Leadership Forum: Paper Prisons

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The great and remembered periods⁰ invariably. ^tB

human history seem,

revolve around the rise, actions,

Paper Prisons

By First Lieutenant Lawrence P. Hebron,

U.S. Marine Corps, Executive Officer, Company B, First Tank Battalion, First Marine Division

legacies of great men. Be they kings

warriors, philosophers, statesmen. ^

scientists, the ebb and flow of ⁰

species has been dictated, perhaps to

■ itW

so than by any other single factor, by emergence of the leader. For, g^iven

an“

necessary level of intelligence ^ material resources, it is leadership ^w

develop'

if

has provided the key to human

ment. It is the spark which kindles . ^r .   r hu*

otherwise ordinary, inert mass oi

■                            .                    .     , aril

mans into a vital, determined, ^

directed force capable of achieving

level previously considered unattain®

It is leadership which can take a h^etct^

geneous assortment of separate hu

entities and transform them W¹

organic whole, collectivize and d*^r^

their energies, and produce a result sum of which is greater than the tot*¹¹ its component parts. It is lead^e _

which can instill in a mass of men »-     ^

_______________  ,»**

of purpose, arouse in them a comtnn

soul, and inflame them with a w

ill

cannot tolerate failure. Need and

implant in man a desire to accomP something, but it is rare that a mass achieves anything of note. Achieve¹¹ ^ is the handiwork of the leader. He *

Jisk

the very heart of collective accomP ment.

The leader has thus far been desc^f on a historic level, and certainly it ^w . be a worthwhile suggestion to hist°^rl to scrutinize the course

of K_f

development through the lenses ⁰ “leadership paradigm,” thereby ¹¹ ₍ fully clearing somewhat the my^stc^'_{[i our erratic progress. Leaders, ho*^e j exist and are critical at all stage*

•                                             • • RUti

phases of any collective activity- ^D |

it is true, as I have suggested,

leaders are so important, it is well ^ ^

considering just what compris⁶*

nd f

essential elements of leadership an

</

can we know a leader when we see Unfortunately, this cannot be done much specificity. Leaders are no¹ ^

scribed, they are sensed. A leader¹⁵

who can evoke and harness mass

hu^;

energies and then direct them to

common goal. As such, leadership

do

very subjective quality. Where - ^ find a common ground between serene moralism of a Gandhi^ ^ unholy brutality of a Stalin, an

Pr,

^r".

_c^Plring bulldog obstinance of a ^ Where do we see a kinship Lj_ri'^Veen humble folksiness of a ⁿ and the ferocious Herrenvolkism

ot _a j~

^s'cm

°^ne other obvious and critical which they all shared; they were

_LJ^0SSCSSed of an indomitable will, 'adets

have t

Xthe

’her ^Xampl'^es °f leadership established as

^to work with and of themselves. As e_nt ’J^Eere will be nearly as many differ-

but not defeated. As regards

^letern

don’¹¹¹¹¹¹'⁰^ ^who the leaders are— ' Leaders determine

we

themselves,

S mechanization, the leader is at scj_en^^{S lrtl}Pottant as he ever was. All the

Pt0‘

ⁿtis_ts

^vide

^men who Ptodu

must put them into action

^lnd

^Cr di,

to

’ tim_e ■V be

act

^rr'at_ter ⁿ"^Ust. of course, ^sRip ;_n ° ^adequacy of military leader-

^CcCs;

asi,

oat power, in turn, is

‘tally ,

•tl:

‘tier? One of the few similarities ‘astj ^{S t0 tEat}’ although perhaps not sub            tttust all be credited with

_(Ver'^antial accomplishments. This, how- d_efi’.^{ls a} result of leadership, not a quality. There is, though, at

lual

all

^must be in harmony with the ■list' ^an^ ^must have an implicit and ^ct‘ve understanding of what they

b_e ^are loaders; but always there will phfa_s ^{31 Uncon}querable will. To para- de^rj Llemingway, a leader can be

defj ^at quality is sensed by others, not hy them.

