The Soviet fishing fleet is the largest and most modern in the world. It capitalizes on common property resources of the oceans to make rapid and important economic, political, and military gains throughout the world. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet fishing industry has grown at a dramatic rate. The principal impetus for fishery growth was a Soviet necessity to substitute fish protein for less available meat. Fishing provides about one-third of the annual total of animal protein consumed in the Soviet Union. In part, however, the Soviets turned to open ocean fishing as a result of environmental mismanagement of inland and coastal fishing grounds.
As a result of the attention paid to the fishing industry by the Soviets, overall production exceeds domestic market requirements, thereby opening the possibility for new foreign initiatives. Such initiatives appear based on the belief that a large fish catch supports the Soviet Union’s commercial relations with the less developed countries through the use of products of the sea. The large, modern Soviet fishing industry is capable of catching, processing, and delivering fish and fish products to nations with a dire need for protein to sustain life. Processes are available to convert so-called “trash” fish into a cheap, tasteless, grayish powder called fish protein concentrate. It can be sprinkled on food like salt, thereby thwarting a nemesis of young children and pregnant women, protein deficiency.
Being aware of the foreign policy opportunities in the fishing industry, the Soviet Union has “relations in fisheries” with more than 50 countries and extends some form of aid to 30 countries. Pointedly, Soviet fishing vessels have provided the means for the Russians to offer food rich in protein to hungry countries in exchange for sympathy and support in the United Nations and other international forums. Additionally, through fishing programs, the Soviet Union has established a presence at sea in ocean areas distant from the Soviet Union such as the Caribbean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, along both coasts of North and South America, and Australia.
Not only has the Soviet Union become a world leader in the marketing of frozen fish and fish products, but at the same time has strengthened its economic and political base. For example, according to the present Soviet five-year plan, the fishing industry could earn about $100 million in foreign exchange this year.
In contrast to the Soviet fishery growth is the of the U. S. fishing industry. More than 70% of the fish products consumed in the United States are imported. While the Soviet fish catch has increased, production has remained constant. U. S. commercial fishing is on a course similar to the U. S. merchant marine. That is, the vessels and fishermen are aging, and each year they produce a smaller percentage of the world catch. As recently as 1955, the United States was second only to Japan in commercial fish production. Since that time, Peru, the Soviet Union, and Norway have exceeded the annual U. S. catch. The large increase in the Soviet fishing industry has been attributed to the:
► High annual capital investments in research and equipment
► Introduction of flotilla fishing, wherein trawlers in company with freezing and processing vessels
► Creation and operation of a large marine research organization
► Progressive expansion of fishing operation into all the world’s oceans
Fishing fleet development. In 1917, the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, most Russian fishing was done in fresh water because it provided both an adequate supply and ease of access. What ocean fishing there was took place in the inshore areas from small sailing or rowing craft. The new Communist regime, however, rapidly turned its attention to the expansion and mechanization of the Soviet fishing industry. As a result, by 1922, about 20% of Russia’s half million tons of fish came from the sea, and by 1929 the first large fishing trawlers were introduced into the Pacific Ocean—in the Soviet Far East. Nevertheless, the overall Soviet gain in fish caught between 1917 and World War II was less than 64%. This was not a significant increase for the 23-year period terminating in 1940, considering there were some 2,727 Soviet motorized fishing craft then in service.
After World War II, Soviet agricultural production in general—and the production of animal protein in particular—lagged behind demand, thus turning the attention of Soviet planners to an in-depth investigation of the possibilities of food from the sea. And, because Soviet economic studies demonstrated that it costs twice as much to produce one ton of cattle as to produce one ton of fish, the Soviet Union began a program of large capital investment in standardized, proven, fishing and support vessels. This ambitious project quickly taxed the existing Soviet shipbuilding capacity, resulting in the decision to contract fishing boat construction in both East and West European countries.
During the period 1945–1961, the Soviet fishing fleet was augmented by both procurement and building to a total of 3,500 large and medium-sized trawlers and refrigeration ships. From 1956 to 1966, the gross registered tonnage of the Soviet fishing fleet doubled to make it the largest in the world. In contrast to the 3,500 vessels in the Russian fishing fleet in 1961, current estimates now credit the Soviet Union with some 5,000 fishing and fishery support vessels totaling more than five million gross tons.
