Where Do We Go From Here?

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The solemn signing of the North Atlantic Treaty by Secretary of State Acheson in April 1949 was America’s response to an expansion­ist Soviet Union. And a playful poke in President Ford’s ribs at Helsinki in 1975 seemed to be Communist Party Chief Brezhnev’s way of saying that the time had come to end the Cold War. But there are still those in both camps who view this planet as a cold world in which a reduction in military power can lead to other—infinitely more serious—losses.

Americans are currently undergoing a period of uncertainty with respect to their country’s proper foreign policy and, particularly, the appropriate military posture in support of such a policy. This u^n£*^f tainty stems from several factors; the primary one is j ■ aftermath of the Vietnam War. The lack of a success conclusion to our military involvement in Southeast Asia after years of fighting created a weariness and disillusionment which forced American withdrawal from that area under less than satisfactory terms. ¹ public attitudes which developed during this episode our overall international relations led in turn to a national pastime of questioning the competence afl^£ honesty of our political and military leaders, the m^o1 ity of our presence in South Vietnam, and even the soundness and morality of the basic foreign policy concepts adhered to since World War II. Subsequefl the sudden and complete collapse of South Vietnam¹ the spring of 1975 touched off a new round of ^cotn?f_d able questioning—this time less strident, but manif ing a more general acceptance of the idea that these foreign policy concepts and their supporting nation^aj security arrangements were fatally flawed. It was, afl is, asserted by many commentators, especially the s°' called revisionist historians, that the responsibihO’ the Cold War lay with the United States, and that o actions with respect to many smaller countries duri^H this period demonstrated a new form of arrogant imperialism.

Widespread promulgation of this viewpoint coif cided with the adoption of new approaches in the conduct of foreign policy. These new approaches c^o(i sisted chiefly of efforts toward arms limitation agt^ee’ ments with the Soviet Union and other actions fall^ under the general term “detente” and included ad ^r tion of a new and friendlier attitude toward China

basic circumstances mandating our current natio^11.

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Their combined impact intensified the loss of convic­tion as to the soundness of the national security posture which had been followed without essential change since 1950. This inevitably weakened the previous national consensus and fed the spirit of isolationism usually latent in American public opinion. The result has been a questioning of the need to maintain our armed forces at the levels at which they have been held more or less consistently during noncombat periods since the end of the Korean War. Further impetus has been given to this skeptical attitude by the rapidly escalating costs of advanced weapon systems at a time when people are experiencing at a very personal level the combined impact of inflation and recession. Under­lying all of these attitudes appears to be a widespread acceptance of the idea that the Cold War era has come to an end, that intervention at various places around the world is a repudiated practice of our sinful past, and, in general, that we have now crossed a watershed of history. They see us leaving behind the post-World War II era and entering a new epoch, during which international relations, if not less acrimonious, will at least be of a nature permitting Americans to become less directly involved.

The prevalence of these attitudes, expressed most forcibly in the news media (and undoubtedly in a more extreme form than is truly indicative of the opinions of the country as a whole), creates questions in the minds of those concerned with national defense matters. Such concerned individuals are both inside and outside the armed services and include our public representa­tives in the Congress. Is it possible that the United States is indeed moving in a new direction, a direction which will diminish the requirement for armed forces of the size and composition to which we have become accustomed? If so, a reexamination is called for, not only of force levels and weapon systems, but also of deployments of these forces on missions which have persisted throughout the service lives of virtually everyone now on active duty. The individuals most directly involved in these deployments may well ques­tion the necessity of rigorous operational schedules and the purpose of the levels of readiness being maintained. Inevitably, there must be a loss of certainty in the minds of those who operate the weapons and man the forward positions that the tasks being performed and the deprivations being undergone are as essential to their country’s needs as they were previously thought to be. At the very least, the deluge of new thinking and revisionist history will surely cause many to wonder whether we are indeed entering a new era and, if so, to ask where we go from here. Are our current ship types still proper in design and capability for this period, and is their presence across the seas still necessary?

