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specialty In '
source Management (HRM) sub-
lish:
tion:
eply, the initial efforts to estab- ng a viable and credible race rela-
many minority officers were
r‘Pped
^Parate but Equal opportunity”
Saun^0^0^^ as^e<^ me> but . . . , A. Van ’ P- 92, August 1975 Proceedings)
"“tenant Commander R. C. Curley, U. S. °f Ar ^*ar Retention Analyst, Bureau aval Personnel—Lieutenant Commander v
poli Van ^aun denounces a naval ODt'^ he interprets as limiting
ty^10^18 °pen to officers based upon and Cr are’ or are not> minorities, be<iUestions why minority officers must He ^mP>oyed in eo/rr assignments, limit ft”er states such a policy severely offiS r^e opportunities of minority W^i] t0 eompete in warfare specialties ttiin • lrn'ting the opportunity of non- mar,0^ officers to compete in the Hu
^-CSOll rre /T TT5 ity ’ Pr°gram used a number of minor- thejrcers in the program to ensure that tertlv'ewpoints, and those of their con-
Tr, j °raries, were heard and understood. ,,° do this qua,.. . 0ut” of their warfare specialty O-g tours. As the Officer Personnel reC()'elter article states, this has been AcjJ’ni'!e<l as an undesirable policy. those10"3115'1 C^e art'c^e states that all iu e oncers who have performed well oppo/** billets are being given the sp^ity to return to their warfare
'J’h - *
an p 6 ^act that an officer has served in ruj^. /RR billet goes a long way toward ng the officer a credible asset of the
HRM community. Those who are not interested in becoming HRM subspecialists are not being forced into successive tours as Lieutenant Commander Van Saun implies; however, those who desire to continue in this field may do so as competitive members of the community.
No minority officers are being pushed into the HRM field. The community is open to all members of the naval officer establishment, and conversely all subspecialty communities are open to minority as well as non-minority officers.
While the concern expressed by Lieutenant Commander Van Saun is appreciated, his perceptions of the HRM program are inaccurate. The article printed in the newsletter was intended as a means of saying we realize the ramifications of the previous policy and are correcting them, while at the same time attempting to rectify any adverse implications that policy may have had on an officer’s career.
"The Loss of Leadership”
(See F. C. Collins, Jr., pp. 31-35, April 1975
Proceedings)
R. C. Austin—Captain Collins’ article is another installment in a continuing U. S. Naval Institute series that is reminiscent of the movie serials at the Saturday matinee. The inevitable "black hats” are established early in the article as "many of the nation’s young and not- so-young” and as "top leaders ... attempting to buy youth off with beards and beer in the barracks.” Since the top leader who promulgated a large number of vital and needed reforms has departed, we know from the start that the article will focus on the lower ranks.
One might quibble that authorizing beards was buying off youth. Admiral William S. Sims looked quite distinguished with his beard. Whether beer in the barracks was better or worse than inebriated men returning to barracks from base clubs or local liberty spots is a matter of conjecture. One suspects that one problem of beer in the barracks may have been one of lack of will to enforce appropriate regulations regarding its use.
"Greater responsibility” is again used to cloak the military calling as having an attribute superior to that of its civilian counterparts. With one-year command tours, one wonders how responsibility is determined in other than fires, collisions, and groundings, where responsibility is almost inescapable. Obviously, in these cases, we determine responsibility through boards of
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
tht
retirements. It was made known to
Secretary of Defense’s urging, the m1
ili'
investigation and courts of inquiry. However, who, in a series of one-year command tours is actually responsible for a unit whose training, morale, material condition, or performance is below normal? Were the initial, superficial investigations of My Lai conducted by officers assigned to one-year command tours, operating under the dual handicap of not knowing their command sufficiently to fulfill their responsibilities and knowing they would shortly be out from under the responsibility?
The civilian counterpart, who can be readily dismissed, has the bottom line of a profit center, budget, or sales quota, as well as the major hazards comparable to groundings, collisions, and the like. One must sort through an impenetrable thicket of personnel shifts, divided and overlapping lines of authority, and the like, in an attempt to affix responsibility for time and cost overruns of the orders of magnitude illustrated by the Mk 48 torpedo.
In regard to the Naval War College survey, one would observe that it is most unlikely to find an officer who would answer a survey question that his career imposed less responsibility than other professions.
