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The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization”
{See P. R Schratz, pp. 18-24, September 1975 Proceedings)
lieutenant Commander Larry Seaquist, U-S- Navy—Captain Schratz makes a c°nvincing case that, under certain circumstances and with the right combi- natl°n of personalities, the service secretaries can play a useful role. Note, however, that in the first of his two examples—the TFX caper—Secretaries h Korth and E. M. Zuckert were acting m°re as assistant secretaries of defense than as service leaders. No doubt future controversies, should circumstances and personalities again coincide, will again occasionally involve the civilian service head in a useful role. Nevertheless, one ls still led to the conclusion that by and arge, over the great bulk of the top-level decision-making processes, that role is anachronistic.
With the strong, unified civilian di- tection of all the services being applied through the Office of the Secretary of defense, the echelon of the service secretary seems a redundant, non-vital link ln the chain of command. The proportion that we could save considerable money, eliminate some billets, and simplify the management structure by dele- t'°n of the secretaries and their staffs stdl appears to be very much worth thinking about.
The New Uniforms:
Who Wants Them?”
C. R. Adams, p. 81, September 1975;
• McLaren, p. 76, November 1975 Proceedings)
i-’eutenant Commander A. W. Swinger, • & Navy, Executive Officer, USS Joseph ttauss (DDG-16)—I don’t know when
Admiral Adams retired, but I could not agree more with his comments. Although I have been on active duty since the supposed surveys have been taken that verified the supposed desire for uniform modification, I had never heard of them until after implementation of the uniform changes. I cannot help but wonder, as a naval officer and postgraduate-schooled systems analyst, as to the validity of these supposed surveys.
Without the benefit of statistical analysis, the facts that follow are provided for general consumption and emotional appeal based on real-time observations. Facts from a shipboard point of view that verify the folly of current enlisted uniforms are as follows:
► There is not sufficient storage space, especially on a DDG that has pipe rack bunks and few to no hanging gear lockers, for officer-style blues (civilian clothes notwithstanding) on board most warships in the fleet.
► Sufficient dry-cleaning facilities do not exist, and will not without a great deal of unnecessary cost, on board most ships to properly maintain the new uniforms (e.g. service dress blues and summer blues).
► Sailors cannot work in the new uniforms. Blues, white shirt, tie, and officer style caps for linehandlers? Admittedly, they look terrific from a distance, but are practical only as long as the men do not have to break ranks to actually handle lines. Officer style caps are easily blown away if chin straps are not used. Even if the straps are used and caps are not lost, a second cap must be maintained for dress use. As a result, we revert to my first point—insufficient storage.
► Sailors do not wear the new uniform well. Caps are difficult to retain and expensive to maintain and replace. (They are easily crushed and disfigured with locker stowage, and are easily lost in wind across the decks.) Uniforms are easily wrinkled and become rapidly
A former Marine Corps master sergeant doesn't believe the two recruiting posters have the same impact.
disheveled. The result is a lack of smart appearance.
► Pride in gaining "the hat” as a chief petty officer has been eroded. This point does not need to be belabored, but the Navy has always been unique in its regard, reverence, and dependence upon the chiefs, and the "hard hat” has always been their symbol. This symbol has now become considerably less distinguishable.
► The "white hat, bell bottoms (blue or white), and neckerchief,” especially during our Bicentennial, is without doubt the uniform that our men like to wear, the uniform that our citizens like to see, and the uniform that is the most practical for seagoing men, from work to play.
In spite of the foregoing facts, I think a bit of emotion is attached to Navy uniforms and a uniform appearance. First, as an XO afloat, I cannot order one uniform for any occasion. I can’t do this because, at present, there is not a uniform in the Navy. Tropical white long means some in white hats, some in officer/cPO-style caps, some in bell bottom trousers, and some in straight legged trousers. There are four "dungaree” working uniforms, and types of blues are also numerous.
In any event, if these facts confuse you, I have accomplished my purpose. I do not intend to be facetious in any way, for I consider the uniform of a Navyman a most serious matter. The white hat, bell bottoms, jumper, gusset strings, 13 buttons, and walk-with-a-
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swagger are what I consider appropriate and proper. That’s the way it was—200 years ago!
Richard W. Cunningham, former U. S. Marine Corps Master Sergeant—Although
I heartily agree with Admiral Adams’ views on the old uniforms, I believe he missed a most important point—the visual image.
As a Marine Staff NCO in World War
II and Korea (two years seagoing), I developed a secret hatred/admiration for the Bluejacket and his swaggering image. Our "Jarheads” always looked good in a John Wayne way, but on liberty were no match for the seagoing roll, collar and kerchief flapping in the breeze, non-reg affectations of the white hat cocked over one eye, and the cuffs of the jumper turned back to reveal Hong Kong embroidery—they really looked like sailors!
The responsible individual, or board, has destroyed a tradition, a badge of achievement, or a ceremonial, whose essence is a sort of martial bar mitzvah that I feel must exist to nourish the function and structure of an effective military organization.
It was difficult for me to imagine how the poster artist of years past would have handled the new para-civilian costume, so I tried. I don’t like it. Give us back our firemen, white hats, airdales, deck apes, swab jockeys, gobs, and Bluejackets.
R. W. CUNNINGHAM
Service, Travel, 7thc.
- Instruction
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Proceedings Special Issue
(See August 1975 Proceedings)
William B. Prechtl, Consultant Engineer, Athens, Greece—The August issue of Proceedings is, in my opinion, the best ever. Who can argue with facts—facts presented from both sides of the coin? The authors have made their points very well. I hope the powers that be take heed.
