I. Growing Strength and Expanding Operations
The constant growth and modernization of the Soviet Navy and the continued spread of Soviet naval operations throughout the oceans of the world became a matter of increased public awareness and heightened concern within the United States during 1975. In speeches, interviews and Congressional testimony, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and other representatives of the U. S. Navy have pointed out the alarming trends and details which indicate the significant development of Soviet naval power. The resourceful press has provided additional information.
The most significant aspects of 1975 for the Soviet Navy, as related by these sources, are discussed below.
Additions to the Order of Battle
The Soviet Union continued to augment its strategic forces with the addition of Delta class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). By the end of the year, eleven ships of this class were considered to be operational with the fleet, in addition to the thirty-four older Yankee class SSBNs.
Construction of Delta class submarines runs at a rate of six to eight per year. At this pace the Soviet Navy can be expected to reach the maximum allowable number of sixty-two modern ballistic missile submarines by 1977 when the SALT 1 Agreement expires.
Two versions of the Delta are under construction: The standard Delta class with twelve missile tubes and a modified Delta with sixteen missile tubes now being built in the Northern Fleet area. Both carry the SS-N-8 missile with a range of 4,200 nautical miles. Testing of a MlRV’d missile with characteristics of the SS-N-8 occurred in 1975.
There are some indications that still newer classes of SSBN are under construction. A new facility for the construction of submarines has been reported under preparation at the Northern Fleet shipyard. Concealment of submarine construction components is also reported to have occurred there.
In addition, apparently several new submarine-launched ballistic missiles are also entering the testing phase. All of these are expected to have ranges in excess of 3,000 nautical miles and at least some carry MIRVs. If backfitted into the older Yankee class, a missile of this range would result in a marked improvement in the capability of those units. The Yankee class is currently armed, with the SS-N-6, with a range of 1,300 nautical miles.
Several classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines continue under construction at the rate of two to four per year. A new class of diesel attack submarine is also being built.
The year 1975 marked the beginning of a new era for the Soviet Navy—that of the aircraft carrier. During the summer the lead ship of the first class of aircraft carrier, the 45,000 ton Kiev, began sea trials in the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the second ship, the Minsk, was launched at the Nikolayev shipyard and construction has begun on a third ship of the class. These carriers will carry a mix of ASW helicopters and V/STOL aircraft. This aircraft mix indicates a continued emphasis on ASW as the role of these ships but also provides the capability for a task force air defense and the potential for an anti-ship or ground attack role. The V/STOL aircraft were evaluated on board the Kiev during 1975.
During the year no new class of cruiser or destroyer made an appearence with the Soviet fleet. This marks a pause in the program which had unveiled the Kresta I, Kresta II, Krivak, and Kara classes to the West at two- to three-year intervals between 1967 and 1973. Such a slowdown in cruiser and destroyer development confirms the beginning of the era of the carrier and a shift of emphasis in the continuing development of the Soviet Navy.
Apparently, having settled on the size, configuration, and capabilities of what they call "large ASW ships” (i.e. CG, DDG, and DD) the Soviets have planned to continue the construction of the Kresta II, Kara, and Krivak classes and to modernize the slightly older Kashin class rather than to proceed with the development of still a newer class. Thus, during 1975 the missile cruiser (CG) order of battle was increased by 2 ships. This included ships of both the Kresta II and Kara classes. The missile destroyer (DDG) order of battle increased by 3 ships of the Krivak class. Several ships of the Kashin class have now been observed to be armed with fixed missile tubes firing aft and to be equipped with variable depth sonar.
Meanwhile, many of the ship design and construction resources which would normally have been devoted to continuing cruiser-destroyer development were probably devoted to the carrier program. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that, in conjunction with the carrier era, the Soviets may be working to develop a new class of destroyer or frigate to meet the requirement for an escort and fill the future gap in displacement and armament between the large Kashin and Krivak classes and the small Grisha and Nanuchka classes. Presently, with the many ships of the Kotlin, Skoryy, Riga, Mirka, and Petya classes, there is no such gap. But these ships are growing old, and a replacement must soon be on hand.
Other new ship types included a new class of landing ship, the Ropucha, under construction in the Baltic. Ships of this class have already been transferred to the Pacific Fleet. Several new class replenishment ships are also under construction.
