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Contents:
Good-bye, Columbus 105
By Lieutenant Commander Nils Rueckert, U. S. Navy, former Executive Officer of the USS Columbus (CG-12)
Fly-away, A Salvage Concept for Today’s Navy 110
By Commander W. I. Milwee, Jr., U. S. Navy Force Salvage Officer, Commander Surface Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Needed: An "Operational Requirement” for fire Resistant Materials 112
By Captain Joseph K. Taussig, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired),
President of Taussig-Tombs & Associates
Mothballing” a once proud and cffective warship is not a very glamor- °Us, pleasant, or easy task, particularly ^hen that warship has been a front-line Un*t and has enjoyed successful operations right up to the end. While U. S. Navymen have been assigned to inactive ships in the past, as evidenced by the once large "mothball fleet,” observa- t'ons and lessons learned by the men ^ho inactivated the USS Columbus (CG-12) hopefully will ease the burden °h those who will be assigned a like task ln the future.
The word that the time for the "Tall ^a<fy” to retire, after nearly 30 years of Vive service, came midway through her I9,3_i974 Mediterranean deployment. 1 he commanding officer of the Columbus T'ceived official notification that the ship ^as to be decommissioned ten months tlence with actual inactivation work c°rnmencing two and a half months after her May 1974 return to Norfolk. ,nce only two officers of our 55-man Cornplement and perhaps six of our ^90-man crew had ever inactivated a ship store, we immediately attempted to svelop a plan for the operation and Vablished tentative governing policies. while personnel manning and what its lrtlpact would have on each one of us was foremost in our minds, our initial step was to acquire and study the applicable publications and instructions, of which few were on board. In addition, we established liaison with the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (ISMF), Portsmouth, Virginia, under whose aegis the ship was to be inactivated, as well as with the type commander, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office, Atlantic Fleet. To coordinate this early phase we assigned the chief engineer, who was both a senior and experienced officer with an engineering background, as the "inactivation officer,” and sent him TAD to Norfolk to begin gathering information and publications. Although the engineer/inactivation officer was not completely relieved of his engineering department responsibilities by the main propulsion assistant until the end of the cruise, he apprised the command of pressing inactivation requirements as the deployment progressed. These actions permitted us to gain control of the operation before we were overtaken by events, or decisions were made in which we had no input.
Next we generated a figure for the man-days required to inactivate the entire ship. This figure was the primary force in determining personnel manning requirements since we already knew the time constraint—decommissioning on 31 January 1975. Not having ISMF personnel available to interpret how elaborate the inactivation process would be, whether certain work would be left until reactivation, and bringing us up-to-date on changes to the inactivation guide, our estimate had a built-in error factor before we started. We inspected every accessible space on the ship, estimating the work required to inactivate each in the areas of hull, electrical, piping, and machinery. The ship’s estimated total man-days required for the task was later reviewed by ISMF personnel and modified, based on their experience in inactivating similar-sized ships, and by deleting tasks assigned to activities other than ship’s force. We calculated the number of working days available between 16 August 1974 and 31 January 1975, less legal holidays, weekends, and a ten-day leave period for each man in determining the crew size necessary for this operation. We also included noninactivation oriented man-days for such tasks as watchstanding, food preparation in the galley, and disbursing services. It was estimated that 60,000 man-days would be required. (We were a little
high: 42,000 man-days were eventually expended on the inactivation work itself.) Based on our recommendations, BuPers approved our requirement for a crew strength of 530 men and a complement of 26 officers.
Once the new crew level was established we began the process of determining who should remain on board throughout inactivation. What was needed was largely a non-rated work force to do all the chipping, cleaning, and painting, supervised by a small core of highly effective petty officers. The reduced manning level required that these petty officers had to be good leaders who were not hesitant about getting dirty themselves. Our policy was that retention of a worker would take precedence over a supervisor. We retained virtually the entire engineering department because of the special skills and knowledge required to inactivate all the machinery and equipment under that department’s cognizance. The deck divisions, 90% non-rated, were kept. Most of the operations and weapons department personnel were transferred, keeping only an expert or two in each of the major systems areas. An exception was the retention of a large number of missile gunner’s mates to inactivate the complex Talos missile handling systems. Across the board, potential disciplinary cases and non-performers were also made available for transfer. The inactivation environment was very structured, with well-defined goals and detailed instructions to follow. This placed particular pressure on the officers and petty officers for full accountability for the productivity of their men and left little leeway for slack days or unanticipated absences. The new mission of the Columbus was productivity oriented, and this productivity was easily measured by the number of spaces being submitted to ISI4F for final inspection and close-out each week.
