The Navy can only be a microcosm of the greater culture which is the inheritance of all of us. If that culture reflects a greater intolerance of intolerance today, if it is more sophisticated and permissive, if the young are inclined to question the wisdom of the Establishment, the Navy can only adapt itself to the new order. This is anathema to the old and often intoxicating to the young, but whatever our own tastes and prejudices, change is one of life’s few certainties.
I hope Captain Soper’s proposals are taken seriously in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. A Navy faced with even the possible threat of unionization can do no less.
“NROTC: Quo Vadis?”
(See E. N. Bouffard, pp. 33-42, July 1977;
S. N. Levey and A. M. Wildberger, p. 68, October 1977; M. Johnson and R. E.
Peterson, pp. 82-83, November 1977; J. C. Patrick, p. 79, December 1977; J. A. Carman and R. A. Guida, pp. 81-84 January 1978;
J. K. Poole, pp. 85-86, February 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Miles B. Wachendorf, U. S. Navy, USS Gato (SSN-615)—I support Captain Bouf- fard’s questioning of recent changes in Navy policy toward the undergraduate education of its prospective officers. I am a 1974 graduate of the Naval Academy who double-majored in mathematics and Soviet Area Studies- Russian.
In three years with the nuclear power program I have found very little direct application of my understanding of collective leadership in the Soviet Union, properties of topological vector spaces, or most of the other non-professional subjects I studied at the academy. Nevertheless, my studies of both Soviet Area Studies and mathematics have had a great deal of indirect application in the performance of my duties in the development of an analytical approach to problemsolving. At this stage in my career, I cannot say whether seminars in political science or courses in differential equations helped me more in achieving this very useful asset.
It has been my opinion, based on observations at the Naval Academy, nuclear power school, and in the fleet that the Navy sometimes tries to equate the mediocre engineer with the excellent political science major. Nuclear power school candidates are chosen with a great deal of emphasis on demonstrated proficiency in technical subjects. It is my belief that many potentially outstanding nuclear power officer candidates are Dassed over because they lack experience in the hard sciences despite demonstrated excellent performance in non-technical areas. Similarly, it appears that some officers fail to complete nuclear power school because they were unable to assimilate the torrent of heat transfer, fluid flow, mechanics, electrical engineering, and chemistry to which they were exposed because, unlike the majority of their classmates, they had not seen the material before or had not used it in the past several years due to operating with the fleet. Too many junior officers in the fleet today do not have the understanding and the finesse required to solve the demanding personnel problems such as drug abuse and the effects of extended deployments on crewmembers and their families. It has been my experience that poor material readiness is more often directly related to personnel problems and not to lack of technical expertise.
What the Navy should be looking for in its prospective junior officers is excellence. This excellence may be demonstrated in many fields. Eighty percent technical majors will not solve the pressing problems in today’s allvolunteer Navy. As frustrating as it may seem to some, solutions to many of these problems cannot be found on a slide rule.
“Vietnam: Winnable War?”
(See W. P. Hughes, pp. 60-65, July 1977; H. Brainard, pp. 65-66, October 1977; W. A. Small, p. 84, November 1977; R. McCarty, p. 23, January 1978 Proceedings)
Marion P. Chapman, Jr. —Mr. McCarty’s dismissal of Captain Hughes’ article, without deigning to refute a single point with objective reasoning, adds nothing of value to our perspective on this tragic decade. I personally thought that the captain’s article was accurate and well written.
Mr. McCarty evidently cannot conceive that anyone could seriously hold an opinion which is counter to the one so well entrenched in his own mind and those of his "friends in the graduate history department.” If he ever dares to venture beyond the sacred halls of academe—and perhaps even if he does not—he may one day learn the lesson that opposing views of another whose credentials far exceed one’s own, when they are thoughtfully presented, merit serious and objective consideration.