Citing governmental control over units involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis as the turning point (downward) in "trust, confidence, and responsibility extended to the commanding officer of a Navy man-of-war,” portrays a lack of understanding of the interplay and significance of the factors involved. The United States and the U.S.S.R., in a visible, significant confrontation, had capabilities and interests involved which presented immediate and serious consequences for each nation. With each nation having thrown down the gauntlet, there was little room to explain away, or accept, an untoward incident on the part of either nation’s participating units. In short, with the factors involved, it was inconceivable then, and now, that the fate of both nations would be exposed to the possibility of a single unit commander’s momentary indiscretion. Let the games of "chicken” and "hold-down” be played at times and places other than when each nation’s fingers are poised over the nuclear exchange buttons.
Indeed, the recent incident regarding falsification of bombing missions in Southeast Asia can be cited at least as supportive of the wisdom of a measure of centralized control. If similar incidents occur in future times, we may well see another "turning point” when representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are assigned to every command. Clemen- ceau’s comment that "War is too important to be left to generals” has application in an updated version that, "The possibility of nuclear exchange is too important to be left to a single unit commander.”
George Allen, does in fact give and get 110%. The Redskins traded 110% of their draft choices and George Allen, as the head coach and general manager, rather dutifully and manfully acknowledged his responsibility and paid the $5,000 fine. The National Football League, to its credit, thereafter raised the penalty for future cases to $25,000.
In the case of the purloined Kissinger papers, we could find neither an admiral nor a yeoman first class who could be found responsible or admitting to the
WASHINGTON REDSKIN FOOTBALL TEAM
Washington Redskin coach George Allen
fact that perhaps all was not right in the procedure. Apparently, our reaction was to affix no responsibility. Evidently, we adjusted the penalties usually prescribed for lapses in responsibility, to that of waiting for the case to slide mercifully from the front pages into the oblivion of the past.
Total honesty extends to disabil*1)
public that a number of flag officers for flying status one day were disable upon retirement the next day. With tb*
tary medical services performed adm|fS bly and improved the health of W officers to the extent that disability & tirements and the tax benefits dropPe from 47% to 14%.
The point is that perhaps we do n°j always "accept the high standard 0 responsibility” and should require m0tC at the higher levels of our superiors, & well to state that "we must requiw less of subordinates.” [1][2]
in job effectiveness and no ad-
verSe refl
ectlon on the military service Centlv aVy ^as made great strides re
The Na,
", -
positj nS us recognize this as a "leade and not’ *n t^e name of s *P> belittle this progress.
Uss Safeguard (HKS-2j)-Why an otherwise intelligent and sane
•Pust
Ptirn
ier
lQsed
and riT1jnce' a society where beards cent 7 Crate^ ,ong hair are fully ac-
Versel ' t^C ^ear<^ surely does not a<L A v ^ redect on the military service, cut ^ t°rt haircut> such as a "brush etv' WJ cause more comment in soci- Stv,;° ay than the moderately long
standSa!d^lttef by CUrrent Navy dress
sho I, ' ^tfatlatly, beer in the barracks a md n0t interfere with the ability of TheatUre 'nd’v‘dual to perform his job. pers Pr°hlem of some less responsible with ^C adow'n8 alcohol to interfere he cq Clr duty Perf°rrnar>ce would not harra>ueCted prohibiting beer in the elsewh S' ^°r amP^e supplies are available is a society 1° which alcohol
in * 1 y available and its consumption accet>° ,^rat'on 's generally considered teller ^ beCr ’n t7le barracks does not ,a versely on the military.
necess ^ dress and conduct are surely ofr„ 3ry 7or the military service. Part Peri F°ns'hle leadership, however, is to
assure^ evaluate these codes and unne C at t7le codes do not contain Undes77 restrtcti°ns- A code, free of allows'^ C.and unnecessary restrictions CreaseS max‘mum personal freedom, decan J l°h-associated frustration, and no loJnificantly improve morale with
;e refle,
; Navy
7 ln removing such undesirable ns,gn a t,
Hewit‘ Rose, U. S. Naval Re- ( °n leadership be prefaced and ated atWl &ratu'tous and unsubstanti- "new” 7 S °n superhcial aspects of the ev*dencaVy'5 *~aPta'n Collins offers no haVeC5 t0 show that "our top leaders leader^eCdvc^ sullied the mantle of y°Uth ^ or have attempted to "buy is p0or°, ' Where is it shown that it allow b Cadership to permit beards, to h°tr0rseer ln Che barracks, or, horror of Cpyjj, ’ to try and rout out racism with cl«s 0n ? and Executive Seminars? Arti- thisjfri ?adership are always useful, but hom • C e s shrill generalizations detract *ts value.
