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"The Lessons of Vietnam”
(See J. E. Grccnbackcr, pp. 18-25, July; and
pp. 83-84, December 1973 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral A. E. Jarrell, U. S. Navy (Retired} —The lesson to be learned from Vietnam is the same lesson we should have learned from Korea, but didn’t. The lesson is: It is a fallacy to wage no-win wan.
From our country’s birth until World War II neared its end, our political leaders’ wartime strategy was attuned to the thinking of the American people. Wars were fought to be won as quickly as practicable, thus limiting casualties and costs, and keeping to a minimum the time our citizen-warriors were absent from their normal occupations. The no-win strategy was put into effect in Korea without obtaining the consent of the American people. It was a departure from American tradition.
I agree that . . in the Korean War, the one most like Vietnam, although with important differences, weariness set in before the end of two years.” The Inchon landing, however, took place about 80 days after the Communists launched their initial assault. A few days later, our tanks were at the Yalu river. The enemy was in complete disarray. Our landing at Wonsan was unopposed. Almost everyone at the scene believed that the war was about over. True, the Chinese People’s Volunteers had concentrated north of the Yalu, but their field commander, Lin Piao, feared a mutiny (Lin later was Mao Tse-tung’s heir apparent, but was killed in an airplane accident in September 1971). Lin knew, and it was common knowledge among
his troops, that if they invaded Korea they could not subsist off the land, but would be dependent on their dumps in Manchuria. To allay the "Volunteers’ ” fears, Lin published a leaflet which stated that he had been assured that Washington would restrain General Douglas MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against Lin’s lines of supply. Lin was referring to an agreement between British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and President Harry S. Truman. General MacArthur had not been informed of the agreement, but it was made known to the Communists by British diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean who, on the verge of being arrested, fled to the Soviet Union.
With his lines of supply assured, Lin invaded, and the war went on. The invasion angered President Truman, who threatened to use whatever force he considered necessary to kill the invasion, and Attlee promptly flew to the United States to hold Truman to his agreement. Yes, weariness did set in, both at home and among our troops.
The author refers to several successes where our maritime strength was employed in limited capacity, but he attributes our failure at the Bay of Pigs ". . . because it was wrongly assumed that the [Cubans] would arise and join the invaders without waiting to see which side was winning.” Actually, the invasion had been planned very carefully and, had it been carried out as planned, success would have been assured. Cuban Freedom Fighters had received military training in Guatemala, Panama, Florida, Louisiana, and at Fort Meade, near
Washington. The essential element of the invasion plan (called Operation Pluto) was the use of air power. Castro’s tiny air force of 20-odd aircraft was to be destroyed on the ground with a minimum of three air strikes. There were to be two strikes prior to the invasion, and a third to coincide with the landings. The invasion plan also called for knocking out Castro’s fuel supplies, thus immobilizing his tanks, trucks, and tractor-drawn weapons. On White House orders, the first strike was cut from 16 to eight planes. The second strike was canceled; also the third. The first, and only, strike of eight planes caught Castro by surprise and inflicted heavy damage, which Castro admitted in a televised report to the nation. Our political decision to cancel the second strike (and, of course, the third) doomed the invasion. We didn’t give the Cuban population any real opportunity to join the invaders. They had no choice but to remain passive. What could have been an easy victory for the Freedom Fighters turned out to be a fiasco because of our political vacillations.
I agree that, in Vietnam, ". . . maxi-
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members arc invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
mum effective employment of the forces available was never permitted.” The author discusses, in general, only the employment of our own forces. He touches very lightly on the employment of the forces of South Vietnam, and not at all on the employment of the large contingent from the Republic of Korea. An attacker has a tremendous advantage if he is permitted to do his ground fighting in the territory he has invaded. Nothing would have dismayed the North Vietnamese more than to have their southern kin hit them where it would hurt the most—at home. The Communists would have been so busy defending their homeland, and repairing the destruction incident thereto, that they could not have created a problem in Laos or Cambodia, and there would not now remain a force of 300,000 armed enemy troops in South Vietnam. This is the equivalent of about three million armed enemy troops in our own country. The man with the bayonet is a compelling factor, and to get him in the right place at the right time is one of the most important functions of our
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1973. 360 Pages. Illustrated. Bibliography.
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Navy, but he was never seen in North Vietnam. If we had made it clear that we would support a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam, the war might have ended much earlier, possibly without the need to accomplish the invasion.
I heard the late President Syngman Rhee plead futilely, time after time, with American diplomats and military leaders for permission to win, with his own troops. "Just give us the weapons and let us get the job done,” he said, ". . . because if you don’t beat him, he will one day beat you.”
The fear of a major war has been overplayed. It was used during the Korean War, although we were five years ahead of other nations in developing the big weapon. Russia had only exploded an atomic device, and did not have a deliverable bomb. Of course, a major war may break out at any time, but we seem to be obsessed with the idea that caution should be a unilateral American policy. Caution is, or should be, a two-way proposition. Possession of adequate military strength is the only
Ilicitcment to liar
way to keep a would-be enemy from becoming reckless.
It seems to me that the lesson of Vietnam is the same as the lesson of Korea, but we have yet to learn it. We have made the same mistake twice. Let’s not get into another war unless we intend to win it.
