This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
’T’ain’t farfetched that one day soon a Texas archaeologist, an Oklahoma roustabout, or an Arizona park ranger will look up and see an Unidentified Floating Object which local authorities will quickly identify as one of them newfangled surface effect vehicles that can mosey along on a saddle of air and haul its military or civilian cargo where a twenty-mule team would balk at going.
A
•Z. Xt a time when the U. S. armed forces are becoming smaller and defense budgets more austere, strategic mobility requirements will be growing if this country is to possess an adequate military posture. Such mobility could well suffer as the result of the increasing unsuitability (and possible unavailability) of the Panama Canal and because of the depleted size of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. It is, therefore, of great importance that means be developed to overcome present and potential limitations on our ability to get our forces where they are needed when they are needed.
The strategically inadequate and vulnerable condition of the Panama Canal—largely a consequence of the development of nuclear weapons and increased Central American volatility—has been recognized for the last two decades. As a result, a number of proposals for a supplemental canal in Central America have been advanced and studied. However, these seem to have the same fundamental vulnerabilities as the Panama Canal. The construction of such a supplementary canal does not appear to be a satisfactory solution to the problem. On the other hand, it does appear that a trans-American
route within or near the southwestern United States would reduce the problems significantly. Such a route could be made to work because progress in surface effect technology has opened possibilities which can overcome the route constraints imposed by conventional ships.
Surface effect vehicles (SEV), also known as surface effect ships (SES), air cushion vehicles (ACV), hovercraft, hydroskimmers, and ground effect machines appear to be a most promising development in surface transportation. Riding a cushion of down-drafted air, they move with exceptional speed and ease over land, water, and marginal terrain such as tundra, swamp, and marsh. The basic concepts of today’s SEVs were evolved in the mid-1800s by naval architects who theorized that speeds could be greatly increased by "lubricating” the hull with a layer of air. An operating craft was built by the Austrian Navy in 1916 and achieved speeds of 40 knots. The technology then lay dormant until the 1950s, when Englishman Christopher Cockerell rejuvenated it, leading to the development of the hovercraft and the spread of SEV development programs to most of the advanced industrial nations of the world.
British 70-knot, 177-ton Mountbatten hovercraft have ferried more than eight million passengers and one million autos across the English Channel since August 1968. Under U. S. Navy contract, Bell Aerospace and Aerojet General are currently developing prototypes of amphibious assault landing craft with payloads of 60 tons each. In addition, the 100-ton SES test vessel that each of the companies has built for the U. S. Navy is an initial step toward the eventual development of 4,0005,000-ton transoceanic SESs that will travel at speeds in excess of 80 knots.
This article discusses a concept that embodies the construction of a trans-American route across the southwestern United States for the use of oceangoing, naval and mercantile SEVs and the development of SEVs capable of transiting the route.
The Ships: Overall fleet effectiveness can be significantly improved by the development and procurement of a family of basic, land-capable, multipurpose SEV hulls/platforms to be sized according to the requirements of the broad missions that the particular class is to perform. An important factor in the design of all these ships will be the capability to ascend and descend moderate slopes. Engineers who have studied the matter consider the construction of 2,000-ton payload surface effect ships capable of negotiating 14% slopes to be technologically feasible.1 The following gross characteristics for one such ship were developed in informal discussion:
'A 14% slope is one which rises 14 feet vertically in a horizontal distance of 100 feet.
► 4,000-ton gross weight, approximately 2,000-ton disposable load
^ Length: 300 feet; beam: 150 feet ^ Cushion pressure: 2 psi ^ 200,000 horsepower
^ Fuel consumption: 0.4 pounds per horsepower hour, 40 tons per hour
^ Structure to gross weight ratio: 30%
^ Machinery weight: 10%
^ Auxiliary weight: 10%
^ Disposable load: 50%
Given the development of such a family of SEVs, a suite or "package” of specific mission modules could be constructed for each class of vessel; only one of the modules would be mounted or installed at any given time. The other modules could be stored at home ports or advanced bases for installation as contingencies dictate the need for changes in force composition. Such a force would provide greatly increased flexibility and capability for a given cost as compared to a force of "from-the-keel-up” mission-oriented ships.
Examples of possible SEVs include:
Ship Size Mission Modules
Large Attack carrier (V/STOL aircraft)
Hospital
Antisubmarine warfare carrier
Landing force transport
Amphibious task force command ship
Landing force supply ship
Sea control ship
Shore bombardment ship
Medium Destroyer tender
Submarine tender Force artillery firebase Landing force maintenance ship Antiair warfare missile ship Amphibious task group command ship Landing force transport
Small Antisubmarine warfare ship
Antiair warfare picket ship Direct support artillery battery firebase Minelayer Minesweeper Convoy escort Landing force transport
These are merely examples of what might be done; precise force levels of SEV sizes and mixes of mission modules for each size must be determined by study and analysis.