"’Hit ^re'^evance of leadership to the vi_0Us ^ ^establishment should be ob- ,_Pand^Ev- ‘ⁿ this age of rapidly Pass; technology and all encom-

'fast

and technicians can do is sti|| ^{Us w}’^th the machines, but it is

^Uce results with them. As long °al ^VVorL together toward a common ■mportance of the leader will

^t((lu_Ce[j^lrr'^ln*^sL- Recent trends have not l>av_e; ^{tEe r}°le of the leaders but rather ‘tchfjj P°^sed a greater demand for their qu_esti * P^r°ficiency. But what of the Loun<d ■ °^{E tEe} *^evel °L leadership ^Jb|_{e tQ}^{ln (}Le military today—will it be ’ant _tr% ^rneasure up or not? It is impor- °n our hunches now; for by ^we are able to prove them, it t°o late to do anything about

address the

!^errris °f military success. Military p_Crj_0r^S thieved through the relatively ^l|’ b_af,i ^emPl°yment of combat power bat:. . ^e- Comba

^,tCrial ^COmP^r'^scd °f two components: ^rCs°Ur_Ce ^resources and psychological ^s- The first of these is con­cerned with the quantity and quality of tangible assets such as weapons, muni­tions, troops, and a myriad of support materials. The latter component, how­ever, is concerned with the intangible and often indescribable energies and abilities of the inner being. A leader must be skilled in handling the former, but he must be a master in directing the latter. Again, the reason for this is clear —machines do not fight, men do. A commander must count on having, at times, to fight an enemy who is superior to him in those tangible assets men­tioned above. A fight cannot be avoided merely because it appears it will not be a fair one; and to establish a record of success like history’s great command­ers, it is necessary for a leader to be able to fight under such adverse conditions and win. It is foolhardy to count on an enemy squandering his resources—if one is to beat a materially superior foe, it must be accomplished through the all­out mobilization of those inner energies. This is the duty of the leader. In fact, the greater the material disadvantage, the more crucial is the role of the leader.

Today, the U. S. military faces a grave situation, and, accordingly, so does the nation. For various reasons, the U. S. Government has effectively resolved that we shall not possess a definite material superiority over our enemies in the military sphere. In fact, many military authorities believe just one of those enemies, the Soviet Union alone, has at least equaled us in almost every major area of material military resources and surpassed us in many. It is unfortunate, at least, that such a situation has been allowed to develop, and years to come may prove it to be much worse than merely unfortunate. The military, how­ever, must work with what it is given; and if it has been resolved that we will not be granted superiority in material resources, then we must emphasize those intangible, psychological re­sources. In short, a premium has been placed on proficiency and leadership.

If this were all there is to the problem, then our situation would be tenuous but not yet grave. There is, however, another element which conspires with the first to frustrate the efforts of our military leaders to make up for inadequacies in other areas; and now I will commence to address this problem at the company grade level. That other element encom­passes a wide range of specific policies and programs which can be lumped together under the broad heading of “misplaced priorities.” These misplaced priorities, which affect both allocations of finances and personnel, combined with our inadequate material resources form a virtually insurmountable obstacle to combat preparedness. The most devastating thing is that most of it is beyond the miltary’s power to resolve.

From the perspective of this company grade officer, the greatest leadership problem we face presently, and are likely to face for the next several years, is a lack of leadership from above. This applies, in part, to the military establishment but is more directly aimed at the govern­ment itself. In spite of some opinions to the contrary within governmental circles, the “government,” on the whole, has decided to accept a situation of military parity with our enemies. As a general observation, this is not a decision characteristic of a great nation. More specifically, it is virtually impossible to determine if parity has been achieved due to the secretive nature of nations’ military preparations. If you appear to be at a level of relative equivalence based on what you can see, you may, in fact, be at a substantial disadvantage due to what you can’t see. Additionally, this parity is based on a comparison of our might with that of our single, most ob­vious adversary—the Soviet Union. It does not consider our strength in rela­tion to possible Soviet alliances. The formula used to determine parity is, at best, questionable. We are at a decided disadvantage in many quantitative cri­teria, and whether the qualitative edge we have in other areas is enough to make up the difference is open to conjecture.

The policy of parity is closely linked with economic considerations. Whether the policy of parity is a necessary result of budgetary constraints or whether the budget is determined based on a calcula­tion of what is necessary to maintain parity is really an abstract, academic con­sideration as far as the military is concerned—the only thing that really matters is that we don’t have sufficient funds. Regardless of where the money is going, not nearly enough is getting to the lowest levels where the actual troop training is going on. There seems to be a