Finally, during April 1975 the Soviets’ second nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Arktika, departed the Baltic and arrived in Murmansk to enter service. While not belonging to the Navy, the ship will provide considerable support for naval operations in the Northern Fleet area and for the movement of naval convoys across the northern sea route to the Pacific. Construction has begun in Leningrad on a second ship of the class, Sibir.
During 1975 the variable geometry wing strike aircraft Backfire entered the naval air arm. The V/STOL aircraft to be carried on the Kiev is also now coming off the production line and entering naval service.
Soviet Naval Order of Battle, 1 January 1976 |
|
SUBMARINE |
|
Nuclear |
|
SSBN (Ballistic Missile) |
|
HOTEL class |
About 8 |
YANKEE class |
34 |
DELTA class |
11 |
SSGN (Cruise Missile |
About 40 |
SSN (Attack) |
About 35 |
Diesel |
|
SSB (Ballistic Missile) |
22 |
SSG (Cruise Missile |
25 |
SS (Attack) |
About 150 |
MAJOR COMBATANTS |
|
Aircraft Carriers |
1 |
Helicopter Carriers |
2 |
Cruisers |
|
CG (Guided Missile) |
21 |
CLC |
11 |
Destroyers |
|
DDG (Guided Missile) |
34 |
DD |
53 |
SMALL COMBATANTS |
About 1,015 |
Including |
|
PGG/PTG |
About 135 |
LST/LSM |
About 80 |
AUXILIARIES |
About 755 |
SERVICE CRAFT |
About 400 |
Exercise Okean1 75
During the year, the Soviet Navy conducted the first large scale, worldwide combined fleet exercise since Exercise Okean occurred in April and May of 1970. Activity began shortly after 11 April when the Ministry of Defense announced that ". . . the Navy will conduct exercises at sea in accordance with the combat training schedule of the Armed Forces. Current missions of the ships and aircraft of the fleet will be emphasized in the exercises.”
The exercise, like that of 1970, represented a test—and a demonstration to the world—of the results of five years’ effort to develop their naval capabilities. As such, it marked another stage in the development of Soviet naval power, involving a broadening of their strategy and an expansion of their interest into areas of the world where the power of the Soviet Navy had not previously been felt.
In 1970, the Soviet Navy proved that it could deploy in strength and conduct operations distant from home waters. h showed that it had a mission for and was capable of such operations as maritime reconnaissance and anti-carrier warfare These were significant extensions from the traditional role of defense of the homeland and operations on the flanks of the armies.
In 1975, the Soviet fleet demonstrated its ability to deploy and operate worldwide. It conducted ocean surveillance and command and control in support of a variety of missions such as antisub marine warfare, anti-carrier strikes, and attacks against western sea lines of communication.
The American Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II, summed up the results of the five-year effort as demonstrated in the exercise by saying, "Inmy view, this Soviet naval exercise clearly demonstrates the fact that the Soviet Navy is capable of operating effectively in all oceans of the world.”
The 1975 exercise, which lasted about ten days, involved some 220 ships- slightly more than in 1970, and included the newest classes in the fleet, the Kara and Krivak. Major forces were deployed in the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic Ocean, the Sea Japan and Pacific Ocean, and the Mediterranean, all areas of considerable defensive interest to the Soviet Union. Other groups of participants operated in the Caribbean and off the west coast of Africa and in the Indian Ocean, areas d vital western sea lines of communication and chokepoints on the world’s sealanes.
Just prior to the exercise, the Soviets announced the launch of Cosmos 723 (launched on 2 April) and 724 (launched on 7 April) which had the orbital characteristics2 of ocean reconnaissance satellites and were most likely employed in support of the exercise.
Naval air played a significant role in the exercise for reconnaissance, missile strike, and ASW operations. Turbo-prop TU-95 (Bear) aircraft conducted reconnaissance over the Atlantic from bases in Cuba and Guinea in West Africa as well as over the Norwegian Sea and the Pacific Ocean from bases in the Soviet Union. The IL-38 ASW aircraft (May) also operated from bases in the Soviet Union over the Norwegian Sea and Western Pacific and over the Indian Ocean from Somalia. Missile-armed TU-16 (Badger) aircraft conducted numerous strike missions against surface forces in the Norwegian Sea, North Atlantic, and Pacific. The new Backfire strike aircraft also participated in the exercise.
