New Era in Navy Recruiting

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It has been said that "Root, hog, or die!” weaning ''Nobody’s gonna’ do it for you, Charlie”—ought to be our national motto. With the advent of the all-volunteer force, the Navy is banking on better recruiters, new ideas, and new programs in order to compete with the other services for the bright young prospects it needs to stay in business.

For 32 years prior to June 1973 (except for one short period in 1947-1948), the United States met her military manpower needs largely through national conscription. The Selective Service Act of September 1940 kept the Army’s ranks filled while providing a dependable bonus of prospects for the other services. An enlistment in the Navy or another service was usually longer than Army induction, but the life-style seemed more palatable to many. Recruiters were often little more than order takers whose main job was keep­ing current on the latest programs and sorting out the best of many prospects.

National conscription in the United States ended, and the all-volunteer force began in June 1973. Al­though a special Presidential commission headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates confirmed the feasibility of an all-volunteer force, the end of the draft came at a bad time. National employment levels were high, and civilian industry was competing fiercely for top-quality youth. The lingering echoes of anti-war sentiment, coupled with the severely damaged military image resulting from our Vietnam involvement, placed the military a poor second in this competition. Yet, by reorganizing their recruiting efforts, streamlining their images, and launching a frontal attack on the youth job market, the military services have been largely successful in meeting their goals. For the Navy, a force of nearly 550,000 with an annual personnel turnover in excess of 20%, this means recruiting slightly more than 100,000 men and women each year. The Navy’s response to the recruiting challenge is an interesting case study in mar­ket research, packaging, and salesmanship.

The Problem-Quantity versus Quality: In recruiting, two basic and interdependent thresholds must be met. First, a quantity of individuals must be recruited annu­ally which will maintain the size of the Navy prescribed by Congress. The number of 17-30-year-old males in the U. S. population, has remained relatively constant at 21.5 million since 1970. No significant changes are predicted through 1980. However, the number of these young men actually available and acceptable to the military is about 4.8 million. Of these, over half go on to higher education, thus reducing the eligible group to about 1.6 million. All armed services compete in this population segment, particularly for the high school graduates and the brightest of the non-high school graduates.

The second threshold is quality. The quality of re­cruits must guarantee an input of sufficient intellectual potential to successfully complete technical training and ensure adequate manning of all Navy specialties. In concrete terms, this means that 65% of the 100,000 recmits entering the Navy each year must be academi-

cally ready to successfully pursue a technical program of studies immediately upon completion of recruit train­ing. The success of the all-volunteer force rests on the ability to meet both these thresholds. While recruiting the required numbers was thought to be possible, it was not at all certain that the quality could be maintained. Studies of the British all-volunteer force since 1961 indicated that significant reductions both in quality and quantity would be inevitable.

Organizing to Solve the Problem: Beginning in April 1971, Navy recruiting efforts were reorganized. A cen­tral Navy Recruiting Command, headed by a flag offi­cer, was established in Washington under the Chief of Naval Personnel. For the first time, a single authority assumed responsibility for all regular and reserve Navy recruiting except for the Naval Academy. A careful selection process was instituted to ensure assignment of top performers to recruiting duty.

While the Navy always took a certain care in enlisted recruiting assignments, mainly because of the independ­ent duty aspects, officers were less stringently screened. Most officers regarded recruiting as not career­enhancing; it was often sought as a twilight assign­ment. It did not have to be demanding, and afforded entry to geographic areas outside the customary naval sphere. Today, "front-runners” with demonstrated ca­reer potential—individuals who reflect the kind of dynamism and vitality the Navy would like young people to associate with its image—are sought out for recruiting assignments.

Command of a recruiting area is equivalent to a sea command for promotion purposes. Special schools were established to teach recruiters sales motivation and marketing techniques with specific application to the section of the country where they were assigned. And, because a sales effort needs some stimulation to get off the ground, money and people were generously added. From 1972 to 1975, financial support for Navy recruit­ing was doubled (from $56 million to $112 million), the advertising budget more than quadrupled (from $7 million to $31 million), personnel devoted full time to recruiting increased one-third (from 4,500 to 6,000), and in fiscal year 1975 alone, the number of recruiting stations increased from 1,330 to 1,440.

