At 1020 on 23 February 1945, members of the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, placed a small U. S. flag atop Mount Suribachi on the island of Iwo Jima. A short tune thereafter, Joe Rosenthal took one of the most furious photographs of World War II as the first flag was replaced by a larger one obtained by Marines from their Navy comrades on board LST-779. That event, recreated in the Marine Memorial near Washington, has come to represent the mission with which the Marine Corps has been charged since the 18th century—projection of power ashore in furtherance of U. S. interests.
The Marine Memorial serves as a tribute to the forward thinking of the post-World War I Marine Corps planners who disregarded the pessimistic views of tacticians sounding the death knell for amphibious warfare. Pointing to the British-French failure at Gallipoli in 1915, the pessimists argued that the World War I development of the tank, airplane, and machine gun foreclosed the possibility of a successful assault from the sea against hostile, defended shores. Ignoring their critics, Major General John A. Lejeune, Brigadier General John H. Russell, Major Earl H. Ellis, and other Marines resolutely went about the business of adjusting to tactical and technological change, revolutionizing amphibious tactics and weaponry in the process. The wisdom of their efforts was manifested in the amphibious successes of World War II.
With the successful conclusion of World War II, the Marine Corps went through the transformation from its wartime posture as the "first to fight" to a ubiquitous force in readiness. Again, technological changes raised challenges to the Marine Corps and its amphibious mission. Amid arguments that the atomic age had revolutionized warfare, Marines assumed occupation duties in Japan, occupation and peacekeeping duties in China, and their portion of the presence mission performed by the U. S. Naval Forces Mediterranean (later the Sixth Fleet) in those perennially troubled waters.
It rapidly became evident that the defeat of the Axis powers had not brought international political stability and peace to the world. Neither the newly-founded United Nations nor our monopoly of nuclear weapons was a panacea for the challenges to the free world. Recognizing the necessity to respond to these challenges, Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947. Reflecting upon the myriad missions assigned the Marine Corps over the years, Congress provided that the Marine Corps would be:
". . . organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces . . . for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall . . . perform such other duties as the President may direct."1
Again the Marine Corps rejected cries of obsolescence of its amphibious mission, seeking instead refinement of that mission in light of experience and technological advances. Changes were developed to respond to challenge. The concept of vertical envelopment—assault by helicopter—evolved to respond to the challenges of the nuclear age. Concepts developed at Quantico in the postwar years were refined in the years immediately following, soon to be put to use.
On 25 June 1950, overly relying upon the 12 January 1950 statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson which excluded Korea from the security interests of the United States, the North Korean People's Army invaded the Republic of Korea. In a classic example of the consequences suffered by the occurrence of a vacuum between antagonists, North Korea rushed to fill the void, quickly forcing United Nations forces into a defensive toehold at Pusan. Relief came when the hastily-organized First Marine Division landed by amphibious assault at Inchon on 15 September, reversing the tide of the war. The lessons of the first three months of the Korean War remain valid a quarter century later:
- A lack of resolve to protect the interests of the United States and its Free World allies will always be met by Soviet challenge. Our experience in Angola reaffirmed this.
- Those challenges seldom occur according to any scenario or prediction envisioned by Free World planners, whether public or private. Although many have prepared for a major power confrontation in Central Europe, that arena has experienced 30 years of peace and prosperity. Rather than restrict themselves to a single scenario, our principal antagonists have sought a global challenge—usually by proxy—while avoiding direct confrontation.
- Any response to a challenge must be made with forces in being (including reserves). Our fast-paced world no longer permits the luxury of time enjoyed at the outset of World Wars I and II.
- To the enemy's chagrin, amphibious operations seek out his weak points rather than striking at his strong points. The Inchon landing of 1950, for example, served to deter the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from denuding itself of ground forces during U. S. involvement in Vietnam. Uncertain as to if, when, or where an amphibious assault would be made, major units remained tied down in anticipation of landings until the concluding months of the war in 1975.