Shortly before the conclusion of the exercise, on 19 and 20 April, Minister of Defense Grechko and Navy Commander in Chief Gorshkov visited the Northern Fleet and "From aboard a ship . . . observed torpedo and gun firings and also the execution of other combat exercises.” The exercise culminated with the Soviets simulating a strategic strike.
Soviet sources were reticent concerning the purpose and the degree of success of all this. The concluding announcement simply stated that, "The naval exercises at sea have been completed. The forces of the fleet engaged in the exercises demonstrated high combat training, received the necessary practice in accomplishing the missions before them, and returned to their bases.”
The initial statement announcing the exercises in stating that "Current missions of the ships and aircraft of the fleet will be emphasized . . .” clearly indicated that the exercises were intended to test the ability of the Navy to carry out its currently assigned missions rather than to investigate the possibility of accepting new missions or developing new capabilities. In that light, the operations in the Indian Ocean area, particularly by ASW aircraft, and the operations in the eastern Atlantic and western Pacific near the terminus of U. S. sea lines of communication with Europe and Japan take on increased importance in any analysis of current Soviet naval missions and strategy.
In his Navy Day article in July, Admiral Gorshkov said, "The navymen considered these exercises to be a serious test. . . . Submarines and surface forces, aviation units and forces, the command and staffs, all control organizations demonstrated in the exercises their readiness to accomplish difficult combat training missions in a complex and rapidly changing situation.”
More directly, the Deputy Commander in Chief, Admiral Smirnov, said "The naval exercises which were held not long ago were a difficult examination for the personnel of the ships and units. . . . The participating forces demonstrated a high level of combat training in these exercises.”
Other Deployments
In addition to conducting Exercise Okean 75, the Soviet Navy continued to keep units deployed "on distant voyages” through the year. The significant naval commitment in the Mediterranean has long been accepted as normal. The Soviet Navy demonstrated the ubiquitous nature of the Mediterranean Es- kadra by the presence of a ship in the vicinity during the visit of the U. S. Secretary of the Navy to American ships operating in the Ionian Sea and during the collision between the USS Belknap and USS John F. Kennedy east of Sicily.
During 1975 the Soviet Indian Ocean contingent was built up significantly. It now usually includes at least one major combatant armed with guided missiles. In addition, the force was augmented by three landing ships, at least one of which had military vehicles embarked, during the year.
At other times, the large ASW ship Obraztsoviy (Kashin class DDG) and the mine-sweeper, Dmitry Lysov, were reported by the Soviet press to be operating in the "far reaches of the Atlantic” for "prolonged periods.”
During 1975, the Delta class SSBNs conducted patrols in the Barents Sea, close to home but within missile range of the United States. The Yankee class maintained their Atlantic and Pacific patrols. The year brought the first movement by a Yankee westward from the normal Atlantic patrol area for an excursion along the U. S. coast.
Other submarines also conducted operations in the Atlantic while Echo class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines continued deployments to the Caribbean during the year.
The naval leadership continually stresses the value of these deployments for training. In his Navy Day article, Admiral Gorshkov said that ". . . the present generation of navymen has gone through the good school of long ocean voyages and has been soundly tempered.” That these cruises are useful to focus the attention of the officers and men of the fleet on their capabilities and needed improvements is illustrated by the statement of one officer that ". . . we look upon the voyage as a school. . . . We don’t return shamefaced about our deficiencies but are openly struggling to overcome them.”
Port Visits
In his Navy Day article, Fleet Admiral Smirnov stated that "Soviet navymen can note with honor that in the campaign to establish good relations between peoples, they are doing their share. In particular, the numerous visits by our ships to foreign ports foster this. In the last five years alone they have visited more than sixty countries. . . .”
During 1975 a number of foreign port visits were of enough significance to receive play in the Soviet press. The foremost of these was the visit of the large ASW ships Boykyy and Zhguchy (Kanin class DDGs) under the command of Rear Admiral Kalinin to Boston in May. That visit was conducted in exchange for the concurrent visit of the USS Leahy and USS Tattnall under the command of Rear Admiral Justin E. Langille to Leningrad.