Quantity: In the mid-1960s, the average recruiter had to interview 50-100 prospects before he found one willing to enlist. Today, about 300 interviews are re­quired for each enlistment. Sources of contacts range from private individuals to organization membership lists. The most productive leads usually come from high school counselors or teachers, mail-back cards in national magazines, technical and vocational school class lists, and vocational ability tests given in cooper­ating high schools by recruiters. Some programs ex­pressly designed to generate names of prospective en­listees include:

► The National Recruiting Information Center: A 24-hour information service with which anyone can communi­cate by dialing a toll-free number. Contacts are passed to the local recruiter for follow-up. The center averages 111 calls each day, and 80% of the callers are recruited.

►  The Recruiting Assistance Program: Fleet sailors and recruit training graduates volunteer to return to their hometowns for a ten-day period of recruit assistance. Contact with classmates and acquaintances generates prospects.

►  Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery: It is a ver­bal, mathematical, mechanical, and electrical skills test administered by recruiting personnel to senior high school students. A civilian educational specialist in each recruiting district obtains permission from local school authorities for the military to administer the test. The test is machine scored, and an interpretive breakdown on each student is returned to the school guidance counselor in a format which he can use to counsel the student. It assists the student by providing an indica­tion of his vocational strengths and weaknesses; it helps the counselor provide more informed guidance to the student; and it gives the Navy a name, an address, and initial qualitative evaluation of a future prospect.

Because further education is the single strongest incentive for a young high school graduate to come into the military service, these programs and others try to increase awareness of the Navy’s educational opportu­nities among civilians who come in contact with young people most. High school and college guidance coun­selors enhance their usefulness by their ability to sug­gest a wider variety of options to their students. The Navy becomes a viable alternative in their eyes when they learn of the educational opportunities offered.

Quality: Once a prospective candidate expresses a serious interest in enlisting, the next step is a review of three background factors (school grade completion, suspensions/expulsions, and drug record), a written intelligence examination, and a physical examination. When the results of these three quality filters are factored, they provide the recruiter with a reasonably accurate percent prediction of the candidate’s chance for success in the Navy. Cutoffs on this prediction scale are established by the Navy Recruiting Command (with some waivers possible by the local recruiting office) to control the quality of recruits entering the service. Once a candidate has met the cutoff point, consideration is given to the program (s) for which he is eligible and the

service obligation he is willing to accept.

During the screening process, the recruiter is ex­pected to keep in mind the totality of the individual’s qualifications, that is to look at the "whole person.” A strength in one area might offset a weakness in another. If the recruiter believes the candidate has the potential to make a good sailor and if he can honestly say he would be willing to serve with the individual, he is permitted some flexibility in enlisting him. Subjective judgment becomes the final screening tool. However, it is not in the recruiter’s best interest to enlist just to meet his monthly quota. On the one hand, the re­cruiter and the recruit are tied together administratively. A pattern of failures in recruit training reflects adversely on the recruiter. On the other hand, failure in re­cruit training can be predicted with some measure of success. Warning signs uncovered in the screening process are best heeded rather than ignored. Time is saved which can be productively applied to bringing in recruits who are unquestionably qualified.

A 1973 study of 70,000 recruits by Commander John Neese of the Navy Recruiting Command’s research division came to several interesting conclusions about success and failure in recruit training. It has provided some valuable insights into where the Navy should look for recruits. Apparently, the percentage of attrition in recruit training increases with the age of the recruit and affects the non-high school graduate more severely than the graduate. The 17-year-old appears to be the best risk relative to other age groups at a given educa­tional level. (A more recent study by the Center for Naval Analyses indicates that 18 and 19-year-olds are slightly better risks than 17-year-olds for completion of the one year’s service. Individuals 20 or more years old remain the poorest risks.)