The ship’s organization was revamped to reflect the changes in our mission such that the operations and weapons departments were disestablished. F*ve major teams were formed. (Table 1 iUuS' trates the ship’s inactivation organization.)
► The engineering team retained responsibility for the main propulsion spaces and all electrical and auxiliary equip ment. The engineer officer coordinate and supervised electrical, auxiliary, an shipfitter support for all teams. Auxiliary equipment inactivation and electrical work had to be completed before any compartment could be submitted (°! close-out. All piping and ventilati°n systems in an interior space with tops'^e openings had to be blanked as well-
► The deck/weapons team was responsibk for all topside areas, the weapon launch ers and mounts, deck gear, and the Talos missile houses and magazines.
► The electronics team had responsibihP
for the antennas, all superstructure inte rior spaces including communication5 and fire control equipment rooms, clC’ and sonar. .
► Alpha team had responsibility f°r a ^
spaces below the main deck, forward 0 the main engineering spaces. .
► Charlie team had responsibility f°r a spaces below the main deck, aft of main engineering spaces.
The more senior officers were retained for the team head billets. Experience and maturity were very important in meeting the challenge of effectively managing each inactivation team. Each team head was a proven leader and manager. Alpha and Charlie teams were headed by lieutenant commanders while the other three were headed by lieutenants. All the Columbus’ supply department officers, headed by a lieutenant commander, and all warrant officers were retained as well. The "inactivation officer,” also a lieutenant commander, coordinated plans and progress between the team leaders and ISMF and other outside activities, and established a uniform, periodic system of progress reporting. His office centralized all information relevant to the inactivation, managed the large portable tool inventory, and coordinated the schedule and work of the gas free engineers. In reassigning the crew within the new organization, the ship attempted to maintain former division integrity whenever possible. The mass transfer of petty officers to other fleet units, however, created a temporary personnel shortage which required the augmentation of some 100 non-rated men to bring us up to strength.
When the word got around that the Columbus was to be decommissioned, the ship was immediately looked upon as a source of urgently needed parts and equipment. This was to be expected, but it had to be made clear that the ship was to remain a ready unit of the fleet at least until her return from the final deployment, and that she was being placed in the reserve fleet and was not being stricken. This necessitated maintaining the integrity and completeness of all installed systems and equipment. In weighing the priority of retaining equipment or component parts versus having them cannibalized for other fleet units, higher authority eventually authorized, on a case-by-case basis, numerous items for removal from the Columbus— but all will have to be replaced if she is to be considered a viable reserve fleet asset. Another decision made early was that not a single nonconsumable item would be transferred off the ship without being documented on requisition and receipt forms (DD n49or 1348-i) and signed by the CO. Some transfers were subsequently questioned for various reasons, and a well-documented transfer file proved valuable. The transfer of any installed equipment or equipment components required CNO’s approval.
A number of items had to be routinely removed from the ship, and this large task commenced shortly after our return to CONUS. Stores and supplies, classified documents, deteriorative items, such as life rafts and life jackets, and a myriad of other things began moving. The immensity of this moving operation was not appreciated until storerooms, shops, storage lockers, fan rooms, and voids that had been progressively filled for years now had to be emptied.