Other visits in the western hemi sphere included a call by two large ASW ships (Krivak class DDs) on Cuba prior to Exercise Okean 75. The oceanographic expeditionary ship Leonid Sobolev, with students of Soviet Higher Naval Schools3 aboard, visited ports on the Pacific coast of South America.
The Soviet Mediterranean flagship Zhdanov (a CLC) made port calls in Split, Yugoslavia, during March; Toulon, France, during July; and Tunisia during August. Soviet ships visited the West African port of Conakry, Guinea, on several occasions and called at Lagos, Nigeria, during the year.
In the Indian Ocean Soviet ships periodically call at Port Louis, Mauritius, where, early in 1975, a cruiser and auxiliaries called in the aftermath of a hurricane to render assistance. Major Indian Ocean ships called at Bombay, India, during November and regularly visit Colombo, Sri Lanka. On occasion, Soviet ships call at Umm Qasr, and visit South Yemen.
Support Facilities
During 1975 the Soviet Navy continued its efforts to develop overseas facilities and arrangements as locations which will assure convenient repair and logistic support to deployed naval forces.
In the Mediterranean, despite the loss of the use of several Egyptian harbors, Alexandria continues to be used for Soviet submarine maintenance and overhaul. Syrian ports are being increasingly utilized and Yugoslav shipyards are once again available for Soviet use. After a change in the Yugoslav port rights law in 1975, a Soviet submarine tender and a submarine completed repairs in Tivat, Yugoslavia, during 1975. Late in the year a large Soviet floating drydock was delivered to that port, enhancing the capabilities for support of the Mediterranean Eskadra.
In the Indian Ocean, efforts during 1975 concentrated on base development at Berbera, Somalia. Guided missile patrol boats were delivered there and Soviet-controlled cruise-missile support facilities were provided. Exercise Okean 75 illustrated the availability of Somali airfields for use by Soviet naval aircraft. Late in the year a large floating drydock was transferred to the area, significantly enhancing repair capabilities in support of Indian Ocean operations. At the other side of the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy has made increasing use of the former British dockyards in Singapore. While no warships have yet been admitted, naval auxiliaries have undergone work there.
II. Working to Improve Capability
The growing order of battle and expanding worldwide operations of the fleet amply illustrate the steady development of Soviet naval power. A balanced assessment of this power, however, must also include consideration of those who man those ships and conduct those operations.
The Soviets continually refer to personnel as the most important element in the power of their armed forces. For example, on Navy Day 1975, the Soviet Ministry of Defense newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) said: “The Soviet people have a right to be proud of their Navy. It has now become oceanic and missile, nuclear, aviation, and submarine equipped. But, however modern military equipment may be, it is personnel who determine the success of an effort by knowing how to use it.”
Thus, as the Soviet Navy has been enlarging and modernizing its fleet and expanding its operations, it has also been devoting considerable effort to improving the abilities of its personnel. How well this is accomplished will, in the final analysis, determine the total capability of the fleet, the essence of naval power.
In spite of a penchant for military security, efforts to develop and improve the capabilities of naval personnel are relatively open to our scrutiny. While the Soviet press is traditionally full of Marxist-Leninist dogma, political exhortations, propaganda, and praise for Soviet progress, the concept of self-criticism is equally strong. Thus, a careful reading and analysis of the Soviet military press can provide useful insights into the state of development and readiness of the Navy.
In this regard, some of the more interesting aspects of the Soviet Navy revealed during 1975 are shown in the adjacent table.
