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^ Ina
^apabilit,
Du
th;
an 50 such tubes. At the March
Pbr*n ^ea °n ^ August. The
rUti
reusing Strength and
tes
f. unn8 1976 the Soviet Union con- ‘nued to strengthen and improve 1 the strategic and general purpose °rces its Navy. Reflecting a grow- laf and confidence in their
SoCSt and weaPon systems, the
., Vlets tested and operated them on e high seas for the world to observe
and consider.1
Strategic” Forces
ne strategic” submarine force
^ew so fast in 1976 that by March ,'6 ^0victs admitted violating one of e provisions of the SALT I agree- J?ent- Under that agreement the Viet Union is limited to 62 modern j4 hstic missile submarines with 950 • Unchers. For each modern submarine lyncher above 740, however, the Vlets are required by SALT I to dis- tie one older launcher as compen- 1011 > coincident with the sea trials t^le °cw submarine. Early in 1976 . e Soviets began sea trials of four new ^BNs of the Delta II class, each armed tfi ^ launchers. Thus, at that time ey had more than 790 launch tubes, ,ClUlring that they dismantle
A
'n'mK the problems and
emb
arrassments suffered by the Soviet
t£ly this past year was the ramming of
^frigate VSS Voge (FF 1047) by an
. 0 tl class nuclear submarine in the
tor?,* „
otographs opposite show the submarine n‘nS parallel to the Voge, tJ>r°aching the frigate head on, and f*n ^0Wer two), wallowing in the t■ ^ate5 wake after the collision. The Po ^ e~Screu Voge had to be towed to it U submarine seems to have made ack on her own.
meeting of the SALT consultative group, the Soviets said they had inactivated 40 of the tubes but, because of bad weather, admitted they had been unable to dismantle them.
The speed with which the Soviets can develop and build new classes of submarines and their associated missile systems is impressive. In the past ten years the Soviet Union has completed 53 modern nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines of several classes (Yankee, Delta I, Delta II classes). During 1976 alone, eight submarines (Delta I and II classes) were added.
The older ships (Yankee class) are fitted with a missile (SS-N-6) capable of hitting targets 1,300 nautical miles distant, while the newer ships (Delta I, II classes) are fitted with a missile (SS-N-8) with a nominal range of 4,200 nm. During November 1976, however, an SS-N-8 was launched by a submarine from the Barents Sea to a mid-Pacific impact area, a distance of
5.600 nm.
New weapons for both classes of submarine in this force entered the final stages of development during 1976. One is a solid propellant missile with an estimated range of 2,400 nm which, so far, has been tested with only one warhead. It is expected that this missile, the SS-NX-17, will be deployed in the Yankee class submarines. At-sea launches of another new missile, the SS-NX-18, occurred during November and December 1976. That two-stage liquid-fueled weapon may be capable of carrying as many as three warheads to a range of
4.600 nm. Reportedly, it will soon be ready for deployment into modified units of the Delta class. Both of these missiles are expected to be improvements over their predecessors not only in range, but also in accuracy and payload.
The Kiev
On 18 July, the ASW cruiser Kiev left the Black Sea and, during July and August, conducted operations in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, and Norwegian Sea while enroute to the Northern Fleet. The immense Soviet pride in this newest addition to their general purpose naval forces was demonstrated on 25 July, Soviet Navy Day, when the military newspaper Red Star carried an article with photographs on the new ship and her commanding officer, Captain 1st Rank Yu. Sokolov. According to Red Star, “The ship is called an antisubmarine cruiser. This means that her most important mission is to seek out and attack an enemy submarine hidden in the depths. . . . The ASW cruiser Kiev is well armed. She has outstanding seakeeping qualities says the commanding officer ... jet propelled helicopters and high speed aircraft rise from the deck of the ship . . . the ASW weaponry functions faultlessly. Swift missiles . . . look toward the heavens. . . . Recently the missilemen of the cruiser accurately hit air and surface targets.”
Western observers generally consider the ship, more than 30,000 tons, an aircraft carrier. The aircraft complement totals about 35-40, half of them Forger vertical take off and landing aircraft and the others Hormone ASW helicopters. The role of the VSTOL aircraft has not yet been fully revealed. They will probably be used primarily for air defense, but have 'Wherever possible and appropriate the names of Soviet ships are given in conventional form: The large ASW ship Kerch. Otherwise, NATO designations are given: a Kara class, or a Kara class CG. NATO aircraft designations are in parentheses. Soviet aircraft designations are not.
Soviet Naval Order of Battle, 1 January 1977
______ 1
____ 41
______ 7
-------- 9
___ 710
about 400
137 88 391 • 85 367 81 51
34
55
107
ble of other missions as well. In West they are classed as cruisers an destroyers. One Kara and a Kresta H were added to the fleet during the year. The construction of the Kriva^ class increased considerably, with f°nf being completed. In the West Kara and Kresta usually are classed as guided missile cruisers and the Kriv® as a destroyer.
No frigates entered the fleet during the year but, with the aging of l®r^ numbers of destroyers (Kotlin an Skoryy classes) and frigates (R*Sa class), a new frigate class will prob®' bly be needed in the next sever® years. Meanwhile, conversion of sotne older destroyers (Krupnyy, Kild,(1 classes) has been completed and mod' ideations of the Kashin class con' tinued in order to extend their service-
During the year, the 40th annivef' sary of Soviet naval aviation, the m°d' ernization of that force continued, n°c only with the deployment of c^e VSTOL aircraft aboard the Kiev, buj with the assignment of addition® modern missile-carrying twin-jet ®|f’
2
22
II
1*
150
General Purpose Forces
During the year the construction o( general purpose submarines continue at a modest pace, most likely due t0 the emphasis devoted to the strategy force. One nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, two nuclear attack submarines, and two diesel attack submarines joined the order of battle-
All principal surface combatants built by the Soviet Union since 19^8 have been designated “large
___ 8
— 34 _ 19
__ 41
— 38
__ 22
_ 25
some potential for use in the reconnaissance, anti-ship, ground supp01*’ or ASW roles.