- Challenges to the amphibious mission of the Marine Corps as obsolete neglect the propensity of the Marine Corps to anticipate and respond to technological and tactical change. Leadership in development of surface effect vehicles and V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) aircraft today carries on the forward thinking traditions which led to the development of the LVT (landing vehicle, tracked) in the 1930s and of modern-day helicopter tactics in the post-World War II era.
The quarter century which has elapsed since the Korean War has seen the Marines put to many tests, most within the naval missions of naval presence and projection of power ashore. The myriad missions assigned since U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 are illustrative of the manner in which the Marine Corps is called upon to support our foreign policy objectives.
The ink was barely dry on the 1973 Paris peace agreements when amphibious forces carrying Navy helicopter squadron HM-12, Marine helicopter squadron HMH-463, and elements of HMM-165 were dispatched into North Vietnamese waters to conduct a minesweeping operation of Haiphong Harbor. Operation End Sweep commenced on 27 February 1973 and was concluded on 5 July, having been delayed at one point for two months by diplomatic discussions between North Vietnam and the United States.2
A few months later, 34th MAU, the Sixth Fleet Landing Force, was dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean as the Arab-Israeli War commenced on 6 October 1973.3 Other Marines of the Second Marine Division were immediately deployed from Camp Lejeune, bolstering the force to MAB level. Initially assigned to stand by for possible evacuation, their naval presence mission assumed greater importance on 25 October when—in response to threats of Soviet intervention—U. S. forces were placed on DefCon III status.4 The 4,400 Marines of 4th MAB remained on station until mid-December.
Three months later, a contingent of Marine forces joined their Navy comrades to participate in Nimbus Star, the Suez Canal minesweeping operation. That operation barely was concluded when 34th MAU, engaged in a NATO exercise on the Peloponnesian peninsula of Greece, was dispatched to the waters surrounding the embattled island of Cyprus. The Marine force evacuated 752 persons (including 498 citizens of the United States) representing 22 nations to the amphibious ship Coronado (LPD-11). Predeployment planning for the ever-present possibility of evacuation had been so complete that the embarked stores of the amphibious force were able to supply diapers for the infant children of the evacuees.
Halfway around the globe, floods once again ravaged the Central Luzon basin area of the Philippines in August 1974. Marine helicopters on board the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) were summoned to assist Philippine government relief efforts. The mission was a familiar one to the Tripoli's sailors and Marines. They had provided flood relief to the Philippines two years be fore.5 During the six-day operation, Marine helicopters flew nearly one-half of the 249 individual sorties flown, providing food for an estimated 300,000 people.
As the Marine Corps entered 1975, it looked forward to the first year in more than a decade in which Marines were not being shot at somewhere in the world. That hope quickly diminished as the governments in Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam began to collapse under the onslaught of Communist forces. Acting in Operation Eagle Pull in the former and Frequent Wind in the latter, 9th MAB evacuated more than 7,000 U.S. and foreign nationals from the two beleaguered nations.6 Other Marines served as security forces on board the numerous Navy and merchant ships carrying out the seaborne portions of the Vietnam evacuation.
Less than two weeks after the conclusion of the Saigon evacuation, the American cargo ship Mayaguez was seized on the high seas on 12 May by naval forces of the revolutionary government of Cambodia. Marine forces were quickly dispatched from Okinawa to board the ship while her crew was being recovered, thus ending a tumultuous month.
The assassination of the U. S. ambassador to Lebanon and his economic advisor in Beirut on 16 June 1976 brought to the fore evacuation plans which had been executed in part the previous October. When partial evacuations were carried out on 20 June and 27 July, they were seaborne evacuations accomplished by amphibious craft from the Sixth Fleet Amphibious Force. A last-minute attempt by the Palestine Liberation Organization to exploit the 20 June evacuation for diplomatic and tactical gain (thereby jeopardizing the lives of the evacuees) was thwarted when President Gerald Ford announced his intention to land the MAU if necessary to safeguard the evacuees and the mission's success. Prior to each evacuation, the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious force had been in neighboring waters in anticipation of evacuation orders, discreetly out of sight, prepared to task organize its forces to suit mission requirements and diplomatic necessities.