COMMAND LIST, 1975 |
|
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union |
—S. G. Gorshkov |
First Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral of the Fleet |
—N.I. Smirnov
|
Deputy Commander in Chief, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy Admiral |
—V.M. Grishanov |
Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral |
—N.N. Amelko |
Deputy Commander in Chief Admiral |
—G.A. Bondarenko |
Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of the Main Navy Staff Admiral of the Fleet |
—N.D. Sergeyev |
First Deputy Chief of the Main Navy Staff Admiral |
—V.N. Alekseyev1 |
Deputy Chief of the Main Navy Staff Vice Admiral |
—I.A. Sornev |
Commander in Chief, Soviet Naval Air Force Colonel General (Aviation)2 |
—A.A. Mironenko |
Commander in Chief, Northern Fleet Admiral of the Fleet |
—G.M. Yegorov |
Commander in Chief, Baltic Fleet Admiral Vice Admiral |
—V.V. Mikhaylin3 —A.M. Kosov |
Commander in Chief, Black Sea Fleet Vice Admiral |
—N.I. Khovrin |
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Admiral |
—V.P. Maslov4 |
Commander in Chief, Caspian Flotilla Rear Admiral |
—L. D. Ryabtsev |
Commander, Mediterranean Squadron Rear Admiral |
—V. I. Akimov5 |
1 Admiral Alekseyev was much less prominent in 1975 than in previous years, reflecting reduced responsibility leading toward mandatory retirement in 1977. |
|
2 Colonel General is equivalent to a full Admiral. |
|
3 Admiral V. V. Mikhaylin was awarded the Order of the October Revolution on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday in July 1975. He was Cine of the Baltic Fleet from 1967 until relieved by Admiral Kosov in November 1975. |
|
4 V. P. Maslov was promoted from vice admiral to admiral between April and July 1975. |
|
5 A Rear Admiral from Baltic Fleet, Akimov served as commander until at least August 1975. |
More Naval Kremlinology4
During 1975, preparations were underway for the XXV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union scheduled for February 1976. As a result, political activity increased in anticipation of possible party and governmental leadership changes due to the health and age of Secretary General Brezhnev and the generally advanced age of the entire upper echelon of the Soviet leadership.
Within the Soviet Union such activity does not become visible publicly except in the most oblique manner. One such oblique reference suggests that at least some of the activity involved criticism of the advanced age of the Soviet military and naval hierarchy and their ability to provide leadership in the age of modern technology.
On 25 May, the Communist Party newspaper Pravda carried a theatrical review of a play entitled "The Front,” then running in Moscow. The play was about an old General who would not ". . . learn to fight in the modern manner.” The General had a distinguished and useful career but "... a man, especially if he holds a command position, becomes an obstacle ... if he ceases moving rapidly ahead and has not kept up with the times.” The reviewer commented that the play ". . . stirs up memories and forces us to think about the present.”
As so often in the Soviet Union, the staging of the play itself, an updated revival of a World War II production, and the review bringing it to the attention of a wide audience and commenting on its contemporary significance, may be a thinly veiled criticism of the present military and naval hierarchy.
While at sixty-five Admiral Gorshkov is not the oldest,5 he is among the older military leaders. In February 1975 he marked his birthday while on an official trip to India, thus illustrating his continued vigor and dedication to duty. The criticisms about learning to fight in a modern manner and not keeping up with the times would seem not to refer to Admiral Gorshkov, for under his leadership the Navy has continually modernized its conventional forces and it devotes a large portion of its resources to strategic systems. Nevertheless, at his age, and approaching his twentieth anniversary as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov is clearly a candidate for retirement.
A Name to Watch
One name which has become increasingly familiar to Soviet readers during 1975 is that of Rear Admiral Viktor Frolov. The admiral is commanding officer of a Northern Fleet missile-armed nuclear-powered submarine, an unusual position for a flag officer. During 1974, he was elected as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet and was the only Navy man other than the top commanders of the Navy and fleets so honored.
Admiral Frolov and his crew have been honored on numerous occasions. They were singled out to receive a letter from the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, L. I. Brezhnev, an honor which received wide publicity. The Admiral was invited to hold discussions with the Main Navy Staff and has been interviewed by the Soviet press. Several of his officers have been awarded the Order of the Red Star and several of the men have received citations "for combat services.”
The assignment of an admiral as commanding officer and the wide publicity suggests that his submarine may be the first operational unit of the new Delta class.
Individual Training
Individual training in the Soviet armed forces is part of the overall Communist effort to create the "new Soviet man.” Thus, in addition to extensive military and technical training, it includes much political indoctrination and considerable effort to change the traditional national characteristics which can affect adversely the performance of the Soviet military man.
One of these characteristics is the reluctance on the part of the typical Soviet citizen to display initiative in his thoughts or actions. This characteristic has been developed in the Russian people during a long history of autocracy and serfdom and reinforced in modern Soviet man by his own personal experiences with the modern Soviet political, bureaucratic, and police systems.
Consequently, one of the recurrent themes of the Soviet military press is the need for those at all levels, but especially officers and commanders, to exercise initiative and develop the ability to deal rapidly and decisively with unexpected situations without awaiting orders. The articles generally emphasize that training must include realistic and surprise situations and must demand a correct assessment of a situation, and the use of ingenuity in developing a solution and decisive action. The rewards that come to those who perform in that manner are often pointed out.