I believe this "first issue” ever to be devoted to a single professional subject a pleasant departure and, subject-wise, most timely. The staff is to be congratulated for an excellent issue and a superb publication in general.
"Navy Shipbuilding:
Building Ships or Bureaucracies?”
{See L. D. Chirillo, pp. 38-45, August 1975 Proceedings)
Commander Hubert E. Russell, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired), naval architect— Commander Chirillo’s article was of particular interest to me as I was commanding officer of the Coast Guard Resident Inspection Office at Avondale Shipyards when construction of the high endurance cutters started in 1964.1 agree with Commander Chirillo that the Hamilton-c\ass (WHEC-715) cutter is of the same overall degree of complexity as the Knox-class (DE-1052) destroyer escorts (now FF-1052 frigates). Horsepower and speed are nearly identical, but the Hamilton's twin controllable-pitch propeller and gas turbine plant give her much more maneuverability from an engineering space about 40% smaller than the Knox, with her single screw, steam plant.
At the first shipyard conference in January 1964, Captain C. G. Houtsma, then Chief of the Naval Engineering Division, Coast Guard Headquarters, said that the Coast Guard wanted a ship per the specifications, and that the Coast Guard was not going to initiate any changes even if the stack gases came out the hawse pipe, as long as the ship would run. Mr. Z. Carter, then president of Avondale Shipyards, was enthusiastic about this policy. He stated that while it is often thought that a shipyard makes a killing on changes, the disruption a
The construction costs of the USCGC Hamilton (WHEC-715 ), pictured above, and her sister cutters were held down because the Coast Guard established its ship specifications and stuck to them.
change brings to logical planning often costs more than the shipyard expects it t0> and certainly costs more than the customer expects to pay.
This set the tone for the Coast Guard contract. Neither party was "hard nosed” but both were very "businesslike” in the best sense of the word.
Our original staff was as follows: Commanding Officer, lieutenant commander; Hull, lieutenant and chief en- gineman (ENC); Machinery, CWO-2 and ENI; Electrical, master chief electrician’s mate (emcm); Administration, Koman first class; and Supply, storekeeper second class. Only two men, the EMCM and the ENI, had been involved in a shipbuilding contract before, but all were individuals who had had extensive sea duty. Each knew he could very well go to sea in the ship being built. Fifteen months later, the staff had grown to 11. It eventually grew to 30 to handle the 12 ships.
The contracting officer was in Wash- lngton, D.C., so he signed for contract Ganges. I was responsible for all technical matters, including plan approval, and °t advice to the contracting officer on contract interpretation and cost evalua- tlon. I think that the present Coast Guard management policy of stationing £ke contracting officer at the building yard is an excellent one. Commander Ghirillo points out the low figure for changes, $213,202 (2.1% of contract), and claims, $75,000 (0.7%), on this first "aajor Coast Guard cutter built since orld War IE The credit for these low gures should be shared between the oast Guard and Avondale Shipyards, ^hrough their then project engineer, °m Doussan, they responded quickly requests for changes and to the c allenge of solving problems as they arose. I must admit that I also was 'repressed with the rapid response of rupyard engineers to construction site Problems. I believe it had something to 0 with charging lost construction time to rhe engineering "bonus pool.” j order to reduce shipbuilding costs, ^eel that the ship buyer’s management
^ Eliminate, if possible, from the specifications those systems which have not ^er> shaken down. Accept the delay at installation in a post-construction availability will incur. Require that the
specification-preparing engineering staff state which government-furnished items may cause problems before the specifications are issued for bid.
► Promote those who treat government money as if it were their own-i.e., those who think, "If it were my nest egg, would I spend X dollars to make a change or would I live without it?” Do this thinking before putting the shipyard to the time-consuming effort of preparing a cost estimate.
► Fire those who have a horror of the ship not being perfect no matter what the cost. (No ship is perfect in everyone’s eyes.)
► Do away with unilateral changes. Knock heads with the shipyard representatives and work nights, but come up with an agreed-on cost/delivery change before proceeding.
► Promote early resolution of conflict by having personnel on the scene who are eager to resolve the problem rather than buck it up to the next level of command. The shipyard is generally much more amenable to modifying something early at a fair price if they know that drawn-out administrative costs will not eat up their profit.
► Be fair in interpreting the specification, neither "goldplating” a requirement nor accepting less than what is spelled out in the specification.
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► Control the tendency to rely on the excessive number of paper reports instead of live eyes on the scene. For example, quality control procedures may require a completed compartment report after all work in the compartment, including insulation, is complete. The customer then inspects the compartment but cannot see the welds. While not infringing on the shipyard’s own quality control organization, I found it advantageous to the Coast Guard, and, I think, to the shipyard, to have relatively continuous roving inspection by my staff. Items were uncovered early enough to make corrections at relatively low expense.
► Don’t depend on performance-type specifications to take the place of thoughtful plan approval comments. Shifting a valve location is relatively simple on paper. Proving that the specifications require the installed valve to be moved without a contract change is obviously more difficult.
I disagree with Commander Chirillo on one point. He states that "Former operating unit commanders are needed ... at each shipbuilding site in order to maintain a policy of detachment from Navy designers so that for each problem the quality of the specification as well as the shipbuilder’s interpretation would be questioned.” Horrors! I have run into the situation where each operating unit commander has a different solution and each is sure he is correct. I would rather see that expertise utilized during the specification and contract plan preparation phase when changes are cheaper, perhaps even free.