The actions of the past three years illustrate the missions of the Marine Corps in its support of the foreign policy of the United States. With amphibious units simultaneously and continuously deployed in a naval presence role in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Western Pacific, they stand ready for any mission, ranging from those of the humanitarian nature of disaster relief and evacuation to confrontation with malevolent opportunists. By being sea-based, they remain a conspicuous and mobile example of the U. S. concept of forward basing, providing, in the words of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "the visible capability that serves to deter many acts of aggression."
The recent, well-publicized private study by the Brookings Institution suggests that these needs are no longer feasible inasmuch as there now exists within the United States a "growing disenchantment with military ventures overseas."7The Wall Street Journal, responding to that study, suggested instead:
"Americans have never been enchanted with overseas military ventures. But they have often backed such ventures when the reasons for them were clearly understood. Having a force in readiness is one way to discourage adventurism by other powers."8
The United States as a Sea Power: The substantial contribution of the Marine Corps to the foreign policy objectives of the United States is not accidental. It exists because of the necessary reliance of the United States upon the seas for communication and survival. Separated from 90% of the world by water, the sea is the economic lifeline of the United States. Foreign trade, of which 70% arrived by sea, was in excess of $142 billion in 1974. Vast amounts of strategic raw materials were imported from overseas: 100% of our cobalt, mercury, and natural rubber, 98% of our manganese, 91% of our chrome, 90% of our aluminum, 72% of our nickel, and 37% of our oil. Our demand for imported natural resources increases annually, as do our overseas investments, currently worth more than $130 billion. Indeed, the economy—and therefore the survival—of the United States is dependent on seaborne trade. While we value the fact that our political and military opponents are overseas rather than overland, we have become increasingly vulnerable in many respects due to our insular status. Our commitments to allies, economically or militarily, are fulfilled primarily by sea trade. Hence there exists a dependence on other states and their resources, on the oceans to deliver those resources, and on the oceans to preserve those resources. We utilize the seas to protect and maintain our national interests, to maintain the global balance of power, and, when necessary, for the support of diplomacy by force.
U. S. Foreign Policy: Like the foreign policies of all nations, that of the United States is concerned with questions of survival, security, and fulfillment. Our interdependent world precludes our seeking unilateral answers to these questions. The essentially bipolar world in which we exist politically requires the establishment and maintenance of commitments with our allies.
Foreign policy must respond to change if it is to be effective. The foreign policy of the United States has been subjected to a number of influences in the last decade. International factors have had a significant effect. A new policy toward the People's Republic of China, relations with the Soviet Union based on negotiation rather than confrontation, and the emergence of a loosely unified but vocal third world, have forced rethinking of our foreign policy and the use of military force in support thereof. Domestic influences have had their impact. The foreign policy assertions of Congress have been influenced not only by the crisis of Watergate but by the demands of our democratic society to avoid what many honestly perceive to be unwarranted commitments. Resort to an all-volunteer military, concomitant personnel strength reductions, and demands for quality over quantity, both in personnel and equipment, reflect our capital intensive society in which emphasis is given to our technological and industrial capacity to minimize the risk of American lives. Our foreign policy and the military role in support thereof, like that of every other nation, are dictated by our history, geography, economy, politics, the foreign policies of other nations, and events within those nations.