The net result of the Soviet campaign to expand the fishing industry has been an increase in catch from 1.8 million metric tons in 1950 to 7.8 million metric tons in 1972. Only Peru (other than 1972) and Japan, traditional fishing nations, surpass the Soviets in total annual catch. This can be contrasted with the static record of the United Kingdom, and an American catch that declined from 1958 to 1972 (Figure 1). For the future, the modified target goals for the ninth Five-Year Plan (1970–1975) include an increase in catch of fish and marine products of 47% from the 1970 level.
|
1958 |
Rank |
1966 |
Rank |
1967 |
Rank |
1968 |
Rank |
1969 |
Rank |
1970 |
Rank |
1971 |
Rank |
1972 |
Rank |
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
World |
33.3 |
|
57.5 |
|
61.1 |
|
64.3 |
|
62.9 |
|
69.3 |
|
69.7 |
|
65.6 |
|
|
Peru |
1.13 |
5 |
8.84 |
1 |
10.20 |
1 |
10.56 |
1 |
9.24 |
1 |
12.61 |
1 |
10.50 |
1 |
4.67 |
3 |
|
Japan |
5.51 |
1 |
7.10 |
2 |
7.90 |
2 |
8.67 |
2 |
8.61 |
2 |
9.31 |
2 |
9.91 |
2 |
10.22 |
1 |
|
U.S.S.R. |
2.61 |
3 |
5.35 |
3 |
5.78 |
3 |
6.08 |
3 |
6.50 |
3 |
7.25 |
3 |
7.33 |
3 |
7.76 |
2 |
|
Norway |
144 |
4 |
2.87 |
4 |
3.25 |
4 |
2.80 |
4 |
2.48 |
4 |
2.98 |
4 |
3.07 |
4 |
3.20 |
4 |
|
U.S.A. |
2.70 |
2 |
2.52 |
5 |
2.41 |
5 |
2.44 |
5 |
2.46 |
5 |
2.71 |
5 |
2.79 |
5 |
2.65 |
5 |
|
U.K. |
1.00 |
6 |
1.07 |
6 |
1.03 |
6 |
1.04 |
6 |
1.08 |
6 |
1.10 |
6 |
1.09 |
6 |
1.07 |
6 |
|
Source: Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, Vols. 34 & 35, 1972, (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1973), pp. 4-15 |
The increase in Soviet fish catch was not just a simple function of increasing the number of trawlers at sea. In order to make the quantitative gains noted above, the U.S.S.R. also relied upon new methods of fishing fleet operations, new areas for fishing, and use of modern techniques developed through scientific fishery research.
The Soviet method of open ocean commercial fishing involves one or two large factory ships supporting an entire fleet of trawlers. The commercial operation begins only after an area of interest is scouted by a few Soviet fishing vessels to determine if sufficient resources are present to warrant the fleet effort. Once the decision is made to work an area, a fishing fleet moves in. It may consist of hundreds of trawlers, mother or factory ships, and support ships such as oilers, repair ships, and refrigerated transports. The entire effort resembles a naval operation and, in fact, is under the civilian command of a fishing fleet commodore, who evaluates the catch, weather, scouting vessel reports, and such other information as is available in order to deploy his fleet to best advantage.
The cooperative effort of Soviet fleet or flotilla fishing operations does indeed contribute to a high overall catch. This is especially impressive when one considers that the American fishing captain is an individual competitor who feels his personal interest is best served by keeping fishing information to himself. Additionally, American fishing boats find it necessary to return to port after five or six days of productive fishing to off-load cargo. Soviet trawlers stay at sea for months at a time, off-loading to mother ships, even remaining at sea for extended periods with relief crews provided directly from the U.S.S.R. by passenger ship.
With their flotilla operations, Soviet fishing fleets have progressively extended their areas of operation farther and farther from the Soviet homeland. In the early 1950s, the Russians began fishing off foreign coasts. By 1954, they were operating off Newfoundland, traditional waters for U. S. and Canadian fishermen. In 1958, Soviet fishing ships were operating off Labrador, and a year later they were in the Bering Sea. Next, in 1961, operations were extended to the Cape Cod area, followed by offshore fishing adjacent to North and South Carolina, Florida, Washington, and Oregon. By 1964, Soviet fishermen were in all important grounds in the North Atlantic, and fleets of up to 300 vessels operated within sight of shore in the Pacific Northwest. And, finally, in 1967, Soviet fishery research vessels began explorations off Ecuador, Peru, and Chile—a prelude to Russian fishing operations off South America. Additionally, the Antarctic and the Indian Ocean have become frequent operating areas for Soviet fishing fleets.