"Great White Fleet”
Survivor Dies
Thomas G. Kilpatrick, Radio Officer, SS America Sun—It may be of interest to the members of the Naval Institute, that one of the survivors of the ’round the world cruise of the "Great White Fleet,” passed away on 2 October 1973.
He was "Admiral” Ellwood Hayes, who operated the Hayes launch Service in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania for many years, and who was a 16-year-old in the USS Ohio (BB-12), when President Theodore Roosevelt sent the Battle Fleet off on its famous cruise.
Ellwood Hayes was very proud of his naval service, and had a number of photographs and other mementoes of the cruise in his office at the head of Sun Oil Company’s number one dock in Marcus Hook.
Although he was well up in the 90s, Mr. Hayes was still active in his business, and still piloted a launch until just over a year ago.
For Christmas of 1972, at my suggestion, Mr. Hayes’ daughter and son-in- law, bought him a copy of the Naval Institute Press book, The United Staid Steel Navy, and I understand that the old gentleman hardly let it out of his sight thereafter.
"Laser: The Light Fantastic”
(See K. R. Stehling, pp. 42-48, August 1973
Proceedings)
Dr. Holman W. Jenkins—We and the rest of the world are standing on the threshold of a development of unprecedented significance: an X-ray laser which, instead of being reflected back and forth many times while its energy level is being built up, will penetrate objects regardless of whether they have an opti' cal reflecting surface. An X-ray beam by its nature dissipates its energy as it penetrates its target: it’s rate of dissipation
Comment and Discussion
75
being inversely proportionate to the depth of the mass it is penetrating. By conventional standards, this means that the greater the mass resorted to in shielding a target, the more intense would be the concentrated dissipation of energy. As a tactical weapon, an X-ray laser theoretically would be the most revolutionary instrument yet developed. Depending on its portability, it would make obsolete every other weapon.
Such technical difficulties as there are in producing a beam of extremely high- power and minute divergence does not seem insurmountable, given what has been accomplished since I960. It isn’t beyond the realm of credibility that experimental X-ray lasers already exist in a number of countries. If so, the jolts that we’ve experienced so far in this century are as nothing to the revolution that military and naval science will undergo as a result of the development of this new tactical weapon.
The Big Ten: Our Trident Missile Submarine Class
R. Kaplan—The ten submarines to possess the Trident missile will form the backbone of the deterrent strength of the United States. They should, therefore, carry names commensurate with their atomic capabilities. They will also be the largest, heaviest, and costliest submarines ever constructed by this or any other nation.
"Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1969-1972”
(See E. H. Simmons, pp. 196-223, May 1973 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth F. Leon, U. S. Navy—That is an omission concerning U. S. Marine support forces participating in the Easter Offensive of 1972.
No mention is made of the deployment of Marine EA-6A electronic warfare
diction craft (CPIC) as the Mk. 92, when it is actually the Mk. 93.
The Mk. 92 is the fire control system which will be used in the PHM and the PF. This system is the "Americanized” version of the Dutch Wm-27 series and is analogous to the Mk. 87/Dutch Wm 22. The Mk. 93 is a completely different beast, which was developed by Honeywell to Navy specifications. At 5% of the cost, 70% of the capability, and 15% of the weight of the Mk. 92 (for the PHM), the Mk. 93 represents a major breakthrough in small, inexpensive, and effective fire control systems. The Mk. 92 does not.
The ten names I propose come from British warships built before and during World War I. The "big ten” would be known as the Centurion class. The other nine boats would bear the names of the Champion, Colossus, Crusader, Defender, Dauntless, Hercules, Leviathan, Unity, and Victorious.
"Incident in the Nanpo Shoto”
(See B. McCandless, pp. 67-77, July 197} Proceedings)
A
Joseph H. S. Haggin—During the Naval Academy cruise in the summer of 1949, Commander McCandless was commanding officer of Mine Division 2, with the USS Shannon (DM-25) as the flagship. We Plebes were, among other things, detailed as messengers for the CO.
We had refueled from the USS Missouri (BB-6}) one morning and I had manned the forward distance line. My hands were raw and bleeding when we finished but 1 didn’t have time to think about it, because 1 was due on the signal bridge for the 12 to 4 watch as messenger. We had just resumed our station in the screen around the Missouri, when the skipper shoved a clipboard in my hand and told me to get the message
aircraft belonging to Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1 and 2 to DaNang Air Base in Vietnam and to the Naval Air Station, Cubi Point in the Philippines. Commander, Task Force (CTF) 77 ordered this deployment in early April 1972 and VMCJ 1 and 2 assets were tasked heavily to provide active electronic jamming services against the North Vietnamese electromagnetic environment. These highly-specialized aircraft and flight crews participated in daily Gulf of Tonkin operations in support ofOperation Linebacker throughout April and at least through the May 1972 aerial mining of Haiphong Harbor. Marine EA-6As were on-station for all Navy alfa-strikes and for coordinated U. S. Navy tactical air and U. S. Air Force B-52 air strikes.
As electronic warfare officer for Commander, Task Group (CTG) 77.0, the Yankee Station commander, I participated in direct liaison with the Marine EA-6A flight crews and in tasking them on a daily basis for these operations. Their contribution to the survivability of airborne strike forces over North Vietnam was significant and should not be overlooked.