Lieutenant Commander James T. Westwood, U. S. Navy—Since I joined the Naval Institute in 1963, there have appeared between the covers of our monthly Proceedings a number of excellent essays on the general subject of leadership, or aspects thereof. In my view, none have surpassed, in cogency, grasp, insight, and thoroughness, the essay by Captain Collins. His remarks summarize, or highlight, the bulk of literary remarks printed, and wardroom and mess deck conversations I have encountered.
Captain Collins’ first-listed "timeless motivational quality of leadership” is self-discipline, and it heads his list for reasons that I would like to hope that I correctly interpret. All other discipline flows and has its being from and in self-discipline. Without self-discipline in sufficient and constant measure, all other attempts at leadership and discipline are doomed to eventual failure. When we speak of "leadership by example,” we are really speaking of evident self-discipline on the part of the leader. Imparting self-discipline in others, and sharing with them common standards of performance and behavior, is the most important task of a leader at any level.
Numerous leadership surveys, as well as common sense, indicate that the primary trait sought by a subordinate in a superior is competency. Subordinates will entrust themselves and the direction of their efforts to leaders whom they perceive to be competent or genuinely trying to be competent. Compassion and understanding are critical, but they cannot succeed where competency is wanting. Leaders have, as they should, different styles and personalities. Not all are endowed with energetic good cheer, hail and hearty extroverted fellowship, or an innate ability to smile at all times. Increasingly, however, those are the supposed leadership traits being sought in our emerging leaders in the Navy. In some ships and stations it is now considered more important to be popular and have "personality plus” than it is to be competent, informed, and decisive in terms of mission performance and readiness training. In such situations, competency—that which we know to be paramount in leadership—begins to take second place. Missions are not accomplished without competency and the
pride it promotes, which may be likened to the kind of commitment, standards, and morale which tend to persist indefinitely.
Officers and men are inspired and motivated by being members of a unit which is mission-oriented and in which competency is easily credited. Competency, in turn, has its origin in selfdiscipline. Only high, consistent, and fair standards are ultimately credited because they allow us to judge performance, behavior, and accomplishment in terms of competency rather than in terms of personality and popularity.
"Linebacker Strike”
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 46-51, August 1974;
J. T. Hayward and K. J. Davis, pp. 76-77,
December 1974; R. C. Powers, pp. 85-86,
April 1975 Proceedings)
Captain Philip R. Osborn, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The recent operations in response to the Mayaguez affair again point out the problems of inadequate ships with insufficient weaponry. A U. S. News & World Report article (2 June 1975) stated that "the two U. S. destroyers on the scene each had [only] a single 5-inch gun, but only one of the two guns— that on the Holt—was in working order.”
In a world of increasingly complicated technology and with a priority of mission to defend against air and submarine attacks, we are neglecting the basic missions of any warship—the ability to defend herself and successfully carry out the traditional role of warships, including what in the past would be called "gunboat diplomacy.” In the past, even noncombatant and auxiliary units carried fairly heavy conventional armament. Had this policy continued, we might not have suffered the humiliating loss of the Pueblo or the attack on the Liberty. The lack of conventional weaponry, coupled with frequent failures of the present complicated weapon systems, could prove potentially dangerous and embarrassing to even some of our newest naval units which might find themselves powerless against a hostile gunboat of ancient vintage. Weapons grow in power and complexity, however they do not necessarily make obsolete the conventional guns that can be manually operated if necessary. From shoot-
some interesting insights into the man’s personality. What the ju
ol^
niot
ing guns to navigating, the basics should never be neglected. A balance should be struck between specialized operational missions and traditional warship requirements and capabilities.
"Command and Control Changeless—Yet Changing”
(See D. T. Poc, pp. 23-31, October 1974;
D. T. Poe, p. 78, March 1975 Proceedings)
"Communications and Command Prerogative”
(See D. J. Marshall, pp. 26-33, January 1974 J. S. Hulburt, p. 96, July 1974; J. S. Cowie, pp. 83-84, August 1974 Proceedings)
Commander H. L. Holthaus, U. S. Navy, Staff, CinCPacFlt—The command and control procedures exercised in the prosecution of the recent Mayaguez recovery incident, whether by intent or circumstance, were analogous to, and supported, the mechanics of command and control discussed by Admiral Poe. The Mayaguez command and control scenario could easily be inserted within the pages of his very perceptive article.
