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DX Competition”
?VPr Devanney. pp- 18-29, August 1975; pr. . ato> PP- 71-72, December 1975 rroc"dmgs)
e Make Our Ships Ugly y Design”
[See p c ;
g ^ lms’ PP* 113-118, November 1974; B. ^ 'diweiker, pp. 83-84, February 1975; owns, p. 87, April 1975 Proceedings)
Koy £
read
(A'
Schuieiker, structural engineer-
with
interest the ship design issue
arti(fUSt °f c^e Proceedings. The Was ^ found most interesting
J ^ DX Competition” by Dr.
light f^evanney. While the most en- tyithei}ln8 portion of the article dealt Petit' 6 managerial aspects of the com- raisg 0’ f^c PurPose of this letter is to 4rrb;.tW° Points relating to the naval P^ture involved.
^PrUan' Devanney indicates that the desjg. Ce fDD-963) was a weight-limited Proceed- in the November 1974
as anni£s Philip Sims used the Spruance struct eXamPie °f the boxy super- desi Ure required by a volume-limited ^as the final design of the SorrieCe rea]ly volume-limited? Is there rpentsreason why so many compart- deck? rT1USt i°cated above the main
perhaps a 10% decrease in the size of the steam plant. This same 10% decrease in power might mean that only two gas turbines would be required, rather than the three or four projected, for a machinery saving of 33% to 50%. A considerable increase in hull steel could be justified to obtain such a decrease. It has been my experience that optimization programs using continuous variables work poorly when one of the variables is actually discrete, and that good results can be obtained only by fixing such a variable in each possible state and then optimizing the remaining ones for each different state.
M
the p- sec°nd point has to do with Vhiiett0n Parametric design program, that th ltton was "becoming aware” Wheree sitips would be weight-limited,
S,
<Aas the author of this program?
Weight^ S^ou*d have seen that a have lrruted ship would necessarily the prQCess v°lume, and either altered tions _^rarn or recommended modifica-
Al;
So
to
I
the
input to correct for this.
ClevariCornpletely disagree with Dr.
PotverS assertion that the steam
take , j 3nt Was the only one that could adva
Cettain'jVantaSe of greater length. A ^ength increase might result in a Crease in power required, and
Dr. J. W. Devanney III, Associate Professor of Marine Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology—From Mr. Plato’s polemic in defense of Design Work Study (DWS) in response to a footnote it would appear that I have touched a very sore spot. I will limit myself to two comments. One, while cost-effectiveness may be the goal implicit in DWS, the quantitative objective function and systematic comparison of alternatives against this objective function which represent the core of true systems analysis are nowhere to be found in the DWS vernacular. The statement in my footnote stands. Secondly, one did not need computerized timelines and all the other paraphernalia of dws to know that destroyers were overmanned. One needed only common sense and a look at aircraft, submarines, or even shoreside installations performing similar functions to see that.
With respect to Mr. Schweiker’s very cogent comments, I don’t know why we put destroyer officers’ quarters, CIC, etc., topside. Look at an aircraft carrier. It is true that while our initial iterations indicated that we had plenty of excess volume in the hull, as soon as the word got around the volume began to fill up. All the subsystems suddenly needed
more cubic feet than initially estimated, and the superstructure began to grow. It’s another example of the need to continuously fight this sort of Parkinson’s Law. Compare the volume "needed” by submarines and that "needed” by the Spruance to perform essentially the same sonar function.
Mr. Schweiker is absolutely correct in saying that the parametric design program should have been modified immediately when the fact that the ship was not volume-limited became clear. I have no defense. However, contributory factors were lack of time and the unwieldy size of the design team.
With respect to size versus power for our gas turbine parametric design runs, s.h.p. was fixed at each of the discrete levels available and not continuous. We tried hard to get the power requirement down to two gas turbines. However, the speed/length ratio of the Spruance is low by destroyer standards. Hence the tradeoff between lower Froude Number and additional wetted surface with increase in length was a weak one, especially since fuel weight depended on the still lower Froude Number cruise speed. Our power/length relationship bottomed out before we got down to two gas turbines. I personally believe that if we had time to work the problem up from scratch, correct for our overly conservative errors in the worm curve and added drag, there’s a good chance we might have made two. As it was we couldn’t quite do it. We were forced to three, and eventually, because of uncer-
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
Ship-
author’s lack of first-hand informa We found out which training P*Pe we would be entering at ex;
tion-
line
the
fact.
ment at least has some basis m
it does not begin to tell the whole
tainties relating to the combining gear, to four. The fact that the gas turbines only came in two sizes, combined with some of our other problems, effectively prevented us from taking advantage of the lower power associated with a longer ship.
I’m surprised and a little disappointed that there have been no comments on my article’s basic theme, which is honesty in military systems analysis.
"The Female Naval Aviator:
A Free Ride?”
(See R. P. Shipman, p. 84, September 1975;
J. S. Harmon and J. E. Burgess, pp. 75-76, December 1975 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Joellen M. Drag, U. S. Navy, Helicopter Support Squadron Three— The innuendos and half-truths contained in Lieutenant Shipman’s article amazed and apalled me, and, as one of the first women naval aviators, I feel obligated to attempt to set the record straight.