"The Marines:
Now and in the Future”
(See E. H. Simmons, pp. 102-117, May 1975
Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
1st Lieutenant G. W. Anderson—Upon surface examination, Brigadier General Simmons’ article provides a concise recapitulation of Marine Corps functions for the immediate future. Although concise, informative, and professional, one area of the piece gives cause for concern to the Marine on the street.
The area of concern is the discussion of the transition of the individual Marine from a role as a rifleman to that of a sensor for a more sophisticated fire direction system. I am sure that most Marines were grateful to General Simmons for this piece of information since it is the first time most of us heard of it. General Simmons accurately points out that the 1964 MarCorps 85 study predicted that the sense-and-destroy approach was the wave of the future. Unfortunately most of us didn’t realize that the future is now.
If this is in fact true, convincing the people at Parris Island and San Diego will be as difficult as General Simmons predicts. No one wants to sound like a tactical anachronism, but no self- respecting soldier or Marine wants to view himself as a mere expendable part in a larger system. There is a discernable difference between the infantryman and the technician. Many times in the mud
ENTER THE FORUM
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and the dust, that special difference has been the margin between defeat and victory. I firmly believe that if we merely choose to view our infantry assets as antennae, we are committing folly no matter what the tactical situation may seem to dictate.
What I object to is not the concept, but the method of presenting it. Marines in particular, and infantrymen in general, tend to view themselves as action initiators. The sensor system view is impersonal and tends to indicate that the individual is merely an object to be acted upon by larger forces. In short, what I am proposing is that you may act upon the Marine, but don’t tell him that is what you are doing. Sometimes a soldier must find reserves of strength in situations where those reserves are not available on the outside. It is my contention that those reserves cannot be found in individuals who view themselves as antennae.
The concept outlined by General Simmons will eventually be sound tactics, but if presented in an ill conceived manner it could prove to be abysmal psychology. The thought process behind this concept is not new. It was the same line of thinking that caused a bitter breach between Army and Marine Corps units during the Pacific campaigns of World War II. At that time Army units viewed themselves as backup forces for moving in after the artillery had finished. The "mopping up” operation or the "last resort” aspect of the use of the rifle as mentioned by General Simmons was being implemented by Army infantry units until the artillery support failed to eliminate the opposition. At that point the system broke down because the troops were simply not prepared to go out and dig the opposition out of their holes and kill them with their bare hands if necessary. I do not deliberately bring up this mutually embarrassing situation to rekindle hard feelings, but to point out a lesson that should have been well learned 30 years ago.
No one is arguing that the American infantryman can use as much fire support as possible in defeating most of his potential adversaries. But the key word is use. The man on the scene must feel that he is using the weapons available to him as tools and not being used by them.
The argument here is not the intent, but the impetus of the proposal. Antennae do not march through mud and dust for hours on end and launch an unsupported attack against a position that has not been properly softened up- Good infantrymen do.
The concept of the individual Marine infantryman using the combat support firepower available to him in a coherent and well executed manner makes much more sense than attempting to turn him into an inanimate extension of an impersonal fire direction system.
Naval Kremlinology
Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., U. S. Navy, former Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow— Kremlinology has had successes and failures and, thus, supporters and detractors of its usefulness. In the absence of hard intelligence which provides an insight into Soviet plans and intentions, however, analysis of the background and shifting positions of Soviet leaders has sometimes provided hints of things to come. Application of this technique of Kremlinology to the
has
defi
years.
Leadership of the Soviet Navy (Major Line Officer Positions)
overseen the planning and develop
mtive information concerning the
ure commander and the content of e plan, we do have some basis for peculating on the future leadership of e Soviet Navy and assessing the general policy it will follow during the next
Position | Incumbent (1972)1 | Incumbent (1973j1 | Assumed Position | PacFlt2 Experience | Remarks |
Commander- in-Chief | Gorshkov | Gorshkov | 1956 | Only as young officer (1934) | Approaching retirement |
1st Deputy CinC | Kasatonov | Smirnov | 1974 | CinC 19691974 | Relieved Adm. Amelko in Pac. |
1st Deputy CinC & Chief, Main Navy Staff | Sergeyev | Sergeyev | (1960s) Only as young officer | Approaching retirement | |
Deputy CinC | Yegorov | Bondarenko | 1973 | CoS 1967-73 | Served under Amelko & Smirnov in Pac. |
Deputy CinC | Amelko | Amelko | 1969 | CoS 1958-62; CinC 1962-69; Cruise to Indian Ocean 1968 |
|
Deputy Chief Main Navy Staff | Aleksey ev | Sornev | (1970s) 1958-70; Cruise to Indian Ocean | Served under Adm. Amelko as RAdm. in Pac. | |
CinC Northern Fleet | Lobov | Yegorov | 1973 | None known | Former Deputy CinC Navy |
CinC Pacific Fleet | Smirnov | Maslov | 1974 | CoS 1972-74; CinC 1974- |
|
CinC Baltic Fleet | Mikhaylin | Mikhaylin | 1967 | None known | Approaching retirement |
CinC Black Sea Fleet | Sysoyev | Khovrin | 1973 | 1955-71, including command of group of ships visiting Indian Ocean in 1968 | Served under Adm. Amelko as RAdm. in Pac. |
1From Soviet naval press July 1973 as compared to July 1975 2From Soviet book Krasnoznameny Tiki Okeamkiy Plot, Moscow 1973
leadership of the Soviet Navy raises the suggestion that some new influences are now working which may alter the course of Soviet naval development and strategy.
