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The great and remembered periods0 invariably. tB
human history seem,
revolve around the rise, actions,
Paper Prisons
By First Lieutenant Lawrence P. Hebron,
U.S. Marine Corps, Executive Officer, Company B, First Tank Battalion, First Marine Division
legacies of great men. Be they kings
warriors, philosophers, statesmen. ^
scientists, the ebb and flow of 0
species has been dictated, perhaps to
■ itW
so than by any other single factor, by emergence of the leader. For, given
an“
necessary level of intelligence ^ material resources, it is leadership w
develop'
if
has provided the key to human
ment. It is the spark which kindles . r . r hu*
otherwise ordinary, inert mass oi
■ . . , aril
mans into a vital, determined, ^
directed force capable of achieving
level previously considered unattain®
It is leadership which can take a hetct^
geneous assortment of separate hu
entities and transform them W1
organic whole, collectivize and d*r^
their energies, and produce a result sum of which is greater than the tot*11 its component parts. It is leade_
which can instill in a mass of men »- ^
_______________ ,»**
of purpose, arouse in them a comtnn
soul, and inflame them with a w
ill
cannot tolerate failure. Need and
implant in man a desire to accomP something, but it is rare that a mass achieves anything of note. Achieve11 ^ is the handiwork of the leader. He *
Jisk
the very heart of collective accomP ment.
The leader has thus far been descf on a historic level, and certainly it w . be a worthwhile suggestion to hist°rl to scrutinize the course
of Kf
development through the lenses 0 “leadership paradigm,” thereby 11 ( fully clearing somewhat the mystc^'{[i our erratic progress. Leaders, ho*e j exist and are critical at all stage*
• • • RUti
phases of any collective activity- D |
it is true, as I have suggested,
leaders are so important, it is well ^ ^
considering just what compris6*
nd f
essential elements of leadership an
</
can we know a leader when we see Unfortunately, this cannot be done much specificity. Leaders are no1 ^
scribed, they are sensed. A leader15
who can evoke and harness mass
hu;
energies and then direct them to
common goal. As such, leadership
do
very subjective quality. Where - ^ find a common ground between serene moralism of a Gandhi^ ^ unholy brutality of a Stalin, an
Pr,
r".
cPlring bulldog obstinance of a ^ Where do we see a kinship Ljri'Veen humble folksiness of a n and the ferocious Herrenvolkism
ot a j~
s'cm
°ne other obvious and critical which they all shared; they were
LJ0SSCSSed of an indomitable will, 'adets
have t
Xthe
’her Xampl'es °f leadership established as
to work with and of themselves. As ent ’JEere will be nearly as many differ-
but not defeated. As regards
letern
don’111111'0^ who the leaders are— ' Leaders determine
we
themselves,
S mechanization, the leader is at scjen^S lrtlPottant as he ever was. All the
Pt0‘
ntists
vide
men who Ptodu
must put them into action
lnd
Cr di,
to
’ time ■V be
act
rr'attern"Ust. of course, sRip ;n ° adequacy of military leader-
CcCs;
asi,
oat power, in turn, is
‘tally ,
•tl:
‘tier? One of the few similarities ‘astj S t0 tEat’ although perhaps not sub tttust all be credited with
(Ver'antial accomplishments. This, how- defi’.ls a result of leadership, not a quality. There is, though, at
lual
all
must be in harmony with the ■list' an^ must have an implicit and ct‘ve understanding of what they
beare loaders; but always there will phfas31 Unconquerable will. To para- de^rj Llemingway, a leader can be
defj at quality is sensed by others, not hy them.