The Route: A preliminary terrain analysis to determine route feasibility has been completed. Two principal constraints were applied in conducting the analysis. The route must have minimal impact on existing manmade features, and it must not encounter slopes steeper than 14% or 8° in an unimproved state. The analysis was conducted from 1:250,000 scale maps of the southwestern United States. The maps had a contour interval of 200 feet in the mountainous western portion and a contour interval of 50 feet in the eastern, more level portion. The 14% slope criterion was selected because it fell within the arbitrary capability parameters of two of four preliminary conceptual designs for arctic surface effect vehicles currently being considered as sample designs by the U. S. Naval Ship Research Development Center, Carderock, Maryland, and was therefore considered to be achievable. Detailed profiles were constructed for each slope encountered, and the steepest grades were found in the area between Camp Pendleton, California, and the Salton Sea in southeast California. The steepest of these did not exceed 7y2% in the unimproved state. The general trace of the route, originating at Camp Pendleton, California, and proceeding east toward Brownsville, Texas, is shown on the accompanying map.[1]
A gross approximation of land acquisition costs for the route has been made by using the right-of-way acquisition costs for U. S. interstate highways 10 and 8 which pass through comparable parts of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. These costs are as follows:
State | Right of Way Width | Per Mile Cost | Miles of Route | Cost |
California | 335' | $133,787 | 214 | $ 28,630,418 |
Arizona | 363' | 25,503 | 418 | 10,660,254 |
New Mexico | 322' | 55,209 | 220 | 12,145,980 |
Texas | 00 | 85,424 | 1,133 | 96,785,392 |
|
|
| 1,985 | $148,222,044 |
However, this cost may be reduced significantly because great parts of the route cross the Salton Sea and follow the beds of the Gila and Rio Grande Rivers which are not private property.
Predicated upon the general characteristics and capabilities of SEVs, route construction should be relatively inexpensive compared to equal distance costs of jet- capable airfield runways, interstate highways, railroad tracks, and canals. This is due to the fact that the downward pressure of the supporting air cushion should be about 150 pounds per square foot. As a consequence, subgrade requirements will be minimal, and surfacing, where needed, can be limited to durable soil stabilization. The major engineering requirements should develop with relation to earth moving for establishing improved gradients, lateral route grades approaching zero, and for overpass construction where the route will cross highways, railroads, rivers, and canals. Hardstands where the vessels can stop off of the right- of-way will be required. The interval between these must be determined by study and analysis, as will the matter of whether defiles should have one- or two-way traffic.
Military Aspects: The acquisition of the capability described herein would have profound strategic implications. No longer bound by the Panama Canal, the distance from New York to Yokohama would be reduced by 1,790 miles and from New York to Guam by 1,602 miles. If a supplementary overland route across Florida is also built, the distances would be another 385 miles shorter. To put it into more practical terms, ready SEV units of the Pacific Fleet at San Diego could reinforce the Atlantic Fleet at Norfolk in 43 hours, using a speed of 70 knots from San Diego to Brownsville and 100 knots from Brownsville to Norfolk. This would provide a formidable degree of mobility and flexibility, particularly when compared to the time for conventional ships to make the trip via the Panama Canal—if the canal is operative and its use is politically feasible.
Viewing the conterminous 48 states as the center of a global situation, this SEV capability would give the United States all of the advantages which accrue from operating on interior lines with respect to the Atlantic coasts of Europe and Africa, and the Pacific Coast of Asia. If the improbability of simultaneous European and Asian crises is accepted, the central location of Brownsville, Texas, appears to be attractive, from time and distance perspectives, as a basing site for the fleet’s SEV components. In an environment of austere funding and reduced force levels, a minimum number of vessels would be in the most flexible posture when operating from this vicinity. It is close to the Caribbean and Central American countries and is nearly equidistant from conventional fleet units at San Diego and Norfolk. The proximity of Fort Hood to Brownsville would also make it possible to deploy the First and Second Armored Divisions, U. S. Army, or their successor formations, as complete, combat-ready entities, far more rapidly than has been possible before. This mobility capability employed in the amphibious or troopcarrying role should greatly enhance the deterrent Weight of forces in being, both strategically and in the arena of international diplomacy.