"Small Combatants—1973”
(See A. D. Baker, 111, pp. 2J8-269, May; and p. 98, November 197} Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Donald G. Todaro, U. S. Navy— In his Naval Review essay, Mr. Baker identified the fire control system for the coastal patrol and inter
to Commander McCandless on the double. From my place on the wing of the signal bridge, I could see him up on the forecastle taking in the sun. I sounded off and offered the clipboard complete with bloody smudges on the message blank. He read the message, initialed it, and then asked me where the blood came from. I showed my hands and explained about the distance line. The chief boatswain’s mate was working nearby and the Commander immediately began advising him, in colorful terms, that he had better provide gloves for the refueling crew thereafter. The chief aye- aye’d and went back to his work. Commander McCandless then turned to me and gave me what-for for not getting gloves in the first place.
Like all good chewings out, this one didn’t instill any fear of the man at all. For the remainder of the cruise, I never encountered Commander McCandless again without him asking about my hands, once ashore in Cherbourg. It’s a little thing but, as your commentary says, he is still very much in our memories, expecially in mine. He was a real sailor.
"R.A.F.—Redundant Air Force”
(See G. W. R. Nicholl, pp. 57-64, August
197} Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, U. S. Air Force—Perhaps the most important trouble with the article is that its major premise is invalid. Commander Nicholl does not make this premise explicit until his last page when he says: "In summary, the case put forward has attempted to show that a 'strategic bombing’ objective in conventional war. . . .” The key word is "conventional.” He is proposing the elimination of Britain’s strategic bombing capability on the assumption that all future wars will be conventional. This is a very attractive concept, and it seems to me that this indeed will probably be the case. There are many among the arms control scholars, however, who would say that the surest way to guarantee that it would not be the case, would be for one side or the other to do away with its nuclear deterrent force.
Another major fault with Commander Nicholl’s argument is that he
ignores the political aspects of the problem. Strategic bombing did not live up to its pre-World War II notices; but, at the political level, that is beside the point. What is important is what the world believes to be the case. We have seen France and China feverishly building up a strategic bombing capability without much hope of ever bypassing the United States or Russia. Why have they made these sacrifices? It seems obvious that these two powers, at least, feel strongly that there is some important political utility inherent in the possession of a force de frappe— regardless of the military usefulness of such forces. While it is true that Great Britain is no longer the superpower it was in the 19th century, it is also true that it remains one of the great powers, and a part of that power is derived from the existence of its long-range nuclear striking forces. Thus, eliminate the Royal Air Force, and you eliminate one of the pillars of that power which Great Britain still possesses.
The article presents as historical fact the assertion that aircraft carriers are inherently less vulnerable and less expensive than shore bases. This can hardly be more than an opinion, and evidence to the contrary might include: the reluctance of the British admirals to hazard running the gauntlet to succor Malta during World War II, the loss of ships on that run, and the long survival of that shore base against everything the Luftwaffe had to throw against it. If carriers are so invulnerable, why was Doolittle prematurely launched against Tokyo merely because the task force had been spotted by a Japanese fishing vessel? If carriers are so invulnerable, why then the constant tension between the Pacific admirals and the ground commanders over the retention of carrier air support near the beachheads for more than a few days? It is doubtless true that, in a way, in a later war, the carriers on Yankee Station were more secure than was DaNang or Chu Lai, but to present the idea as a historical law is certainly open to question.
Commander Nicholl says that an airman can be trained in a matter of months, whereas it takes years to bring up a good soldier or sailor. Here again we find an assertion presented as a historical truth. What kind of sailor? What
kind of airman? No doubt, in World War II, a Swordfish pilot could be trained more rapidly than a battleship commander. Is the same idea true when the pilot is the commander of an F-4 and the sailor the coxswain of a whaleboat? How long does it take to qualify a man to be OOD underway on a destroyer— about a year after graduation from the Academy? What about a B-52 aircraft commander—four to five years?
Nicholl’s article cites the findings of the Morrow Board of 1925 as support for his ideas about the impropriety of a separate air force. Here, his historiographical fault is more one of omission and misinterpretation than it is of error of fact. He omits that the Congress had formed the Lampert Committee which came in with conclusions quite opposed to those of Morrow. One recent interpretation of the whole affair was that President Coolidge, wishing to undermine the conclusions of the Lampert Committee and help build the government’s case against Mitchell, hurriedly convened the Morrow Board and presented it with the "party line.' Supposedly, that line was duly ratified and published just two weeks before the Congressional Committee came in with its report.
M
Commander Nicholl again makes an interpretation which some would call faulty when he blames the Air Ministry for the inadequacies of Royal Navy aviation at the outset of World War II. He complains that the ships were too small- and that the aircraft were too slow and obsolete. Defenders of the Air Ministry would argue that, in every case, the aircraft delivered to the Navy lived up to or exceeded the specifications which had been laid down by the Navy itself Moreover, they would argue that the real fault lay in the conservative attitude of the higher reaches of the Royal Navy- By the 1930s, the American admirals— many of them—were beginning to think of the aircraft carrier as the capital ship of the future and that its aircraft were becoming the main repositories of the offensive power of the fleet. The British admirals, on the other hand, never departed from the older ideas. The battleship remained the key to victory- Aircraft carriers and their charges were only auxiliaries. The natural result of this was that the admirals thought that
Comment and Discussion 77
the optimum carrier would be a relatively small vessel, and because of this smallness, there would be little room onboard for a large variety of aircraft. Thus, there was a tendency for the Royal Navy to desire all-purpose aircraft—which could never have the load capacity of a good bomber, the speed of a good fighter, nor the range of a good reconnaissance airplane. It seems to me that Nicholl’s argument that the Air ministry’s foot-dragging forced the Royal Navy to order American aircraft simply does not hold water—it appears to be more likely that it was the conservatism of the British admirals themselves which was at fault. But then, did the Royal Navy even need aircraft as good as America’s?