Lieutenant Shipman’s first shot concerned carrier qualifications, in which female pilots have been repeatedly forbidden to participate. He claims that the carrier quals make or break every naval aviator and that, by excluding women from these quals, the women gain an overwhelming advantage over the men. What is not mentioned is that there are many other naval aviators who do not routinely carrier qualify (CQ) before receiving their wings. Today’s helicopter pilots do not land on carriers in fixed- wing aircraft during flight training. In addition, if there is no carrier deck available, they do not even qualify in a helo until their first tour of duty. With the decommissioning of Training Squadron Five in 1973, most pilots destined for patrol (VP) and transport (VR) commands also do not receive the opportunity to CQ during flight training. In fact, with today’s tight budgets and reduced time spent in training, only a few pilots (primarily attack and fighter) still have the privilege of carrier qualifying during flight training. These men are never in direct competition with women aviators except in the primary T-34 training at Saufley Field where carrier quals are not, and never have been, part of the syllabus. Furthermore, since women are not, at this time, allowed to enter the jet training pipeline (no matter what their grades in primary training), it would seem that they gain absolutely no advantage over any man in flight training because of their prohibition from carrier landings. On the other hand, men have a distinct advantage over women aviators. The impossible limitations placed on women after completion of flight training more than offset any imagined advantage gained from lack of carrier quals.
Another contention contained in the article is that female aviators’ career patterns border on the divinely inspired. This sweeping generalization is based solely on first tour assignments since none of the women is close to a second tour. Apparently, the implications of the restrictions that women aviators must attempt to operate under are not fully understood by some people. The very things that make certain duty stations desirable for men render them somewhat short of heavenly duty for women. In the "helo squadron that never leaves San Diego” my situation is not all that enviable. I get only the barest minimum of flight time, usually on routine postmaintenance flights and low-priority review flights. If these are not cancelled by operational fleet support commitments, which I am prohibited from flying, I still never leave the immediate San Diego area. Until recently, my billet assignments were unavoidably limited to administrative positions. Maintenance and operations billets are few and far between and usually go to the seagoing officers because they go on deployments and "need the experience.” In my fitness reports, however, I am graded with those same officers who, while at sea, gain the essential and valuable career experience, flight time, and operational qualifications that just cannot be obtained when you "never leave San Diego.” As for career patterns, to this date, there simply is no such thing for the female aviator. This squadron could be my first, last, and only "operational” flying billet. The situation is certainly not the fault of my squadron. I get all the consideration possible under the circumstances, but special consideration is not what women pilots need or want. We want to be free of the restrictions imposed on us so that we can participate
and contribute as fully as the men " work with everyday.
Lieutenant Shipman also believes t * the very concept of the female aviator unfair to men from the beginning training. I maintain that it is far unjust to women, and that we su from it to a greater extent than any m aviator has or will. While g01.1^ through flight training I did not n°n any of my male contemporaries hgn to keep up with the women’s sche ^ or complaining of discrimination, the contrary, they felt we were e ^ pushed and pressured unnecessarily. * ^ I was urged several times to "sni'
flight as the men did. Lieutenant ^ man’s statement that women 8 monthly grounding chits as nee ^ absolutely false and considerably bcne1^ the standards of good taste I NV expect from a fellow naval officer-
Another erroneous concept the ah displays is the belief that all the %v0^'er(. aviators knew exactly where the>' . - going and what they would be J ^ prior to their first flight in a T-34- only say that, like many other ments in the article, it indicates
actly
same time as our male contemp°ra^ that time was after primary traininS^| Saufley Field. As for knowing °ur duty stations before we ever fleW’ ^ idea is laughable. Even the detailed ^ not know where they would Put^£|0 Initial intentions were that the j types would be assigned to searc ^ rescue units or become station P1 neither of which has happened, ^ Throughout its length, the implies that women are physica . j, able to perform on an equal basis the men. For proof, Lieutenant S T [0 cites the failure of the women P1 0^ meet the basic physical training e requirements in Pensacola. That t
stoD'-
We were not required to meet thc ^ minimums as the men, but required to try, and some of uS^ j very close. On the other h*11^’^!! definitive standards for women h* ^ established at that time. We vte*c^0}C posed to form the basis on whic standards would be set. Like it
: that tot is
Ig
mofe
suffer
male
yoifiE
lOtitf
hting
eduk
On
being
r,
id" J Ship got
led is no
artic'c
,0mel1 - wek flying
I a n
state' 2 ^ iati°n'
^and discontent among the men and T)1 r^e will continue and tsrnale^ Worsen’ The plight of the to th aviat°rs is minor in comparison line Q(p'tUat*on presently facing female anh r Cers’ fcmale enlisted personnel, Hijit UtUre fcmale graduates of the tv0rt^at^ service academies. Being a r°sesr av*ator is far from the bed of am h leutenant Shipman pictures, but I p>reSe°n°re^ anci proud to be one. Our tioveh 6 1S m°re than a temporary trig ^ t0 ,^e chalked up as "an interest-
shortco^e”ment'” Pr°hiems and
deepe0rnings are symptomatic of much Navy1r1 f.more serious problems in the t^en,
^SaPpear- • ■ ■
Costj . ’ ‘grioring them could prove
Y indeed
Comen are n°t as strong as men when it fly^CS t0 upper body strength. But, bfut« a'rcraft is not a direct function of hav C StrenSth> an<d the women aviators thj6 ^roven their ability to fly as well as ^rnen with whom they trained.