During early 1975 this theme was reiterated, starting with the speech of General of the Army Yepishev, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, to the All Army Conference of Army Workers. The General called on the political workers ". . . to develop with new energy the creative initiative and aggressiveness of the personnel . . .” of the armed forces.
Among the numerous articles in Krasnaya Zvezda and Morskoy Sbomik which followed this lead were several in April directed specifically at the Navy. In an article entitled "Sudden Problem,” the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Maslov, described a situation in which a Pacific Fleet minesweeper struck a mine while conducting operations in the Gulf of Suez. The hull was ruptured, causing flooding to the steering spaces, fuel tanks, and engine- rooms, and the ship lost power. Although stunned, the commanding officer ", . . confidently and effectively gave the orders . . .” and "succeeded . . . in mobilizing the crew.” As a result, ", . . the minesweeper was led to anchorage where in a short time its combat readiness was restored.” The Admiral admitted that "Frankly speaking, the episode was not an ordinary one.” He stated, however, that ". . . hourly, any commander ought to be prepared with a decision for a suddenly arising problem.” He should "Never, first of all, forget that the ocean itself, by its own power, is able to bring many surprises in each voyage.” The Admiral also noted that ". . . some senior officers view the birth of initiative with indifference . . and went on to say that, therefore, each commander "must teach himself” to deal with "any unexpected problem. Subsequently it was announced that the minesweeper’s commanding officer had been awarded the Order of the Red Star.
In Krasnaya Zvezda for 29 April 1975 j the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Naval Air Force, Colonel General of Aviation Mironenko, stated, "Initiative and resourcefulness are the components of victory . . . their role in the military work of today has even grown. . Consequently, sustained persistent training and a constant search for creativity and innovation is the primary principlefor developing initiative in a young officer.” The General then described how a young pilot of a missile-equipped aircraft assessed an unusual situation and, on his own initiative, made a decision which proved to be correct. That young pilot, he pointed out, is now a general and Deputy Commander in Chief of the Northern Fleet Air Force, atage 38. Later in the year, Krasnaya Zvezda announced that the officer, Major General (Aviation) V. P. Potopov, had also been named an honored military pilot of the Soviet Union
While the Soviet submarine force was not the subject of a major item along this line during early 1975, an article had been directed toward that group earlier, in July 1974. Rear Admiral A. Mikhailovskiy, a Hero of the Soviet Union and a Northern Fleet submariner, wroteabout the conduct of tactical and strategic submarine operations, saying that. . . what is demanded of a commander is novelty and boldness of tactical actions and innovation in the struggle for secrecy.” He pointed out that “real training can only be at sea” and criticized the tendency of Soviet submarinecommanders to adhere rigidly toprescribed standard operating procedure with a consequent failure to use ingenuity in their tactics. The Admiral openly attributed the lack of tactical ingenuity by submarine commanders to a laxity in combat readiness evaluations. From now on, he said, senior authorities will introduce complexities into the scenarios of combat training which will make the commanders function with ingenuity.
Late in 1975 the initiative theme was again stressed for the Navy when Vice Admiral Sidorov wrote an article entitled "Competition: Experience, Initiative, One More Reserve.” He pointed out that in the competition between two units under equally experienced commanders, the success of one unit and the short-comings of another are often traceable to the difference in initiative between commanders.
Unit Training
In the Soviet Navy, individual ship training is accomplished and combat readiness maintained by "socialist competition” between ships which is carried on throughout the "training year.” Ships are evaluated in both specific exercises and on an overall basis by embarked staff specialists and the best receive an "outstanding” rating. Outstanding ships compete for fleet and Navy-wide prizes.
As in all navies some ships are continual winners, such as the Northern Fleet submarine Yaroslavskiy Komsomolets which ". . . has qualified for the title of outstanding for seven straight years,” a Pacific Fleet minesweeper which also has been a seven-year winner, and the Pacific Fleet landing ship which for several years "has carried with distinction the outstanding rating.” It will come as no surprise to any naval officer that the readiness and quality of the ships in the fleet appears to vary widely, even between sister ships or in a single ship from year to year.