In the past 15 years, the Soviets have surged ahead with the most sophisticated and advanced methods developed for ocean fishing by modern science and technology. For example, by refining the age-old technique of attracting fish with light, the Russians have experimented successfully in the Caspian Sea with underwater light source that attracts a herring-like fish, kilka (Clupeonella), to the intake of a powerful airlift pump that sweeps them aboard ship. More than 100 Soviet vessels were engaged in this type of operation in the late 1960s. Another Soviet innovation is the use of sounds of predators to force fish to the bottom, where they are caught in bottom trawls. By forcing the fish down, Soviets can increase the effectiveness of their fishing gear anywhere from 300% to 500%. Additionally, Soviet scientists have developed a technique of shocking fish with an electric charge as they enter the mouth of the trawl, and preventing fish from escaping from the trawl by a series of optical illusions woven into the net. Both methods certainly improve trawl catches. Some writers predict that within a decade or two, Soviet fishing craft will use such new techniques as infrared rays for thermal treatment of fish and ionization sterilization by means of electronic accelerators and isotopes. These notable strides in the art of commercial fishing have given the Soviets equipment and instrumentation superior to that on American boats. The Soviets are thus able to fish on grounds that American fishermen consider unprofitable.
For a long period of time the Russians have had an interest in harvesting ocean plankton for use as a feed supplement for poultry and swine. In January 1962, the Soviet research vessel Muksun was dispatched to the Antarctic in search of krill (Euphausia superba), one of the biggest of the multitudinous forms of plankton crustaceans, ranging in size from about an inch-and-a-half to two inches in diameter. In one three-day period, the Muksun found “feeding fields” more than 20 miles in width. The Soviets estimate that about 50 million tons of krill are available for harvest annually. Krill is converted into a meal that has a high vitamin A content along with protein and fat equivalent of 460 calories per pound. Scientists in the U.S.S.R. have found that one ton of krill meal fed to weanling piglets produced as much meat on the pigs as seven to eight tons of grain, and the pigs grew to usable size more quickly.
Capabilities! Strategy, and Tactics. The Soviet fishing industry plays a significant role in Russian relations with the less developed countries. The Soviets have offered both practical and theoretical training programs to an assortment of such states both in their own country and in the Soviet Union. Among the countries to whom the Soviet Union has given large fishery development projects are Yemen, Tanzania, Ghana, Senegal (tuna fishery), India, Indonesia (navigation academy), Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), Sudan, and Somalia. Fishing ports were constructed in Egypt, Cuba, and India; freezer-trawlers were supplied to North Vietnam; and seiners were transferred to Guinea. Perhaps most significant was the 1964 U.S.S.R.-United Arab Republic fishing agreement that granted the Soviets their first base in Egypt, on the Red Sea at Ras Banas. The fishing agreement resulted in Egyptians training in the Soviet Union, Soviet technicians, advisors, and their families living and working in the U.A.R., and the first license for Soviet-owned ships to use a U.A.R. port.
Additionally, Soviet vessels regularly unload frozen fish and fish meal in many less developed countries such as Nigeria, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ghana where, in turn, local facilities are sometimes made available for Soviet use. The Soviet trade in fish is important for both economic and political reasons, and certainly represents a foreign policy function for their fishing fleet. Undoubtedly, much of the Soviet fish trade with African countries counts as part of their aid program. Past experience has revealed that strings are often attached to Soviet aid programs in the form of administrators, advisors, technicians, propagandists, and others. The newly expanded fish catch has enabled the Soviets to penetrate countries that might have been difficult, if not impossible, to penetrate otherwise.
Soviet inroads into Egypt proved to be a first step toward a Soviet maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. The Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen (D.P.R.Y.) was the stepping-stone to the Arabian Sea from the Soviet-built Egyptian fishing base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea. South Yemen, like other Arab countries, proved useful to the Soviets even though it resisted subjugation to Russian politics and communist ideology. The D.P.R.Y., for instance, acquired trawlers and refrigeration equipment from China, and a fish-canning and fish-processing plant from the Soviet Union. Bearing in mind the lesson of the U.A.R.’s dependence on the Soviet Union, South Yemen has tended toward multinational aid from different members of the socialist camp, so Romanian experts prospect for minerals, and North Koreans advise on farm machinery repair. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. has provided sufficient aid to the D.P.R.Y. to insure continued friendly relations—specifically, Soviet use of Yemen’s port facilities.
The next Soviet stepping-stone in the Indian Ocean was the island of Mauritius. This small island gained its independence in 1968 after 159 years of British rule. In December 1969, the island government planned to grant harbor facilities to Soviet research vessels and fishing trawlers in return for technical aid for the Mauritian fishing industry. In July 1970, the agreement was signed giving the Russians their southernmost base along the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope. In effect, with the Suez Canal closed, Mauritius is to the shipping route around Africa what Yemen is to the route through the Suez. The Soviets have hedged their bets against two alternatives to insure their maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.