Shju Cn<^ ^ls article, Lieutenant
tati 3n a^most renews my faith in his issu0nfy with a brief hint of the real "'hich 6 must ^ace- The federal law Pr°htt>its the assignment of assi Cn t0 comhat or combat-related anv^flrnents must he eliminated before narroUr*er progress can be made. The inte°'V’ unrealistic, and outdated Navy to j.Pretation of the law and its policy cha1SCOUraSe congressional initiative to tion ~'e * ■ ensure that discrimina wom, possibl
aspiring to be naval aviators includ?Ualify *n a^ asPects the trade, §c>es 0*n^ carrier qualification (CQ). He this j-.J'0 say women are excused from claims Cu^ phase of training, which the;,. semany male victims, because of ^if’tUan *S °i->vi°us that Lieutenant ls unfamiliar with the current
multi-engine training syllabus. Since 1973, CQ has been absent from the training of all prospective multi-engine and helicopter pilots, both male and female, who have not received orders to a "boat” squadron. This regrettable omission was due to the state of the economy and not the sex of the students.
Mr. Shipman states that women students escape the poor grades and occasional failures associated with CQ and, therefore, receive an advantage in squadron assignment. He should extend this advantage to all recently designated P-3, transport, and shore-based helicopter pilots. Coincidently, I received my best grades of the training command for field carrier landing practice at VT-5.
The second discriminatory practice mentioned in Lieutenant Shipman’s article concerns the exclusion of sea duty from the career pattern of women aviators. Mr. Shipman asks, "Where is the arduous sea duty for females?” I would, in turn, ask of him, what career pattern? Because women are excluded from combat duty and from attaining warfare specialties, our prospects for command range from slim to nonexistent. Therefore, following her initial assignment, the woman aviator usually faces a future of uninterrupted staff tours. Such duty may be soft as Lieutenant Shipman suggests, but it is neither challenging, nor the type of work that careers are built upon.
Mr. Shipman continues his argument by discussing physical training (PT) at Pensacola. He states that PT standards "are necessarily stringent.” If such standards are so important, why aren’t aviators required to meet those same standards throughout their careers?
Since all of the women aviators completed the other requirements for their wings, compliance with the PT standards must not have been an essential part of becoming competent pilots. Accordingly, the completion of the PT activities has been removed as a requirement for prospective naval aviators and naval flight officers now undergoing training.
It is true, as Lieutenant Shipman relates, that the female flight students were assigned some of the outstanding instructors at Saufley Field. However, when it was discovered that this practice was discriminatory to male students, the problem was alleviated by switching instructors in the midst of pre-solo instruction. How many male students are compelled to experience such an upheaval to achieve equality?
Mr. Shipman’s reference to frequent groundings to escape the hectic pace of flight training bears little resemblance to my experiences or those of my counterparts. Since I completed my training three months ahead of my male preflight classmates, I was probably flying while they were gritting their teeth and stoically bearing their hectic pace. Never was I grounded for three days for "upper respiratory infections,” lower abdominal pains, or other physical difficulties. Neither did I receive time off for softball games, basketball games, or other such vital excuses as did many of my male classmates.
Lieutenant Shipman’s final argument, that women pilots are not needed because there are more than enough male pilots available, may be valid from a purely numerical standpoint. However, his position is not consistent with the goals stated in the Navy’s Equal Opportunity Program. Using his basic assumption, it could be argued that black, Mexican-American, or other minority pilots are not needed because ample white pilots are available to fill the "fleet seats.” Mr. Shipman certainly would not advocate the exclusion of the latter minorities from flight status. Neither can he fairly deny women that same opportunity.
Although we disagree on all of our reasons, I agree, at least partially, with Lieutenant Shipman’s conclusion. A
• Be-
discriminatory practice does exist, cause of our sex, we women pilots excluded not only from combat duty> but also from peacetime flying w the Judge Advocate General has int^ preted to be of a combatant nature, narrow interpretation limits the °PP^ tunities of the women presently m ^ program and makes our future, and ^ future of any subsequent entrants, vag at best. Only when the current ,rn tations are removed will the g‘° . portrayals fabricated by Navy pubJC1 and recruiters bear any resemblance the present situation.
"The Development of the Ar£ of Naval Warfare”
(See S. G. Gorshkov, pp. 54-63, June 197 Proceedings)
Captain 1V. J. Ruhe, U. S. Navy In order to evaluate the significant this article, one must question svn the views of Admiral Gorshkov are ^ tute generalizations on the j
present sea-based air power (missileS
CAN AMERICA WIN THE NEXT WAR?
by
Drew
Middleton
raised serious questions about our ability to defend ourse adequately.
The Russians could overrun continental Europe
Ives
with'11
thirty days, and we would be almost powerless to stop Our army is dangerously small. Our troops in Germany arc
them-
too
few and deployed in the wrong places. Our tank design an production is inferior to the Russians’. The British navy, w
;l,ich
List Price: $7.95 Member’s Price: $6.35
A Naval Institute Book Selection
sheltered us in two world wars, has deteriorated badly, and 1 Soviet navy has become a major threat. The United StaO^ army, though very competent and with invaluable com
experience gained in Vietnam, would not be able to rein Europe in time
force
by
Assessing both America’s and Russia's military, branch branch and weapon by weapon, Middleton concludes that
could win a limited war against a weak opponent
—such as1
This informed and honest assessment of America s military capabilities, by the military correspondent of the New Yortf rimes, gives a chilling description of our chances of losing if a major war breaks out.