One of the lessons learned was to remove as much gear from the ship as possible before arrival at the inactivation facility. Deciding on a stowage plan for topside antennas and equipment that are to be stowed inside the ship should also be done early. Major evolutions included the weapons offload and de- fueling. It was imperative, from the time decommissioning was first announced in February 1974, to overcome the misconception of many, including our own crew, that the ship was a grab bag, with things available to be taken off at will. Intensive indoctrination and tight security controls were necessary to ensure that government property was not re-
Table I VSS Columbus Inactivation Organization
COMMANDING OFFICER
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
CMAA
ADMINISTRATIVE/MEDICAL
DEPARTMENT
INACTIVATION
OFFICER
SUPPLY
DEPARTMENT
GAS FREE ENGINEER
TOOLS CONTROL OFFICER
ENGINEERING
TEAM
DECK/WEAPONS
TEAM
ELECTRONICS
TEAM
ALPHA
TEAM
CHARLIE
TEAM
108 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1975
moved or transferred without proper authority and to discourage souvenir hunters.
A head start was gained on inactivation work by completing over 6,000 man-days before reporting to ISMF. Permission was granted to shut down most combat systems and to commence de- bricking of the boilers upon return from deployment. As early as April, inactivation work commenced on the huge helicopter hangar bay space.
Crew habitability was an immediate concern for the operation. A reactivated barracks ship (APL-50) was made available to the Columbus and berthed at the same pier at St. Helena’s Annex of ISMF in Norfolk. Since St. Helena’s Annex is located in the Berkley section of South Norfolk, some distance from the nearest messing and berthing facilities ashore, the APL was used for crew messing and berthing, as well as for office spaces. It was necessary to move off the ship as soon after reporting to ISMF as possible, to facilitate shutdown of ventilation systems and draining of all shipboard piping systems, as well as to psychologically adapt everyone to the new modus
Inactivation work required a new uniform—hardhats and coveralls.
operandi of inactivation. The APL’s galley and mess decks were activated three days after beginning inactivation of the Columbus, followed a week later by the wholesale crew move from the Columbus to APL berthing spaces. Civilian contractor personnel assumed food service duties, which released additional men for the inactivation teams, although we retained our cooks, and continued mess operations up until the day of decommissioning. Minimal manpower was lost in maintaining acceptable cleanliness standards in the APL berthing spaces since compartment cleaners were usually men with light duty chits from sick bay.
The shift from an operational to an industrial environment was not easy. A full and productive eight hours of work a day was required and demanded of every man on board. "Knock Off Ship’s Work” at 1600 did not mean that a man had already left his working space and was waiting topside to leave the ship. Only at 1600 could he take off his hard hat and proceed across the pier to the APL to clean up before going ashore. Formal training and other functions not essential to the inactivation process were terminated. A training program in safety, first aid, and proper tool handling had been conducted prior to commencement of inactivation. Ship’s routine was modified to allow one-half hour for lunch and was scheduled to run in shifts which were not included in the computation of the eight-hour working day. Generally all non-productive activities, such as haircuts, personal business, mail call, etc., were scheduled outside the 0800-1600 day.
A permanent quarterdeck watch team was formed and assigned directly to the senior watch officer. Five OOD/POOW teams were set up, each team standing an eight-hour watch and going off duty when relieved, with no other assigned duties. Chief petty officers or first class petty officers were assigned as OODs, and third class petty officers or seamen as POOWs. With this procedure, men were not taken away from the inactivation teams during working hours for watchstanding purposes. As a side benefit, it produced a professional watchstanding team which was well-indoctrinated in the watch requirements based on the new circumstances of inactivation. The remaining watch requirements included a command duty officer with one or two officer assistants, a duty master-at-arms, roving security watches in various sections of the ship after working hours, and a security watch at the gate to St. Helena’s Annex.
The ship’s medical and dental officers were detached prior to inactivation, and several senior hospital corpsmen administered sick bay and tended the routine minor medical problems. Many man- days were lost, however, because of the distances and transportation problems involved in referring men to medical facilities in the area in cases where doctors had to be seen. For example, requiring an annual physical or routine dental appointment cost at least half a man-day per individual. We also had some "gold- brickers” who sought any excuse to get out of work and showed up at sick call frequently. In retrospect, we should have attempted to retain our medical officer longer.