Commander Nicholl is critical of Lord Trenchard for the latter’s belief that the bomber will always get through. Now, it is obvious that the bomber did not always get through with acceptable losses. This error, however, cannot justly be laid at Trenchard’s door. He left office in 1929, and up until that time, it was certainly true that the bomber did always get through- witness the World War I Gotha raids on London. The thing which made the idea invalid was the invention of radar in 1935, so, if there is any fault to be assigned, we must find another recipient.
Nicholl cites the North African campaign as evidence that airpower ought not be organized as a separate Service. Yet, the ground commanders themselves have lauded the work of the R.A.F., and criticized that of the U. S. Army Air Force in the earlier days of the latter’s participation in that campaign. The R.A.F. was centrally controlled by an air officer at the theater level; at first, the American tactical airpower was dedicated to the ground commanders down to the division level. These ground commanders were understandably reluctant to release any of their inactive airpower to go to hotter parts of the front. Thus, the Luftwaffe, which suffered an overall numerical inferiority, was able to achieve local air superiority time and again, all because the American tactical airpower had been parceled out in "penny packets” to the individual ground commanders. Over the objections of General Patton and others, the
air commanders persuaded General Eisenhower to centralize the operational control of tactical airpower under the air commander at the theater level. Once the methods of the R.A.F. had been adopted in this way, the Luftwaffe’s local air superiority was quickly overcome.
Commander Nicholl presents the classical anti-strategic bombing argument in the latter part of his article. He argues that, despite the great efforts of the Bomber Command and the 8th and 15th Air Forces, German industrial production continued upwards until the fall of 1944, months after the landings had been made at Normandy. Insofar as he goes, that is perfectly correct, but it is a gross oversimplification. First, he does not point out that the campaign had not been a pure strategic bombing effort. There had been major diversions in pursuit of tactical goals. In 1942, the greater part of American strategic airpower was sent off to the Mediterranean. When it returned to Britain months later, it was again diverted (fruitlessly) to the antisubmarine campaign over the strong objections of the air commanders. That crisis was hardly passed when the time came for Eisenhower to assume operational control of the strategic bombers for use in the support of Over- lord. Thus, a great deal of effort was diverted from the bombing campaign against Germany. The point is that fully three-quarters of the bomb tonnage dropped on Germany was delivered after the Normandy landings. When that fact is coupled with the knowledge of what happened after the fall of 1944, one must conclude that Nicholl’s arguments are open to serious doubt. All the other evidence aside, in Chapter 20 of his book, Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer, Hitler’s economics tsar, said he went to the Fuhrer in early 1945, before the Allied armies were across the Rhine, and told Hitler that the bombing would bring the German economy to a complete halt in a matter of weeks—no matter what the surface forces did. There is no doubt that unaided strategic bombing did not force the capitulation of Germany. That is not the same as saying that it could or could not have done so.
Another serious methodological error in the article is that it uses quotes out
of context in support of ideas quite opposed to those in the original source. Nicholl uses the words of Michael Howard’s essay, "Bombing and the Bomb,” in the book, Studies in War & Peace, to support the proposition that the R.A.F. be abolished and its resources assigned to the surface forces. Yet, in the very same article, Howard says: "The logical development would therefore seem that deterrent and disarmament forces should ultimately come together under a single authority, distinct from the ministry, or the Department of Defence; leaving to the latter the organization of armed forces and the conduct of limited wars.” That, in fact, is the main theme of the Howard essay, and it is clear that it could more readily be used to justify the transfer of the Polaris submarines to the R.A.F. than to abolish that organization in favor of the Army and Navy.
If the want of historical support were not enough to bring Commander Nicholl’s thesis into doubt, the faults in his logic would certainly do so. He goes back to the old arguments of the 1920s and says that there is a basic division of military spheres along the shore line. In order to properly conduct wars in its sphere, according to Nicholl, the Army and the Navy must control the air above the land and the sea. He cites various episodes from World War II to show that to do this the men flying the machines must be trained up in the Army and Navy so that they will speak the same language as their compatriots on the surface (why not train up the sailors and soldiers in the air so that they would speak the same language as the airmen?) After all his various criticisms (of doubtful validity) of the R.A.F., Commander Nicholl does grant that it did win the Battle of Britain—but here he says that had the fliers been in the Army they would have done the job better! Without trying to defend the R.A.F. in all the other battles, I would like to assert here that had the fliers been in the Army, then it is highly likely that the Battle of Britain would have been lost. First, almost every authority on the subject holds that it was a very close thing, and it would not have taken much to tip the scales in favor of Germany. The Messerschmitt 109 and the Spitfire were just about evenly matched.