A leading authority on military affairs, Drew Middleton points out that we are very likely to be involved in another war in the 1970’s, since the Russian “leadership expects future- wars and is making a gargantuan effort to prepare for them. America’s failure to defeat the Vietcong and the superior Soviet weapons used by the Arabs in their 1973 war have
force
fe"’
Persian Gulf oil states—if the Russians don’t intervene in and if the American public supports the war. For the next ^ years chances are that we can win a nuclear war, too, thoLlr
we would suffer unthinkable destruction in the process.
But
the main problem that we face is summed up by Middleton one sentence: “America’s ability to unite ... to win a m- war with Russia is questionable.’
1975. 271 pages. Notes. Index.
Add 50C to each order for postage and handling. (Please use boo!( order form in Iloo/(S of Interest to the Professional section)
view^ °n SCa warPare’ or whether his Qf , s are simply a pragmatic expression °w present Soviet naval forces are mo« effectively used.
Sc miral Gorshkov observes that the uj pe ^conventional naval warfare and at '' fhe concepts for waging war
of ? ^ave changed seemingly because me wid
i naval waiuu, LUUU.3
clearly in the admiral’s words.
effect, he L
c 5>ov
saying to the world that
th.
i""- «f is
major sea powers to believe that the present
uttnug
Ucky enaval power position has been a ffucej ^°luti°n of weapon systems ’
'V i
’ a <
b,
pr°babl,
most surprising, however, is
The antiship missile has long been the primary Soviet naval weapon.
The 800-ton ”Nanuchka”-c/ass boats are equipped with surface-to- surface (SSN-9) and surface-to-air (SAN-4) missile systems.
antish
navies t-t l ■
cha brilliantly elucidates these
hjsn^s' ®ut there is the suspicion that titled SCrvat'ons are pragmatically in- "~1;e-> since the Soviets have made Weant*ship missile their primary . pon, this is the way naval war should e Waged.
view ^^ht, Admiral Gorshkov’s asb ' °n SCa warPare could be suspect the * fr P°litically useful for magnifying equ- ect which his present missile- agajPpe^ forces could have at sea, even po\v St C^e carr*er forces of other sea SUrfaers'He says: "A strike against a of 0rce can be delivered by a group WhichpS. arrned with cruise missiles of l fully accomplish the mission
AddCk’nS “ °Ut'”
offen ■ U’onally> the predominantly force V£ t0^e wf‘‘cf' ar>tiship missile thr;.:_?an.piay in naval warfare comes In naval fV*CtS ^ave bude 'be right kind of of fces t° challenge the sea powers V b W°r^' fhus, the Soviet naval be exaUduP °f the past can no longer pra&ma a*ne<^ s°lely on the basis of a siyeIC strategy generated by a defen- t0 Protect the Soviet air p0wn<a ^rom sea-based, enemy tactical
lpr‘Sht he more reassuring to naval
to
Qviet:
f sr utUltaty pressures created
«ts g ronS alliance of Western sea pow- 5 teCot.^flmiral Gorshkov implies that Eulogy1111’011 °f the effects of new tech- ^Uclear °n SCa warfare—the computer, etc.^ar Power, cruise missile, satellite, Mop tfe .^eadlng naval planners to de- ba>eeir sea forces the way the Soviets
at is
'he S0 ■3 6 length of time over which lets, and mainly Admiral Gorshkov, have channeled their naval thinking toward the culminating sea strategy of today—the use of the massive, long- range missile strike to gain an initial advantage in battle, with a follow-on by submarines and aircraft to maintain the advantage gained from this "first salvo” concept.
As early as 1956 (possibly inspired by the preface to Jane’s Fighting Ships 1954-55 which said that the developing use of guided missiles from ships was the most important achievement of the U. S. Navy in the past year), Soviet naval thinking was focusing on the missile as the driving technology for future naval combat. Admiral Valdimirskii, writing in Sovetskii Flot, September 1956, on "Rocket Weapons and the Conduct of Naval Combat Operations” noted that "the characteristic feature of naval battles will be distances close to the full range of rocket weapons. . . . With the aid of the guided rocket missile of the 'Regulus’ type, it is possible to engage the enemy over a still greater distance of up to 400 miles” (greater than carrier operating distances of 200-300 miles). He observes that, "Ships armed with sufficiently long-range rocket batteries are capable in certain conditions of successfully engaging aircraft carriers.” And that the role of the aircraft carrier "in the struggle against other ships, including small ships armed with rocket weapons, will be different from what it has been in the past.”
Admiral Valdimirskii also saw that the U. S. development of long-range, stand-off missiles, "like the Rascal,” launched from land-based aircraft would, against ships at sea, "exercise a substantial influence on naval tactics and the organization of naval forces.” He further recognized the potential of the submarine using rocket weapons, and notes that articles in the American press advocate "that submarines be equipped with ballistic rockets, ... the advantage of these rockets is the lack of adequate reliable devices for combating them.”
It would appear that the role of the nuclear-powered submarine in rocket warfare was recognized some time later— possibly by Admiral Gorshkov as evidenced by his writings in the 1960s.
But the direct and revolutionary approach to sea warfare which the Soviets appear to have taken, and as described by Admiral Gorshkov—a means of concentrating a tremendous amount of weapon power through a widely diverse attack over a very short duration of time to maximize weapon effect— does not, it would appear, grow from pragmatism but from at least 18 years of clear thinking and design.