Mercantile Aspects: The concurrent development of a fleet of merchant surface effect ships would be a significant step toward reversing the present declining trend of the U. S. merchant fleet. This program could be phased to fully exploit the naval SES research and development program. Hull configurations to exploit containerization or roll-on/roll-off methods could minimize cargo handling costs and time.
The merchant SES-southwestern route combination would open the Mississippi-Missouri-Ohio basin to high-speed, international maritime traffic. Cities such as Sioux City, Omaha, Rock Island, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Louisville, Little Rock, and Memphis would be shipping directly to Yokohama, Osaka, Hong Kong, Vladivostok, Seoul, Melbourne, and Sydney at speeds of 70 to 120 knots, without the delay and additional cost of intermediate transshipment. Port cities on the eastern seaboard of the United States which ship to Asia would realize the same time-distance reductions previously described for naval forces. The total economic implications of this vast change, including the "pipeline” reduction that it will entail can be determined through studies and analysis, which should include assessments to identify second and third order effects. Foreign and domestic mercantile SEVs could be charged an appropriate toll for using the southwestern route, and this revenue would be used to pay for the construction of the route and its subsequent maintenance costs.
Conclusions:
► The development of land-capable naval and mercantile SEVs appears to be technologically feasible.
► The cost-effectiveness of the concept should be determined from a total systems perspective which considers the naval and merchant fleets together as well as the route, because this is the way its realization will impact on the national and global economies.
► The construction of a southwestern, transcontinental route, to be compatible with attainable SEV performance capabilities, appears to be feasible. This is based on the map-terrain evaluation described herein. This route construction project, although massive, does not appear to encounter extremely difficult terrain obstacles. Nor does it appear to be as costly as either the space or interstate highway programs. Further, through the use of toll charges, it should ultimately pay for and maintain itself.
► The attainment of this capability would provide the United States with military and economic benefits which could be of vital consequence in maintaining our national security and economic vitality in the uncertain and difficult years ahead.
3 A graduate of the Platoon Commanders School in 1945, Colonel Dindinger served in China immediately after World War II. He commanded the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines in 1963, was assistant chief of staff (G-2) of the III Marine Amphibious Force in 1965, and served as studies officer in the office of the deputy chief of staff (Research, development and studies) at Headquarters Marine Corps from 1965 to 1968. After serving as the strategic studies officer of the Long Range Study Panel, Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities from 1968 to 1970, he was the director of the Combined Intelligence Center (J-2), Military Assistance Command Vietnam from 1970 to 1971. Upon his return from Vietnam he served as the deputy and subsequently chief of the Plans and Studies Division, Development Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia, until December 1973. He was then assigned to the Secretary of Defense’s special study of the guard and reserve in the total force until August of 1974. Colonel Dindinger’s last billet prior to his May 1975 retirement from active duty was Acting Deputy Director of the Marine Corps Reserve.
[1]The detailed breakdown of the route is as follows: from Camp Pendleton up the valley of the San Luis Rey River to its fork with Pala Creek, up Pala Creek bed to its origin, thence northeast and east around the northwestern and northern slopes of Oak Mountain, and then east through Coahhila Valley to Terwilliger Valley. Southeast through Terwilliger Valley to Coyote Canyon, and down Coyote Canyon to the mouth of Borrego Valley, thence east to the Salton Sea, skirting the southern end of the Santa Rosa mountains. East across the Salton Sea, and then southeast paralleling the route of the Southern Pacific Railroad to the southern end of the Cargo Muchacho Mountains, and then east between these mountains and Yuma, Arizona, to the bed of the Gila River in the vicinity of Growler, Arizona. East up the bed of the G;'a River to its confluence with the San Pedro River, thence south up the San Pedro River bed to its juncture with Tres Alamos Wash. Northeast up Tres Alamos Wash to Allen Flat, and then from there, east through the pass between the Pinaleno and Dos Cabezas Mountains to the vicinity of Bowie, Arizona. From Bowie, east by southeast paralleling the Southern Pacific Railroad to the vicinity of Steins, New Mexico. From Steins east, passing north of Deming, New Mexico, in the bed of the Mimbres River, and continuing east, passing close to Akela, Cambrai and Aden, New Mexico, to the Valley of the Rio Grande in the vicinity of Las Cruces, New Mexico. Down the valley of the Rio Grande, detouring around El Paso, Eagle Pass, and Laredo to the Falcon Reservoir. From Falcon Reservoir east across the flatlands to the Gulf of Mexico in the vicinity of Rincon de San Jose.