The latter was an aircraft specifically designed and consciously acquired for the mission of strategic defense. The former was more-or-less accidentally acquired, in spite of the soldier-airmen of the Luftwaffe, through the personal efforts of Willy Messerschmitt. Now, if soldiers had been in charge of writing specifications for British airpower in the 1930s, what sort of aircraft would have emerged? The Spitfire or a first class dive-bomber? If, as Commander Nicholl says, an airplane is only another kind of artillery, does it not seem very likely that that sort of attitude would surely have resulted in the development of aircraft wholly unsuited to fighting the Battle of Britain? Would a first-class torpedo plane have been preferable to the Spitfire? Commander Nicholl’s logic is its weakest when he asserts that, had the Army controlled the development of aviation, the Battle of Britain would not even have been necessary because the ground forces would have had the proper airpower to carry the day in France. This was not at all likely. It is true that the want of airpower did little
to enhance the prospects of the British forces in France. But far more important was faulty strategy and ground organization. The two great British theorists, Basil Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, had been arguing all through the inter-war years for the organization of tanks into their own units, which could properly exploit their mobility and firepower. Their pleas fell on deaf ears in their homeland. But the Germans were listening, for they organized their armored forces in just that manner—and that turned out to be a vital factor in the German victory in 1940. The Allies, who outnumbered the Germans in armor, had their tanks spread out all along the line, organized into small units, in an auxiliary role to the infantry. Further, the Allied strategy, designed to meet the problems of the previous war, swung the British and French armies up into the low countries in the attempt to meet the German onslaught further forward than had been the case in 1914. The Germans did not come through the low countries, however, and they struck through the
Ardennes Forest and were able to cut across the rear of the entire British and a large part of the French armies. There is no reason to assume that the British soldiers, had they controlled their own airpower, would have treated their aircraft any differently than the tanks. They probably would have spread them out all over Western Europe in "penny packets.” Nor can we assume that the mere possession of airpower would have improved the soldiers’ strategy making.
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Meanwhile, what was going on back in Britain? Cries for additional fighters were coming from the French and the British generals of the expeditionary force. Since the Allied armies already had the Germans outnumbered in practically every category, is there any reason at all to suppose that additional fighters would have saved them—especially since the bombers these fighters were to have protected were already shot down? Or is it more likely that the provision of more airpower to the British forces would merely have meant that more would have been lost? The critical point here is that the War Cabinet met to
Comment and Discussion 79
consider the anguished pleas coming from France. Churchill was on the point of sending yet another ten squadrons of Hurricanes to France. Air Marshal Dowding, then the Commander of Fighter Command, set himself against this, and persuaded the Prime Minister that such a move would entail the defeat of Great Britain. Now, had Dowding been an army man, what would his answer have been? Can anyone suppose that these vital squadrons would have been held in Britain where they very probably were decisive in the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain?
Leaving World War II behind, Commander Nicholl asserts that "The crucial decision to carry strategic bombing across the DMZ was made in mid- 1964.” That sentence betrays an incomplete understanding of airpower. Strategic bombing is the attack of the enemy’s will and means to fight at their sources. This means that one must attack the factories producing the war materiel. In the case of Vietnam, those factories were not even in Southeast Asia so the campaign cannot properly be described as one of "strategic” bombing. In that same sentence, the author contradicts himself. Earlier, he had insisted that the only real accomplishment of the heavy bomber force in World War II came when it was assigned to attack the enemy railway systems in Western Germany, Belgium, and France. He goes on to say that this was a "tactical” target system. How can it be that the railroad line between Hanoi and China is a "strategic” target and the one between Paris and Germany was a "tactical” one? Nicholl also asserts that Trenchard was wrong to say that one ought to strike enemy resources as far behind the front as possible—the author’s argument here is that the further back one goes, the more dispersed is the enemy’s industry. In a few cases, that may be true. But the more typical instance might be that all of Germany’s aviation gasoline in World War II was being produced in only six synthetic oil plants. How much easier would it be to destroy these six targets, assuming them to be in range, than to go after thousands upon thousands of refueling trucks? Is it better to get a squad along the front, or a convoy along a road, or a troop train, or a troop transport upon
the seas, or a major training base in the enemy homeland? That is what Trenchard was talking about.
Nicholl’s proposition, that the R.A.F. should be abolished, has not been much discussed here. The counter argument would be an article, or perhaps even a book, in itself. Without passing any profound judgment on that issue, I nevertheless feel that the author has failed to prove his case.
L. John Clarke— Having served with both the Royal Australian and Royal Air Force, I am afraid that I find the article to contain the same carefully selected facts and one-sided arguments that have characterized interservice jealousies for centuries, and have inevitably sent many good men to their deaths while their senior officers take aim at their brother Services, rather than at the enemy.
Thus, Lieutenant Commander Nicholl claims that: "A man can become a proficient pilot in months; it takes years to become a proficient soldier or sailor.” A claim so extraordinary that one could suggest it be told to the Marines—particularly those flying British vertical takeoff combat aircraft, whose potential is still being explored.
One finds, too, that great emphasis is laid only on the least successful campaigns of the Royal Air Force, even to picking out one raid on Cologne in which only 474 of the enemy died (the effect on British morale of this first 1,000-bomber raid is never mentioned; yet, it was a tremendous boost to a nation still being bombed by the Luftwaffe and quite weary after years of defeat and shortages).