"When the Good Shepherds Were Blind”
(See P. Abbazia, pp. 49-57, September 1975;
R. B. Carney and A. C. Murdaugh, pp.
73-75, January 1976 Proceedings)
Captain H, B. Joslin, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I well remember Convoy ON-67. I was in the USS Bemadou (DD-153) standing the 8 to 12s as OOD on the starboard wing of the bridge (the wing towards the convoy, keeping station by seaman’s eye as assisted by 7 x 50
The Bernadou (DD-153), pictured above, was one of two four stackers assigned to Allied Convoy ON-67.
obvious that she did not see
coming in the haze. We closed
knots in order to bring our
operated 3-in./50 caliber guns into
as soon as possible. Just as we ^
about to get off our first ranging
the submarine dived (at a range o 1 ^
to four miles as I recollect). Commas ^
C. Broussard, our captain, c°rre^.^e
anticipated the submerged su^rn^a(j£
maneuvers and in due course we
-son*
off**
school at Key West, I was sonar
>vi of
mation to the captain. At the priate moment I also ordered the of the depth charge pattern. On th>s ^ full pattern of nine depth oharg1^
:ory d‘. ,,
^ _____________ Abb<„
Shortly after the depth chargeS
ide
inf°r'
ifO-
fired. At this point my stor)' ' slightly from that of Dr. Ab ^
tU
not
glasses) with the JOOD on the port wing. That he had only a pair of 6 x 30 glasses, and the enlisted lookouts had none attributed to our blindness. The single gun crew on the galley deckhouse stood its watch within a canvas box tent. True condition watches were out of the question without the men being overcome with extreme fatigue.
Fortunately for us, the Germans did not give a higher priority to sinking of escorts, as it appears we would have been easy targets.
One thing the author did not mention was the "Snowflake Doctrine” of British convoys which called for firing of these illumination projectiles or rockets by all merchant ships in the convoy that were adjacent to a ship that was hit. This starshell-type of illumination lit the sea for miles around, and silhouetted all of us for the U-boats.
One aside, the four-stacker Bemadou at this time was a three stacker— number four boiler had been removed and was replaced by a fuel tank to give us longer legs. The remaining stacks had been cut down in decreasing heights (forward to aft). The top of number three stack could almost be reached from deck level.
Captain George Al. Hagerman U. S. Navy {Retired)—'Dr. Abbazia has done an incredibly fine job in researching and recounting the saga of ON-67. I know; I was there as first lieutenant, communications, and sonar officer of the USS Lea (DD-118)—one of the escorts of that convoy.
Dr. Abbazia refers to a desultory patrol of the Lea. Allow me to state unequivocally that nothing was ever desultory on board the third oldest destroyer in the Navy. Our steering cables ran aft exposed along the main deck from bridge to the steering engine. A paint rag or ice could have put us in irons. We had a battery-powered, gunnery phone circuit and even the remnants of a voice-tube communications circuit connecting the gunnery officer to his 3-in./50 caliber gun mounts. When the seas of the North Atlantic kept breaking the bridge windows, we replaced them with plywood. (Watches were stood on the open bridge in the days before the Navy had foul weather gear. We did have Red Cross sweaters and scarves.) One night the box holding the signal book and tactical publications floated over the side on a wave that swept through the pilot house. Occasionally we went 48 hours without being able to relieve the engineering watch because of seas sweeping over the main deck.
Dr. Abbazia correctly states that the Lea had radar. In fact, we were one of two Atlantic Fleet destroyers that received the British ASV radar in 1941. As communications officer, the operation of this radar was my responsibility. We housed it in the only available space—a small sheet metal shack on the well deck by the wooden mast. The ASV radar was an aircraft radar with a fixed antenna. The transmitting antenna faced forward. There was a receiving antenna on each side of this transmitting antenna set at an angle of 35° to the bow. The radar scope had a vertical base line. If the target was dead ahead, pips of equal size showed up on opposite sides of this base line. If one pip was larger than the other a judgment had to be made concerning the relative bearing of the target. For example, if the port pip was twice the size of the starboard pip then the target was about 30° on the port bow. The distance of the pips from the bottom of the base line determined the target range. We were never able to get a range on any ship in excess of 8,000 yards. Minimum range was upwards of 1,000 yards. In addition to being most elementary, the biggest fault of the ASV radar was the coaxial cable to the antenna. The outer shield was copper and the inner conductor ran through a solid compound which seemed to attract moisture. More often than not this radar was inoperative because moisture had gotten into the cable. It then had to be dried out with heat before the scoj^ would show any sign of life.
Dr. Abbazia’s description of the encounter with a surfaced subma is basically accurate. On that occasi ^ we were ordered to search down bearing of a radio signal that th^ Toward had intercepted. When spotted, the submarine was headed a ^ from us throwing up huge geysefs( spray with every wave she hit. 1° ^
the lookouts spotted the spray jt before we could see the submarine ^
25
onar contact. Having been to the so
luiuui ai — j
and manned the British range reC°A on the bridge. My job was to Pr° range, bearing, and other target
iloded, and as we commenced out to reattack, the after lookouts teP £j,£ that a submarine was broaching tj1c starboard quarter. It was late lI? ptR afternoon of a typical North A ^ rough, murky, overcast day with ^ ing winds, lots of spray, and lltC ibility. The after gun was locate ^ the after deck-house; but bef°r^ (g gun crew could understand or commence firing, the submati'e(c disappeared beneath the waves.