The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is currently scheduled for February 1976. This congress will confirm and announce the next Five-Year Plan to guide the development of all aspects of the Soviet system, including the navy, for the Period 1976-1980.
These congresses usually confirm and announce changes in the Soviet leadership. Because of the need to arrange for rhe leadership succession, in light of Chairman Brezhnev’s reported ill health ar>d the advanced age of most top Soviet eaders, this congress may report numerous personnel changes on the second echelon of the Soviet hierarchy.
During 1976, Admiral of the Fleet of rhe Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov will celebrate his 20th anniversary as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. Fie ment through which the Soviet fleet has ecome a challenger for the position of e world’s greatest sea power. The °ccasion of the congress, then, is not °n|y due time for Admiral Gorshkov to retlfe, but a seemingly appropriate moment for him to rest on his accom-
Pushments.
"Phus, in 1976, along with the propagation of a new plan for the development and operation of the Soviet eet> it is quite possible that a new Commander-in-chief will be named to ’mplement that plan. Despite a lack of fut five
k Over the past three years, there have een a number of changes among the Personnel occupying senior line officer P°sitions of the Soviet naval high command. These changes have brought to o^e top level of the Soviet Navy a group °fficers who have all served tours as p°P commanders in the Soviet Pacific et and who have had operational xperience in the Indian Ocean.
There is, in this "stacking” of the
Soviet naval high command with a "clique” of Pacific Fleet officers, the appearance of an intra-Navy power play occurring around the succession to Admiral Gorshkov. It looks suspiciously like the work of Admiral N. N. Amelko since he was, for some time, the sole Pacific Fleet officer at a senior staff level of the Soviet Navy and had close connections with all of the newcomers (see remarks column in table).
Perhaps Admiral Amelko has, for the past several years, been gathering support and setting the stage for a Pacific Fleet officer’s elevation to the Navy’s top job. On the other hand, perhaps some time ago a non-Pacific Fleet senior officer was, or was expected, to be designated as
Admiral Gorshkov’s "heir apparent.” In reaction to that selection, then, Admiral Amelko may have taken advantage of his position and his opportunity as a senior staff member to strengthen the Pacific Fleet representation at the Navy’s top level as a balance to a future nonPacific oriented commander-in-chief.
If the successor to Admiral Gorshkov is to be a Pacific Fleet officer the most likely candidate is Fleet Admiral N. I. Smirnov. He is a former Commander- in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who has been serving for the past year as the First Deputy Commander to Admiral Gorshkov.
No other Pacific Fleet officers seem to be contenders for the commander’s position. Admiral Amelko and Admiral Bondarenko have been Smirnov’s direct subordinates for the past year while Admiral Maslov has been Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for only a year. Additionally, to bring in another Pacific Fleet officer would create the situation of an ex-Pacific Fleet officer both as commander and first deputy, or require the rotation of Admiral Smirnov after only a year on the job, neither of which seems appropriate.
If a non-Pacific Fleet officer is selected to be commander-in-chief, the likely candidate is Fleet Admiral G. M. Yegorov, who has no known Pacific Fleet experience. He has been a principal deputy commander on the staff of Admiral Gorshkov until 1973 and, since that time, has been Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet, receiving a promotion to fleet admiral.
No other non-Pacific Fleet officers appear to be as strong candidates. Fleet Admiral Sergeyev, currently Chief of the Main Navy Staff, is of the same vintage as Admiral Gorshkov and probably due for retirement. Admiral Mikhaylin, Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet for the past ten years, and Vice Admiral Khovrin, Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, do not have the previous Moscow high level staff experience which seems appropriate for a commander-in-chief.
In the event that Admiral Smirnov is elevated to commander-in-chief, it is likely that his first deputy would be a non-Pacific Fleet officer. If Admiral Yegorov takes command, finding himself surrounded by a Pacific Fleet- oriented first deputy and staff he may desire to have another officer on his staff with well-rounded fleet experience.
One such officer whose selection would be suitable in either instance and who, thus, must be marked as a "comer” is Vice Admiral Khovrin. This officer has shared the Pacific Fleet command and Indian Ocean operational experiences of the present staff members and, yet, his career has been recently broadened and balanced with experience as Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet and, now, Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet.
Regardless of the identity of the next commander-in-chief, it is clear that now, and for the near future, the Soviet Navy will be guided by a senior staff with strong Pacific Fleet experience. That staff orientation cannot help but have influenced, and continue to influence, Soviet naval development and policy.
It was a Pacific-oriented staff which participated, under Admiral Gorshkov, in the development of the forthcoming Five-Year Plan. Likewise, it is such a staff which will implement that plan under the guidance of Admiral Gorshkov’s successor. Further, such a staff has been created when the current trends in world affairs will naturally draw Soviet attentions eastward. The continuing animosity between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C., the growth of the Chinese fleet, and the Soviet contest with both China and the West for influence among the third world nations of South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral, all demand an increased naval strength and presence in the Pacific/Indian Ocean area.
In such circumstances it can be expected that future Soviet naval policy will put increased emphasis on the development of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and on the expansion of the operations of that fleet in the Indian Ocean. The only real question is the degree of emphasis. This will depend on the personal experience and influence of the next Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.
Under Admiral Smirnov the shift of the Soviet Navy to a Pacific strategy is likely to be dramatic, rapid, and significant. Under Admiral Yegorov the shift should be more subtle and measured, but equally significant for the naval balance of the area.