In the face of the publicized convictions of those wh° adhere to the historical watershed theory, it is well that the question is being asked by those whose minds are at least not closed to an opposite conclusion. It is ^a^° important that the question should be raised, studied’ and answered during this period of national uncertain ty. In spite of this uncertainty, I submit that there is| objective evidence that we have crossed a watershed o our post-World War II history, dividing the Cold Waj era from a new world characterized by diminish^ international conflict and relaxation of tensions.

security posture remain largely unchanged from those

War period shortly after the close of World War 1 While it would be foolish to insist that there has be^£l1 no change in many manifestations of these underly^lfl^ circumstances or that new factors have not arisen ^t0

complicate the issue, the changes have beefi only ^ degree and not of essence. The answer for members ® our sea services as to which direction we should proce^e is clearly that we must go forward, as before, adapt¹** our posture and weapons to conditions which assure¹ are changing, but changing at a speed not appred²¹

This conclusion is supported by a close examin^at'°|| of the basic elements of the international situation ^a(1

the policies adopted by the United States in response that situation. Those who think otherwise and argue the watershed change are at best terribly premature a*¹ at worst ignorant of policies being pursued by our competitor. They are also ignorant of the wide ^raIT of actions historically available to any nation capab^ pursuing a maritime strategy through its possession deployment of an appropriate level of seaborne fof^ceS' capability now being developed by the Soviet Uniofl- In order to achieve a proper understanding present situation and to perceive clearly what

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the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine was American response to an expansionist Soviet U*"°1

unambiguous. If there was any question of this experience of Czechoslovakia the following y^eaf ^ moved any lingering doubts. It was essential to ⁰ national security that this major industrialized teg* ,| with its large and highly skilled population not ¹ within the Soviet orbit. To counter this threat.

Treaty Organization (NATO) was created, and b

Where Do We Go From Here? 2 1

The U. S. Navy’s ability to exert influence in various areas of the world depends on the continued overseas deployment of ships such as the USS Midway (CV-41), shown here in drydock at her home port, Yokosuka, Japan.

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^r°Und and air forces were stationed on a permanent ^^asis in the central portions of Western Europe. The ■ S. Sixth Fleet was established to secure the southern to^ °^^ATO and, as a corollary to its primary purpose, ⁰ help insure stability of the Mediterranean region, tth the Korean War, the policy was applied to the

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tnrnent of those countries allied with the Soviet ⁿⁱ°n. At that time, mainland China was seen as such ⁿ ally,

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₍ giving rise to a view, shared by many in the _;^^ed States, of Communism as a monolithic force ⁿg together all nations adhering to this ideology, ^^espective of deep-seated national differences. Com- ^ⁿdng with the Korean War period, the containment S_Q ^lcy ^spread to the Pacific and led to the support of p_r ^ch Vietnam in 1954 upon the withdrawal of the Uj °^c _ from the area. It also led to an era of “pacto- Sj ^{nia and} the establishment of such organizations as 4U^T° ^an<^ ^CENTC- ^A period of relative balance ensued. i_ts . ^0ugh the Soviet Union continued trying to increase Eas^ln^^UCnCe *^{n tde} ^^astern Mediterranean and Near j_Sr ¹ ky taking advantage of the continuing Arab- 1} ^conflict, it met with only limited success.

Ch' ^^{Cre are we toda}Y^? Certainly much has changed. _aj_t^^na'^s now clearly the adversary of the Soviet Union, ^evidence of this shift was apparent as early as ^and       intensification °f the Arab-Israeli -dispute

by ,f ^r°blems stemming from the oil embargo triggered _nat^Che Vom Kippur War in 1973 shocked the Western ty_i(_'°^{ns a}°d their allies elsewhere into the realization of V¹ ^^eP^endence upon Middle East oil. In addition, tia_t ^emergence °f ^a large number of newly independent c_0l) °^ns has led to a loose coalition of old and new n_at^^tries generally referred to as the Third World ^s' Their activism, strident demands, and fre- tjjj j. ‘nrernal instabilities have created a serious poten- Pow °^{r lnt}ernational disputes involving the major ^S'Snif^S ^'overtheless, in spite of these admittedly ^lcant developments, one overriding fact has re-

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mained unchanged since World War II. The Soviet Union is still the only other nation which can be truly classified as a superpower and is still pursuing expan­sionist policies in support of goals which must certainly be considered inimical to the national interest of the United States.

It is unfortunate in one sense that the threat is no longer so direct and unambiguous as it was in the early days of the Cold War. At that time, as on many occa­sions since then, the display of naked force by the Soviet Union made the underlying danger apparent to all. During such periods, the Western allies invariably pull closer together and look to their defenses. It is much more difficult when Soviet public utterances speak of East-West detente and urge an increase in commercial contacts.