°nning the Computer”
deli eh ^uffman—'Captain Mehmel’s
fint 0fFerin.g on t^le methods of & a niche in the world of com-
at‘°nstlniC System op control over oper- 1.n faraway arenas of action, fitncti * 6 t^C systemhas apparently not oPera°ned as had been planned, the 10ns °f military forces in the
sh^6 t0 re&a*n sonar contact and 0rt y thereafter we were ordered back
t0 ON-67.
Th •
Co e entlre experience of the ON-67 stnv°y was very frustrating. Patrolling
ope'0 k °n C°^’ stormy nights from an Coen ridge at five knots greater than in SPeed was accomplished by clos- 0£® Untd y°u could discern the shadow f0[.a ^°nvoy ship and then angling out the r uCe t0 ^ve rninutes. Occasionally jCeS *P upon which you had been an p10^ Statdon would drop back and, in J? toward the convoy, you ^nd yourself in the second or bef co^umn of the convoy. It then You3 ^ hair-raising to extricate tni/u without being run over or en for a surfaced submarine, tvatlna^’ tdere were the sinking ships in ^ er with temperatures less than 40°F.
Water*0 COU^ not ^ast i°ng >n such
Tn, S',°N'67 was fortunate to have the "Ward in
not n cornPany. Other convoys were ^ean0 ^uc^'~ior them night attack be C ,tdat rescue operations could not timen erta^en until daylight. By this •■eveai^jSearc^ hack the convoy track ed httle besides lifeless debris.
Pr0(.t^ )Mchmel, PP- 94-96, October 1975
findi;
Puters *** ** ’-inu or v_wm-
mainS and his tips on how to build and Uloto *ln an emP‘re were most hu- tvho ^ ^nyone, military or civilian, oUrS enc°untered various aspects of the ^0nJPuterized society, can recognize fieri ut0 ^ems and opportunities identi-
One Captain MehmeL of small reference at the beginning
tatherartlcde> however, points up a Sfudy Ser*0us trend which deserves refer to his comments on C°Pim S'the World-Wide Military ipg tQand and Control System. Accord- des;fiaptain Mehmel, the system was a rea]_ t0 §‘ve the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vietnam conflict illustrate the problems encountered when command functions are exercised without being on the scene of action. This was shown in many of the air strikes made during the war which were of doubtful value because the rapidly-changing situation in Vietnam was not apparent in the high-level planning sections in Washington.
While these problems can be overcome, a much more serious problem remains: the loss of individual initiative by those more-junior officers who must make the tactical decisions based on the demands of their immediate theater. Communications have revolutionized warfare, they have so many other things. However, individual action and leadership on the part of up-and-coming officers could be stymied if high commanders do not allow most decisions to be made at the scene of the action.
Perhaps most illustrative of the problem is a statement made by one Jimmy Smith who, as assistant air operations officer, was stationed on board the USS Yorktoum (CV-io) on the staff of then Rear Admiral Arthur W. Radford in World War II. The occasion was an air strike against Tokyo made by Carrier Division Six on 16 February 1945. The pilots were amazed to find opposition much less than expected in an area where so many Japanese planes were stationed.
Smith indicated the reason for the light opposition was that the strike had been made so close to a high level headquarters. As quoted by J. Bryan III in his book Aircraft Carrier, Smith said: "The closer you get to headquarters, the harder it is to get anything done. You have to go through channels, and sweat your way up the chain of command, and when you’ve made six copies of everything, some un-retired admiral sends them back because you dropped a comma. If we’d been attacking an island outpost today, a tough Reserve lieutenant would have seen us coming and thrown all his planes into the air, and there’d have been one hell of a fight.”
I feel that all higher headquarters should take a long look at their own operations to make sure initiative remains with the on-scene commander, who will be allowed to react as the situation demands.
"Sea Control Ship Concept: Down the Drain”
(See E. R. Callahan, p. 91, August 1975; G. Levine, pp. 82-83, September 1975 Proceedings)
"Sea Control Aircraft:
The Case for the Chopper”
(See R. H. Klippert, pp. 46-52, April 1975 Proceedings)
"Naval Aircraft of the Next Decade”
(See S. T. De La Mater, pp. 66-89, May 1974 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue-, J. Lynn and J. R. Powell, pp. 90-92, September 1974; P. H. Sherf and A. J. Kettering, pp. 86-87, October 1974; J. Caldwell, p. 85, April 1975 Proceedings)
"Sea Control Ship and the Navy Mission”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 92-93, March 1974 Proceedings)
Eduardo Italo Pesce, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil—In 1974, the Congress deleted all funds for the sea control ship (SCS) procurement. Although the class seems to be dead, its concept isn’t. The 12 front-line carriers authorized for the 1980s cannot be everywhere at the same time. Currently there are seven LPHs in the fleet, and five LHAs building or fitting out, which totals 12 carrier-type vessels for amphibious operations.
Since the Tarawa-class LHAs have the capabilities of an LPH, LPA, LKA, LPD, LSD, and LCC, I propose that the seven Iwojima-chss lphs be converted to fulfill sea control, projection ashore, and logistic support missions. My proposal requires more than the "minimal modifications” Mr. Polmar envisioned when he suggested that "six ... of the Guam design [Iwo Jima-class LPH] could ... be allocated to the sea control role” when the Tarawa-class LHAs join the amphibious forces.