" 'Finest Ships’ or 'Not Worth a Damn’”
(See J. M. Kennaday, pp. 84-85, July 1975 Proceedings)
Captain Philip Mohun, U. S. Navy (Retired)—l was serving in the Brooklyn (CA-3) as a gunner’s mate (GM) second class when the South Dakota (CA-9) relieved us as flagship of Commander, Division 1, Asiatic Fleet in the late fall of 1919—so add another armored cruiser to the flagship list.
The South Dakota was painted all gray and her complement consisted of newly recruited two-year enlistment boots. A great deal of effort was expended to paint her in the Asiatic Fleet colors- white hull and buff topsides. We contributed working parties to assist in the project while in Shanghai.
We sailed for home and arrived in San Diego with a homeward bound pennant 880-feet long (a foot for every day we were out).
Finally, I can testify that the armored cruisers were damned uncomfortable ships. I was transferred to the Seattle (CA-11) after my tour in the Brooklyn-
"The Naval Shore Establishment and Parkinson’s Laws”
(See D. A. Morton, pp. 44-53, June 1975;
W. C. Pittman and E. H. Levine, pp. 88-89, October 1975 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Dennis H. Krieger, U. S. Navy, Naval Research Laboratory—I certainly enjoyed Commander Morton’s article. He has discussed a serious problem and offered some interesting ideas of the causes.
One area he did not discuss is the growth of consulting firms that are particularly prevalent in the Washington, D.C. area. These firms, also affectionally known as "beltway bandits,” are firmly entrenched throughout the naval establishment in Washington and serve staff functions for various offices. The contracting of these firms has been one method of circumventing the civilian employment ceilings in various commands. For practical purposes these consultants can be considered part of the naval shore establishment. The desirability and effectiveness of this activity would make an interesting study-
The Bermuda Triangle”
(See M. Ebon, pp. 87-88, September 1975
Proceedings)
Captain William B. Hayler, U. S. Navy {Retired), Master Mariner—Mr. Ebon’s feview of Berlitz’ The Bermuda Triangle and Kusche’s The Bermuda Triangle Mystery—Solved should be of interest to ad mariners. This is because many of us who have been fully occupied in our Vari°us seagoing trades are only belatedly beginning to realize that there is a Bermuda Triangle” and that books 0n the subject are appearing with surprising frequency. Another has just Popped up on the horizon: The Bermuda Bangle (Adi-Kent Thomas Jeffrey. ^ew York: Warner Paperback Library, 1975. 189 pp. $1.75 [paper]). And as °ng as there is a market there will be rctore. The view expressed by Captain • H. Aguilar, skipper of the California atitime Academy’s training ship Golden Bear probably sums up the feel- lngs of many of us: "I sailed through * e Bermuda Triangle all during the ar and didn’t know it was there.”
Books the nature of the three mentioned will generate interest among laymen. The professional seaman can expect his share of questions from landlubber friends and students. If he brushes them off he will risk being classified as ignorant, set in his ways, or not in tune with the times. We should be familiar with the literature of the sea of which this is becoming, some of us might think, a disproportionately large part. The questions about the Bermuda Triangle indicate that there is at least some interest in the sea. The mariner can take advantage of this situation to create an interest in sea power, a strong Navy, and a large American flag merchant marine.
Mr. Ebon classifies the two books he reviewed as "light heavyweights.” On that basis the Jeffrey book is a lightweight. The author is evidently unfamiliar with the sea. Nautical terms are frequently misused or misapplied and the descriptions suffer. If a vessel disappears without a trace the author is puzzled that "there wasn’t a remnant of life preserver or piece of clothing.” If a dinghy was found, torn loose from its mountings, this tells the author "nothing about what happened to the crew.” No responsible seaman can say offhand why a ship "goes missing” in the Bermuda Triangle or elsewhere on the vast oceans of the world. But the answer is not in the occult, in the time dimension, or because of UFOs. The Flemish fisherman’s prayer has this to say: "Oh God, Thy sea is so great and my boat is so small.”
"When the Good Shepherds Were Blind”
(See P. Abbazia, pp. 49-57, September 1975, Proceedings)
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Admiral Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy {Retired)— This is an excellent account of a savage struggle in the North Atlantic in that it tells the story from both the Allied side and the German side. It is of great interest to me as I was assistant chief of staff and operations officer of the outfit in overall command of the convoy escorts west of the Brit- ish/U. S. chop line.
It is true, and not widely realized, that we were in belligerent status from the 13th of September, 1941, three months before Pearl Harbor. However, the escorting was not done by a task force of the Atlantic Fleet.
In January 1941, President Roosevelt directed the formation of a force for the protection of shipping under Rear Admiral Arthur Bristol, and assigned certain ships and planes to his command. Admiral Bristol sent his chief of staff to England to negotiate for bases, and directed me to take charge of training; he remained in Washington to handle financial and related matters.
As "convoy” was a dirty word at that time, the innocuous cover name of "Support Force” was adopted. It became TF 24 later. The Atlantic Fleet furnished the ships and planes, but the operation of the force was under Commander Support Force, independent of the CinC Atlantic.
As Dr. Abbazia points out, our ships’ lack of radar put them at a terrible disadvantage vis-a-vis the wolf pack’s night attacks. Radar was a sore point with us; BuShips said in effect, "just wait, and we will have something better”—not real comforting to our escorts. So, we on the Support Force staff made an under-the-table deal with the RAF for 13 of the primitive sets that it had stalled in its Coastal Command planes—sketchy by modern standards, but they did help our escorts some ad interim.