Besides aircraft, the Kiev has an in1' pressive array of weapon systems. The ASW suite includes at least two sonars, a nuclear-capable ASW missile launcher, ASW rockets, and torpedo tubes. In addition, the ship has t1®0 four-tube surface-to-surface miss^e launchers, two twin-arm medium an two twin-arm short-range surface-t0" air missile launchers, two twin 7 mm dual purpose gun mounts, eighc small caliber Gatling guns, and an eX tensive electronics and communic®' tions suite.
SUBMARINES
Nuclear
Ballistic Missile (SSBN)
HOTEL class ___________________________ ._________________
YANKEE class ___________________________________________
DELTA I and II class______________________________________
Cruise Missile (SSGN)
ECHO and CHARLIE classes __________________________
Attack (SSN)
NOVEMBER, ECHO, VICTOR I & II classes
Diesel
Ballistic Missile (SSB)
ZULU, GOLF classes ____________________________________
Cruise Missile (SSG)
WHISKEY, JULLIET classes ___________________________
Attack (SS)
WHISKEY, FOXTROT, TANGO classes __________
MAJOR COMBATANTS Aircraft Carriers
Aircraft carrier (CVSG)
KIEV class __________________________________________________
Helicopter carrier (CHG)
MOSKVA class ______________________________________________
Cruisers
Missile (CG)
KYNDA, KRESTA I, II, KARA classes _________________
Command (CL, CLC)
SVERDLOV class ________________________________________________
Destroyers
Principally SAM armed (DDG)
SAM KOTLIN, KANIN, KASHIN classes _ Principally gun, ASW, or SSM equipped (DD) SKORYY, KOTLIN, KILDIN, KRIVAK classes Frigates __________
SMALL COMBATANTS
Missile (PGG, PTFG) ___________________ ._________________________
Patrol Escorts _____________________________________________
Other _______________________________________________________
River/Roadstead Patrol.Craft ___________________________
Mine Warfare Craft _______________________________________
Landing Ships (LST/LSM) _________ _________________________
Landing Craft ______________________________ _______________
AUXILIARY SHIPS
Transport oiler ____________________________________________
Small oiler _________________________________________________
Replenishment oiler______________________________________
Small replenishment oiler _______________________________
Other ____________________________________________
SERVICE CRAFT ________ _____________________________
•Plus one fitting out and one under construction.
I
(Backfire) and close-support air- 3 t (fitter) into the large land-based P0r>n of the force.
I
1
1
[
£
i
f
e
s
i
Th
e modernization of the Soviet mid mfantry continued also. From Red ^C^ternber until early November Star carried nine articles and tQs on this subject, a number of air *c^ described or depicted the use of la ,CUs^‘on vehicles as amphibious o^> ing craft. And the October issue an 6 ^ava^ Digest carried a photo of Co aif cus^‘on landing craft on the sCr' This increased press coverage sro_ fStS t'lat such craft are becoming equipment for the naval in-
^tandard
'an try.
Shbu
Adr
tiding
e
i
a
il
,e
n
I-
)t
ie
it
r-
c amiral Gorshkov has been given ^osiderable credit for the develop-
ent of the Navy from a force of
smaii u 1
> short-range combatants to one
ant ar^C’ l°n8_range major combat - *• Undeniably he deserves much lt for the political and strategic ceptions which spurred and per- fo tte<^ tPe development of the fleet, ,t^le policy and management skills fo 'C" guided that development, and f,.r t^e leadership which brought it to cU|'lon. Yet, he could not have suc- trt- ^ without the full support and k ‘hendous efforts of the Soviet ship- ^"Iding industry. July 1976 was a ^ nth which, in several ways, marked e culmination of an illustrious era Soviet shipbuilding. Almost sym-
for
bolically, as the largest and most complex naval ship ever built in the Soviet Union, the Kiev, deployed from the Black Sea, the long time leader of Soviet shipbuilding passed away.
On July 11, B.Ye. Butoma, minister of shipbuilding since 1957 died at age 70. Butoma was credited with taking “. . .an active role in creating new classes of naval ships, transports, and fishing ships. Under his direct leadership nuclear propulsion was introduced into shipbuilding . . • Later in July M. V. Yegorov, the deputy minister, was appointed minister. Yegorov began his career as a naval officer. As minister, he is responsible for building Soviet naval ships as well as merchant and fishing ships.
Also in July, the longtime director of the Baltic Ordzhonikidze shipyard, A.V. Yadrin, died. Yadrin’s Leningrad shipyard was the principal producer of naval ships :mmediately after World War II and engaged in the mass production of Whiskey class submarines. Later, the skills of the yard were directed toward the construction of the nuclear icebreakers Arktika and Sibir, of some large merchant ships and, most importantly, of the Soviet Navy’s first large replenishment ship. With these demonstrated capabilities, it is likely that when the Soviet Union builds its first nuclear powered surface combatant, the Baltic Yard will be the construction site.
Almost all eleven shipyards build-
ing warships (five for submarines, six for major surface combatants) have undertaken major modernization or expansion programs over the last five years. These projects, when completed, will add considerably to the Soviet shipbuilding capacity which is already underemployed by Western standards.