“Managing the Shore
Establishment”
(See H. N. Kay, pp. 18-25, December 1977
Proceedings)
Lieutenant T.W. McQueen, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy—The commanding officer of a shore establishment command is the equivalent of a city manager in the civilian world. The major difference between the typical city manager and a base commander is that the city manager was hired because of his proven professional management skills to run his community, while the base commander is ordered in to fill a billet.
Captain Kay points out the many problems the typical unrestricted line officer will encounter for the first time when he assumes command of a shore command. He also goes on to identify the real need for the Navy to place proven professional managers in charge of our shore commands before it is done for us.
Like Captain Kay I do not believe that a wet/dry Navy is the answer to our professional “city manager” shortage, and the turning of our shore bases over to civilian contractors is even more unpalatable. However, the suggestion that the Navy identify midlevel officers who have completed command tours in their warfare specialties and divert them into a shore establishment management pipeline also seems to be a swamp full of alligators. Volunteers for a shore establishment management subspecialty might be few and far between.
Most commanders coming off their command-at-sea tours have real aspirations for flag rank, and few will believe that if they are diverted in this manner they will remain competitive for selection with their contemporaries who have remained in the operational Navy. Therefore, it would be unlikely that a newly created shore establishment management subspecialty would attract top performers from the unrestricted line community. Because of this natural avoidance reaction, it would soon become known as a community of “not ready for prime-time players” and be unable to function as envisioned.
There is a real need to put out shore establishment into the hands of professional managers. However, to send unrestricted line officers to schools for training in labor relations, financial management, budget planning, non- appropriated fund administration, civilian personnel management, housing administration, facilities management, and numerous other specialized areas would be wasteful for two reasons:
► Unrestricted line officers at this grade level are proven professionals in their warfare specialties and to remove top performers and divert them into shore establishment management would cause a loss of valuable expertise in the warfare communities.
► The Navy already has within its officer corps many individuals who have spent their entire careers in these fields and are, in fact, professionals in shore establishment management. These officers are, of course, the Supply Corps officers and the Civil Engineers Corps officers.
The use of senior supply and CEC officers as base commanders would bring the necessary professional expertise to base management while keeping the managing of our bases inhouse. It would also release senior warfare specialty officers to remain within their own communities.
On a base such as Naval Station, Norfolk, or Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek, where the base supports many tenant commands and a large community of dependents and retired personnel, a Supply Corps officer would be a good choice as base commander. On a base like Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, where facilities are a larger area of concern than people support, a CEC officer might be used.
There's another side to Bells 222.
Bell Helicopter Q33HI3Z]
DivSiono'Te.lfon WC
Bell's SRR/222 Right for the Coast Guard
G? Its right for the crews B Its right for the missions 0 Its right for the ships
There are, of course, bases where a certain warfare specialty is almost a sole tenant command, and it can be argued that base management should be favored toward that specialty. An air station is an example of this situation, and in cases like this the use of a supply or CEC officer as base commander with a naval aviator as the executive officer would probably be the best answer. The key to the whole problem is in managing of bases professionally—not parochially. As a solution to this real problem, the use of supply and CEC officers is radical, untraditional, and would undoubtedly cause a lot of heartburn for the warfare
communities, which would perceive this move as a loss of prestigious senior officer billets. However, a solution such as this may be one of the better alternatives we have. It seems that by tapping our in-house professionals we will probably be much better off than we would be if we relinquish control of our bases to outside contractors.
“Get off my Back, Sir!”
(See R. E. Mumford, pp. 18-23, August 1977; W. R. Cooper, M. J. Wooten, and C. R. Cramer, p. 77, December 1977; L. R. Canepa, p. 81, January 1978; R. D. Jones, pp. 81-83, February 1978; K. G. Schacht, pp. 115-116, March 1978 Proceedings)
Captain Jan Bjpmsen, Royal Norwegian Navy—The observations and conclusions contained in Commander Mum- ford’s article and the subsequent discussion seem to be accurate and relevant. I believe they are valid for the
Norwegian Defense Establishment as well. 1 have therefore taken the liberty of changing the first cartoon a little, giving them Norwegian badges.