"’Hit re'evance of leadership to the vi0Us ^ establishment should be ob- ,PandEv- ‘n this age of rapidly Pass; technology and all encom-
'fast
and technicians can do is sti|| Us w’th the machines, but it is
Uce results with them. As long °al VVorL together toward a common ■mportance of the leader will
t((luCe[jlrr'ln*sL- Recent trends have not l>ave; tEe r°le of the leaders but rather ‘tchfjj P°sed a greater demand for their questi * Pr°ficiency. But what of the Loun<d ■ °E tEe *evel °L leadership Jb|e tQln (Le military today—will it be ’ant tr%rneasure up or not? It is impor- °n our hunches now; for by we are able to prove them, it t°o late to do anything about
address the
!errris °f military success. Military pCrj0rS thieved through the relatively l|’ baf,i emPl°yment of combat power bat:. . e- Comba
,tCrial COmPr'scd °f two components: rCs°UrCeresources and psychological s- The first of these is concerned with the quantity and quality of tangible assets such as weapons, munitions, troops, and a myriad of support materials. The latter component, however, is concerned with the intangible and often indescribable energies and abilities of the inner being. A leader must be skilled in handling the former, but he must be a master in directing the latter. Again, the reason for this is clear —machines do not fight, men do. A commander must count on having, at times, to fight an enemy who is superior to him in those tangible assets mentioned above. A fight cannot be avoided merely because it appears it will not be a fair one; and to establish a record of success like history’s great commanders, it is necessary for a leader to be able to fight under such adverse conditions and win. It is foolhardy to count on an enemy squandering his resources—if one is to beat a materially superior foe, it must be accomplished through the allout mobilization of those inner energies. This is the duty of the leader. In fact, the greater the material disadvantage, the more crucial is the role of the leader.
Today, the U. S. military faces a grave situation, and, accordingly, so does the nation. For various reasons, the U. S. Government has effectively resolved that we shall not possess a definite material superiority over our enemies in the military sphere. In fact, many military authorities believe just one of those enemies, the Soviet Union alone, has at least equaled us in almost every major area of material military resources and surpassed us in many. It is unfortunate, at least, that such a situation has been allowed to develop, and years to come may prove it to be much worse than merely unfortunate. The military, however, must work with what it is given; and if it has been resolved that we will not be granted superiority in material resources, then we must emphasize those intangible, psychological resources. In short, a premium has been placed on proficiency and leadership.
If this were all there is to the problem, then our situation would be tenuous but not yet grave. There is, however, another element which conspires with the first to frustrate the efforts of our military leaders to make up for inadequacies in other areas; and now I will commence to address this problem at the company grade level. That other element encompasses a wide range of specific policies and programs which can be lumped together under the broad heading of “misplaced priorities.” These misplaced priorities, which affect both allocations of finances and personnel, combined with our inadequate material resources form a virtually insurmountable obstacle to combat preparedness. The most devastating thing is that most of it is beyond the miltary’s power to resolve.
From the perspective of this company grade officer, the greatest leadership problem we face presently, and are likely to face for the next several years, is a lack of leadership from above. This applies, in part, to the military establishment but is more directly aimed at the government itself. In spite of some opinions to the contrary within governmental circles, the “government,” on the whole, has decided to accept a situation of military parity with our enemies. As a general observation, this is not a decision characteristic of a great nation. More specifically, it is virtually impossible to determine if parity has been achieved due to the secretive nature of nations’ military preparations. If you appear to be at a level of relative equivalence based on what you can see, you may, in fact, be at a substantial disadvantage due to what you can’t see. Additionally, this parity is based on a comparison of our might with that of our single, most obvious adversary—the Soviet Union. It does not consider our strength in relation to possible Soviet alliances. The formula used to determine parity is, at best, questionable. We are at a decided disadvantage in many quantitative criteria, and whether the qualitative edge we have in other areas is enough to make up the difference is open to conjecture.
The policy of parity is closely linked with economic considerations. Whether the policy of parity is a necessary result of budgetary constraints or whether the budget is determined based on a calculation of what is necessary to maintain parity is really an abstract, academic consideration as far as the military is concerned—the only thing that really matters is that we don’t have sufficient funds. Regardless of where the money is going, not nearly enough is getting to the lowest levels where the actual troop training is going on. There seems to be a
i &
■ resp«
-tf
plex, but the solution shot1
Id
souf
¥
itself is mystical and imperfectly stood, but very effective. To
b'J'
able to survive for some years,
Leadership is the
rvivC’
great emphasis on computerization and sophisticated systems and machinery to support the combatants. That is all well and good, unless it happens at the expense of the proficiency and competence of the combat troops, which seems to be the case. It appears that we have been taken up with the construction of an awesome support capability which no one really knows how to work. Again, machines do not fight, men do. This is not to say that we should slacken our efforts to provide the fighting forces with the best support available. We must ensure, though, that our troop training remains abreast of our technological advances; we must guarantee a sufficient and proficient fighting force. Right now, that fighting force is neither sufficient nor proficient, and one of the key factors in that deficiency is a lack of adequate funding.