During 1974, the large ASW ship Bodryy ( a Krivak class DD) ", . . firmly held first place in the Fleet according to the results of socialist competition.” This was attributed by the Soviet press to "an outstanding commander and outstanding crew. . . .” However, "The large ASW ship also has sister ships. All of them have the streamlined silhouette, powerful weapons, and high speed developed by the designers in their search for technical perfection. But the crews of the ships are not the same. The mark of Bodryy is the combat perfection of her crew.”
As if to underline these remarks, within several weeks Krasnaya Zvezda carried another lengthy article on a sister ship of the Bodryy, the Storozhevoy. During 1974, "The Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, went to sea onboard this ship and evaluated highly the mastery of the anti-submariners. ... In a word, the Storozhevoy had all the requirements necessary to win first place in the ranks of outstanding ships. . . . Yet, at the end of the training year it became clear that the ship could not do better than fourth place.” The article attributed the problems of Storozhevoy to a laxity of political awareness and morale and discipline aboard the ship. One article during 1975 related a successful ASW exercise by the Storozhevoy but gave no indications the ship had overcome her problems or would be classed as outstanding.
Similarly, the cruisers Grozny and Varyag (both of the Kynda class) are regularly mentioned as "outstanding ships.” During August 1975, the press reported that the Grozny was again doing well and was on her way to another award. Yet, during 1975, another ship of the Kynda class, the Pacific Fleet cruiser Admiral Fokin was the subject of at least three articles criticizing the missile and engineering departments and the discipline and morale of the crew.
As indicated by such statements, the Soviets clearly focus on the political reliability, morale, and discipline of the crew as a major determinant of success in "socialist competition.” Indeed an important factor in the competition between ships involves the percentage of the crew which has qualified as "outstanding seamen.” That is a designation awarded not only for technical qualification but also for political participation and a good disciplinary record.
Outstanding ships often report upwards of 80 per cent of their seamen as "outstanding.” On the other hand, some ships do not have such reliable and happy crews. This latter case was amply illustrated by the reports that on 9 November 1975, 20 of 42 crew members of a Soviet Baltic Fleet antisubmarine ship mutinied and attempted to sail their ship from the Soviet port of Riga to Sweden. The attempt was thwarted and the crew members were reported imprisoned. That ship obviously did not finish the year with a high standing in socialist competition.
During his Navy Day interview. Admiral Gorshkov summarized the progress of unit training to that point in 1975, saying "Socialist competition in our fleets is being conducted on an ever greater scale. . . . The leaders in the competition are the crews: of many nuclear submarines; of the cruisers Murmansk, Admiral Senyavin and Dmitriy Pozharskiy; of the large ASW ships Sil’nyy, Ochakov, and Dostoynyy (another sister ship of the Bodryy and Storozhevoy)-, of the ocean minesweepers Primorskiy Komsomolets, Sakhalinskiy Komsomolets and Miner; of the guided missile patrol boats Kiroskiy Komsomolets and Komsomolets Tartariy and others.”
Later in the year it was announced that the leading ships were "atomic submarines of the Northern and Pacific Fleets,” most certainly those commanded by Rear Admiral V. Frolov and Captain Second Rank M. Zaitsev which have received extensive publicity during the year, as well as the large ASW ship Sil’nyy in the Baltic Fleet and Krasniy Krim (a Kashin) in the Pacific Fleet.
During 1975, steps were taken by the Soviet Navy to . . improve the organization, heighten the activity and effectiveness of socialist competition in order to strengthen the readiness of the Fleet.” These ". . . changes enhanced the role of the commanding officer and the [operational] staffs in the daily organization of the competition and increased their control over the process.” It is hoped that these changes would stimulate an increase in "political enthusiasm” among the crews and thereby ". . . increase readiness, promote unity of the military collective and strengthen discipline and order.”
Minesweeping
During 1975 the Soviet Ministry of Defense established a badge "For military minesweeping.” The medal depicts a ship and floating mine and is to be awarded to Navymen for bravery and skill in accomplishing mine clearing missions.
Soviet Pacific Fleet minesweepers conducted clearing operations in the harbor of Chittagong, Bangladesh after the Indo-Pakistani war. Again in the summer of 1974, while the Americans were clearing the Suez Canal proper, Soviet minesweepers conducted clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez and the adjacent Strait of Gubal. It was during these operations that a minesweeper was damaged and some men injured by a mine. This incident suggests the impetus behind the establishment of the award. An article in October 1975 indicated that as a result of those operations 167 officers, michmen,6 petty officers, and sailors had received various awards.