Captain J. L. Finley, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, CSS Kawishiwi (AO- 146)—If I am permitted the temporary latitude of calling a six-plane fighter detachment a command, I have had three previous commands, an executive officer’s tour—all aviation—and am presently serving in a surface command. Therefore, my remarks must necessarily be based upon a primarily aviation background and limited surface experience. However, discussions with my local surface contemporaries and counterparts appear to lend strong credence and support to my opinions.
I found the article to be representative of a past time frame, narrow in viewpoint, and generally unknowledgeable of the exceptional progress made in combating and correcting just those deficiencies—particularly with respect to the political and fiscal realities of the times as regards material readiness—expounded by the author.
Having spent a command tour in CVW-5 in the USS Midway (CV-41) during its early years in Japan, I believe I can speak with "some authority” when it comes to discussion of "rudder, direction, assist visits, etc.” I believed then, and do now, that the success, attitude toward, and perception of any “visit” are a direct reflection of the attitude of the organizations involved. A positive approach by both parties generally produced positive results and was beneficial to all concerned. The number and timeliness of such visits were, at times, questionable. But I have seen and am continuing to observe great corrective strides being taken in that arena. Then, and now, 1 have experienced that most all visiting teams have been amenable to schedule changes if at all possible when requested or desired by the “visitee.” Today, I believe that sincere and extensive effort is being made in reducing/consolidating and properly coordinating assist visits/inspections, etc.
The article additionally tends to suggest an unfamiliarity with, or reticence to accept, standardization. The comments strongly remind me of those made by us aviators some 15 or so years ago as RCVWs, NATOPS, 3M, etc., were thrust upon us. But the vastly improved results in combat performance, aircraft availability, lower accident rates, improved safety, and generally increased professionalism were, and are, overwhelming testimony to the effectiveness of the programs. At no time did those programs ever jeopardize the initiative, professional flexibility, or rewarding concepts of command. I perceive those same initial feelings as the surface force becomes thoroughly ingrained with EOSS, PQS, PMS, etc. The implementation of these sorely needed programs has not gone “without a hitch.” And in some instances they still warrant a hard look with regard to implementation. Those are merely growing pains. I firmly believe, and my present surface experience supports the feeling, that the same overall beneficial results achieved in aviation will be achieved in the surface force.
In general, most of the competitive means of evaluations and examinations mentioned by the author for judging performance have long since been done away with or modified—in many cases, for just the reasons the author stipulated. However, I sincerely hope the Navy never ceases some subjective evaluation in observing its ships, men, and airplanes. I served a four-year exchange tour with another service that has essentially eliminated that facet of judgment in evaluating its operational readiness and performance. Believe me, “we’re number one.” “Vertical Assault: The Proof Is
in the Doing”
(See P.L. Townsend, pp. 117-119, November
1977 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Epam G. Panas, Hellenic Navy (Retired)—Major Townsend states that it would be necessary to study the military aspects of the Cyprus crisis in isolation from the political factors. This could be a fatal mistake. Five days prior to the Turkish invasion, a coup was launched in Cyprus to assassinate President Makarios and overthrow his regime. The coup was foolishly organized by the then-military government in Greece which considered the Cypriot president’s policy as being opposed to its own obscure ambitions. This unprecedented action brought about the following chain of events:
► Political chaos in Cyprus ^ Complete disruption of the otherwise well-organized defense plan of rhe island
^ Provision of an excuse to the Turkish government to implement its plan for the invasion of Cyprus, ostensibly for the protection of the Turkish- Cypriot minority on the island ► Downfall of the military regime in Greece, resulting in political chaos in the country.
Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the sea transit and the first landings were virtually unopposed. And I would certainly not advise the U.S. Marine Corps to study in depth this Turkish invasion, as suggested by Major Townsend.