With the handicaps under which our escorts labored, what could be done? Actually, only deny the wolf pack opportunities for attack. But how? The only answer was to deny the submarines freedom to trail for information, and positions from which they could successfully launch torpedoes. So we devised a system of escort tactics to accomplish these two objectives. Theoretically, occupying the torpedolaunching points was obvious and only required the necessary number of escorts. Occupying the trailing area was something else, for it called for escorts leaving the vicinity of the convoy and going off several miles from the precious ships of the convoy; that concept was hard to sell in practice.
Old-timers, many of them World War I veterans, were wedded to the concept of sticking close to the convoy ships; and some were sadly outwitted by aggressive wolf pack sub commanders.
Commander A. C. Murdaugh was the first to put the deny-the-trailing-area concept into practice—a bold and rugged job in a desperate and tense situation. Although the new tactic did not produce submarine kills, it served well to keep ships transporting vital cargoes afloat.
Rear Admiral A. C. Murdaugh, U. S. Navy {Retired), former Commanding Officer of the USS Edison (DD-439) and head of the U. S. escort group assigned to Allied Convoy ON-67—Dr. Abbazia has reconstructed a lively narrative which particularly fascinates me because, until now, I never knew the identities of the opposing skippers, nor the details of their movements. From our side, the events as he tells them are subtantially as I remember them.
We had correctly estimated that there were six submarines and that at least one of them was a real "ace.” The morning after Krech’s masterly attack under cover of a thunderstorm, the British convoy commodore, more experienced than I, sent me a signal: "That chap must be one of their top ones. I do hope you have done him in.” Unfortunately, we had not.
For the benefit of modern electronic- minded sailors, it may be helpful to describe the "state-of-the-art” at that time. The Edison (DD-439) had no radar. The Nicholson (DD-442) had only gunnery radar, not designed for target acquisition, but far better than none. The two four stackers, as I recall, had fixed- antenna contraptions, donated by the RAF, which covered an arc of about 20 dead ahead. They, too, were much better than none. Sonar was a source of constant frustration. Neither skippers nor sonarmen could understand why sonarmen who regularly had picked up contacts at thousands of yards at Key West counted themselves lucky to do so at 600 yards. Nobody had yet told us about layers, thermal gradients, and other bathymetric phenomena. I do not recall about the others, but the Edison had no side throwers, and was limited to dropping depth charges over the stern.
We were well aware of our blindness, and made every effort to train lookouts and to perfect our night vision. Just before this trip, some scientist in the bureau got out a letter saying that Africans had superior night vision. We at once put all our colored (as they were then called) mess attendants on night lookout watch. It was particularly dis-
agreeable duty for farm lads fresh from the South, but they did not complain.
actual conversation when we were regaining contact with the convoy on one of the nights in question went as
follows:
, can you make out the Convoy yet?”
'Deed, Cap’n, I don’t know nothin’ bout no Convoy, but I sees a little steeple goin’ along over there.”
We went "over there” and sure enough, there were the masts of the convoy. buPers was right again.
On the bright side, although it was a P'ckup unit which had never operated together before, there were absolutely n° command problems nor misunderstandings. My everlasting gratitude S°es to life-long friend and classmate Neb” Keating, to "Bob” Braddy, and t0 Clarence Broussard, and to the skippers of the Algoma and the Toward, whom I never met.
Being such a small escort group, we never got in each other’s way. Later in tbe war, when escort groups numbered ab°ut 14, we used to practice set proce- Ures for surprise night attacks, but by fhen we never needed them, for we all a<f surface search SG radars, and there Was no chance for a surfaced submarine t0 get in.
The dilemma posed by fiction writers, whether or not to stop and pick up survivors, never arose. We were deter- j^’ned to gather in all we could, and e“> rightly or wrongly, that this attitude was shared from seaman to CinC.
Current instructions required us to Stay within a 50-mile belt, centered on e assigned routing. Otherwise, the rst course change would have been m°re radical. The convoy commodore arN I had agreed to make the second, aPproximately 90°, change after dark, Whether or not permission came t r°ugh. We knew that communi- Catl°ns were slow, and did not think could say no. An additional con- cation in turning northward was to within range of air cover from Ar- §er>tia. We also knew that Admiral Bris- to Would stretch his Lockheed Hudsons 0 the limit to help us.
f f one may draw any lesson applicable it° tbe present from all this, I suppose ls rhe confirmation of the conventional wisdom of the war colleges. Never remain idle in the face of the enemy. Or, in the more popular paraphrase of the General Prudential Rule, when in danger or in doubt, run in circles, scream, and shout.
Fleet Observations,
From the Fleet
Commander J. M. Lang, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Barnstable County (LST-1197)— There has been, of late, a plethora of varying and sometimes conflicting steaming orders descending upon the fleet from on high. These policy pursuits and directives, though frequently beneficial and needed overall, have caused considerable confusion and frustration amongst the rank-and-file on board our ships. Since the underlying essence of this new philosophy is diametrically contradictory in many respects to the recent Zumwalt era, it would be well to list a few examples which are prominent in fleet discussions these days.
Uniform changes have been coming down so rapidly that most fleet folk cannot keep abreast. In our great drive toward egalitarianism, with everyone— seaman to admiral—wearing the same uniform, our sailors have lost their identity, not to mention their once neat and distinctive appearance. This new-style "officer/ePO” uniform for E-6 and below simply does not fit the bill in any respect. Very few, if any, professionals have been heard to comment favorably upon it. Other darts are being thrown at the deletion of khakis and brown shoes, the ambiguous status of tropical whites, what constitutes a practical working uniform, and acceptability of civvies on board and ashore.