As if to forestall further discussion on the subject, the President’s actions clearly invalidated the "generalist” theory and displayed a determination to exercise detailed leadership directly from Washington. Certainly "moral and emotional requirements,” due in part to recent world developments, seemed to be foremost in the minds of the White House decision-makers. Therefore, political and diplomatic aspects were the driving force behind military operations.
Current events are proving Admiral Poe’s conclusion correct in expecting that the modus operandi for dealing with crisis situations will be by direct communication from Washington to the on-scene commander. Therefore it can be perceived that our command and control organization must conform to a streamlined approach that provides for effective coordination with, and the transfer of information to, national authority. The procedure used for the Mayaguez recovery operation provides a basic outline for future implementation.
The on-scene commander that circumstance places within the zoom lens of worldwide attention may feel, for the moment, that his immediate command authority has been decreased. However, there are still sufficient opportunities in the Navy to exercise command initiative, despite "modern communication miracles.” If anything, the challenge is greater because worldwide attention can be rapidly focused on any command deficiencies. Today, almost anyone who can read the newspaper is in a position to be a Monday morning quarterback on the relative merits of the on-scene commander’s "errand-boy” performance, or point with pride to his superb initiative. In fact his performance is the "feedback from the field” that will haunt or support the higher authority that departed from a traditional generalist role in favor of becoming a more active and precise tactical executor of national policy.
Jean Ebbert's book describes the intricacies of official and social life id the Navy.
might not otherwise have if all his coF' tacts with the junior depended solely 0lj the workday basis, or on larger soO** gatherings where conversation is apt t0 be quite superficial. These observatioF5 are not idle, rather they are part and pat cel of good leadership—know your meF- This is not to say that the juni°r cannot benefit from the experience aS well, for when he sees the man he work5 for in his home setting he may obtaiF learns during a social call may illumina^ what he’s learned during duty hour5' This is not of value?
Also, I take issue with the youFU lieutenant’s assumption that social calk are to inculcate social graces which '[3] pay off in meeting foreign dignitari^5 and officials. In the first place, no ^ minute social call will give anyone sod*1 graces he or she does not already have' But what the call can do is give both the junior and the senior a little practical relating comfortably and graciousl) with those several years older or youngFj than themselves. Since most of us ten to feel most comfortable with our coF' temporaries, such "practice” tends i0
The
Pr°fesso,
fecul °Ur S^mPat^'es and our critical thp *fS ,more Pvely, more in touch with ne wh°le scene.
verv 1 ^u'te a§ree tllat relatively
uPon ^ naV3^ °®cers w‘ll ever ^ called anH <L° dea^ w*cb foreign dignitaries
^rv0?^15’ Wil1 b' «1Ied «P°" fello t0.dea^ w'tb aH sorts °f their aIonW mericans. Knowing how to get °f ^ tbem will be the very stuff Tech IC i tbe*r naval careers are made. matn*Ca knowledge may be the raw
tionsribUt°fK naVil officer’s quaiifica- °Wn " be cannot communicate his
others recePtive to the ideas of
feason’k^ !?n°w how to disagree in a lcnow, , fashion, all his technical go soCf may S° for naught. I would w°rk ", aS t0 Say tbat tbe ability to manan Play with others is one of navai CPublications that a professional I d° Cer needs to possess, of tp, not wisb to overstate the value 'bake ^ tad in cbis regard. It cannot the ins3 1 "Tforoat of a boor, nor render expjriJ' Cnt mannerly- but as 'be junior a variety of social situa- help ^a *s among them—he cannot about v learn a few piercing things will fi lmself and others. One day he comm11 bibaself the senior, possibly a rnatUl.an officer. From that more bittiseh Terspective he may well find learned ^u*tC grateful for all that he has Is 4q t rougb his social experiences, higjj lnutes once or twice a year too price for such lessons?