The conclusion of the Vietnam War has had a demonstrable effect upon our foreign policy. Domestically we have faced not only the previously-mentioned personnel demands but the inevitable postwar reaction of isolationism to "bring the boys home." Both domestically and abroad, cries have been heard for the withdrawal of United States forces from overseas bases, although our allies are anxious that we maintain our defense commitments. With the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, for example, the Japanese have increased their pressure on the United States to withdraw our armed forces from Okinawa and Japan while insisting that the United States maintain the commitments of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 to defend Japan. Domestic political pressures exist for reductions in this nation's contributions to NATO forces even without resolution of the mutual and balanced force reduction discussions. Like reductions have been suggested for U. S. forces in Korea, while the Nixon-Ford Doctrine emphasizes the decreased role U. S. ground forces will play in the peacetime or low-intensity war environment.
Withdrawal of forces does not mean abandonment of allies and friends, however. Our lack of self-sufficiency and our desire to discourage aggression require that we continue to project our forces overseas. Obligations remain. Crises will continue to occur. The withdrawal of forces, rather than diminishing U. S. responsibilities, has increased the need for our nation and its leaders to rely upon its sea power to provide the necessary response. Our experience during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 showed that any attempt to deploy our forces by air would be fraught with difficulty in seeking landing, staging, and overflight rights, and it would be inadequate from a logistic standpoint.9 Furthermore, crises often demand forces in being, on site. As suggested by the Mayaguez incident and the most recent evacuations from Lebanon, time frequently is of the essence. Rapid as air travel may be, the lengthy reaction time for deployment by air of any Army reaction force based in the continental United States impedes serious consideration of its use.10 These factors suggest a greater reliance on Navy and Marine forces as the principal military tools for implementation of this nation's foreign policy.
The missions of the Navy are four: strategic nuclear deterrence, sea control, projection of power ashore, and naval presence.11 We—and apparently the Soviets—have come to realize that the mutual capacity to destroy completely requires that force used in the pursuit of political objectives be amenable to selective and explicitly limited application. Thus, the success of the first mission has resulted in increased emphasis on the last three, which may be described as the historical and traditional roles of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The worldwide tendency of the last decade for states and factions within states to resort to violence as a first, rather than a last resort has increased the importance of these missions, whether in discouraging expansionism or in protecting the lives of Americans and other foreign nationals unwittingly endangered by local violence. The role of the Marine Corps in each of these missions is significant.
Naval presence—historically known as "showing the flag"—is defined as "the use of naval forces, short or war, to achieve political objectives."12 Although a mission with lengthy historical precedent, naval presence today is viewed more as a declaration of intent to honor our commitments to our friends and allies than in the 19th century context of "gunboat diplomacy." In an era in which emphasis has shifted from confrontation to negotiation, it has assumed increased significance—to the extent that Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations, has predicted a "95% probability that the most likely future use of naval forces will be in the Presence role."13
The value of naval presence lies in its unused but highly visible potential rather than realized capabilities It is a tactic of conflict avoidance executed through preventive deployments, such as the routine deployments made by amphibious forces to the Western Pacific, Mediterranean, and Caribbean, or through reactive deployment, as was accomplished through the reinforcement of the Sixth Fleet Landing Force during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Deployment of Marine amphibious forces to Peru on a mission of earthquake relief in 1970 and to the Philippines in 1972 and 1974 emphasizes the use of these forces to "show the flag" on humanitarian missions while demonstrating the rapid deployment capabilities of our amphibious forces.
The greatest role of the naval presence mission, however, is that of deterrence of intervention. This was illustrated in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 when the Soviet Union moved to achieve its long-held ambition of intervention in the Suez.14 Notwithstanding the value of nuclear deterrence and detente the principal stumbling block to Soviet ambitions was the Navy-Marine force of the Sixth Fleet, which lay astride the Soviet path to the Suez.