Naval ships are turned over to the Soviet Navy under shipyard guarantees, usually expressed in numbers of operating hours. Repairs and replacements of equipment which fail during the guarantee period are the responsibility of the shipbuilding ministry rather than a burden on naval shipyards and the naval budget. Efforts on the part of the Navy to keep equipment operating hours within the shipbuilding ministry’s guarantee levels are often cited as one reason
Instruments for nearly every occasion appear in this view taken on board a Kashin class DDG. First, a pair of SA-N-1 missiles for air defense, then a saluting gun for diplomatic and holiday events, and, in the right-hand comer, part of a 12-barrel RBU-2500A antisubmarine rocket launcher. It is interesting that, while in the U.S. Navy we focus on the prominent antiaircraft missiles and consider ships of the class to he DDGs, the Soviets emphasize less obvious instruments and classify the Kashins as large ASW ships.
why Soviet naval ships on long deployments frequently are seen towing each other or lying at anchor without gear operating. (Other reasons will be mentioned shortly.) Repair and overhaul after the guarantee coverage expires are the responsibility of the Navy’s own repair yards subordinate to a Naval Ship Repair Directorate under Rear Admiral Gevorkov.
II. Expanding Operations
During 1976 the developing maturity of Soviet naval power was illustrated by the expanded use of the Navy to support Soviet interests throughout the world. Reports from widely separated capitals revealed a heightened awareness of the presence of that Navy and concern about the military operations, political pressure, or intelligence collection which could result from that presence.
Scandinavia
The proximity and power of the Soviet Northern Fleet became mote visibly ominous to the Norwegians during 1976 while negotiations continued with the Soviet Union to establish the boundary separating their areas of control in the Barents Sea. At issue are fishing areas, mineral rights on the continental shelf and, perhaps most important, unhindered operating and transit areas for the Northern Fleet.
Norway is aware of the presence of the largest of the four main fleets of the Soviet Navy and, especially, the sizeable contingent of naval infantry stationed near her northern border. During 1976, the arrival of the Kiev not only enhanced considerably the capabilities of the Northern Fleet in open-ocean ASW, but, as a secondary mission, it also improved the Fleet's power to support naval infantry operations.
Regularly, ballistic missiles are tested by launches from the Barents Sea to impact points within the Soviet Union. During July and September, however, as if to emphasize their negotiating position, the Soviets fired ballistic missiles from within their country to impact points in the disputed sea.
Equally aware of the threat on their southern flank, the Norwegians reported that, by the end of October, six ballistic missile submarines of the diesel-powered G-II class had entered the Baltic. From that sea the SS-N-5 missiles carried by these submarines, with a range of 700 nm, can threaten much of Scandinavia, Germany, the
Benelux countries, and Britain. These mobile and easily concealed mis5^c platforms add flexibility to the SovieC theater nuclear forces in the Europe*11 area.
For years the Germans and Da°eS have watched Soviet naval activity, 10 eluding amphibious operation5’ gradually shift westward in the Baltic In September, a Soviet cruiser, sot°e destroyers, and eight landing ship5 operated close to the German a° Danish coasts. The Danes may h*ve wondered if these threatening oper* tions were under the command 0 Admiral V. V. Siderov, the Fifjt Deputy Commander of the BaU*c Fleet who had been their guest 1(1 Copenhagen only the month before-
The Mediterranean
The Soviet naval presence in Mediterranean varied from a high 0 70 ships during May and June to * low of 55 in the fall. In April, whih Pravda warned against U. S. milltaf) intervention in Lebanon, four surfed*
a the
during the subsequent evacuation I /Urier'can citizens from battle-torn sh j110"’ the lar8e ASW ship Kerch and °We<^ tE'e Ed- S. evacuation convoy a Kotlin class destroyer accompanied the USS Spiegel Grove as she
0ved inshore to evacuate the U. S. families.
Africa
In
nean ,
operations off the West African
terranean and arrived in Cona- capital of Guinea, on 10 January e the news agency Tass was deny-
8 that any Soviet ships were off An- P a’ When the destroyer returned to °nakry on 15 January, the larger
shi
s ‘ps and several submarines and sup- P0^ ships of the Mediterranean Es- I ^fa Were rePorted deployed off the e anese coast. Then, during May and une, coincident with the tension over ^ytian intervention and with the visit j Premier Kosygin to Syria, about °2er> ships were added
e<Jiterranean force and a major exercise ’
was conducted in the eastern
editerranean by ships from the atk Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Eskadra.
°ff West
contrast to the apparently mod- ^ 'nAuence which the Soviet Fleet 85 able to exercise in the Mediterra.°ast early in 1976 displayed the abil- y of the Soviet Union to use its ntlme forces for the projection of C ®ov'et aircraft and Soviet and tn 311 mercbant ships carried Cuban ^ °ps and Soviet supplies to support Q£.e leftist forces contesting for control ^ the former Portuguese colony. eanwhile, a token naval force dem- strated Soviet interest by interpos- 0p ltsdf symbolically across the path any outside intervention and pro- lng a modest capability for military
action.
. f Jriginally this force consisted of a ,0t 'n class destroyer and an Alligator naass LST, the latter with the 100-150 al infantrymen who normally are ^aintained on station in the Gulf of ^ u'nea. As the Angolan civil war ^'ghtened, a Kresta II departed the
. EUtCrranpan nnrl orrntprl in C' nno_
Kry
*hil,
P took her place off Angola, in topany with naval and merchant sly ^ an<E an intelligence collection P‘ Coincidentaly, a Sverdlov-class *ser was moving westward in the
Mediterranean and a Kashin was moving southward off Portugal, giving the appearance of preparations to augment the West African force.
By the end of January, however, no more ships had arrived and those on station had moved back to their normal operating area in the Gulf of Guinea. The Soviet presence in West African waters remained greater than normal for the early part of the year, as the destroyer was relieved by another in February and the Kresta II remained until March.