The lwo Jima-class ships are 592 feet- long, with a full-load displacement of 18,300 tons. They have a large hangar, two deck-edge elevators, strong selfdefense armament (six to eight 3-in./50 caliber guns—some ships have a Sea Sparrow BPDMS launcher in place of one of the twin gun mounts), and advanced
lH*s
For a number of reasons the
. , * . At
sis—fulfill the "sea control” role-^
electronics (SPS-40 and SPS-io search radars, SPN-io navigation radar, and TACAN).
The ships have 23,000 s.h.p. (shaft horsepower) single-screw propulsion. The steam power plant consists of two conventional boilers in a single fireroom, producing a speed of over 20 knots. These boilers could be replaced by pressure-fired boilers developing 40,000 s.h.p. The ships then would have a top speed in the 26-knot range. Fin stabilizers also could be fitted.
The armament would be improved by fitting Sea Sparrow in all the ships. In addition, extensive helicopter and V/STOL facilities would be needed, such as a forward flight deck "square” tapering end, blast shielding for the takeoff lanes, and landing point deck grating to avoid reingestion of hot gases during V/STOL landings. Adequate stores for ammunition, missiles, torpedoes, and spare parts also would be required.
The converted ship class could be designated helicopter support ship (HSS), as a forerunner of the proposed VSTOL support ship (VSS). Such a ship would operate a mixed air group of helicopters and V/STOL aircraft. The helicopter complement would include the RH-53D for minesweeping, or even a new multi-purpose version of the H-53 with an advanced ASW, AAW, and surveillance capability. The CH-53E heavy-lift helicopter would be used for vertical on board deliveries, and several smaller rotary-wing aircraft, such as the SH-3 derivatives, also would operate in large numbers from the HSS. The fixed-wing aircraft would be of the AV-s/AV-16 Harrier series.
The helicopter support ship would perform all the missions envisaged for the sea control ship, plus several alternative missions, including: amphibious assault; protection of ships in a stationary area; underway escort of a convoy or task group; offensive ASW; surveillance; limited AAW; attack on surface ships; limited strike; close support of amphibious operations; minesweeping; LAMPS support; vertical on board delivery center; personal transfer; aircraft ferry; and vertical assault.
The ship would be a formidable asset in "showing the flag” operations. Imagine the impact that a permanent HSS deployment in the Persian Gulf area, for example, would cause. The HSS would fill a gap in areas where air cover for surface units is not available.
Norman Polmar, Editor U. S. sections, Jane’s Fighting Ships—The SCS never would have been able to provide ASW functions for a carrier task force. She would have been too slow at 24 to 26 knots to accompany a carrier task force or high-speed freighters (e.g., modern containerships). For the same reason, Mr. Levine’s proposal to use the new 22-knot amphibious assault ship (LHA) in that role would be of limited value.
More important, the requirement for the large, highly capable LHA in amphibious operations is an overriding consideration. Although attractive in theory, combining the SCS-LHA functions would probably break down in practice. To place Harrier V/STOL light- attack aircraft on board LHAs as well as troops and support helicopters would crowd the ships’ decks and maintenance facilities and tax the feasibility of the proposal. To add ASW helicopters would reduce the number of primary mission (amphibious assault) aircraft that are
carried; to employ the same helicopter for both roles is impractical because o the problems associated with differed configurations, and of continually in^ stalling and removing the complex an somewhat sensitive ASW equipment- Also, would two sets of helicopter crews be embarked? What would the effect e on readiness of the ASW people if 1 c ships operate only in the amphibiouS role for several weeks, or months? P£C haps two or three LAMPS helicopter should be embarked in an LHA to pr0 vide a limited antisubmarine defense- A more capable, dedicated "sea c°n trol ship” (i.e., ASW-plus) is required. n the March 1974 issue of the Proceeding* proposed employing six of the seven ^ Jima-class LPHs as interim sea contf ships when the Tarawa-chss LHAs jo1 the fleet. With one LPH and the v LHAs in the amphibious force there would be one helicopter ship availa for continuous (l-in-3) deployments the Mediterranean and Western PaC1 The six other LPHs would be suitable ^ interim SCS-type carriers, a conceP proven feasible by the recent evaluatio of the USS Guam (LPH-9) in that to ■ I then proposed that "the fun now proposed for eight SCS . . . coul ^ applied to construction of fewer, more capable warships. . . .” This latt^ point appears to have been accepte the context of the V/STOL support s ^ (VSS) now proposed by the Navy. Se'e^ or eight of these carriers have o scheduled in the fiscal year 1977' new construction programs. ^
Although the final design of the ^ is not firm, the ship probably will be ^ the order of 25,000 tons and capab c operating about 30 fixed-wing ^
aircraft and helicopters. These airet’* would be primarily for the ASW misS‘ with limited airborne early warn ^ (AEW), antiair warfare (AAW), and 5 face attack capabilities. The electro^ and speed (estimated at 28 to 30 kn° will permit these ships to escort hig^ speed merchantmen and participace carrier task force operations.
cannot—especially on a part-time least, full-time helicopter/v/STOL
are required for the lower threat and aircraft carriers for the higher t
u
eutenant
Mac-
Michael,
for
small
rivers—were constructed by
*itha
COus
bows (the USS Nespelen pro- for Antarctic expeditions),
^as permanently in Mediterranean
v^cc Tu J
the 1 le AOGs generally served with pa*Phibious forces, but were often <iet , e<a services to single units on Cse Led mission. During the Vietnam- io ar’ Pacific Fleet AOGs serviced A°sUntry airbases.
ipu a c^ass, the AOGs contained many tent design paradoxes. Their rela
Changes in Status of Ships”
^ee J Finkelstein, p. 126, October 1975 Proceedings)
Commander John L.