U. S. withdrawal from many overseas bases has increased the naval significance of the presence mission and, paradoxically, has occurred as U. S. interests overseas have increased. The myriad destabilizing factors and conditions which exist today suggest there will be no shortage of crises in the future. Experience has shown that few crises are immediately resolved. Military force, while ready, must rightfully defer to diplomatic efforts at peaceful settlement. The crisis in Jordan in 1970, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and the most recent and prolonged crisis in Lebanon, for example, required the presence of Navy and Marine forces for extended periods of time. As in Jordan, they may serve principally as a passive deterrent to outside intervention. In the two more recent incidents, on the other hand, once needed, the need was immediate. The apparent requirement in each varied from day to day, suggesting the indispensability of a Navy-Marine Corps presence: a visible and highly mobile force, capable of remaining present in international waters for an indeterminate period, capable of projecting ashore on short notice a force task organized to provide the necessary response to any challenge to the interests of the United States.
The foregoing statement suggests that the missions of naval presence and projection of power ashore are inseparable except, perhaps, in academic definition. The practice of the past few years would seem to confirm this. Neither of the humanitarian missions of disaster relief or evacuation meet the technical definitions of projection of power ashore or amphibious operation, the latter being one of three means by which the former is accomplished.15 Perhaps what is absent in applying the latter definition to recent history is a clear-cut identification of shores hostile to the landing force, except in the cases of Pnom Penh, Saigon, and the Mayaguez incident. Herein lies the merging effect brought about by the on-site task organizing capability of the Marine Corps: that of responding to mission requirements, however unusual, including making a forcible entry if necessary.
The Marine Corps' capability is enhanced by its reputation both domestically and in the international arena as an elite, disciplined force capable of executing missions, when necessary, of limited duration. This reputation is essential. On the one hand, it deters the use of force by nations or factions within nations to oppose humanitarian missions, while on the other it assures those states of the ability of U. S. forces to execute a limited duration mission without threatening the territorial integrity or political independence of that state. It suggests the resolve to execute a limited duration mission while remaining neutral toward warring factions, as occurred on Cyprus in 1974. The international reputation of the Marine Corps as a professional military force permits it to accomplish its mission with a minimum of force in a minimum of time, displaying sufficient capability while reserving unused potential.
As a limited mission, limited duration force, the Marine Corps offers certain assurances domestically. Deployment of U. S. Army forces historically has been perceived as a commitment to a sustained land campaign. As Army Chief of Staff, General Frederick C. Weyand, stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 2 February 1976: ". . . in greater degree perhaps than the other services, if and when the Army is committed, the United States is committed." Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley offered similar comments on 9 November 1931: "The Army is a little different from the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps can land on foreign territory without its being considered an act of war, but when the Army moves on foreign territory, that is an act of war. That is one of the reasons for the Marine Corps." On the lower scale of the conflict spectrum, then, the projection of Marine forces ashore—whether in humanitarian intervention or in response to hostile actions, such as in the Mayaguez incident—suggests both internationally and domestically the limited nature of the mission while serving as a continuum of the naval presence mission. It is a reassurance to our friends of our capability and determination to honor our commitments while serving as a deterrent to the inimical intentions of adventurist groups or nations.
If there is a blurring or merging of images on the lower end of the spectrum of Marine Corps missions, the same occurs in Marine Corps support of the Navy's mission of sea control. Looking at the dual functions of the sea control mission of "denying an enemy the right to use some seas at some times, [while) asserting our own right to use some seas at some times," marine Corps capabilities are supportive of each.16 Projecting amphibious forces ashore, the Marine Corps can seize and defend advanced naval bases from which Navy and Marine forces can control essential geographic bottlenecks or "chokepoints," denying enemy naval forces egress from or ingress to an area of operations.17 In the passive roles of deception and intimidation, that is, threatening an amphibious assault at any place at any time, we succeed not only in forcing the commitment of enemy naval forces but ground forces as well. The potential of the Marine Corps has not been lost on the Soviets, who in recent years have organized special amphibious defense units in recognition of the threat.18
Conclusion: International conditions suggest the unlikelihood of a world devoid of crises. The upward spiral of interstate and intrastate violence and count violence indicates that the mission of evacuating U. S. and foreign nationals will continue. Long-standing or emerging states can become battlefields overnight as factions wage bitter fights in the name of self-determination. American overseas investments and tourism, as well as diplomatic and strategic interests, suggest Americans will always be exposed to these crises as they occur. Experience lamentably shows there always will be Americans who, for business or personal reasons, fail to heed Department of State recommendations for timely departure from strife-torn countries, necessitating their subsequent evacuation by military forces. Requests for disaster relief will also continue to occur.