Usually the Soviet presence in the Gulf of Guinea, the continued pressure to retain access to the port and airfield at Conakry, and the rumored desire for a naval base, perhaps at Tamara Island, are attributed to an effort to acquire influence in West Africa in order to be in a position to interrupt western shipping in the South Atlantic. While the naval presence certainly will support such activity, it may also be for another purpose.
The Soviet Union is seriously short of bauxite for the production of aluminum. While various domestic substitutes are available and have been developed, the Soviets still import about 35 million tons of bauxite each year, half of it from Guinea. The requirement to assure the continued access to this vital raw material and insure its uninterrupted flow must play a significant part in promoting the South Atlantic presence.
Indian Ocean
The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean during mid-1976 reportedly consisted of five combatants, including a large ASW ship and an escort. The force was augmented briefly by a Krivak en route from the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific, and by a naval support ship, several space event support ships, and research units.
Soviet activities indicated a continuing interest in developing their capabilities to operate and support naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Their continued interest in Somalia was illustrated by the participation of Fleet Admiral N. G. Sergeyev, Chief of the Main Naval Staff, in meetings with Somalian officials during the lat- ters’ visit to Moscow in April. The Soviet Navy continues to retain airfields, ship repair facilities, and cruise missile storage sites in Somalia.
There was evidence of the extension of Soviet influence further south along the East African coast in July, provided by the announcement that the Soviet Union and Mozambique had agreed to a joint fishing study and that a Soviet research ship would be operating in African coastal waters. Less certain, but more sensational, were reports that Soviet military personnel had begun construction of a jet runway on an island off the Mozambi- quan coast and that a naval base was to be constructed there.
Elsewhere in the Indian Ocean the continued efforts to maintain influence and create a presence were highlighted by the visit of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov to Sri Lanka and India during December. Undoubtedly the visit was part of the long standing efforts to entice these two nations to exercise more lenient port call policies and to provide facilities or base rights in support of deployed Soviet ships.
Pacific
The Soviet Navy made its presence increasingly felt around Japan during 1976. Japanese officials reported that after May the number of ships in the area was abnormally high and Soviet aircraft increasingly violated Japanese airspace.
During the year the Soviet Union began its first noteworthy effort toward establishing a presence in the South Pacific. Offers were made to build airports for the island nations of Tonga and Western Samoa, along with requests for the rights to establish bases for fishing ships. Likewise, the extended cruise of the naval- manned research ship Fedor Litke throughout the South Pacific indicated a growing interest in the area.
Intelligence Collection
Reports of intelligence collection operations by Soviet trawlers persisted. The Canadian Maritime Command said that Soviet fishing vessels and merchant ships operating off Canada’s coasts were engaged in intel-
ligence collection. Across the Atlantic, Spain accused Soviet fishing ships based in the Canary Islands of being engaged in spy activities. Suspecting the same, the French Navy forced a Soviet ship to leave the area near Brest harbor where French nuclear submarines are based. Information on the activities of Soviet fishing ships provided by Ludmilla Marlemyanova, a marine biologist who defected from the Soviet ship Argus while in Plymouth, England, during 1976, lends credence to such accusations.
Port Visits
Each year the number of calls in foreign ports increases. In a Navy Day article for the Soviet international news weekly, Moscow News, retired Admiral N. Kharlamov said that “In this year’s first four months our warships have made more than 100 calls on ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. ...” Citing the value of these port calls, Admiral Gorshkov said that "friendly visits and business calls by Soviet ships to many foreign ports and bases are of great importance . . . tens of thousands of Soviet naval seamen vividly demonstrate ashore Soviet ideology, our way of culture and discipline, and everywhere leave the very best impressions of themselves.”
While “hundreds” of Soviet port calls may occur throughout the world, those which the Soviet Union chooses to report in its own press or which receive notice in the foreign news media are usually those of an official nature, often involving a flag officer. Such calls during 1976, listed in the accompanying table, illustrate the worldwide activity of the Soviet Navy.
Exercises and Deployments
In his Navy Day interview, Admiral Gorshkov stated that “Combat training of Soviet sailors takes place in close cooperation with the navies of . . . the Warsaw Pact. Joint maneuvers . . . have become a great school for sea training.” Indeed, the activity off Denmark and Germany during September was a part of the joint Warsaw Pact exercise Shield 76. While the Baltic Fleet participates in such joint exercises, other fleets conduct their exercises further from home and without the participation of “fraternal" units.
Northern Fleet exercises were held in May in the Norwegian Sea. At leasf four large ASW ships operated with several nuclear-powered submarines- In the fall two large ASW ships of the Kresta class operated in the vicinity allied forces during NATO exercise Teamwork.
Ships and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet were reported to have conducted a large exercise in the Philippine Sea about 120 miles east of Okinawa during July. Four surface ships, including a Kresta II, took part, as well as IL-^8 (May) ASW aircraft and TU-95 (Beat) reconnaissance planes.
Certainly the most significant deployment and long cruise during 19^° was that made by the Kiev as she was transferred from the Black Sea to the Northern Fleet. Another noteworthy interfleet transfer was that made 1(1 the spring by a Krivak class ASW ship- a Ropucha class LST, and oiler. De' parting the Baltic in April, these ships passed through the Suez Canal and, after operations in the India0 Ocean, joined the Pacific Fleet. The large ASW ship was most likely the Storezhevoy, the ship made famous by the November 1975 mutiny and thus- in 1976, banished to Siberia, undoubtedly with many new faeeS aboard. This deployment was not reported in the Soviet press.
Deployments which were reported in the Soviet press included those 0 the Kresta II class ASW ships Admira Makarov and Marshall Timoshenko’ both of which conducted “prolonged cruises” for which numerous prizeS
Were awarded. The Boris Chilikin class tan er Vladimir Kolechinskiy was reported back ", . . From a many tttonth cruise.”