The natural tendency for those of us who have waited so long for a mellowing of the Soviet Union is to take these statements at face value. Much closer to the truth is undoubtedly the Soviet desire to stabilize the western border of its empire while it devotes increasing atten­tion to its unfriendly relations with China on its oppo­site border and to the expansion of its influence in the Third World. Under these circumstances, the threat is scarcely less serious. At the same time, it is far more difficult to contain. The threat is as great or greater for the reason that the interests and physical objectives of the Soviet Union have expanded far beyond its im­mediate periphery. Until the early 1960s, the most ambitious thrust of the Soviet Union was centered in the Mediterranean region with an emphasis on creating allies in the Near and Middle East and thus reducing American influence. Today, its efforts have expanded into every area of the world. This worldwide thrust is more difficult to contain because the expanded Soviet interests and objectives have been accompanied and supported by the development of a truly oceangoing navy, capable of operating in virtually every ocean area of the world. It is obvious that the Soviet Union has come to appreciate the advantages to a nation desiring worldwide influence which accrue from the possession of far-reaching sea power.

Ironically, the Soviets have learned this lesson from our own book, while we are beginning to forget or ignore what we seemed to have understood so well during most of the Cold War era. They appear to have fully absorbed the conclusions to be drawn from the

predominance of U. S. sea power since World War II. The Soviet shipbuilding program, which once emphasized submarines, has now shifted to familiar surface types, including, most significantly, aircraft carriers. Current Soviet foreign policy matches its sup­porting naval buildup. The Soviet Union has virtually stabilized the status quo along its borders with the NATO nations while it pursues alliances and naval base agreements along all sides of the African continent, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia. The presence of Soviet naval forces around the Arabian peninsula is a most ominous development, threatening the security of oil supplies vital to the industrialized Western nations andjapan. What we are seeing is the development of a classic worldwide maritime strategy supported by large and capable naval forces and a merchant marine of matching size and capability. In the face of this evi­dence, it is difficult to see how the unbiased observer can reach any other conclusion than that the Soviets have not only not changed their basic foreign policy goals; they have extended the pursuit of these goals by an expansion of the areas subject to influence by the proximity of Soviet armed forces from the immediate boundaries of the Soviet Union and its satellites to a large number of countries bordering the world

Soviet pretence in troubled Africa did not begin, nor has it ended, with this parade of Russian sailors at Massawa, Ethopia. Where the U. S. bluejacket will go from here will certainly be determined in some degree by where the Soviet sailor goes from there.

oceans. It has thus shifted its initial continental strategy to one that combines continental with maritime. The Soviet Union still maintains a vast army in Europe and Central Asia and is now adding far-flung naval forces_ It is a combination which greatly extends the scope o Soviet capabilities.

In the face of what must truly be viewed as an i°' creasing threat to the interests of the United States iⁿ several areas of the world, it is inconceivable that this nation can afford to pull back and reduce her forces' The inevitable result would be an increase in the number of countries whose form of government an attitude toward the conduct of industry and comment would be inimical to the broad range of America¹¹ interests.                                     _

In spite of the new era spokesmen and revision!⁵¹ historians, the need to maintain strong naval fo^rc^^s deployed in strategic areas of the world as the country⁵ first line of defense will inevitably have to be recognize by the country as a whole, and hopefully not too la^te- Unfortunately, much of the public discussion over th^e need for numbers and types of naval vessels has bee¹¹ limited to considerations of their usefulness in circui® stances of general war with the Soviet Union. We mU^st' of course, maintain our strategic deterrent forces for °^uf ultimate safety and try at the same time to desig^{0 1} capability in our general purpose forces which won make them useful in certain aspects of a general However, this is not the arena in which the act^ua operations and conflicts have been taking place sin^{cC 1} World War II. While mutual strategic capabilities ha^vf I forced the two superpowers to exercise great cauti⁰¹¹

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Where Do We Go From Here? 2 3

^when the vital interests of the other party are ap- P^r°ached, these capabilities also provide an umbrella ^Under which limited actions, positioning of forces, and ^^ven friendly presence have been able to support ^oreign policy objectives effectively.