The action by Isreali forces at Entebbe, Uganda, on 4 July 1976, showed the feasibility of using a highly trained military force to combat international terrorism. The unlikelihood of an international antiterrorist force and the likelihood that Americans will be among the victims of terrorist actions paralleling the Entebbe episode suggest a mission for which the Marine Corps is suited, equipped, trained, and readily deployable.19
The events of the last 30 years indicate that major power confrontation will not be at the nuclear level, and that our principal antagonist will continue to test our resolve at every opportunity. Rapid development and worldwide deployment of a quality blue-water navy show Soviet appreciation of the dual roles of the Navy as demonstrable political power and a challenge to U. S. sea power. The appearance of Soviet amphibious forces off Angola one year ago reflects Soviet recognition of the importance of the naval presence mission and, in support thereof, the capability to project forces ashore.
Challenges to the survival and security of a nation dictate its foreign policy. The resoluteness of responses dictates the foreign policy of its challengers. The history of our nation is reflected in its use of the Marine Corps, the nation's force in readiness, as one of its principal tools of response. Our increased dependence upon sea power for security and survival suggests that use of the Marine Corps will not diminish but increase.
Major Parks entered the Marine Corps by way of the Platoon Leaders' Class (Law) program in 1961. Although he always has been designated a Judge Advocate, he has served as a reconnaissance platoon leader, infantry company commander, and shore party company commander. He reported to his present assignment in the Office of Legislative Affairs, Secretary of the Navy, in August. In his previous assignment as the Marine Corps Liaison Office to The Judge Advocate General's School, U. S. Army, Major Parks taught international law at that school, the Army War College, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the Marine Corps' Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College. Named one of the Outstanding Educators of America in 1975, Major Parks previously coauthored "If I Become a Prisoner of War…," which appeared in the August Proceedings. A graduate of Baylor University and Baylor University School of Law, Major Parks is now completing the requirements for a master's degree in foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.
1 National Security Act of 1947, as amended, §206(c) or 10 U. S. Code S5013(a).
2 Lieutenant Colonel John Van Norrwick, USMC, "Endsweep," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1974, pp. 29-36. Rear Admiral Brian McCauley, USN, "Operation End Sweep, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1974, pp. 18-25.
3 A Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) ordinarily is composed of a battalion landing team (a task-organized infantry battalion with armored, artillery, amphibious tractor, engineer, and other reinforcing units), a medium helicopter squadron, and a logistic support unit. A Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) usually consists of a regimental landing team, a helicopter group, and a combat service support unit group. A MAU normally comprises 1,800-4,000 men and a MAB, 8,000-12,000.
4 Lieutenant (junior grade) F. C. Miller, USN, "Those Storm-Beaten Ships Upon Which the Arab Armies Never Looked," Proceedings, March 1975, PP. 18-25.
5 Colonel Richard C. Kriegel, USMCR, "Operition Saklolo: The Battle of the Nutribun," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1973, p. 29.
6 Colonel Sydney H. Batchelder, USMC, and Major D. A. Quinlan, USMC, Operation Eagle Pull," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1976, pp. 47-60. Major General Richard E. Carey, USMC, and Major D. A. Quinlan, USMC, "Frequent Wind," Marine Corps Gazette, February (pp. 16-24), March (PP. 35-45), and April 1976 (pp. 35-45).