Creditably, there has been a pronounced drive to improve personal appearance and grooming standards with reference to beards, haircuts, and elimination of such outlandish costumes as tank tops and mixed uniform and civilian attire. Mini-skirts, T-shirts, and visible hair curlers have been outlawed from base facilities—a move which causes aggravation among some dependents (and their sponsors), but certainly improves the decorum. Emphasis has decidedly shifted from the "anything goes” Zumwalt era back to the traditional professional line.
Perhaps the most baffling and expensive shift of direction is the urgent program to s-trip living area flammables from all our ships. Here the pendulum has swung full cycle from heavy emphasis on habitability, comfort, and pleasant decor to stark naked, ostensibly fireproof living spaces. Obviously a lock-the-door-after-the-horse-escapes effort brought on by the malcontent who set the Forrestal fire, the flammables removal program has recently been given extremely high priority throughout the chain-of-command. Furnishings, furniture, and living amenities—worth millions of dollars and in many cases almost brand new—are being ripped out of our ships in an orgy of visible effort to placate various commanders and InSurv board inspectors. Admirable though this stripping policy might be, some consider it a bit ironic that we sit upon hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel and oils, thousands of pounds of ammunition and explosives, thousands of sheets, blankets, and bedding, clothes, paint, plastics, paper, etc., and then worry about the tv cabinet in the crew’s lounge, the chairs in the CPO mess, and the captain’s desk top.
Casual observations and conversations around the Norfolk area during the past summer’s reserve training season indicate that our Naval Reserve program may be far less effective and reliable than we would want. The reserve program seems to be undergoing a perpetual series of reorganizations and redirections. Many reserve officers are dissatisfied and disillusioned with the program. For example, none of the 17 reserve officers who spent their two-week training duty on board one ship had a viable mobilization billet. They freely admitted that they were assigned, and accepted, any AcDuTra assignment just to "get their points and annual vacation.” Another group of 12 reserve officers, whose mobilization billets were written to augment a service force staff, found their staff had been deleted with the Surface Force reorganization and no longer existed. They spent their two weeks looking around for something to do. Many "weekend warriors” are spotted in the exchanges, clubs, and on golf courses and tennis courts during their duty weekends. When questioned, some laughingly reply they hope the weather stays good so the golf, tennis, and beach parties will be pleasant. Additionally, many of those reservists who are assigned to existent mobilization billets are earmarked for staffs. Few seem to be assigned to operating units. In wartime what we don’t need is larger staffs; what we do need is augmentation for our ships. Perhaps the substantial funds expended to transport reservists to and from their often nebulous training duties, and the pay they draw, could be much better spent on fuel and spares for our operating fleet. At least, the reservists could be trained for needed mobilization billets.
Superimposed upon these trends, officers in command (especially) and others can recognize the certain signs of return to a "normal,” pre-Vietnam, peacetime Navy. Though difficult to describe to someone outside the profession, this return to normalcy has been characterized as an aura of fear and distrust—fear of those high in the chain-of-command and distrust of those below. This "cover your number” game has permeated the fleet and resulted in a rather unwholesome atmosphere. Many commanders and commanding officers are running scared. Directives and inspections—often likened to harassment —come cascading down, with each layer in the chain adding its "me too.” Onetime reports are demanded to excess; suggestions from above are parroted then reinforced into immediate demands. Fail an inspection and you’re fired. (The recent proliferation of inspections is amazing. For example, even after the myriad of pre-deployment inspections and certifications have been successfully negotiated, ComSixthFleet imposes his own comprehensive checkout on ships arriving in the Mediterranean.) Form seems to drive out substance.
There are so many opportunities for an officer in command to get into trouble these days that rumor has it some highly-qualified "hot runners” are refusing command, preferring nice, safe, promotion-guaranteed jobs instead. It may well be, however, that the responsibility-shirkers and complainers do not possess the strength and character required of Navy professionals. Perhaps the new era changes are necessary and that only the best, most dedicated will come to the fore and take their chances.
"Defensive Seamanship”
(See M. R. Byington, pp. 24-32, June 1975;
W. S. Orr, T. J. Vaughan, and C. W. Bond, pp. 87-88, October 1975 Proceedings)
Captain M. R. Byington, Jr., U. S. Navy —Naturally I read with interest the comments concerning my article. I confess some frustration, less at the comments than at my apparent inability to clearly communicate to the readers. I still believe that the defensive seamanship method is understandable, albeit not simple, when read with care by the motivated seaman. The method’s operational application is unquestionably simple.
By Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet.
In this companion volume to his successful works, The Submarine and Sea Power and Aircraft and Sea Power, Admiral Hezlet now deals with the electric and electronic revolution that has so affected naval warfare in the twentieth century.
Admiral Hezlet begins with warships and electricity in the nineteenth century, preparing us for the effects of the invention of the wireless and other developments prior to 1914. Then in three chapters, he gives us World War I, with particular emphasis on the Battle of Jutland. He follows with the developments between the wars, 1919-1939, and then three chapters on the spectacular changes during World War II. A
Electronics
.Sea
Power
last chapter brings his subject up to date, leaving the reader once again in Admiral Hezlet’s debt for his great ability to render technical matters in language that is both clear and pleasurable. Few writers on naval warfare have contributed as much as Admiral Hezlet, in this and the preceding two volumes, to our understanding of the sea power that has played such an important role in the preservation of the United States and Britain.