Support for Deployed Forces
, ^ccording to a major article by miral Gorshkov in the July issue of e magazine Rear and Supply, “It f?Ust be said that our Navy, entering ® expanses of the world oceans, is at tsadvantage in matters of rear support in comparison with the navies of do 6r nat'ons’ ' • • Much has been ne m recent years to improve the ftaneuverable rear (mobile logistic uPport) but large tasks remain to be
solved."
The magnitude of the problems is e illustrated by the situation in the editerranean during 1976 where the oviets faced many of the difficulties lch have long challenged the labilities and ingenuity of other deployed navies. Efforts to retain access to existing bases or to gain additional base rights for their deployed forces were largely unsuccessful and the fleet was forced to rely chiefly on mobile logistic forces for support.
On 14 March President Sadat of Egypt abrogated the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. In April he announced that the Soviet Navy would be required to vacate the facilities they had maintained in Alexandria to support the Mediterranean Eskadra. The last five Soviet ships sailed from Alexandria later in the spring.
The Soviet Navy also has access to Syrian ports, where it maintains limited repair and replenishment facilities. Later in the year there were rumors that, because of inordinate Soviet pressures on Syria to change its policy toward Lebanon, the Syrians might deny the Soviets access to those ports. Having lost the Egyptian facilities and without any other bases in the eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Union evidently felt obligated to submit to the Syrians and drop their pressures, for no Syrian announcement denying access to the ports ever came.
Thus, in an effort to replace the lost Egyptian repair and support facilities, and to provide an alternative to the Syrian facilities, should they be denied, Soviet interest focused on Yugoslavia. Admiral Gorshkov spent the month of August in that nation mixing an official call with a vacation. He visited the ship repair yards at Split and, most likely, discussed with Yugoslavian officials the use of those facilities to supplement those at Tivat which have been working on Soviet submarines and surface ships for more than a year. Tivat is near the old Austro-Hungarian Navy’s advance base in World War II.
°ates | PORT, COUNTRY | ADMIRAL |
10'17 Mat. | Port Louis, Maritius | RAdm N. Ya. Yasakov |
^'13 April | Split, Yugoslavia | RAdm L. Ye. Dvindenko |
*2 June | Tunis, Tunisia | VAdm G. Nevolin |
^'21 June | Aden, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen |
|
28 May-l June | Portsmouth, England | VAdm V. M. Leonenkov Cmdr Leningrad Naval Base |
2 D26 June | Bordeaux, France | VAdm A. M. Kosov CinC Baltic Fit |
10'15 Aug. | Copenhagen, Denmark | VAdm V. V. Siderov First Deputy CinC Baltic Fit |
22'27 Aug. | Havana, Cuba | Capt. 1st Rank Yu. Mozharov |
23-30 Aug. | Vancouver, Canada | RAdm V. F. Varaganov |
24'28 Aug. | Bissau, Guinea/Bissau | — |
2'2 Sept. | Oulu, Finland | RAdm L. K. Zarubin |
Sept. | Messina, Italy | RAdm. V. I. Akimov Cmdr Mediterranean Eskadra |
14'!9 Oct. | Split, Yugoslavia | RAdm L. Ye. Dvindenko |
9'!2 Nov. | Luanda, Angola | Capt. 1st Rank Skornyakov |
22 Nov. | Lagos, Nigeria | Capt 1st Rank Skornyakov |
l8~23 Nov. | Basra, Iraq | RAdm P. M. Yarovoy |
12~15 Dec. | Cochin, India | Adm. FSU S. G. Gorshkov |
SHIPS
Destroyer and transport
Detachment of ships
School ship Gangut (Don, AS)
Escort ship (prob Petya, FF) and transport
Large ASW ship
Obraztsoviy (Kashin, DDG)
Cruiser Sverdlov and destroyer Svetliy (Kotlin DD)
Destroyer Nastoychivy (Kotlin, DD) and escort ship (Mirka, FF)
Large ASW ships Siln'ty and Svirepy (Krivaks, DD)
Large ASW ships Sposobny (Kashin, DDG) and Gnevny (Kanin, DDG)
Destroyer Bravyy (Kotlin, DD)
Two minesweepers
Cruiser Zhdanov (Sverdlov, CLC) and large ASW ship Smely (Kashin, DDG)
ASW cruiser Leningrad (Moskva, CHG) large ASW ship Krasny Krym (Kashin, DDG) and submarine (Foxtrot)
Destroyer Bravyy (Kotlin, DD)
Destroyer Bravyy (Kotlin, DD)
Large ASW ship Odarenny (Kashin, DDG)
Large ASW ship Odarenny (Kashin, DDG)
The Gorshkov visit was a prelude to one in November by Secretary General Brezhnev. During that visit the Secretary General allegedly put great pressure on President Tito to provide Soviet ships with increased access to Yugoslavian ports and naval repair facilities as a prelude to the acquisition of base rights. Additionally, a request reportedly was made for overflight rights for aircraft enroute to Mediterranean operations. According to their reports, the Yugoslavians turned down the Soviet requests.
The magnitude of the problems created by this lack of forward bases is illustrated by a report that during the fall of 1976 when the Mediterranean force numbered 55 ships, only ten were combatants, and the rest support ships. While that may have been an extreme example, combatants normally constitute a minority of the Soviet surface ships deployed to the Mediterranean. Even those few frequently have to anchor off Crete, in the Gulf of Solium, or at other sandbars awaiting support ships to bring them supplies from the Black Sea.