7 Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 35.
8 "A Few Good Men," The Wall Street Journal, 11 February 1976, p. 12.
9 Beween 13 October and 14 November 1973, utilizing 24% of our active airlift capability, the military airlift to Israel transported 22,487 tons of cargo. Three times that amount went by sea. Of the heavy equipment required by a mechanized force, a Government Accounting Office study reported that "The [air] quantities delivered were not significant enough to have effected [sic] the war's outcome," further noting that "most of this [air] cargo did not arrive until after the ceasefire or until after the first shipload arrived." C-5A aircraft, capable of carrying 107 tons of cargo, averaged 73 tons per flight. Had refueling not been permitted in the Azores, those loads would have been cut to 33 tons. The extreme range would have prohibited the use of the C-141 without refueling in the Azores. Report to the Congress, Airlift Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973 Middle East War, Washington, Comptroller General of the United States (GAO), 16 April 1975, pp. 10-15, 57-58. See also Colonel A. P. Sights, USAF, "The Projection of Power by Air," Proceedings, May 1975 (Naval Review Issue), pp. 86-101. See also Senator Robert A. Taft, Jr., "White Paper on Defense: A Modern Military Strategy for the United States," March 1976.
10 Administratively moving combat essential elements of the 82d Airborne Division to the Middle East, for example, with a basic load of ammunition and a five-day supply of rations and fuel would require more than 700 C-141 sorties. Such a move would requite ten to 15 days from a standing start, seven if alert times were sufficient to permit prior preparation. An airborne assault of the same force would require 1,200 sorties, including aircraft for a heavy drop. Estimates for other Army divisions are longer. Oil Field; as Military Objectives, Washington, Library of Congress, 21 August 1975, pp. 60, 64; and United States/Soviet Military Balance, Washington, Library of Congress, 22 January 1976, p. 30. Furthermore, heavily damaged airfields precluded the use of air transport delivered ground forces during the evacuations from Cyprus in 1974 and Lebanon in 1976.
11 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, "Missions of the U. S. Navy," Naval War College Review, March-April 1974, pp. 2-17.
12 Ibid, p. 14.
13 Commander James F. McNulty, USN, "Naval Presence—The Misunderstood Mission," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp. 21, 22. Ironically, in order to strengthen its single scenario approach of a Marine Corps confrontation with the Warsaw Pact nations, The Brookings Institution study of the Marine Corps erroneously declared the Navy had ranked the presence mission lowest in order of priorities. Sinkin and Record, op. at. p. 33.
14 Shlomo Slonim, "Suez and the Soviets," Proceedings, April 1975, pp. 36-41.
15 Projection of power ashore "is concerned with the impact of naval on land forces, and can be divided into three categories: amphibious assault, naval bombardment, and tactical air." Turner, op. cit., p. 10. The joint service Doctrine for Amphibious Operations definition of amphibious operations is an "attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore." For further discussion see Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, "The Marines: Now and in the Future," Proceedings, May 1973 (Naval Review Issue), pp. 102, 108.
16 Turner, op. cit., p. 7.
17 Colonel Marc Moore, USMC, "Strategy for a Triangular World," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1973, p. 31, which mentions 26 "chokepoints" around the world "where the land lies in close proximity to critical sea routes . ." Deployment of a MAU to seize and defend a naval base for a squadron of the new Pegasus-class hydrofoil gunboats (PHM) in the Straits of Malacca, for example, would be supportive of Navy sea control measures.
18 G. H. Turbiville, "Soviet amphibious landing defenses," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1975, p. 20.
19 Recognizing the international law principles of sovereignty and the protection of human rights, the author limits his suggestion to the concept of self-help in cases like Entebbe, where the local government faltered in its upholding of the latter of the two principles. For a discussion of these principles, see Richard B. Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help By States to Protect Human Rights," Iowa Law Review, Volume 53, 1967, pp. 325-351.