Soviet Naval Academy
ag0 j
SovjetCard a lecturer discussing the the ij naval theme with midshipmen of pected l ^ava* Academy. I fully ex- his CQa| e naval "expert” to reach into sPeech b0cbet for a second prepared Paper! tde excuse> "Oops, wrong On tc ,ut no> he continued his chat l^ava]C Slrn*larities between the Soviet
Academ demy and the U'S' Naval
gtaduatg comPared the morale of COtltraseS.i tbe two institutions, and of tw06 tbe'r experience as products •j’hCre°TPosing systems, ffie tw tfre some similarities between blaval A academies ” One is called the eademy, the other is known as
the Voenno-Morskaya Akademiya. The Naval Academy is situated on the right bank of a river; the Voenno Morskaya Akademiya is on the right bank of another river (the Malaya Neva). The present senior admirals of the U. S. and Soviet Navies studied at some time in their respective academies.
However, if you attended the graduation ceremony at the Soviet Naval Academy, you would see a lineup of command rank officers waiting to get their certificates. Their official designation is slushateli (auditors) and most of them would be three-stripers or above.
In an epoch when higher education and research are the order of the day for naval officers, the role of the Soviet Naval Academy is becoming increasingly important. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Admirals Nikolai Sergeev and Semeon Lobov, Vice Admiral Vladimir Mikhailin, and other leaders of the Soviet Navy received advanced training on the banks of the Malaya Neva in Leningrad.
The New Uniforms:
Who Wants Them?
Rear Admiral Carlton R. Adams, U. S. Navy (Retired)—l have yet to find an officer, retired or on active duty, who approves of the new enlisted uniform changes. The majority of those enlisted personnel I have questioned prefer the old uniform.
I remember that some years ago a fleet-wide survey was conducted to
check if coat and pants type uniforms would be preferred to the traditional type—the response was overwhelming in favor of the bluejacket type. Over the years the uniform board voted against change for sound reasons (tradition, looks, storage difficulty on board ships, costs, etc.)
None of the major naval powers— U.S.S.R., England, or France—or even minor ones have changed their uniforms for enlisted personnel lately. The tradition of changing uniforms when one is advanced from first class to chief has passed. The prestige of being a chief has been eroded to a degree. It is a shame!
When the Soviet Navy was born, all ratings and ranks wore practically the same uniforms. Isn’t it strange that now the Soviet Navy dresses its enlisted personnel in our old traditional "bluejackets” uniform and the officers’ uniforms are heavy with braid (capitalism), while we are tending toward making all hands look like officers (socialism)?
United States executed a remarkab) rapid and in-depth resupply of Israel, no one contends that we had advance
als"
against other naval forces. It must
if
Father Remembers Hancock
Dante Petro—As the USS Hancock (CVA- 19) steamed under the Golden Gate Bridge on 18 March 1975, 1 realized this could be her last cruise. The San Francisco weather was typically wet and foggy as it almost seemed the city was saying good-bye to the fine old veteran carrier.
I have a personal interest in this particular carrier as my son, Ensign Dante Petro, is attached to Attack Squadron 164 on board the Hancock. As an aviation torpedoman I had the privilege of loading torpedoes and depth charges on the Hancock before she sailed on her maiden voyage during World War II. I was on board the Hancock when she was brand spanking new, and now my son sails on what may be her last cruise.
"Suez and the Soviets”
{See S. Slonim, pp 36-41, April 1975 Proceedings)
Commander Thomas A. Brooks, U. S. Navy—Mr. Slonim’s central thesis that the Suez Canal is the driving factor behind Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East is rather an oversimplification in that it ignores the strategic importance of Arab oil, the Soviet desire for bases (particularly air bases) along the Mediterranean littoral, and the historic
Russian (Tsarist as well as Soviet) interest in southward expansion with its focus on the Indian Ocean and Indian subcontinent.
That the reopening of the Suez Canal is advantageous to the Soviets is selfevident. The distance between the Black Sea Fleet and Soviet naval operating areas in the northwest Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, is on the order of 4,000 miles shorter than the transit routes of the Soviet Pacific Fleet units which currently deploy to these waters. This is not to say that Pacific Fleet units will be replaced by Black Sea Fleet units. I personally doubt this would happen. The ease and speed of augmenting the Soviet Indian Ocean presence (or even the Soviet Pacific Fleet) via the Suez Canal, however, is readily apparent. Add to this the shortening of Soviet dry cargo merchant ship ' routes to East Africa and the Indian subcontinent and an open and operating canal becomes very attractive to the Soviets.