It is at this lower range of the graduated use of armed ^orce where the real operations have been carried out ^an^ the real influence asserted—in most cases without ^lrir>g a shot. Naval presence has sustained our friends among the smaller countries and induced caution ^am°ng those who might otherwise act against our Interests. The essential elements of such naval presence ^aye been the carrier striking force and the amphibious

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^Ce- In port, the aircraft carrier is an impressive and awe-inspiring sight. At sea, she is capable of a

avy punch and the ability to penetrate hundreds of ^{1 es} inland with sophisticated airborne weapons and j. Provide support to and protection of the amphibious ^rce. The latter, with the ability to put troops on the . ^Un<i at short notice, is equally influential, if less '^ptessive to look at. The advantages of on-scene °^Ssession of a broad range of maritime options are plainly too valuable to abandon in spite of the cur- ^nt y fashionable view of the immorality of interven­

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^ln the affairs of other nations. If Vietnam is cited

^an example of such alleged immorality, it should be ^lnted out that there is nothing immoral in the con- Pt of rendering assistance to a nation resisting con- _of^Uest.by its neighbor, particularly when the best hope th ^Ultimate*Y achieving basic human freedoms lies with

^ government being supported. The extent of the 'mht;         ⁶               ^

ary support we rendered to South Vietnam was

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mittedly a mistake in hindsight, but only because we ^.^ached for an objective which was beyond our mari- grasp under the circumstances then prevailing. _tj ^{e su}Pport of foreign policy through a forward mari- _sj^^{fle str}ategy remains sound. The Vietnam experience {j°^u*d teach us primarily that the capability of the ^P'ted States in most areas of the world is maritime in ^Ure and that we must keep in mind the limits of that ^aPabili_ty

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^ls likely that those who oppose on more practical

the continued maintenance of deployed sur­’ ^naval forces will concede past accomplishments but ^estion the continued effectiveness of these forces pr_e^{Cn the}y ^are balanced off by a substantial Soviet naval ^ ^Serice in the same area. It would be foolish to deny °til ^{t0 a} P°I^nt rheir argument has validity, but it is ^ y ^a partial validity. It is true that both the United Mi ^{CS anc}^ ^t^^ie Soviet Union have exercised caution tjj^Cr^ ^tI^|e application of low levels of threat or force runs th              direct confrontation with the other’s forces,

hji^ *^s °o question that in such a situation our flexi- y will be reduced and the influence which can be

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asserted will become more limited. But this is not to say that the usefulness of a visible presence becomes non­existent. The encouragement of or constraints upon local political leaders will still be possible even though to a lesser degree. It is in such circumstances that relative superiority of weapon systems becomes very important. For this reason, discussion of proposed reductions of the capabilities, and therefore effective­ness, of aircraft carriers to be built in the future is a cause for concern. Where there is a competing presence of two naval forces, the effectiveness of each will be somewhat reduced but the effectiveness of the more powerful will be less reduced. In any event, our inter­ests would certainly suffer more were the United States to react to the presence of Soviet units by withdrawing from the area. The attitude of the Shah of Iran in this connection is illustrative of what must surely be the view of many leaders of the Third World nations. In a recent interview he stated that although he would pre­fer the presence in the Persian Gulf of neither Soviet nor United States naval forces, if the Soviets are to be there he would like to see the Americans there also.

The chief problems of gaining a public understand­ing of the usefulness of support for the maintenance of the elements of effective sea power are that the impact of that sea power is seldom dramatic and is as often characterized by non-events as by events. Even when its application results in positive happenings, its effect is often so subtle that the cause is seldom associated in the public mind. The media providing public information seem to be able to conceive of the usefulness of naval sea power in terms of actual fighting but not as an influence toward peace and stability. As has been pointed out above, it is the latter which has been the more significant over the last 30 years.

It would be possible to cite numerous examples of the influence of an American naval presence on actions taken and on actions refrained from in the world’s trouble spots during the period since World War II, but two of the more recent will suffice. Writing in the 1 July 1975 Wall Street Journal, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. pointed out that the reinforcement of the Sixth Fleet in 1970 contributed to the Soviet Union’s withdrawal of support to the Syrian invasion of Jordan. An example of a strengthening of a freedom of choice by an Ameri­can naval presence is the action of Egypt in expelling large numbers of Soviet advisers and technicians. With­out the overall support of American foreign policy, backed up by the presence of the Sixth Fleet, this action might never have taken place.

There are, unhappily, negative examples emphasiz­ing this same point. Whatever part the congressional action denying continued material aid to South Viet­nam contributed to the sudden collapse of that country