Further, the picking out of isolated instances is a method of argument which can backfire quite badly; should we assume from the slaughter of the Russian fleet at Tsushima that the Russians will never amount to much at sea? Or that the incredible total victory over a Japanese task force by a scratch collection of Australian and U. S. air force airplanes in the Bismarck Sea in 1943 sounded the death knell for all naval task forces?
There is, of course, some sound common sense in Commander Nicholl’s article. But regrettably, there is also a
strong echo of attitudes which were proved self-defeating not merely in World War II, but in World War I. For instance, the strange claim that the R.A.F. would have done its job in the Battle of Britain as efficiently, if the men had been wearing khaki. Yet, one of the reasons the R.A.F. was created in 1918 was to free Britain’s military aviation from the hidebound parochialism of army men, many of whom, the moment World War I ended, wanted to scrap tanks and reintroduce the cavalry! For it was these same men who grossly misused their air arm (squandering modern aircraft and experienced pilots in suicidal trench-strafing, for instance) to such a degree that control of that arm had to be taken away from them.
Faults are on all sides. The solution, however, has never been difficult to see. It is simply to treat interservice jealousy and prejudice for the subversive activity it really is, and aim instead at the not- impossible target of senior men who are total warriors and clear thinkers. Men who can orchestrate all the armed services to best deal with both the tactical and strategic situation in a way that gives the best results for minimal losses—bearing in mind that it takes days to make a rifle, weeks to make an aircraft, but years to make a nuclear submarine, and so on.
Perhaps we can then forget about these tiresome interservice squabbles, which to the outsider must appear as ridiculous as the trombone-players, cornet-players, and drummers of a service band all wanting to play the dominant theme in the loudest possible way during a rendition of "My Country ’tis of Thee,” to prove their instrument is the most "important.”
"World’s Apart”
(See N. D. Eddstein, pp. 18-25, February; pp. 81-82, September; and pp. 95-98, November 1973 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander II. S. Stoddard. U. S. Navy— Lieutenant Commander Archer cancelled his U. S. Naval Institute membership and, in his comment in the September issue, stated that he could ". . . no longer tolerate the editorial policy of the Proceedings. The drivel being published in this publica-
tion is so repugnant that I am no longer able to support this endeavor.”
I would hope that letters such as his have no effect upon the future editorial policy of the Proceedings. It must remain a free forum for sincere ideas and opinions, no matter how controversial. It should not only publish articles that adhere to the "party line,” but also those which "stir the pot” and generate imaginative thought and meaningful dialogue. Only then can the Proceedings actively contribute to the naval profession, indicating the need for changes within the Service when necessary, or re-affirming faith and confidence in time-honored policies and traditions. Lieutenant Commander Archer should have written a point-for-point rebuttal to Ensign Edelstein’s article, rather than cancelling his subscription and burying his head in the sand.
turnover in the crew, fewer and fewer people remained who were aware of the existence of this "lode” in the innards of the "old” Nevada. In my seagoing career, I have often heard of the engine room spaces referred to as "The Iron Mine” and here, in reality, we had a "Silver Mine.”
The Nevada survived the A-bomb tests at Ulithi, but was later used as a target and sunk in the Pacific.
I have often wondered whether this Treasure Trove was removed prior to her end or whether, with the passage of time, these silver bus bars were forgotten and went to the bottom with this fine old ship.
"Japanese Militarism”
(See J. E. Auer, pp. 46-55, September 1973
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Bernard D. Cole, U. S. Navy— Near the end of his article, Lieutenant Commander Auer states that ", . . the [Japanese] government would be wise to go forthrightly to the populace and seek support for Japanese defense.” The philosophical view of "leadership” in Japan differs from the traditional Western concept of the term. Japanese leaders do not "go to the people” to gain their support. Leadership in Japanese politics does not involve an individual appealing to the masses in order to rally support behind himself and his policies. Rather, the Japanese concept of leadership involves the individual recognizing the popular view of a segment of society and aligning himself with it in such a way as to command the segment’s loyalty to the extent that desired shifts may occur at the "leader’s” direction.
It is, if you will, leadership not from out front, but from behind. Recent cabinet resignations—forced by "improper” appeals for popular support of certain defense policies—have emphasized the currency of this concept in Japan.
Lieutenant Commander Auer hints at the most important misconception about the results of the American occupation—that Japan was turned into a liberal democracy. A few years of occupation did not obliterate centuries of history and cultural evolution.
Ensigns, Bays, and Aircraft Carriers
Dennis M. Greene—The Navy’s first aircraft carrier honored aviation pioneer Professor Samuel Pierpont Langley (1834 to 1906). The name selection at that time (1920) followed the Smithsonian official line that Professor Langley fathered heavier-than-air powered flight by his experiments from a launching platform in the Potomac River in 1903; although unsuccessful, his craft was considered aerodynamically sound and could have flown had it not been subjected to a number of unfortunate mishaps.
The second and third carriers were built on hulls laid down as battle cruisers (designated CC). The six "heavies’ under construction had already been named for former famous ships of the Navy. In fact, two of them were named for still existing 1797 frigates. This little problem was overcome by officially renaming the frigates Old Constellation and Old Constitution! With completion of the Lexington and Saratoga as carriers, the precedent was set and all subsequent flat-tops up to CV-38 honored famous ships or battles in U. S. history.
