National Security: Can We Sell the Program?

 

 

 

strength be recognized by the incumbent superpowers. Nations rich in raw materials are gaining in strength as the result of their control of resources vital to the more advanced economies. China has awakened; great in years, she can aspire to new greatness simply be­cause of her enormous size and the vigor, ingenuity, and resilience of her remarkable people. As political sci­entist Stanley Hoffmann observes, we have moved from a world dominated by a single strategic-diplomatic chessboard to a world dispersed into a variety of chess­boards.¹ The complexity of this situation is immedi­ately apparent. Our ability to shape events and protect our interests in this complex game will determine whether we will be chessmasters or pawns in the years ahead.

Third, as events have altered the realities around us, so have they changed our security interests and voided our strategy. The physical containment of Communism is no longer a viable national policy. Geography has become important to the United States only insofar as changes in its control affect the overall U. S. teh tionships with other major powers. We must develop a set of relationships among the major power center* so that no combination of powers can threaten tbc political, economic, or physical security of the Unite¹ States. This is a task for diplomacy. Yet, a foreigⁿ policy that attempts to deter and avoid nuclear tvat> keep the power balance in equilibrium, and assure the security of the United States, must be able to call ^uP°ⁿ military power on occasion to make it effective.

Stanley Hoffmann, "Choices,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1973, p. 5.

essential for modern industrial production. Europe Japan are even more dependent on overseas resou The political, economic, and security implication this burgeoning economic interdependence are ^aPP‘_)C ent. Undoubtedly, they place added burdens on . world’s richest superpower, the United States. The oil embargo and the sharp differences between E^u , and the United States over how to deal with the P¹ lem only serve to highlight the more fundatu j problems existing in food, energy, raw materials

Fourth, the advanced industrial nations are incre# ingly interdependent in trade and economic affairs an increasingly dependent on the rest of the world f°^r energy and raw materials. The magnitude of this in^tet dependence is only now becoming fully visible. ^^eSt ern Europe, Japan, and the United States alone condut over 60% of the world’s trade. Since I960, world tra has quadrupled; it now approaches $1 trillion pet T and is growing at a rate of more than 10% annual f The United States imports 69 of the 72 raw mated³⁵

stakeent Such a development is of major concern. At t_rj_a ff’J^aP^an, and the United States, but also a second

^°netary affairs. The means to solve these problems yet to be devised, but the solutions or non- hons are going to govern world affairs for years aie.

aen presenting the case for the preservation of our •T power, the professional military officer must ^rec°gnize that there are four basic constituencies in- ^^Vec* in providing forces for the national security. , ^ese constituencies include domestic, economic, for- *8ⁿ, and military policy advocates. Each group’s per­l ^CtlVe influences its views as to the need for, and P^e of, military force structures. For instance, in a ^ fficant portion of the domestic constituency, there ³⁵ been a pronounced change in attitude about the ^Jitary establishment in both the United States and

^^tern democracies.

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eff_e ^{nCre 1S a} S^cneral questioning of the relevance and ob'^Ct*^{VeneSS militaf}y f°^rce in achieving political i^ecti^vcs. The doubts are prompted by the destruc- _a ^{nCSS moc}iern weaponry and also by this country’s Patent inability to control the initiatives of lesser Entries.

. ^e have also witnessed a so-called "social revolu- cion ”             . •

]jj ’ °ne aspect of which has been an anti-military

h!°^{f large} groups of citizens.

'nsti °^re0VCr’ ^t*^{iere are} fl^eep-^seated doubts about our gov ^{Utlons an<}^ ^{a cer}tain degree of malaise in the rnrnents of the Western democracies. Govern- ffiis ^{3 aut}h°rity is being challenged continually, and U^Ut^^'establishment outlook is bound to affect the _p.^ary> one of our most visible establishments. p_rio^lnally’ ^WC ^^{iavc seen a} pronounced shift in social _as ^r'ries, with added emphasis on domestic programs opposed to defense and foreign programs, force °^SC ^^nvo^^vec^ foreign policy view the military tjj requirements from quite a different perspective Aon ^t^^ose involved with domestic affairs. In addi- di 1 ^t0 the primary goal of avoiding nuclear war, irig ^{1113(5 see}k ^to prevent another power from achiev- the ^m3i°^{r re}gional or global hegemony. Consequently, p_rev^necessiry of maintaining a balance of power to

^ls not only the triangular relationship between

fjjj-° ^e Evolving China, the Soviet Union, and the sg_v Crates. And off, apart from the main arena, ^hin ^ot^^er triangular juggling acts—for example c_at)n ’ J^apan, and the Soviets—are in progress and ^0t be ignored.