Yet, an analysis of Soviet activity does not support the reopening of the canal as being the keystone of Soviet Middle East policy. Rather, I would suggest that Soviet policy has supported the radi- calization of the Arab world in hopes of alienating it from the West and, in the process, gaining political allies and military base rights. Soviet bases in Egypt and Somalia (not to mention lesser supporting facilities in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere) appear to bear out this hypothesis. Thus, the Soviets may have been just as pleased to see the canal closed from 1967 to 1975 in order to make Western access to the northwest Indian Ocean as difficult and expensive as possible.
I would take exception to another of Dr. Slonim’s observations: namely, that the Soviets participated in the planning for the attack on Yom Kippur 1973 and were aware of its timing. President Sadat, in an interview with a retired French general, stated that he and President Assad had informed the Soviet ambassadors to their respective countries (Egypt and Syria) only two days prior to the onset of hostilities. The poorly planned and hastily executed last-minute evacuation of Soviet citizens supports Sadat’s statements.
It is true that the Soviets organized
a remarkably speedy air and seabomc resupply of Syria and Egypt—perhaps ) stripping Soviet units or utilizing exlSt ing stores of military equipment in th: Black Sea area. At the same time, the
knowledge.
'Sea Control Ship Concept: Down the Drain” (See E. R. Callahan, p. 91, August 1975 Proceedings)
"The Marines:
Now and in the Future”
(See E. H. Simmons, p. 102-117, May 1975 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Gordon Levine—For several years, thA has been considerable discussion c011 cerning the need for sea control ship (SCS) as the low components of a hig‘ low force mix; the high componej1 being the attack aircraft carrier. T proposed SCS is seen generally as 14,000-ton ship carrying 14 helicopte and three V/STOL aircraft, with no negligible) weapons or sensors on 1 ship itself. The function of the prop°s^ SCS would be to protect a convoy or taf force against submarines, with the he copters providing airborne early warnifr (AEW) and antisubmarine war ta (ASW) functions. Protection again' nuclear submarines equipped with F11^ siles would be minimal. The one or t" ^ flyable aircraft, even if by luck equipP® for the correct mission, could not a quately defend against an attack by sU face ships or aircraft, especially if an.. ship missiles were employed. If the S aircraft were equipped for the wt01^ mission, there would not be time rearm in a normal attack situation, j Any warship must be able to defe*1 against more than one type of thre It must have a reasonable capability defense against any type of threat aI1 in order to control (SCS’s middle nafF a specified area, must have the abi1 to act offensively within that
be flexible enough to operate both deep water and close to unfrien shores.
elieve an improvement over the on ^0.Se^ Scs> wouW be a larger ship, 6 a reacJy being built—the amphibi- itS assault ship (LHA). At 40,000 tons, can easily carry a mix of 30-35 heli- Xrs an^ v/STOL aircraft, allowing a altr^tantlai number of aircraft to be on sio °r ant'ship and antiair mis- benS hef°re, the helicopters would CQUSC ^or ASW, aew, and electronic steajterrneasures (ECM). However, in- /<- ianding craft, this new ship
rni wou^ carry a number of
"ST**** hovercraft. There are a tjlaer °f lightweight missile systems t could be used: Penguin, Exocet, G ^lel- or Harpoon, by r^e SCS-LHA directing an attack hove'SS^e^‘firing aircraft, helicopters, and a suerCraft’ accorcling to data relayed by Vi(je?,ej**arice helicopter, with ECM pro- tnod ' another helicopter, even a Crn missile cruiser would find life die CU C SGS-LHA’s ability to han- in (^rnerous different types of threats
distli S °re arCaS wdile maintaining a nt station is most important.