Admiral Gorshkov displayed his interest in improving mobile replenishment on several occasions during 1976. In March, the Admiral was reported to have expressed his thanks to the merchant tanker Yelna when she returned from a cruise, during which she operated in the Mediterranean for several months, "providing naval ships with fuel oil and other materials.” Likewise, during his inspection of the Mediterranean Eskadra in June the Admiral was reported to have observed operations involving the simultaneous refueling of several ships from a tanker.
Problems
As the Soviet Navy has expanded the number and extent of its operations on the high seas, there has been an increasing number of reports of problems with bad weather, collisions, and mechanical breakdowns.
During the year the Soviet press described how a group of ships under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Sokolan had been caught in Hurricane Debbie. One of
those ships was the large ASW ship Groznyy (a Kynda class CG ) under the command of Captain 1st Rank (now Rear Admiral) Ryabinskiy. The Groznyy received praise for completing the planned training program despite the adverse weather. Another ship also challenged by the weather was the large ASW ship Dostoyny (a Krivak class DD) which encountered a “severe three-day storm” while on a training cruise. The mission was carried out despite the fact that the storm knocked out a compressor and radar equipment at different times. The commanding officer, Captain 3d Rank A. Il’in, received a medal and the crew received congratulations from Admiral Gorshkov.
The year seemed to be one in which Soviet nuclear-powered submarines could not avoid foreign ships. A November class from the Northern Fleet became entangled in the nets of a Norwegian trawler on 1 July and was forced to surface and return to home waters. Likewise, on 8 October, a Japanese trawler snagged a Charlie class guided missile submarine off the Kamchatka Peninsula. The best- known incident, however, was that of 28 August in which an Echo class guided missile submarine collided with the USS Voge (FF-1047) in the Ionian Sea.
On 4 August one of two TU-95 (Bear) long-range reconnaissance aircraft enroute to Cuba crashed in the Atlantic about 275 miles off Newfoundland. Three Soviet ships, including a tug equipped for diving and dragging operations, worked in 100 fathoms for six weeks until they recovered parts of the aircraft.
Mechanical breakdowns are likely more frequent but less evident than collisions or crashes. Occasionally, however, they occur in places where they become obvious. This occurred during November when a Foxtrot class diesel-powered attack submarine was forced to surface near the Tsushima Strait and receive assistance from a subtender.
III. Training and Readiness
The Minister of Defense told the newly graduating officers in July that “However awesome and sophisticated the weapons, the outcome of a battle- operation, or war as a whole is, in the final analysis, determined by people- Perhaps reflecting concern over this is* sue, admirals echoed this sentiment in their Navy Day speeches. For example, Admiral Lobov, the Navy’s representative on the General Staff: "The strength of the Navy lies not in the fact that it is equipped with the newest ships, material, and weapons- Its main resource is outstanding Pef" sonnel.” Admiral Grishanov, the Chief of the Navy Political Directorate: "... the decisive strength of the fleet is its personnel.” And Admiral Amelko, a Deputy Commander in Chief of the Navy: "The main and decisive force of the Soviet Navy is people.”
All of these highlight the awareness of the naval leadership that they are dealing with what a Red Star article described as "... an operator- machine system.” They realize that “. . . the overall dependability of the entire system depends upon the dependability of each of the elements. I‘ the operator-specialist proves to be unreliable himself, that is if he is poorly prepared technically, physically, an^ psychologically, then he is naturally not in a position to insure reliable operation of the system.”
Political Reliability,
Morale, and Discipline
Naturally, in the aftermath of the 1975 mutiny by crew members of the Storezhevoy and coincident with the refection of several Air Force pilots, the maintenance of high political reliability, morale, and discipline became a principal concern of naval leaders.
In order to insure that conditions 0* low political awareness, poor morale- and lack of discipline, all of whieh were known beforehand to exist in the Storezhevoy, are now dealt with early and properly, responsibility has been placed squarely at the command level- At the 25th Party Congress, Secretary General Brezhnev discussed mil*' tary leadership in surprisingly sophisticated terms. He pointed out that “The modern leader must combine within himself party-mindedness and profound competence, discipline and
‘nitiative, and he must take a creative aPproach to matters. At the same tlrne’ on any issue, the leader is obli- Sated to take account of the sociopolitical and educational aspects, e tactful toward people and their needs and aspirations, and to set an jXample at work and in his daily life.” p Navy Day interview, Admiral orshkov pointed out that “these *8h party demands apply in full to c°mmanders of ships, units, and formations, suggesting that the time 35 come in the Soviet Navy when a ^rnrnan<^er must understand and re- t0 his men, commanding by resPect rather than by more traditional and harsher means.
c ^ndeed, Admiral Gorshkov indi- that the primary means of trying avoid future problems would be to
article in Red Star entitled “On Distant Meridians” published about the same time also emphasized that a strong collective is considered to be the key to preventing major disciplinary problems. After discussing one unnamed ship aboard which discipline problems developed in the course of a long voyage, the article pointed out that such problems are avoided in the cruiser Leningrad and other ships with a “collective atmosphere” because the crew is “a single combat family.”
The same article noted that on the unnamed ship, "... toward the middle of the voyage, breakdowns appeared in the behavior of individual sailors . . . because some ship officers became less exacting toward the personnel and less attention was paid to the question of discipline.” This need that if he does not learn to maintain a high level of discipline in school he will not likely do so as an officer in the fleet.