1975. 318 pages. Illustrated. Index.
List price; $15.00. Member’s price: $12.00.
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A Naval Institute Book Selection
I wonder why Mr. Orr’s letter neglected to address the merits of the method (say, compared to available
Chief Bond’s letter summarily rejected the method because it would not have prevented the Andrea Doria- Stockholm collision of 1956. That case arose from a meeting situation, virtually head-on, wherein neither ship was priv- heged—before or after beginning avoidance maneuvers. As prefaced in my artlde’s initial paragraph (and again
alternatives), rather than attempting to psychoanalyze me. Speculation regarding my opinion of merchant marine officers ar*d airline pilots is hardly germane. The method is equally applicable to merchant and naval vessels in the privileged S'tuation addressed. A collision is a
collision!
covered in Figure 2 and at the bottom of Page 31, left side), the meeting case is clearly outside the defensive seamanship concept’s envelope.
I share Chief Bond’s enthusiasm for che universal use of bridge-to-bridge VHF radio as a clarification aid, and, as early as 1972, often used it to advantage, ^hen timely communications can be established (i.e. no identification or anguage problems), the emergency maneuver can be precluded. It is again emphasized that the prescribed "defen- Slve seamanship” emergency maneuver is che last resort. Radio, light, and whistle Slgnals should precede it, but cannot substitute for it.
^r- Vaughan’s pedantic critique re- ^ah a superficial reading of the article.
« discovery that the method does not a ways keep the ships 500 yards apart Was well-recognized and discussed at the er>d of the first paragraph on page 29:
h should be observed that the closest point of approach (CPA) can never exceed collision clearance. It usually be considerably less because of finite ship dimensions and closure subsequent to the potential collision time. A collision clearance of t'vo ship lengths is suggested as aPpropriate for preliminary analysis.”
. ucidentally, the 500 yards employed t^1*s case Is purely illustrative, and in ct ls about 100 yards shy of the ^°minal two ships’ lengths suggested for re iminary analysis by individual commanding officers. In the final analysis, a umewhat greater value of "collision Cai_ance” may well be prudent.
r- Vaughan’s subsequent charge
that the method "in at least one case definitely causes collision” is a serious one. His selected example discloses that he evidently did not read the last paragraph, left side of page 32, where his chosen example of 130° collision angle was specifically addressed. The procedure there recommended results in discontinuing the emergency turn after 100° and the separation after 170 seconds is not zero, as feared, but at least 100 yards and opening based on conservative assumptions.
Having rejected a collision avoidance method he does not seem to understand, Mr. Vaughan’s final paragraph asserts that the collision avoidance problem (crossing) defies solution except by iterative, computer methods. Nevertheless, his last sentence promises a unique new solution method using transparent templates over a maneuvering board. Without additional amplification judgement must be reserved.
In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, I maintain that defensive seamanship "implies approaching the well-defined, prudent limit of collision hazard without flinching, confident that a sound avoidance plan is available if required.”
"Where is the Western Navy? The World Wonders”
(See H. Garde, pp. 18-23, April 1975; J. M. Tourek, pp. 84-85, August 1975 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Richard Fravel, U. S. Navy— Commander Garde is to be congratulated on his prizewinning essay. He has spotlighted a strategic area—the Northeast Atlantic—which is sometimes neglected in U. S. political and military thought. This neglect is not so much total disregard, but a sense that this area is Western preserve.
Commander Garde has rightly hit upon the necessary formula for corrective action. The solution, however, is more easily prescribed than achieved. Where do the ships Commander Garde seeks come from? Unfortunately, he does not provide us with a clear or satisfactory answer. The call for a strong Western navy, while laudable, is somewhat vague. Rhetoric should be followed by concrete proposals.
The dilemma outlined in Commander Garde’s article is clearly one for American planners to address. It is also illustrative of the fact that solutions to strategic and political/military problems are seldom, if ever, available in black and white choices. Certainly a free North Atlantic is vital to U. S. national interests. As our naval resources become increasingly scarce, however, we are forced to choose our policies in accordance with a set of national priorities. These priorities must be established from the political perceptions of current issues relative to our national interests.
For example, some people would hold that recent events in Portugal and Italy support the need for an increased U. S. naval presence in the Mediterranean and its approaches. This position is also advocated by those individuals who believe the U. S. should be prepared for possible military operations in the Mediterranean if future developments in a country such as Spain or Yugoslavia become adverse to our national interests. The usually volatile, and always delicate, situation in the eastern Mediterranean argues its own case for a strong U. S. naval presence. At the same time, a large-scale force reduction in the Pacific could serve as the signal for other powers to increase their activities in the area. In all these cases, however, the nagging question persists, "Where will the ships come from?”
Burden sharing among our allies is often suggested as the cure-all. The concept is good, perhaps, but a review of past and present efforts in this area somehow restrains one from giving way to enthusiastic optimism for its prospects. The dismal thought is that Western naval presence all too often means U. S. naval presence.
If the goal is something more than talk, then the Atlantic Alliance members (European and North American) must develop the national self-discipline necessary to coldly determine and provide the contributions required to ensure the continued success of NATO. The Western democracies, the United States included, must remind themselves that moral and material preparedness, along with eternal vigilance, is still the price of liberty. Detente notwithstanding, our bully must be as strong as the other side’s if our eyes are not to be blacked.