Foreign policy strategists are likely to support a military force structure that assures rough parity with the Soviet Union, and one that will want to prevent any large area of the Third World from falling under either Russian or Chinese hegemony.

To be successful, the United States must be able to influence the perception by these countries of the rela­tive balance of power in the world. The concept of influencing perceptions is hard for most Americans to understand. We have never been dependent on a super­power for protection and, in this century at least, we have not been in a position of casting about to see who is going to be on the winning side. However, for most small nations and many advanced ones, this perception of power is a vital ingredient in their policy determinations. Thus, U. S. foreign policy strategists will be concerned that our military force structure gives reality to the perception of power and is diplomatically useful.

Those concerned with economic policy will see in­ternational trade, finance, and economics as the major areas of conflict—areas in which they believe military power is less relevant. The solutions to the economic problems of the world have a direct bearing on our nation’s military security. Our present defense arrange­ments with Western Europe and Japan rely almost entirely on the U. S. nuclear shield. This basic rela­tionship, despite many other changes, still appears to be intact. However, if we pursue economic policies that adversely affect our allies, or undercut our relationships with them, we run the danger of seriously bringing into question our intentions regarding provision of the nuclear shield. In other words, if they cannot trust us

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for new weapons, force structures, and preparedness fundamental political-military considerations which^cSl) be readily perceived and understood in the p^resef>t' while being applicable to the future.

This may seem a difficult task, but in presenting ^c case for naval forces, we in the Navy and Marine have a well-stocked magazine of arguments. The df acteristics of naval forces fit well with the capab' requirements of today’s realities and future possibility

► Strategic Deterrence: Sea-based strategic missile sys^teI11 have proven to be the least vulnerable of all our ^stf3 regie forces. For the foreseeable future this invu

to work toward common interests in economics, can they trust us in some crisis situation to use our military power in the common interest when the chips are down? If our allies should come to the conclusion that we are an unreliable partner, the entire structure of our defense forces and basic concepts for defense would eventually have to be completely realigned. The oppo­site is also true; allies cannot undercut us, lest they force a withdrawal of our support.

From the perspective of military policymakers, the realities suggest several goals. First, they see the neces­sity for the maintenance of essential nuclear equality with the Soviet Union. Second, they see a continuing need for assuring the physical security of Western Europe (NATO) and Japan as an essential element in our own security. Third, they see the continuing need for counter-intervention forces. It was the counter­intervention capability of the United States that pre­vented the Soviet Union from dominating the Middle East crisis of October 1973 or from taking actions which would be contrary to the long-term interests of the United States and its allies. Fourth, they see the need to maintain substantial military forces. Samuel Huntington argues that—as paradoxical as it may sound—the potential uses of military forces increase in an era of negotiation. Military alerts, deployments, mobilization, and weapon decisions are not only means of deterring aggression, they are also means of exerting pressure in negotiations. Thus, military strategists be­lieve flexibility of the force structure and capabilities of the forces will be important adjuncts to negotiations, both in deterring conflict and actual crisis situations.^[1]

In the continuing debate on national security poW and military force structures, it is impossible to pred’^ct whether it will be domestic concerns, foreign p°^^lC' imperatives, economic factors, or military requirement that become dominant in shaping our military f°^r£e structure. However, there is at least one certainty. ^w will not have an adequate force structure unless we ¹⁽¹ the military profession can make a solid case for °^ut views and present our recommendations and requ>^re ments in a manner that makes sense to the vafi°^uS constituencies involved. Each constituency will ha^ve differing vision of the future, often colored by its °^!* perspective of world events. To predict the future perilous, so we should attempt to base our argum¹

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ability will be a key factor in maintaining our nu^c

deterrent.                                                                              ^