Off both coasts of North America and in the Gulf of Alaska, large-scale Soviet commercial fishing operations have been a cause of U. S. and Canadian concern. For instance, in November 1969 Canadian Fisheries Minister Jack Davis charged that fishing operations by huge Soviet fleets were wiping out fish resources and endangering certain species.
In the Gulf of Alaska, American and Soviet fishermen came to odds over the harvesting of king and tanner crab in the eastern portion of the Bering Sea on the U. S. continental shelf. Confrontations between U. S. and Soviet fishermen led to instances of damaged fishing gear, with all the implications of an escalation in violence. However, in 1965 a Soviet-American agreement on the harvesting of crab was signed, and in 1967 an agreement in the interest of conservation of fish stocks and measures to prevent damage to the fishing gear used by fishermen to the two nations was signed for the U. S. Pacific Northwest—off Washington, Oregon, and California. A sidelight to the 1971 renewal of the latter agreement was the provision that Soviet fishing and fisheries support vessels be permitted to make up to four calls per month at each of the Pacific coast ports of Seattle and Portland.
In essence, the massive Soviet fishing effort in traditional North American waters has supported Soviet economic policy, while at the same time making fishing more difficult for the North Americans. Additionally, Soviet-American agreements on the conservation of fish stocks have shown not only a concern by both sides for future fish catches, but a policy desire to avoid situations that might lead to serious conflict. The extension of Soviet fishing and fishery support vessel privileges to visit Seattle and Portland serves to increase Russian presence in North America by peaceful commercial means, and with favorable press coverage.
Soviet fishermen have also made an impact in the Caribbean and South American areas. Cuba provided the foothold for a fishing base in the Western hemisphere. In 1966, the Soviet Union established a fishing fleet command in Havana that included repair yards, cold storage plants, canneries, and warehouses. Extensive docking facilities are able to service more than 100 fishing ships. For more than one reason, Soviet money and technology created the entire modernized Cuban fishing industry. Undoubtedly, both the Cubans and the Russians had an interest in diversity the island’s one-crop sugar economy. The Soviets also had a supply problem for their own fishing fleets operating off the east coasts of the U. S. and Canada—more than 4,000 miles from the Soviet Union. (Soviet ships could resupply at Canadian ports, but not in U.S. harbors without a 30-day prior notice.) Additionally, if the Soviets were to operate in South American waters, a base facility in the Caribbean became a near necessity. In any event, a Soviet interest in fishing from Cuban bases began shortly after Premier Fidel Castro came to power, and it has continued to this date.
Premier Castro estimated that the initial costs of the Soviet-built fishing port in Havana Bay, including seven trawlers, approached 12 million pesos, a coat that Castro was to repay partly in food exports and partly in services provided for Soviet fishing vessels using the facilities. Significantly, the fishing base is not limited to port facilities alone. The project includes a Soviet-aided fisheries school, equipped with scientific equipment and Russian instructors. Additionally, the Soviets allegedly paid $115,000 for each of 90 Spanish fishing trawlers for Cuba to develop a shrimp-boat fleet. As a consequence, South American countries whose only concern for their fishing grounds was the occasional appearance of an American shrimper, now must compete with Soviet and Cuban vessels on a regular basis. Industry leaders have estimated that Cuban shrimp boats will surpass, in both number and technology, American and Mexican shrimp boats operating in the Caribbean.
Havana, then, has provided the Soviets with a port from which Russian vessels can operate throughout the entire Caribbean and east coast of South America. Significantly, the Cuban base has been the keystone to a Soviet Maritime presence in the Western Hemisphere. Using Havana Bay as a base, the Soviets succeeded in making fishing agreements with both Peru and Chile. In the fall of 1971, the Soviets agreed to build a major port complex (estimated at $60 million) for the Peruvian government at the town of Paita. A similar agreement was reached with Chile in late 1971. Pravda reported in April 1972 that the Chilean government has leased five ships which include hydrographic vessels from the Soviet Union. Chilean ship captains were trained on board these ships by the Soviets. Pravda quoted Humberto Martinez, Minister of Lands and Settlement (in charge of Chilean fishing) as saying: “Thanks to the Soviet ships we now have a better opportunity to exploit the resources that the ocean has heretofore concealed from us in its depth.” Indeed, according to Pravda, Soviet ships are taking fish at more than 400 meters—depths that Chilean fishermen have never worked before.