Furthermore, an account based principally on contemporary, mostly one-sided, news accounts can never be considered reliable or unbiased. Because I’ve been in retirement from the Hellenic Navy since 1967 and have no access to official sources, I cannot comment on the details of the campaign from a military viewpoint. It is, however, a well-known fact that, despite the above-mentioned political factors favoring the invaders, they did have a hard time accomplishing their objectives.
1 do not maintain that an invasion of Cyprus in force should be considered unfeasible, but under the conditions it was executed, in broad daylight with no attempt to conceal the fleet’s activities, and despite the local support from Turkish-Cypriot elements on the island, it would have been doomed to failure in face of any organized resistance, which was in this case nonexistent. I am convinced that this operation, obviously prepared months before, would never have been even attempted under normal conditions. The plan was implemented only after taking advantage of the utter confusion due to the prevailing political chaos in Cyprus and Greece, which assured the invaders of the confrontation of nothing more than a token resistance on the island and the impossibility of intervention from Greece.
Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Harries, Canadian Armed Forces—As a past commanding officer of an airborne engineer unit I am very interested in and supportive of the airborne aspects of warfare. However, as a member of the U.N. forces in Cyprus prior to, during, and after the 1974 invasion by Turkish joint forces, and particularly as the commander of an international task force which occupied the Nicosia International Airport, in the name of the United Nations, from 23 July on, I must dispute a number of Major Townsend’s comments.
I understand the author drew from a number of media records for the material for his article. I submit that the situation in Cyprus, in the period he discusses, was so confused that many media reports of that time, individually and as a group, were biased, imaginative, or inaccurate, and definitely incomplete.
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I will list the points with which 1 disagree and present the facts as we of the United Nations forces saw them.
First, Turkish paratroopers did not descend on Nicosia International Airport. The drop zone was the open, but rocky, fields some miles north of the airport, north and west of Nicosia, and adjacent to the then land-locked Turkish-Cypriot enclave.
Second, we neither saw, nor have I heard evidence substantiating “. . .a helicopter, with fighter coverage touch[ed] down briefly ... in a Turkish Cypriot enclave near Nicosia airport ... to deposit a paratroop command group.”
Third, the Turkish forces controlled neither the airport nor the roads to it, on 20 July. It was not until late on 22 July that Turkish forces brought small arms, machine gun, and antitank gunfire on the airport complex. On 23 July, I took over the airport complex from 800 to 1,000 Greek and Greek-Cypriot troops on behalf of the United Nations, with a force of 140 Canadian, British, and Irish U.N. soldiers.
Fourth, the Turkish tanks did not travel from Kyrenia, on the north coast, to the airport “by nightfall” on the first day of the invasion. The battles in the mountains and clearance of the Kyrenia-Nicosia road through them took a few days. We at the airport, which became the major component of a multi-garrison complex involving up to 1,200 U.N. soldiers, did not have to contend with Turkish tanks on our perimeter until midAugust.
The Turkish airborne operation was most interesting in that, once on the ground, no attempt was made to advance, either against Cypriot National Guard positions or to the airport. Apparently the aim of the airborne troops was to join up with Turkish-Cypriot fighter units in the Turkish enclave. The operation deserves comment on purely technical grounds as well. Drop altitudes varied from about 350 feet to 2,000 feet. Apparently no support weapons of any type were included in the drops. Much equipment was left in the drop zone. There was no opposition; an important point because, had the island’s defenders been in any way prepared, the Turkish paratroopers would have suffered extremely heavy casualties.
In summary, the airborne part of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, although a spectacular show on a beautiful morning and no doubt a morale booster for the Turkish-Cypriots in their enclave, played no major part in either the immediate plight of the strategically important Nicosia Airport, or in the results of the invasion, viewed as a whole.
“The Time Has Come To
Revamp the Naval Reserve”
(See J. L. Hall, p. 21, January 1978
Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) John J. McGrath, U.S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Hall’s proposed restructuring of the U.S. Naval Reserve reflects key problems with the reserve forces, but in a way he did not intend. His comment demonstrates the cause and effect confusion which seems to be rampant within the active duty community.