Commanding Officers
Soviet armed forces leaders are uneasy about the relative youth and inexperience of the new commanding officers.
for “exactingness,” or the strictist adherence to the smallest detail of regulations at all times, has long been the Soviet method of maintaining discipline. That it is now also being reemphasized as a useful method is further highlighted by an October article in Red Star calling for increased level of “exactingness” in the enforcement of discipline at officer training schools. It noted that the trainee of today is the officer of tomorrow and
^rnphasize the old Russian tradition loyalty to the collective. He ltTled that “A distinguishing feature the present time is the fact that ttary labor in general and in the avy in particular is becoming in- ^teasingjy collective . . . the fostering . a high sense of responsibility in a'l°rs and the creation of a healthy *^°tal atmosphere among them— se are the most important tasks e'ng resolved in the fleets.” A long
During the year, Red Star began a series of articles entitled “Molding the Commander” which discussed the various means of developing command qualities in young officers. The first of these was entitled, significantly, “Without Allowance for Youth.” In the July issue of the Naval Digest, Admiral Smirnov wrote on the “The Quality of Future Ship Commanders.” He continued the debate concerning
the selection and training of commanding officers which began in 1974 and included three major articles in 1975. He reiterated the philosophy that it is the responsibility of the commanding officer of a ship to train his relief.
In his Navy Day interview, Admiral Gorshkov noted that “People born since the Great Patriotic War (i.e. less than 30) are now commanding warships.” A September article in Red Star admitted that “. . . unfortunately our seeming rapid rebuilding does not always work out well . . . Undoubtedly not every officer, even though thoroughly agreeing with the purpose of a new, more up to date ship, is actually equipped to command it effectively.” A December Red Star article noted that “Among the officers who lead crews today, a higher percentage than ever before are young commanders with comparatively little experience behind them.”
Most top military leaders served in World War II. They recall the heavy costs which the Soviet armed forces paid in the early days of that war because of their inexperience, so the lack of combat experience in today’s commanders is worrisome. It is, along with Russian tradition and Communist principle, the reason for the highly centralized command system in the Soviet armed forces.
Training Methods
The naval leadership continues to stress the value of the extended deployment as a training school, but not necessarily underway—an unusual item in Red Star stressed the types of training which could be accomplished while at anchor—and to adhere to the philosophy that every man trains his own relief as the principal means by which individual training is accomplished. Nonetheless, there has been a growing awareness of the need to accomplish some schooling ashore and to use more advanced techniqueS of individual training.
In his Navy Day speech Admiral Gorshkov reiterated, with qualify*" tions, the philosophy that “long ocean voyages . . . are the best school f°r enhancing naval training and the spe" cial and tactical training of person' nel.” In his more extensive interview he expressed concern about training matters, stating that “raising the effectiveness and quality of combac training in the fleet is complex work . . . which presupposes the introduction of scientifically substantiated principles of instruction and education and the broad use of progressive experience.” Likewise, Admiral Grishanov noted “the persistent struggle against oversimplification in training.”
Outstanding Ships
“Socialist Competition” among watch sections and subdivisions aboard each ship and among the ships themselves for various fleet and navy-wide prizes is the basis for °f' ganizing and motivating individual and unit training in the Soviet Navy- The best men and ships receive wide publicity in the military press, both as a reward and as an inspiration and spur to competition.
There has been a continued effortt0
lrnprove the value of the competition 35 a training method. According to an ^tricle in the November 1975 Naval ‘8est> the just completed Socialist j°mpetition of 1975 had been con- ucted under “somewhat changed es which were aimed at “creating more businesslike competitive situa- tl0n> placing the competitors under 9ual conditions and reducing the expenditure of effort and support utilities substantially.” As for 1976, e article called for the “creation of rn°re complex situations” which ^fuld ‘train commanders always to Pirate actively, decisively, and with mtiative. ’ For the crew the emphasis l^.to be on maintenance and, thus ■ tra'nmg should be aimed at inculcat-
fitnate
reward, Ochakov was the ship
'Promoted to Admiral (Engineer) about June 1976 2Relieved Admiral V. N. Alekseyev who has retired. 3Promoted to Admiral in March.
4Promoted to Admiral in November.
COMMAND LIST 1976
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union
First Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral of the Fleet
Deputy Commander in Chief, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy Admiral
Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral
Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral
Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral
Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral (Engineer)
Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral (Engineer)
Deputy Commander in Chief, Chief of the Main Navy Staff Admiral
First Deputy Chief of the Main Navy Staff Vice Admiral
Deputy Chief of the Main Navy Staff Vice Admiral
Commander in Chief Soviet Naval Aviation Colonel General (Aviation)
Commander in Chief, Northern Fleet Admiral of the Fleet
Commander in Chief, Baltic Fleet Vice Admiral
Commander in Chief, Black Sea Fleet Admiral
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Admiral
Commander, Leningrad Naval Base, Educational and Training Establishments Admiral
Commander, Mediterranean Eskhadra Rear Admiral
caf Sa^or w‘th more solid practi-
skills in proper servicing of Weapons and the technical equipment ls care, high quality of inspections maintenance operations ...” ,0As the Socialist Competition of k ° proceeded it appeared that, ased on the publicity received and e prizes awarded, the ASW ship c akov (Captain 2d Rank V. ,, epelev), a Kara class CG of the Black s^a is clearly the outstanding
'P in the Soviet Navy. During ^ _> the first full year the Ochakov
ln the operating forces, there was t much publicity concerning the ^Proved ship. Nevertheless, at the of the 1975 training year it was ^Ported that the ship had won the l^°msomol Central Committee Chal- n8e Red Banner as “The Best Naval ^ r ace Ship and a number of other po°norary awards established in the rmations and the fleet.” During the the ship was mentioned first in fe ^ ^’st outstanding ships and was j^tured in numerous press articles. In J *t was reported that all rocket ^ f gunnery shoots of the Ochakov had een outstanding, that the electro- fo C*lan‘ca^ division had won a prize r readiness and for the best damage dyr°l efforts, and that the ASW, air cjj ense> radio-technical, and medical v*sions were excellent. Eventually e ship won “The Challenge Banner ac^e Military Council of the Fleet many prizes." Finally, as the ul- n which Admiral Gorshkov embarked
during his Mediterranean deployment.