The Black Sea Fleet "ASW cruiser” Leningrad (CHG) also participated in the Red Sea mineclearing operations which, according to an article by her Captain, lasted two months and cleared 176 million square meters. Despite that effort, the Soviet Union never certified to the Egyptian government that the straits were clear. On 16 June 1975 a Panamanian flag merchant ship was damaged by a mine in that area.
Throughout 1975 Soviet press articles on mine clearing invariably concerned training in the Pacific Fleet, indicating that this fleet, because of its previous experiences, has begun to emphasize improvements to its minesweeping capability.
Casualties and Damage Control
In September 1974 the Soviet Navy experienced what has been described as the worst peacetime naval disaster in history. The large ASW ship Otvazhniy (a Kashin class DDG) exploded, caught fire and sank, with only a reported 75 survivors. This disaster aboard Otvazhniy was not an unusual or isolated occurrence aboard that ship. In July 1973, a Soviet military journal reported the posthumous award of the Order of the Red Star to a sailor who lost his life while fighting a fire aboard Otvazhniy. These two incidents separated by more than a year would seem to reflect a continuing low standard of safety and a poor capability for damage control aboard Otvazhniy. Since such a situation existed aboard a ship that, by all indications, was considered an exemplary ship, it is likely that similiar conditions existed throughout the fleet. In recognition of that problem, there have, since that time been a number of articles in the Soviet press reflecting an increased emphasis on damage control and illustrating the type of training now being conducted.
One article, for example, reported a drill on the Northern Fleet cruiser Alexander Nevskiy which started in a realistic manner with dense smoke pouring into the berthing compartment as a meal was being concluded.7 The drill involved fighting the simulated fire, dealing with a generator casualty, and shoring up a below waterline hole. The article recommended that the experience developed from the training aboard the Nevskiy be circulated to other ships in the fleet.
Another article described the conversion of an old ship into a practice-training station in the Black Sea Fleet. Aboard this otherwise useless ship the article said that, under the leadership of experienced instructors, crews can learn firefighting and can train in other types of damage control. Similar damage control training, featuring firefighting and hull repair, is being stressed at enlisted training detachments according to a number of other articles.
Other articles have stressed the handling of actual casualties. In addition to the incident described by Admiral Maslov involving the explosion of a mine alongside a minesweeper, there was at least one other incident related to those operations.
The captain of the Leningrad related that, while in the South Atlantic returning from the Indian Ocean to the Black Sea, a boiler room steam line burst, shooting out superheated steam. A senior seaman on duty received burns, but although overcome with pain, he did not leave his post. He got to a telephone, reported the casualty and then returned to his waterglass to see how the boiler was faring. The damage was repaired by other members of the boiler team and the commanding officer stressed that. . . not one minute of movement was lost.” The commanding officer pointed out that such incidents were, "on the whole, a rare occurrence” and said "the equipment on our ships is safe.” The commanding officer stated his purpose in mentioning the incident was to provide an example of the high military and moral character and correctness of tradition of Soviet seamen-
Finally, a long article extolling the virtues of a young and outstanding commanding officer provided a glimpse of Soviet maintenance and damage control difficulties and successes. The article described how "Once on the ship (a Kashin class DD) the diesel generator went out of order. The specialists . . came to the conclusion that repair was possible only under factory conditions.” The commanding officer, however, intervened with a long morale and confidence-building lecture of encouragement. As a result, repair was undertaken by a senior engineering officer and a senior petty officer and, apparently, was successfully completed.
1. Pronounced Ah-key'-an—not Oh'-key-an, as customary.
2. Both had apogees of about 277 miles, perigees of about 256 miles, inclinations of 65 degrees, and Periods of a few seconds less than 90 minutes.
3. Equivalents of the U.S. Naval Academy.
4. See. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1976.
5. Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko is 72, and the commanders of the Ground Forces and Rocket Forces are 66 and 67 respectively.
6. Michmcn means warrant officers. The duties of a michman, however, are more like those of a CPO in our navy than a warrant officer.
7. Soviet crews eat in their berthing spaces.