(jer e Prcsent LHA has two basic point retainS<\rn'ss'lc systems which would be
Ion"! ' !,ts three 5_inch Suns> no 'vouM rded ^0r sh°re bombardment, raPid fi C reP*ace<d w‘th small caliber c]0s . re weapons more suitable for aira f"1 defense against small ships and p[la,a P possibly with the Vulcan or fensan* kcing added for a missile de- enou , de scs-LHA would be large aircra£ to handle major repairs to the great*: a"d hovercrafb permitting a a comb ln<aePendence of operation. For Pulsj11 atant’ rhe LHA’s twin screw prop- makes more sense. With the st°ppSj Scs> ih her single propeller were to pfe ’ C^e iorce or convoy would have her0ceed without her, either leaving nee,/: ^en<^ f°r herself or detaching pairs escorts to protect her while re- re^ Were made. This would result in the conv°y strength and making Tbe , S an<^ her escorts sitting ducks. chaA would require relatively minor tro,”S« t0 become an effective "con- ^ * ‘P—saving both time and money. Wherf0W'tdreat env*ronment exists only whate t”ere ‘s an absence of fighting— lim; ^Se *s a naval unit which has very Vbjf Va^ue aher the shooting begins? twlceC t^le SCS-LHA could be possibly as expensive as the proposed SCS,
it would make up for it in capability. She could not only defend against air, sea, and subsurface threats, but could strike offensively against other naval forces within a 200-300 mile radius. Instead of a small ASW carrier, protected by others, we would have a true sea control ship.
I would also like to comment on another weapon system. Brigadier General Simmons points out the Navy’s weakness in the area of its gunfire support capability. However, I feel the lightweight 8-inch gun system is not the answer. By the time the major caliber lightweight gun is evaluated and becomes operational within the fleet, circumstances may be such that it cannot be used when needed.
I can envision conditions, due to the proliferation of mobile antiship missile systems, that would make it suicidal for a small naval force to attempt gunfire support. A carrier force could suppress the defenses by tactical air strikes, but could not move in close to shore to provide gunfire support without risking the loss of high-value ships against the destruction of relatively low-value shore targets. By the time it becomes safe enough for the naval force to close to gun range, the issue most likely will have been decided. Either the landing force will be repulsed, or the beachhead will be so well established and secure inland to the point where gunfire support will not be effective due to the constraint of maximum gun range.
I agree with General Simmons’ assertion that a greater role should be played by tactical aviation and the Marines’ own major caliber weapons.
si
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way to perform many tasks, and that ,
u
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ct
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ce
te
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membe^
more
when they reach positions of increase responsibility. Further, it increases the*(
pride and sense of satisfaction in a j0^
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imum possible freedom in the perform
id
maximum possible non-job-related areas, as long as -
freedom does not interfere with j°
th<
,b
Lieutenant Commander William T.
[2] U. S. Naval Reserve—Captain CoH'(,! presents a good discussion of the leadeJ ship qualities. One aspect not expliclt ■ discussed, however, is that a leadb should be open-minded enough to re3 ize that there is more than one correft
own particular choice for a method performing a given task is not neceS sarily the best method for every indiv1' ual. Because of individual different and preferences, others may prefer aker nate methods. Allowing subordinates(0 perform tasks in their own way, as of restrictions as possible, allows the*1’ to use their own initiative and crab' them to think independently, makii’f’ them more valuable team
well done, for they not only performe the assigned task, they did so in the 'v3' they themselves devised or chose.
In conjunction with permitting maJ‘
ance of duty, an effective leader shot1 allow maximum possible freedom i<l
su^
performance or reflect adversely on military service. I disagree with Capt3*11 Collins’ statement that "our top leadefS effectively sullied the mantle of lea<deI ship ... by attempting to buy yot>c off with beards and beer in the b3( racks.” I fail to see how a beard, nea^l
trimmed, can interfere with effective j°
"Navy Social Calls”
(See J. J. Flynn, pp. 85-86, February 1975;
R. A. Guida and J. M. Kennaday, pp. 83-84,
June 1975 Proceedings)
Jean Ebbert, author of U. S. Naval Institute book Welcome Aboard—I must take exception with Lieutenant (j.g.) Guida’s contention that ", . . all officers must suffer the unnecessary hassle of social calls to ensure that they are well- rounded” on two points.
First, many conversations and discussions to which I have been party in recent years indicate that the custom of social calls is more on the wane than on the rise. As Commander Flynn noted, they are far from universal; they may not even be widespread any more. Therefore it simply cannot be true that all officers are so harassed (if that’s the word).
Second, Lieutenant (j.g.) Guida’s assumption that the social call is primarily for the benefit of the junior is not valid. (One can hardly blame him for making such an assumption. Any alert observer in today’s Navy must conclude it is the juniors, not seniors, who are being wooed, if not actually seduced.) Rather, the chief value of the social call is that it gives the senior an opportunity to size up the junior, to learn something of his personal and professional interests, modes of response, and, generally, his ability to handle himself. These observations give a senior important clues he