U. S. Navy, former Command- nS Officer of the USS Chewaucan th —The October issue listed
exC striking, on 1 July 1975, of the ^'UssChewaucan (AOG-50), ex-USS *spelen (AOG-55), and ex-USS Noxubee °G-56)(thus marking the finish of the lnreC °ecac^es °f active service by ^/tfco-class gasoline tankers in the • Navy. Initially conceived and built and W°rld War 11 to carry aviation iesel fuels, over 50 AOGs—named
r> . — —wcic cunsiruc
> ^nc-> Savage, Minnesota.
(An^6 ^fSt S^'P C^e c^ass> ussPatapsco was launched in August 1942, corrimissioned the following sh' Originally configured, these J ^placed approximately 4,500 tons Cre^ °aded (1,800 tons light), carried a f °f 80 officers and men, mounted r ^'*n-/50 caliber slow-fire guns, and en j"* P°Wered by four 750 s.h.p. diesel ele^lneS drivinS two shafts thru a diesel 0veCrtric dr*ye for a top speed of slightly tta ^ knots. They were capable of prJ\ST>0rtfng 17,700 barrels of petroleum Ucts in 11 tanks, and were fitted cargo hold forward for miscellan- pa .ficar8°- After ferrying fuel among vj,. c island bases for various World 1 operations their postwar roles of t ^xPar>ded to include a wider variety verS.s which truly demonstrated their ir.i at *fy. Some units were fitted with Weaker l Ided fuel a*dAH •
by Uantic Fleet AOGs were modified t0e Edition of close-in refueling rigs w r°v’de them with a limited under- SiXt, refueling capability. When the shit, ,^eet was formed, the roster of the S ln<duded the USS Chewaucan; over Aqqterventrig years, until 1975, an servi tively low horsepower gave them the stopping characteristics of a hockey puck on ice, while their twin screws provided the maneuverability necessary to moor alongside an LPH swinging at anchor on a windy day. Fully laden, their low freeboard invited boarding seas; lightly loaded, their high freeboard gave them definite "sailing” abilities. With laden displacements greater than most destroyers, they rated lieutenants in command—usually mustangs in early years, but as the size of the fleet shrunk more often young officers experiencing their first taste of command.
Although now absent from the U. S. Navy, Patapsco-class gasoline tankers survive in many Free World navies (among them Greece, the Republic of China, and Columbia). The last day of the Chewaucan's service in the U. S. Navy was also the first day of her service in the Columbian Navy as the Tumaco (ARC-50). In the words of her former force commander, ComNavSurFLant, it is "heartening to know she will continue to serve.” His words provide an epitaph for the class as well.
"Essex: More than a Ship,
More than a Class”
(See R. F. Cross pictorial, pp. 58-69,
September 1975 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Frank Brophy, U.S. Navy (Retired) —Having served in the Essex (CV-9) from September 1943 to March 1945, the article and pictorial about the Essex-chss carriers brought back many nostalgic memories. To us who served in the Essex, she was the cream of the class, and the luckiest.
Except for slight hull damage sustained during an enemy air attack while making a strike at Rabaul on 11 November 1943, the kamikaze that hit us on 25 November 1944 gave the Essex the only damage she sustained during the war. Had the suicide plane been a little further to port, he would have missed as so many others did; conversely, had it landed in the midst of our planes aft on the flight deck, there would have been another Bunker Hill-Franklin-type holocaust. We were in the middle of launching a strike against Luzon. However, the Essex’ luck held and superb damage control had the flight deck back in operation within 30 minutes, and we continued the launch.
The Essex is gone now, and it is ironic that circumstances prevented the name ship of the class from becoming the memorial at Charleston, S.C. However, for all of us who served in the Eirex-class carriers, the Yorktoum (CV-10) will always represent the one in which we served.
"The Bachelor Junior Officer:
A Minority of One”
(See G. F. Lehman, page 88, April 1975
Proceedings)
Lieutenant P. 0. Hanson, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Lieutenant (j.g.)
Lehman argued that "the married junior officer (JO) has a decided advantage over his single contemporary.” Martin Binkin, author of a Brookings Institute study on the military pay system released in mid-1975, verified that contention when he said "the current military pay system penalizes single servicemen because they receive smaller fringe benefits than married servicemen with wives and children.” But, it has nearly always been a "brown-bagger’s” Navy.
One of the rare exceptions occurred while I was attending the Air Ground Officers (AGO) School at Jacksonville in mid-1953. The last school period each day was reserved for athletics and physical fitness training. Competitive sports such as tennis, golf, etc., were included in the program. Soon after classes began, suggestions for improving the school’s curriculum were invited. One brown- bagger suggested that the married officers might be permitted to spend the athletics period with their wives rather than with the other student officers. The suggestion appeared to be seriously considered by the school staff until one of the bachelor officers asked: "Why not also let the bachelor officers go off base at the start of the athletic period—after all, the married officers have their women already waiting, but the bachelors have to go out and find theirs.” The school staff soon passed down the decision that all student officers would participate in the established program, without the company of wives. Hardly a victory for the bachelors, but at least not one more loss to the brown-baggers.