The problem of inadequate funding would i>e bad enough by itself, but it has been augmented by the additional problem of misplaced priorities. When resources are in short supply, the establishment of priorities is a critical matter. We, in the military, however, have been tasked not only with the responsibility of building and maintaining the most essential element of our national security, we have simultaneously been burdened with carrying through a number of programs of questionable value. It appears there are some inspired, yet misguided, individuals in both the military and government who have discovered the “captured audience’’ aspect of the military establishment and seek to exploit that quality to try out some of their own pet programs for social betterment. As such, the military has become a virtual laboratory for social scientific experimentation, and we members of the armed forces have become human guinea pigs. This process has taken place in many fields from education to drug and alcohol abuse to interpersonal relationships. It is not that the intent or aims of these programs are wrong, but their practical implementation has placed a tremendous strain, especially, on lower level leaders, and, inevitably, takes place at the expense of mission-oriented training. It is also questionable whether many of these programs really accomplish their goals or, at least, if they accomplish them in the most suitable fashion. It is essential that commanders at all levels be concerned with the well-being of their troops, but I am here reminded of the advice of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel that the best form of welfare for the troops is first-class combat training. If present trends persist in that these extraneous programs continue to proliferate and devour more and more time, money, and personnel—all at the expense of combat training—we may discover in the next war that we possess the best educated, most socially and psychologically well-adjusted body bag stuffers in the world. It is not that the aims of these programs should be ignored. I think, though, that many would be surprised at the large number of these problems that would take care of themselves if we simply tended to our business and concentrated on and devoted our energies to the perfection of our trade. When our men spend most of their time and energy in the field involved in mission-oriented training, they will learn the things they need to know; they will not have the time, opportunity, or inclination to abuse drugs and alcohol to the same degree as at present; and they will learn that whether they like someone or not, they will have to work with him and even rely on him as part of the team. They might just learn that he, or they, aren’t such bad fellows after all. Many of our greatest problems arise from the tedium of garrison, not the rigors of the field.
We, at the company grade level, suffer from a combination of insufficient funds and misplaced priorities, which misdirect and squander what funds are available. This system has, in turn, ossified and become self-perpetuating in that commanders are evaluated heavily on how well they execute these misguided programs and priorities and are promoted accordingly. All too infrequently is a leader evaluated on how tactically proficient he is; but he is scrutinized daily on how well he services the ever-growing myriad of extraneous programs and how good his paperwork is. Accordingly, the bureaucratic mentality is given precedence over that of the field commander. The new young leader entering this system is not given an adequate chance to develop his skills- fic' bound and smothered in a paperP^i and all his efforts to break out and what a military leader is supposed ^ are blocked by the very people-^ superiors—who should be giving whatever support and guidance he nee This is the way the system has co®e operate, and, ultimately, it W0I^S either break or drive out its best men is a sinister conspiracy of events w probably has come into being 4 innocently. Now, when we need nosed, determined, and well-di1^ leadership the most, we are bound system and its administrators which only approach a spineless mediocr®^ best. The greatest leadership Pr0 . we will face for the next several ye9f quite simply a lack of leadership> dally in high circles. This appheS t0 military, but, to a much greater c it applies to the government * determines what kind of resource5 military shall have and toward what it shall direct its efforts. A prime sibility of leadership is to set ^ example, and we in the military ^ look to the government to set an e*a which facilitates the accomplish01 ^ our mission; namely, to deren nation and its values against all ene both foreign and domestic. We ta^e responsibility freely, but, by Go ’ must be given a chance to fulfill it- I honestly fear that the situati°V grown very severe and that this 0^ faces a genuine crisis as regards ouf tary standing. The problems are
obvious. At the risk of mystical, the cure for our iils hes ^ essence of leadership—an essence ^
that power throughout all levels military, it must first of all co®e being in the government. The g f ment has failed to provide uS leadership. This is a failing we have without great expense—hopeful^’ irreparable expense.
focal Poi(lt civilization. If ours is to su must come, soon.