Probably the most significantly improved ship in the Soviet Navy during 1976 was the Northern Fleet’s large ASW ship Admiral Zozulya, a Kresta I. That ship had received little publicity in 1975 but in 1976 was mentioned frequently and cited as “. . . much improved due to a new commanding officer,” Captain 2d Rank A. Kovalchuk. The new Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, honored the ship with his presence during the Navy Day festivities. Her commanding officer was elected a delegate to the 25 th Party Congress and awarded a medal.
Mentioned as "outstanding” in Navy Day speeches were the Pacific
—S. G. Gorshkov —N. I. Smirnov
—V. M. Grishanov —N. N. Amelko —G. A. Bondarenko —V. V. Mikhaylin —P. Kotov —V. Novikov1
—N. D. Sergeyev —P. N. Navoitsev2 —I. A. Sornev —A. A. Mironenko —G. M. Yegorov —A. M. Kosov —N. I. Khovrin3 —V. P. Maslov
—V. M. Leonenkov4 —V. I. Akimov
Fleet’s large ASW ship Marshal Voroshilov (a Kresta II), The Black Sea Fleet’s large ASW ship Krasny Krym (a Kashin), the Northern Fleet’s nuclear-powered missile submarine Krasnogvardyets (a Delta), the nuclear- powered attack submarine Leninets and the diesel powered submarine Yaroslavsky Komsomolets.
The last named has now been "outstanding” for eight consecutive years. Likewise, according to an early 1976 Red Star article “The large ASW ship Sobrazitelnyy (a Kashin) has been operating as an outstanding ship for eight straight years.” The Pacific Fleet’s Kynda class cruiser Varyag was named outstanding in 1976 for the fifth straight year. The Varyag was awarded the Challenge Red Banner as the best surface ship in the Pacific Fleet. Similarly, the Baltic Fleet’s Whiskey class submarine Vladimirskiy Komsomolets and a Baltic Fleet helicopter have been named outstanding for several straight years. The large ASW ship Silnyy (Captain 2d Rank V. A. Yegorov), a Krivak class DD, has been outstanding for three years in a row.
IV. Command
Like the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the leadership of the Navy remained firmly in the hands of the long time occupant throughout 1976. Only minor shifts of other top level personnel occurred, providing no positive indications of the timing and nature of the eventual succession.
Seapoiver and the State
By the publication of his latest major work, the book Seapower of the State,2 Admiral Gorshkov marked the culmination of 20 years’ effort. During that time he has guided the development of the Soviet Navy from a coastal force capable only of defending 2For a review of this book, by Commander Thomas J. Whelan, USN, see Proceedings, November 1976, pp. 85-86. See also, Commander Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Proceedings, March 1977, pp. 79-80, and Lieutenant Commander B. W. Watson, USN, Proceedings, April 1977, "Comments on Gorshkov’s 'Sea Power of the State,’" pp. 41-47.
the shores of the Soviet Union and supporting the flanks of the Army into a fleet capable of “strategic” strikes, of operating in distant waters, and of supporting Soviet political and military interests worldwide. In his book, the Admiral summarizes the philosophical, historical, and military considerations which explain and justify that development of the Soviet Navy and provides to his successors the theoretical and practical foundations on which to base their arguments and efforts to maintain a strong Navy in the future.
In announcing the publication of the book, the Soviet press stated that it “. . . will study the concept of the seapower of the state and its significance in the policies and defense of a nation. It will examine the basic components of seapower and the main attention will be focused upon the Navy, particularly strategic missions in concert with other branches of the armed forces or independently. . . . The book is intended for military readers.” Reviews were published in the Soviet press and “readers conferences” were held throughout the fleet to discuss the book. All, in one way or another, acclaimed Admiral Gorshkov as a naval theoretician because, as one review went, “For the first time in our literature the author conclusively formulates the concept of seapower as a scientific category and reveals its content. He stresses that it is, primarily, the real ability of the state to make effective use of the world ocean in the interests of the defense of socialism against imperialist aggression.” According to another review, Gorshkov “has concisely expounded an integrated theory of the strategic utilization of naval forces in modern warfare.” In recognition of his work the Admiral has been nominated for the M. V. Frunze Prize.
A Bit of Naval Kremlinology
Despite his long tenure and advancing age signs were scarce during 1976 that Admiral Gorshkov intends to step down as Commander in Chief. Nevertheless, the retirement of his long time deputies Admiral Kasatonov and Admiral Alekseyev as well as other shifts in the top level of the Navy over the past several yeafS suggest that the Admiral is preparing the organization for his successor.
Who that successor might be is an interesting topic upon which to speculate. Due to the limited hard evidence available it is also a subject for the art of Kremlinology—the attempt to forecast personnel shifts at the top level based on minor or normally in' significant indicators.
During the 25th Party Congress. 287 persons were elected as member* or candidate members of the Centra Committee. Among those electe were Admiral Gorshkov, Admira Yegorov, and Admiral Maslov- Among those conspicuous by failufe to be elected was Admiral Smirnov, the First Deputy Commander to A miral Gorshkov. Also interesting *n the reporting of the Congress was that a photo of Admiral Yegorov appeal on page 1 of Red Star on 3 March while a photo of Admiral Smirnov ap' peared only on page 2 the following day. No picture of Admiral Masl°' appeared.
Among those who practice Krem' linology such small signs are signi^*' cant. If such an art is applicable to the Navy, it seems that at this time, Ad' miral Yegorov of the Northern Fleet >s considered the best candidate selection as the successor to Admira Gorshkov.
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