The first month of inactivation was a very turbulent one. The change in shipboard organization and the influx of large numbers of new personnel created divisions and teams that were working together for the first time at a job they were new at doing. Alpha and Charlie teams, in particular, had no identity
whatsoever with the old organization-
The leaders of these teams, and to :l lesser extent the other team leaders, had to quickly build team identity and morale in a difficult environment. The move off the ship to APL-50 and the attendant problems associated with using compartments and heads that were built to World War II standards, and were still being renovated and repaired, aggravated this unsettled situation. The demands on effective leadership increased proportionately with the many personnel changes. Between M3/ and July over 100 of the 200 petty off*' cers in the weapons department alone were transferred. Our goal from the beginning emphasized a 31 January 19^ decommissioning. Everything had to be directed to that one mission. Except f°r duty section personnel, we never had to implement a working schedule for wee* ends or holidays. ^
I
Shipboard personnel kept informed 0 the inactivation progress by checking 3 simple straight line graph, which be^ came known as the "Green Line,’ 0
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The false overheads, bulkhead paneling, and deck tiles had to he removed from all spaces. Weapons tracking consoles were covered with plywood.
calendar weeks versus percent comple- tlQn to date. Weekly progress meetings "dth ismf personnel produced our actual percent completion to date, or how close we were to the "Green Line.” We also Published weekly in the plan of the day ^ow many compartments were assigned to each team and how many each team had closed-out to date to give the crew a more visible and understandable gauge °f progress within their own teams and to promote some competition. There ^cre some 860 spaces to be closed-out, ranging in size from a small fan room °r office to a fireroom or the hangar bay. ^hen it became necessary to equalize lhe workloads of various teams, spaces '''ere reassigned between the teams, and n°t people, in order to maintain team ■ntegrity and esprit de corps. In organizing che work, the teams generally started at che extremities of the ship and worked tQWard the quarterdeck. Difficult spaces sUch as voids, pump rooms, and diesel sPaces were started first, along with a Certain number of easy spaces however, 'n order to meet the overall goal of X
number of compartments completed per week. This was important for morale along with the practice of frequently rotating men assigned to heavily corroded spaces.
During the inactivation, a conscious effort was made to keep the military aspects of our organization visible. The industrial environment in a remote section of Norfolk, with the coveralls and hardhats the uniform of the day, coupled with the loss of unit pride in not being able to steam, communicate, shoot, and do all the other things associated with belonging to a ship’s crew, made us emphasize the basic military evolutions. Quarters for muster, instruction, and inspection were held each morning, the ship’s quarterdeck was run in true cruiser fashion including the continued use of bugle calls (on tape), and time was taken to hold a captain’s personnel inspection bimonthly which included an address to all hands and the presentation of awards, letters of commendation and advancement certificates. Morale steadily improved as inactivation progressed.
Every man assigned to a space knew the deadline date for reaching certain inactivation milestones in that space. This was truly a team effort where every man counted. A commendatory liberty program was initiated whereby each team head could nominate a certain number of men weekly for a day of early liberty for outstanding performance. With the rigorous schedule, this was a sought- after distinction.
While we attempted to develop a professional working atmosphere, off duty and special programs were also developed for the crew. The welfare and recreation committee remained active, sponsoring a ship’s picnic, a family Christmas party, and a ship’s farewell dinner-dance. BuPers sent Class "A” school detailers to St. Helena’s Annex to interview non-rated men and approve school requests on the spot. The Norfolk Naval Supply Center sent people from the household goods office to allow men of the Columbus with out-ofarea transfer orders to make household moving plans right on board.
Outside of all the administrative and organizational procedures employed to upgrade productivity, the real key to a productive sailor was the proper motivation, leadership, and supervision he received from his officers and petty officers. This was a time for all hands to dig in and get their hands dirty, from the most senior officer to the youngest seaman. The most effective supervisors were those handling a chipping hammer, needle gun, or paint brush alongside their men.
Editor’s Note: Tor accounts describing the inactivation of other ships (USS Randolph [cvs-n], USS Tench [SS-417] and USS Mount Baker [AE-4]) see H. L. Hussman, pp. 38-48, November 1969; J. R. Henderson, pp. 94-93, April 1970; J. A. Henry, Jr., pp. 105-106, August 1970 Proceedings.