The lieutenant opens by describing today’s reserve as “. . . primarily a paper-shuffling outfit. ...” Though I question the use of “primarily,” I readily concede that my Naval Investigative Service Reserve unit and others with which I have been affiliated shuffle an incredible amount of paper for their size. Now that is the effect, but let’s consider the cause. This requirement for masses of paper comes not from the drilling reservists who must shoulder the load, but from active duty officers who often seem unable to realize that drilling reservists have 16 hours per month to push this paper and maintain their proficiency.
My unit is the finest military organization I have served with, active or reserve, and it gets the job done. But it does this despite the paper mountain and with a considerable investment of off-duty (and unpaid) time. I challenge any active unit in the fleet to match the dedication common among inactive reserve officers.
I haul no water for inactive reserve officers who are marking time. They exist but are in the minority, just as
they are among the active duty forces. The inactive reserve officer referenced here is the average, dedicated officer and not the occasional clock-watcher.
The lieutenant is correct in stating that a reservist’s active duty for training should be with his or her gaining command whenever possible. Of course he fails to recognize that not all of us have mobilization billets at sea, but that is understandable as he clearly is an unrestricted line officer. His comment nonetheless reflects the oft-heard opinion that so-called, nonhardware units somehow are less valuable than hardware units. Are active duty officers of the restricted line and staff corps less valuable than unrestricted line officers on active duty? I doubt it, have never heard anyone say it, and often wonder why it is said of the drilling reserves. Now, the lieutenant proposes elimination of all officer pay billets because the paperwork we are required to generate means we cannot be respected. Balderdash!
Lieutenant Hall probably is correct in saying most drilling reserve officers would remain in the program without pay. Most of the officers I know would do so. But does this proposal mean the Navy now should penalize dedication wherever it is found? We have been reorganized and re-reorganized. Many have played musical chairs between Categories A and B, between B and D, and D and non-pay. (My unit is now Category B, which means we perform half our drills without pay.) As Lieutenant Hall likely is in a hardware unit, he probably is Category A or receiving full pay. We have watched two administrations propose mortal cuts in the Naval Reserve. And we have wondered where the original Navy definition of Total Force has gone. Yet, we are still here doing our jobs. I cannot view that as reflecting poorly on any inactive duty reserve officer.
Solutions of today’s Naval Reserve problems will come when the Navy and Defense Department recognize the Naval Reserve as an asset to be used rather than a liability to be tolerated. The other services, especially the Air Force, apparently have chosen to walk the high road with their reserve forces. The Navy should, too.
Alfred Thayer Mahan:
The Man and His Letters by Robert Seager II
When Alfred Thayer Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power Upon History in 1890, he immediately became known as one of the great thinkers of the age. That book is today considered as perhaps the most powerful and influential book published by an American in America during the entire nineteenth century. Mahan and his work are credited with resurrecting the U.S. Navy from its post-Civil War grave, and with giving it the professional confidence and direction that helped guide it to victory in 1898, 1917-1918, and 1942-1945.
This book, in the words of the author, is "the portrait ('warts and all') of an historian, strategist, tactician, philosopher, Anglo-Catholic theologian, diplomatist, imperialist, Anglophile, Germanophohe, patriot, Republican, racist, journalist, naval reformer, advisor to Presidents and Navy Department officials, academic administrator, egoist, introvert, husband, and father. He remains one of the few military figures in American history whose sheer brain power was his main shield and buckler. He read good books and wrote better ones. An intellectual in uniform, his active pen was far mightier than his sheathed sword. ”
Mahan represented in his thoughts, actions, and career attitudes shifting combinations of brilliance and mediocrity, varying degrees of awesome prescience and stultifying rigidity. His complex character and his complicated philosophy are here simplified and assessed in modern terms by one of the country’s leading naval historians.
1977. 750 pages. Illustrated. Index.