Interestingly, medical attrition in recruit training seems to be a function of the same factors as non-medi­cal attrition. In both cases the upper mental groups are better risks than lower mental groups. The lower the mental group or education level, the less healthy the recruit is apt to be. Other factors brought out in the Neese Study underline areas about which we know little and therefore must be careful not to design recruiting strategy to depend on them too heavily:

JACK MOORE

Thought is being given to creating a specific rating of "recruiter” for those enlisted personnel who seem to he particularly suited to a sales-oriented vocation. Such a professional corps of salesmen would understand the whole Navy and not, as now, only those fields in which they themselves had served.

► Medical rejection rates vary from 38 to 53% geograph­ically. Medical rejection reasons vary geographically as well, although the five most common reasons for medi­cal disqualification are:

►  Recruit training centers (Great Lakes, San Diego, Orlando) differ significantly in both policy and plant; consequently, attrition rates vary.

► U. S. civilian school systems vary widely.

► At least six different test forms are used to measure recruit intelligence. Their commonality is not well understood.

► Cultural shock is apparently a factor in recruit success and failure patterns.

► Political and economic conditions affect recruit motivation and thus success and failure patterns.

Future All-Volunteer Force Strategy: The Recruitment Group, a task force of the blue-ribbon Defense Man­power Commission looking at all aspects of recruiting, asked a number of questions relating to future recruit­ing policies of all services:

"Should there be non-fluctuating recruiting accession standards ... in terms of mental group distribution, proportion of non-high school graduates, proportion of females, minority accessions and geographic representa­tion?” The danger of fixed accession standards and policies for all services, i.e., rigid quality standards, is that in failing to provide for changes in the economy, availability of prospects, mood of the country, varying service needs, etc., the military must accept fluctuating quantities of recruits. The result would very likely be permanently lower manning levels. To maintain the levels desired, the services must be free to adjust quality standards within acceptable limits, balancing low with high quality as conditions warrant.

The Recruitment Group continued: "Conversely, should recruiting accession standards ... be adjusted up or down in order to recruit 'best possible’ quality?” Experience indicates that flexibility in quality standards is necessary to ensure an annual personnel input in the desired numbers and in the best quality mix. Recruiting only the highest quality or accepting large numbers of marginally qualified candidates is equally undesirable. Standards must be aimed at achieving a quality balance.

A higher caliber is needed to fill the most intellectually demanding specialities like nuclear or electronic engi­neering. Bright, but not necessarily scientifically orien­ted individuals are needed for other technical areas as well as administrative and support ratings. The recruit of average intelligence is needed for the more physically oriented, less intellectually demanding ratings.

In considering future improvements in the recruiting process, it might also be asked if a united recruiting effort is feasible. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each runs its own elaborate recruiting organization costing millions of dollars a year. Separate personnel and facili­ties, often side by side in the same town, compete for the same potential recruits. Why not a single recruiting office where an individual could be interviewed, tested, and counseled? His aptitude and preferences could be weighed to place him in the service and program where it appeared he would achieve the greatest success. Obvi­ously, there would be problems to be solved. Which service would do the recruiting in which areas? Should a civilian agency like the Civil Service Commission do the recruiting? How do you prevent a recruiter from favoring one service over another? Nevertheless, re­cruiting costs and personnel might be significantly reduced by such a plan. Training facilities for the recruiters might be consolidated. A broader range of options offerable by a single recruiting office might save the interested young man or woman who now tries only one service, finds he doesn’t qualify, and doesn’t explore the others. The potential savings in money and manpower make the idea worth exploring seriously-

Could manning levels be reduced and better person­nel utilization be realized if non-combat specialties common to all services were recruited into a central support pool without particular ties to any one service? Draftsmen, constructionmen, photographers, dental and medical technicians, for example, might be handled like civilian technical representatives are now and moved to locations where needs exist rather than kept on station as needs fluctuate. This might permit the services’ total requirement to be reduced because they would have access to a central pool of specialists who might be more responsive on a shorter term basis than is possible now.