► Counter-intervention: Regardless of detente, there ^

still fundamental differences in the aspirations of ^£

Soviet Union and the United States. As long as ¹

differences persist, there will be a need for forces '^vtl

can counter Soviet intervention in areas of direct in

•                                                                                             mV*

est to the United States. Soviet military writers 1 made it clear that the U.S.S.R. will continue t° military power (especially naval power) to achieve P litical goals. The 1973 Middle East War exposed ^ nesses in the U. S. military force structure. For examP,^ our land-based forces and their equipment lacked p° ical mobility. They simply could not be taken | their present deployment areas for use in the . East without severe political repercussions. Depend

°^ugh economically beneficial, is by no means essen-

t0 their survival or even to their present standard iving. For the advanced industrial nations, the bene-

adv_;

^ Ucc the probability of such actions requires a ^ Uary force structure that can give credence to both q P^erception as well as the reality of U. S. power.

Ur naval forces have provided this capabifity for 200 _r(V^[2]' Because they are mobile, visible, and powerful serv^lnderS             b' invests and capabilities, they can

aff ^C.^C^^e ^^uai ^r°ie of keeping the sea lanes open and \ ,^Cctang rhe perceptions of other nations, pla .^reseen Events: The military is often accused of _l)r_i(?ⁿ’ⁿ8 for the last war, not the next one. There is oubtedly some truth in this observation as the ^ent debate over the proper force structure for sup- ^rrtlng U. S. commitments to Europe would indicate.

°n overseas bases was a drastic handicap; it can no l°ⁿger be assumed that such bases will be available for ^Use by the United States in times of crisis. Rapidly deployable forces were in short supply; flexibility in employing these forces was limited by constraints on ^as*ⁿg and by inappropriate weapon systems. Navy and Marine Corps officers can take pride in the fact that °^ur limitations were only in force levels, not in types forces and capabilities. The changing realities of |°day dictate more political mobility and flexibility and ^ess dependence on overseas bases. Naval forces give ^Us these capabilities. Without them, we face increasing constraints on our ability to defend or promote the Rational interest.

Economic Interdependence: Oceanic commerce has be- ^COrne so important that the very survival of nations ^and the welfare of their peoples are dependent on the ^use of the seas. On any given day there are more ^an 5,000 ships at sea along the world’s trade routes, he deliberate disruption of the economic system of ^e advanced industrial nations would be a catastrophe . ^tremendous proportions. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. ^ls almost completely self-sufficient in energy and raw ^aterials. The Soviets’ participation in world trade,

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^s °f interdependence also result in their greatest vul­nerability. The temptations to exploit this vulnerability ^r Political or economic gain are great, and the means . preventing such exploitation are limited. It is essen- ^tlal that we maintain visible and usable military power k 'hsure that political or economic coercion, backed y rriilitary force, is not used as a means of exploiting the herabilities of our economic interdependence, here are two ways that military force could be used k ^exploit our economic vulnerabilities: actually inter- _tJ'ⁿg with the movement of goods and materials over oceans, or through coercion which convinces sup- .^ers °f raw materials that continued trading with the ^aUced industrial nations is not in their interest. To

But, even here, there is a consensus in objectives: only the means are in dispute. This consensus does not exist for other possible future wars. Thus, for instance, postu­lating a force structure that would be effective in assur­ing the continued availability of Middle East oil to the advanced industrial nations would immediately draw vehement political objections and could adversely affect current U. S. foreign policy. That the U. S. would want to do such a thing would be considered by many as immoral, and at best, impossible. That it may be necessary for our survival would be rejected as highly improbable. Nonetheless, the history of the past 50 years has been one of surprises. Military forces in being have proven to be essential to the survival of the United States and the protection of its interests. For example, there were few predictions of the rise of Nazi Germany, of Pearl Harbor, Korea, the Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Still they happened. Even though constrained in publicly planning for the next war, the United States has an urgent requirement to plan military forces that will minimize the adverse effects of future surprises. Naval forces can provide the unique attributes of mobility, flexible employment, and real power to meet this re­quirement—on land, at sea, and in the air.

Regardless of how cogent our arguments are, we will never be able to convince everyone of the merit of our beliefs. The best we can hope for is to convince the majority of our countrymen that spending on defense is, in fact, national security insurance. In presenting our case, we must remember that one argument is insuffi­cient to convince all the varied constituency to garner the support needed for our national security. And, just as insurance companies are not ashamed to ask for our business since they know that we may one day thank them for it, we need not be embarrassed to ask for our countrymen’s support.