List price: $24.95 Member’s price: $19.95 A Naval Institute Press Book
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“Apartheid: Shadow Over South Africa”
(See J. A. Rondeau, pp. 18-27, September 1976; G. K. Meriwether, pp. 86-87, December 1976; A. B. Bennett and A. G. Thielmann, p. 89, January 1977; L. V. Herrman and M. F. Cornwell, p. 74, February 1977 Proceedings)
P. S. Williamson—Now that many outsiders have expressed their biased opinions, let a South African reply with direct reference to the article in question and a minimum degree of finger pointing.
Captain Rondeau should be given a well-deserved pat on the back for his accurately phrased analysis that "Apartheid is an emotionally charged issue which tends to drive men immediately into opposed camps and . . . tends to obscure the importance of the Republic of South Africa.” This may be witnessed by the subsequent printed comments, both in support for and emotionally conflicting with the ultimate issue: is South Africa strategically and economically important to the Western World’s way of life?
Lieutenant Meriwether recalls that the Dutch and Hottentots “liquidated” the Bushmen. May he recall that the Hottentots and Bushmen were traditionally enemies; one being a pastoral people and the other a nomadic hunting people with no interest in herding cattle or a sedentary way of life. The Dutch were interested (initially) in establishing a refreshment station for their Far East trading. Let us calmly remember that, it is as true now as then. Furthermore, the Hottentots were not displaced by the Dutch as much as by the great smallpox epidemic of 1713 which virtually destroyed them as a people.
At the same time the Dutch settlers were beginning to spread eastward, striving for freedom from a restrictive society, the Black tribes were expanding westward to escape the rampages of other Black nations further north. But for these details one should refer to the work of anthropologists.
Naturally the Afrikaner is afraid of losing what he has. For more reason, look to the north. Not only Whites, but millions of Blacks are losing all that they have, which includes their lives, to other Blacks. And, the statement that ”... any system of government that denies a portion of its people basic rights and privileges is not a needed ally” leads me to ask whatever happened to the American Indian?
With reference to Mr. Thielmann’s point that the Soviet Navy does not have the flexibility nor the endurance to operate without foreign bases, one only needs to examine the recent developments in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Who needs endurance when you have friendly harbors with all necessary facilities scattered along the countries bordering on the area of conflict? With present U.S. foreign policy having the negative results it has, the stage is being reached when the United States will have to seriously count on its friends. One only has to recall that Zaire asked for assistance but was rejected out-of-hand because of America’s fear of becoming involved in an African Vietnam. At this time, America’s image is definitely on the wane.
The ugly realities that are not noted by South Africa’s antagonists are the problems that are encountered on the mine fields. The fights that periodically break out are not Black/White. Instead, they do show that Basuto, Mashona, Shangaan, Tswana, and Zulu cannot live together in harmony for any great period due to their divergent cultural and social backgrounds which eventually conflict and lead to friction and faction fights of vicious intensity until steam has been released and peace again descends to the bloodied battlefield. The Whites? They’re trying to avoid bloodshed by negotiations and are usually shunned.
As Lieutenant Herrman put it, the people of the “United States can only make decisions in the international arena with [their] eyes open and [their] minds searching for the facts.” Of the hundreds of divergent reports which one receives from the various media, which represent fact, which fiction, what is classed as propaganda, and what is aggravation? Will South Africa be judged according to the actions of the Dutch settlers of the 18th
Comment and Discussion 87
century or will the Western World seek honest, unbiased reports covering all the angles of the problems? Many overseas visitors who come on “fact finding missions” find many facts, but report only those that (a) their readers want to hear, or (b) that they wanted to find. Naturally the reader will disregard that point of view at conflict with his own and will be influenced by those that he finds agreeable.
As Commander Bennett suggests, let those who would make decisions read up on the matter in question. Better still, why not get a clear, concise, unbiased report from any one of the hundreds of U. S. nationals in the Republic of South Africa, be they official or only economic representatives. How can one make a fair decision based on the reports of the mass media which are self-confessed sensationalists?
Let one look at the example of the Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast’s government does not condone South Africa's internal policies, but for economic reasons, and in the interest of peace, it is ready to come forward for peaceful negotiations rather than useless confrontation.