The Shangri-la broke the tradition- She was named as a result of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s statement that General Doolittle’s raiders had flown to Tokyo from James Hilton’s mythical land in his novel Lost Horizons. The Hornet failed to get well-deserved credit at that time.
The menace of the German submarines at the outset of World War fl cried for some fast innovative method of combating them. So, in the shade* of the original Langley, merchant hull* were converted to flat-tops. These were designated AVG (Auxiliary, Aviation. Miscellaneous), then Acv (Auxiliary Aircraft Carrier) and finally CVE (Escort Aircraft Carrier). In line with the policy of naming seaplane tenders (AV) fo( bays and sounds of the United States, the first large group of AVGs bore name* such as Core, Croatan, Bogue, and Cad This policy continued after the adoptiof of the CVE designation. Four converted Navy tankers retained their river names-' Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango, and Santt[1][2] One escort carrier was returned from th(
81
Comment and Discussion
British and she retained their name—
Charger.
As the demand for these "jeep” carriers grew, contracts were made with Kaiser Shipbuilding Company and the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation to mass produce these versatile vessels. By the time the peak was reached, these carriers were commissioning at the rate of one about every six days.
At the same time, the tempo was increasing in the construction of ships of many different types, each requiring meaningful names in accordance with the current naming policies. Apparently someone took the quick way out for the Kaiser-crafted carriers, and obtained a large map of Alaska. The result was the selection of many obscure bay names; some were so obscure that they aren’t even listed in the large and comprehensive Dictionary of Alaska Place Names. To ensure that these names were recognized as geographical places the word "bay” was officially appended to each one. The decision to use these little-or-unknown bay names probably was predicated on
the premise that most of them would be replaced before commissioning by battle or campaign names as the war progressed. One of them even bore three names. The CVE-63 was first named Chapin Bay, was commissioned as the Midway, was renamed St. Lo 11 months later, and was sunk in action less than six weeks after that.
The bay addition to the names was important because of the diverse origin of some of the names. Many of the bays bore nationalistic names supplied by their discoverers or early explorers. The Spanish left behind Alava, Anguilla, Bucareli, and Trocadero Bays. The English named Fanshaw, Gambier, and Windham Bays. The French supplied the name for Astrolabe Bay. The Russians left their marks on Kalinan, Petrof, and Ulitka Bays. Some of the bays had Indian names—Kasaan, Kitkun, Kada- shan, and Kanalku. U. S. Navy and Geodetic Survey ships are remembered by Natoma, Saginaw, and Thetis Bays. All of the bays listed were used for CVE names. And three of the bay-ship names were of former U. S. Navy ensigns!
The CVE-63 and CVE-99 were both named Chapin Bay for a bay on the southeast coast of Admiralty Island in the Alexander Archipelago of southeastern Alaska. She was named for Ensign Frederick Lincoln Chapin, U. S. Navy, a member of an 1892 survey party led by Lieutenant Commander E. K. Moore, U. S. Navy. As noted, the CVE-63 was renamed Midway prior to commissioning. The CVE-99 was renamed Admiralty Islands prior to commissioning. The new name commemorated the March 1944 capture of the islands north of the eastern tip of New Guinea, however, not the Admiralty Island location of Chapin Bay!
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—A tribute to the unknown seamen of an era long past and the maritime masterpieces they painstakingly fashioned—
This first detailed survey of the remarkable ship models made by French and American prisoners during and after the Napoleonic wars deals with the prisoners themselves, their tools and raw materials, and the astonishing variety of the models they created.
Unique both as an art form and as a record of ships of the period, the models range from full-rigged war ships to open boats and include Mediterranean vessels. The materials used include bone, ivory, wood, straw, glass, and hair; and their sizes range from less than two inches long to over seven feet. The construction and intricate detail of the models are displayed in copious photographs, engravings, and contemporary drawings.
1973. 192 pages. Over 130 illustrations.
Appendixes. Bibliography.
The CVE-75 was named Hoggatt Bay for a bay on the east coast of Baranof Island in the Alexander Archipelago. She was named in 1895 for Ensign Wilford Bacon Hoggatt (1865-1938), U. S. Navy, a member of a survey party led by Lieutenant Commander Moore. This carrier was commissioned in January 1944, became a cvhe in June 1955 and was redesignated AKV-25 in May 1959. The Hoggatt Bay was sold for scrap
in I960. The CVE-85 was named Shipley Bay for a bay on the northwest coast of Kosciusko Island, Alexander Archipelago. She was named in 1886 for Ensign John Harry Shipley, U. S. Navy, a member of a survey party led by Lieutenant Commander A. S. Snow, U. S. Navy. The Shipley Bay was commissioned in March 1944. She was redesignated a CVHE in June 1955 and was scrapped in 1959.
It would be interesting to know if any ensign-pilot who flew from the decks of those escort carriers ever knew that the ships names, although indirectly, had honored other ensigns from another era of naval history.
"The Merchant Marine—
Awash in Manpower Problems”
(See W. M. Miller, III, pp. 61-69, October 1973 Proceedings)
W. D. LaBarrease—As Mr. Miller states, our merchant marine is in the sorry state of having the unions and companies constantly at odds with one another while the ships and men, the very things they are fighting over, are growing worse off every day.
