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From Volunteer to Mercenary?
Submarines have been modernized and changed and so have the men who man them.
In the early 1950s, when the Nautilus (SSN-571) was first built, the submarine force relinquished selection authority over personnel destined for nuclear submarines to an organization called "Naval Reactors” (NR), then as now headed by Admiral H. G. Rickover. This was done partly because the submariners were outmaneu- vered in Washington by Admiral Rickover, and partly because the submariners harbored guilt complexes from having resisted Rickover’s advanced ideas. From the first nuclear submarine to the present time all submarine officers and men have been subject to the NR selection processes. The Bureau of Naval Personnel routinely writes the orders, provides the schools, and rubber stamps the requirements, but NR has the final say in all nuclear personnel matters. Through the years all key positions in the Bureau of Naval Personnel dealing in any aspect of nuclear submarines have come under the control of NR in that it must approve the nomination of any appointment. This same technique has been employed on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in key positions in the submarine warfare directory and in the plans directorate, along with key billets in the operating staffs of Commanders Submarine Forces, Atlantic and Pacific.
What has the NR selection process given us? Formerly, an officer aspiring to join the sub force was required to be a qualified officer of the deck in a surface ship and highly recommended by a commanding officer based on operational experience and desire. Today, we recruit young men in their senior years at college. Once, an aspiring officer applied for submarines time and time again until he made it, or was convinced he could not. Today, almost all aspirants have a one-shot chance with very few coming from other than the initial college screening. In the past, there was a long list of officers waiting to enter the submarine service; today, the personnel people have quotas to fill in order to admit sufficient students to fully occupy the schools.
What makes submarine duty relatively unattractive to today’s youth? Are submarines more dangerous than before? Is the pay less? Are conditions more uncomfortable? Are promotion prospects less promising?
I contend that submariners have lost their elan—the zest that once made them equally ready for "a fight, a frolic, or a footrace.” This loss of their collective ardor probably causes more of the current personnel problems than any other factor. The camaraderie, laughter, horseplay, and gung-ho spirit have been replaced by quiet, sullen, humorless, and methodical efficiency. The super dedication of our early nuclear submariners has been foisted on the young officers with no outlets for humor and individuality. Second, the Rickover selection criteria demand only the highest levels of academic achievements for its candidate nuclear officers, despite the fact that shipboard operations have never required or needed an officer corps made up of primarily PhD caliber.
Never in history has an operational organization been able to maintain itself by selecting mainly on academic achievement, instead of desire. It is suicidal to attempt to perpetuate an organization with such incongruous leadership standards for the entire organization. Any large organization needs some brilliant, dedicated men; but it also needs a much larger group of leaders who have the desire, basic skills, humor, and toughness to perform well over time.
The submarine force will likely have to accept lower and lower academic attainment in its candidates, while also passing over men with the important ingredient of desire. The services are replete with organizations which have gone this route. The $15,000 "bonus” used to entice officers to stay in submarines graphically portrays how far down the line we have come.
Many suggestions and programs could be advanced to transform the submarine force back into its earlier posture, if it was decided as the best possible way to go. However, 30 years have passed since the "golden years” of submarining, and it is questionable whether that type of organization is best suited for today’s requirements. The nation has a very heavy trust and investment in this force, and everything which affects it has a serious impact on the nation’s security. Infinite care must be exercised to select and promote only those stable and reliable individuals who possess the required skills and attributes both for submarine command and for custody of national deterrence.
The advent of the Trident has left little doubt that we are now dealing with capital ships. Yet, to date, no announced policy has been forthcoming as to what qualifications and requirements are to be sought for the commanding officers and the officers who will man them. Apparently, we are to continue with college recruitment based on academics for our source of supply. No doubt, if a very large group of this caliber could be recruited, we should be able to effectively select submarine leaders. Unfortunately, we do not recruit enough; retention is poor; the method is expensive; and the motives of the remaining group are suspect. For these reasons, plus the obvious reason of selecting for mission vice engineering, we should return the selection controls to the people who are responsible for mission accomplishment and overall performance.