Would the recruiting effort be improved significantly if the field of recruiting were made into a professional specialty, much like public affairs, for officers and a specific rating for enlisted personnel? In that way indi­viduals particularly suited to a sales-oriented vocation could spend a career perfecting their skills and become truly knowledgeable and effective. Time would not be wasted while the new recruiter "got up to speed” and began pulling his share of the load (generally consid­ered to be about six months). Perhaps the time has come for the Navy to admit that the "Jack of all trades” general line officer is not great at everything and might better spend his time at sea, thinking about tactics, or keeping up to date with the innovations being introduced into the fleet daily. Why not turn the recruiting effort over to a professional corps of salesmen whose career is spent in all phases of recruiting, who understand the whole Navy (not just their specialty with a quick brush-up on all the rest), and whose ties with the civilian community can be intelligently devel­oped over 20 years rather than haphazardly acquired during a three-year, once-in-a-career assignment?

More fundamental are the long-term issues relating to a nation’s ability to maintain an all-volunteer force and its effect on both the nation and the character of the military as we know it. Most opposition to the all-volunteer force in the United States has centered on questions of its size, cost, and relationship to society. While it is too early to assess the real effects of a volun­tary military force in this country, some of the trends mentioned above do point in discernible directions.

It appears that enough volunteers can be found to fill authorized manning levels. Ease of recruiting seems directly related to the state of the civilian economy, but it also seems to be strongly influenced by other factors, many of which, like advertising and the selection of Navy recruiters, are controllable. Advertising and mar­ket research are indispensable in locating and getting the Navy’s message across to selected population seg­ments. But the kind of person selected for recruiting duty, the thoroughness of his preparation, and the extent to which he can present the Navy as a challeng­ing and desirable occupation ultimately confirm or deny all the slogans.

Although it may be easier to find prospects in times of a weakened economy, there is no guarantee those prospects will be qualified educationally or physically for military service. Whereas the Army is primarily people-oriented, the Navy and Air Force are becoming more and more equipment-oriented. The missile sys­tems, sonars, radars, automatic engineering controls, tactical computer systems, secure communications sys­tems, and electronic warfare equipment are only a small sampling of the complex tools which are standard in the fleet today. The sailor has to learn how to run them, maintain them, and fix them when they break. The Navy cannot function without the bright young high school and college graduates who are also being ardently sought after by business and industry. For a number of years, the enlisted nuclear power and ad­vanced technical programs remained unfilled. Increased recruiter efforts in these six-year obligated service pro­grams have paid off. Quotas are now being met. More critical is the lack of sufficient recruits who are eligible for the basic Navy A schools where the masses of "bread and butter” technicians are trained. The four- year obligated service A-school program is the single most important source of future petty officer leadership for the Navy. Accessions over recent years in this pro­gram have averaged nearly 25% below goals and ac­count largely for the critical manning levels in the fleet. In the last two fiscal years, however, A-school recruiting has improved also. Through 30 November 1975, the Navy Recruiting Command was running at a 95.7% success rate in achieving its goal.

Can the all-volunteer force compete financially with the civilian job market? Can the United States afford such a force? Ideally, the primary appeal of a military career—as with any profession—should not be financial reward. However, realistically, if the salary disparity between the military and a comparable civilian job is too great, there will be few idealists who can afford to pay this implied tax for the privilege of serving their country, particularly at a time when the utility of force is being questioned so widely. Recognizing this, the

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The Navy must try to understand what motivates the young enlisted man or woman and treat them like the valuable resource they are. This does not require the abolition of traditional marks of respect for authority as has been done in some countries. It does require a sincere respect for the individual, demonstrated through enlightened policies and programs.

These pay scales give you an idea why enlisting in the Navy is worth considering. Add medical and dental care, convenient shopping at commissary and exchange stores and 30 days paid vacation available each year and your Navy pay is even more impressive.

NAVY PAY SCALES FOR ENLISTED MEN AND WOMEN*

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These basic monthl* pay scales do not include allowance tor living quarters listed on everse side), sub Sistence allowance or other special pay. More pay data and ^tiremeM facts are available ™n vow local 5“*y recruiter or by calling the Navy’s toll-free number. 800-841-8000. (In Georgia, call 800-342-5855. in ^Ha»aii, dial 533-18711 in Alaska, call collect 272-9133; in Puerto Rico, call ^^{011 ect} _|⁷²,‘’ectne 1 October 1875

BASIC ENLISTED ALLOWANCE FOR LIVING QUARTERS

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