In all likelihood, the Soviet Union will continue to offer fishery projects to South America countries on favorable terms in order to maximize Russian presence and influence. In this context, it is important to note that, to date, Caribbean fishing, as compared to other Soviet fishing areas, has been a marginal economic enterprise. In its peak year, 1965, the Soviet Caribbean fish catch amounted to less than 0.8% of the total Soviet catch, and by 1969 it had decreased to 0.07% of the overall 7.3 million tons. Apparently the political and intelligence-surveillance advantage of operating Soviet fishing boats in the Caribbean and South American waters offsets the adverse economic factor.
The expansion of Soviet fishing into the world’s oceans has not been without incident, both economic and political. In Australia, for instance, an undeclared “prawn war” raged for weeks during 1968 off the Gulf of Carpentaria between Australian fishermen and the huge Soviet exploratory ship Van Gogh. The Van Gogh was accused of ruining the high Gulf grounds by using elaborate electronic suction gear to wipe out the prawn beds—thereby jeopardizing the livelihood of hundreds of Australian fishermen. The most serious accusation seemed to be that the Van Gogh scattered the Australian fishing fleet by brazenly steaming toward them at full speed with her siren wailing. Perhaps as a direct consequence of the Van Gogh affair, a Soviet oceanographic expedition of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet a year later was less than welcome in Australian waters. The expedition was on a mission into the western Pacific and southeast Indian Ocean that involved a transit near Australia. The Soviet Ministry of Defense newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, in reporting the Australian phase of the journey, seemed at a loss to explain the Australian reaction:
“The organizers of this expedition hoped that the littoral countries, close to which the Soviet hydrographic ships would sail, would see the necessity and importance of the research, and scientists in these countries would develop an interest toward working with their colleagues. But strangely, during the expedition’s transit near Australia, the Australian press unrolled an anti-Soviet campaign, once again dragging their readers through the smell of the fiery myth of the communist threat . . .”
Criticism of Soviet fishermen was not limited to foreigners. A Soviet official took officers of the Soviet fishing fleet to task for drunkenness, negligence, carelessness, and general disregard for seafaring traditions. The rebuke, carried in an issue of Vodnyy Transport, stated in part that an unnamed executive of the Sakhalin fisheries administration of Russia’s Pacific coast blamed officer attitudes for accidents and damage to fishing vessels. The official associated these incidents with fishermen’s attitudes—that they were fishermen first and seamen second, with no need to observe navigational rules and traditions. The article attributed the attitude of Soviet fishermen to the failure of the Sakhalin School of Navigation to drill students in “the old traditions of the sea, teach them discipline and how to behave.”
Nevertheless, as Soviet fishing vessels have become commonplace on the world’s oceans, the number of irritating incidents appears to have decreased. Perhaps the U.S.S.R. has won its place in the world as a leading fishing state, and now must play a more responsible, although far from a status quo role.
The national and international roles of the Soviet fishing fleet have grown as a function of increased trawler and support ship tonnage, and advances in technology and oceanography. From all indications, the growth rate will continue.
The underlying motivation for Soviet ocean fishing may well lie in the generally unsatisfactory condition of Soviet agriculture. Harsh climate, poor planning, and a lag in modern agricultural technology and methods have all contributed to the continuous failure of the Soviet Union to fulfill its five-year plans in agriculture. Certainly, the pollution problems of the Soviet Union in the industrial age have contributed to a decrease in fresh water fish through lake and river contamination. Yet, whatever the cause, the result has been most spectacular.
The Soviets have, in fact, been highly successful in harvesting food supplies from the sea. This success, however, has not been limited by domestic need or a market economy. The Soviet fishing industry has been guided by specific goals and quotas set by authoritative plans that serve as an interface between domestic needs and international politics. And in the sphere of international politics and policy, one may conclude that Soviet fishing fleet has, in some degree, provided an entrée for a Russian presence and subsequent influence in Egypt, the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen, the Indian Ocean, and in North and South America.
Without doubt, the increased Soviet fish catch reflects some economic loss to the Western fishing nations as well as a political impact from more Soviet fishing ships and fewer Western fishing ships showing the flag at sea. An additional advantage to the Soviets is the foreign exchange they earn from marketing their excess catch in traditional Western markets.
There is little question that the Soviet fishing industry is an important economic and political asset to Russian sea power. As time has passed and Soviet fishing capabilities improve, the Soviet Union is able to offer fishing trawler and construction programs ashore in several selected nations of the world. This has facilitated the extension of Soviet naval operations into the Indian Ocean and Caribbean Sea—as Russian warships were allowed port privileges in areas where Soviet-sponsored fishing port facilities were constructed. Although the Soviet fishing fleet can no more monopolize world fishing than its navy can dominate and control sea lines of communications, it seems likely that the fishing fleet is meeting the goals established for it by the Kremlin.