But the time may be drawing nigh when South Africans may well say, “We have been abused by so-called Western World nations long enough—we are now calling it quits. Look to your own fires!”
For all the accusations being thrown at the floor of the United Nations, large numbers of those Black African states are profiting from South Africa, be it directly or indirectly. There comes a time when a reasonable man must decide between idealism and survival. To make the correct decision is not weakness but strength of great courage.
As a South African, let me point out that there are many who disagree with a great number of our government’s policies, but that is democracy. Notwithstanding that, we will all stand to our guns if it comes to total confrontation. We may not come out on top, but the fight will be remembered for many generations. It is an internal policy for us to contend with and not one of us will accept outside interference with equanimity.
Petty apartheid does exist but you do not change several generations of policy in one day. It is a slow, much- fought battle in which persistence coupled with reason wins. The Black man is making his voice heard, and change is taking place. Captain Rondeau refers to the degradation of the passbook system and influx control restrictions. These are degrading, but of economic necessity. If all the people left the rural areas for the urban regions, who would cultivate the soil to provide food for the nation? Who will provide the work opportunities for the thousands of new additions to the already over-staffed labor force? Where will they be housed?
In conclusion, I call on Lieutenants Meriwether and Herrman and Mr. Thielmann to refrain from passing judgment by virtue of the third-person report. By their vicious attacks on Captain Rondeau and his clear, unbiased thesis I can assume to which
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camp they are affiliated. To justify their attack a tour of duty in the Republic of South Africa may be a very good antidote to this fanatical belief in a subject which has so many ramifications that even a born South African has trouble in keeping a finger on every pulse.
We do not fully approve of our policies, but one must choose between idealism and survival of our world as we know it.
“Run Deep? Yea Run Silent? Nay”
(See E. R. Callahan, p. 90, January 1978; K. W. Estes, pp. 21-22, February 1978 Proceedings)
Ensign Keith H. Toepfer, U. S. Naval Reserve—As increased numbers of the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines join the fleet, the escort role of the high-speed, nuclear attack submarines will take on an increased significance, especially inasmuch as the number of high-speed surface escorts is threatened by increasing costs and reduced appropriations. Unfortunately, Commander Callahan’s conclusions concerning submarine communications in most such operations fail to survive objective analysis.
The effectiveness of any screening force is a function of the area to be screened and the number of units in the screen. In many cases, the protection of a high-value unit (HVU) or units is less than ideal due to inadequate numbers of screening units. In these cases the designer of the screen must take into account several factors, not the least important of which are the sectors which are most probable to produce a threat contact and the required speed of advance (SOA) of the formation. It can be expected that if the potential threat is a cruise missile-capable submarine, then the area to be screened will be sizable and require the stationing of screening submarines beyond line of sight communications with the screen coordinator. Frequently, the formation’s required SOA will be greater than the effective sonar search speed of any screening submarine’s. This is particularly true for the screening submarine equipped for long-range detection. Such an equipped submarine must be stationed well out from the HVU (again beyond line of sight ranges) and, further, employ sprint and drift search tactics.
Prior to reading Commander Callahan’s statement I had assumed that certain fundamental principles of submarine operating procedure were well understood, nay self evident, to the other operational communities of the Navy. Apparently this is not the case.■
One of the primary advantages of a submarine operating as part of an ASW screen is its presence complicates an enemy submarine’s approach. A potential intruder cannot localize a screening submarine and thereby find the weak spots in the screen. Indeed, a potential submarine intruder probably would not be able to determine if a
The Dauntless Dive Dum
of
World War Tiro
IBv ItiirrHI Tillman
I lie year 1012 changed forever llie traditional concepts ol naval warfare, and the rise of the aircraft coincided with the decline of the battleship. In the lour carrier battles of that year, over 70 percent of all hits made by both sides were made b\ dive bombers. It is the author s contention that the most important aircraft used in the Pacific War was the Douglas SHI) Daimlh *JSS.
This is the story of the more than two decades of design, development, and experimentation devoted to the eventual use of the dive bomber bv both the I . S. and Japan. This hook was written because, in the authors words:
The Dauntless remains largely unheralded and perhaps even unappreciated despite the absolutely crucial role it played throughout the Pacific War. 'I'he names of (loral Sea. VI idvv ay. and Guadalcanal speak for themselves, vet the old axiom dive bombers don t make headlines' seems as true now as it did over .50 veals ago. Hopefully this hook will help change some of that.’"
1076. 211! pages. Illustrated. Bibliography. Index. List price: SI 1.50 Member's price: SI 1.60
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U’lense use hook <inter form in Hooks of Interest to llie Hrofessionn! section)
submarine were in the screen. If the screening submarine were to emit electromagnetic radiations for the periods required for voice communications, then it is going to voluntarily divulge its existence and, if monitored over any significant period of time, its location to an approaching enemy. The same argument applies to the use of any sort of transponder, acoustic or electromagnetic.
If we wish to restrict the HVU’s progress to an SOA which will allow a screening submarine to conduct its search at a speed (note that I did not say SOA) of 3 to 6 knots, then the suggestion of a trailing buoy might work. The alternative would be to construct a buoy capable of routinely being towed at speeds in excess of 20 knots, while remaining attached to the submarine and continuing to function reliably. Any suggestion that the submarine be required to retrieve and deploy the buoy for each sprint phase will be unacceptable unless such evolutions can be performed noiselessly. In fact, if the mechanism proposed by
Commander Callahan isn’t essentially noiseless in adjusting to changes in depth, it would be of marginal utility anyway because of its necessarily adverse effect with regard to the submarine’s counterdetectability.
There are tactical ASW scenarios in which reciprocal communications between submarines and surface/air units are appropriate. Rapid voice or data link communications also are feasible, assuming, in the latter case, that the necessary high-speed digital equipment is aboard the submarine. However, I believe it is readily apparent that these communications must not only be rapid in order to be truly effective, they must also be secure from detection.
ONE REASON HE’S AN ACE MECHANIC FOR HIS UNCLE HARRY IS BECAUSE HE LEARNED IT FROM HIS UNCLE SAM.
Training Programs in the Guard and Reserve are helping many men and women do better in their civilian jobs. Thousands of people are learning new skills. Or sharpening ones they already have.
A lot of what Guard and Reservists learn has business applications. And that is one reason employers and supervisors should support the Guard and Reserve and urge their employees to join.
Those local Guard and Reserve units make up nearly 30% of our defense force at a cost of only a small fraction of the defense budget. Another good reason for lending your support to the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve program. Most employers are behind us. won't you join them? Contact Employer Support, Arlington, VA 22209 for details.
If submariners rise to Commander Callahan’s challenge and "pick up the radio telephones,” then we can definitely “fight the real enemy together.” Unfortunately, we may very well have a fight the likes of which Commander Callahan has not envisioned, because we may have stacked the deck in the enemy’s favor.
Service Etiquette
THIRD EDITION
Service Etiquette
iffli
■
I
By Qrctha D- Swartz
Service Etiquette makes it easier! The most complete guide to the complexities of the military social scene, official and unofficial, this reference covers virtually every social situation a man or woman in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard or Merchant Marine will ever encounter—from the June Week Hop to White House receiving lines—with a lot in between.
Concise, crisp, and correct, the book contains the latest male and female uniform charts for all services, covers service abbreviations, advises how to address service people anil civilians (from cadets and midshipmen to U.S. presidents and embassy officials) as well as business and social correspondence.
A wealth of information on modern entertaining is included, covering buffet suppers at home, formal dinners, coffees, seating plans and precedence, order of rank, and the duties of the host and hostess.
A Naval Institute Press Book
1977. 344 pages. Illustrated. Bibliography. Index.
List price: $14.95 Member’s price: $11.95 '
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