As I have experienced in recent years, both sides seemed to have lost sight of the fact that the one and only purpose for their being is to move people and cargo from one point to another by the safest and most economical means possible! To move people and things, and nothing else. Lose sight of these most basic goals, and one finds himself lost in a sea of red tape bewildered by a bureaucracy that no longer seems to know or care about the men or the ships—caring only about their own selfish interests.
The morale of our men in the merchant marine is at an all-time low simply because they have felt doublecrossed, by almost everyone, and again the population of our country isn’t aware of how dependent it is on these men. The same thing, I’m sorry to say, seems to run true in our railroad industry where the threat of loss of jobs and general distrust has severely injured the pride one takes in doing an important job.
When I was in the merchant service trying to live up to my newly-earned status of able seaman, men were constantly being told by their older coun
terparts that the "wise thing to do” was to find yourself a good shoreside job and forget a career at sea. When, after two years of service, off and on, in ships ranging from a seagoing tugboat whose keel was laid in 1896 to a model 1943 Victory Ship in Vietnam, I indeed begin to take those older men seriously. After all, they had devoted all of their lives to the sea. I was but a learning novice, and you had to trust someone. So, with a lot of regrets about leaving, I went into radio broadcasting where I was miserable. I am now back into the transportation industry with a company that really holds promise for the future.
I still miss the ships, however, and the adventure of sailing. But above all, it makes me, as a person, fighting mad to see our country being chased from almost every corner of the world, while at home a "let George do it” attitude continues to promise more and more unrest for the future. I’d like to do something more than just vote and write an occasional letter to Congress or answer polls.
A friend, who also holds seaman’s papers for merchant sailing, and myself have often wished there was some way we could keep our AB tickets updated and our knowledge fresh to the point where, if we were ever needed at sea again, we’d no longer have to start from scratch and face the scorn standing by. A good Merchant Marine Reserve will do for this service what a new enlighted generation of young men are doing for some parts of the railroad industry, where union and management are learning to work together rather than destroy the very thing that gives both sides their "golden eggs.”
Captain John A. Culver, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—One significant point that Mr. Miller appears to have missed is the future need for additional numbers of merchant marine officers. Ships are getting bigger and carrying more cargo, but with little, if any, increase in the number of officers to man them. The number of ships is declining, hence, fewer personnel. Also, ship automation eventually will have its impact on reduced manning levels of merchant ships. It would appear that the need for increased
enrollment at state and federal academies is against the trend of reduced manning. Many state and federal maritime academy graduates, however, have successful careers in the merchant marine, Navy, Coast Guard, Shipbuilding, ship repair, major component manufacturers, admiralty law, marine marketing, and management. Their education should be directed to strengthen their productive capability in the overall industry, and the student population should be kept down, not up. The academies should direct their education of midshipmen toward the entire needs of the industry with a military theme to meet the self- discipline demands of a seagoing environment.
The faculties should be established in two divisions; i.e., a Maritime Department and Educational Department. The Maritime Department should be oriented to the seagoing and military disciplines and manned by seagoing experts. The Education Department should be oriented to educational and industry needs and manned by professional educators in their chosen field. The new purpose of educating future personnel for the entire industry includes the basic purpose of maritime academies to educate future merchant marine officers. The status, prestige, and expertise of the seagoing officer in the Military Department must be reinstituted or the basic objectives of the academies are violated and the academies are headed for failure- The mix of a military and educational faculty is possible with strong, dynamic leadership.
Miller’s idea to "experiment with training procedures” is a good one. The most effective training for future industry professionals would be practical experience in two new training ships tha[ could be rotated between academies- These ships should have the most advanced navigation and communication equipment, have container gantries installed, and have a small tank system In addition, they should be triple-sere"' ships with one automated steam plan1 on one shaft, a diesel plant on another shaft, and a gas turbine plant on the third shaft. Why not amend the Mef' chant Marine Act of 1970 to include two ships as briefly described?
What is wrong with non-union steamship companies similar to many
Comment and Discussion 83
American-flag tanker companies? Would non-union companies be possible in the maritime industry or are the unions that powerful as to prevent it?
The idea of six academies placed under the aegis of the U. S. Merchant Marine Association (U.S.M.M.A.) with a similar curricula has some merit. The economic consideration, however, must be considered by each academy; i.e., their physical and faculty capability to expand their curriculums. The overall economic situation should also be treated with extreme caution by the U.S.M.M.A., since the state academies will always come out far ahead in the asset column relative to the federal taxpayer, and relative to filling the officer needs of the merchant fleet at this time.
Military credit is obtained by sailing in the industry. The Merchant Marine Naval Reserve (MMNR) was phased out of the Reserve structure several years ago, but was reinstated recently. The mere fact that merchant marine officers operate ships and machinery should be enough to maintain their status and promotion in the Naval Reserve. This
type of professional experience is of far more value to the Naval Reserve than Training Center administrative positions. Doctors and lawyers are maintained in the Naval Reserve (mostly non-pay) as professionals, why not professional ship operators?
Merchant Ship Escort
Gordon J. Douglas, Jr. — During the two world wars, many merchant ships were armed with light anti-aircraft and redundant deck guns manned by Coast Guard or Naval Reserve gun crews. These Naval Armed Guards (NAG) served an important purpose in helping increase the volume of fire that could be turned against an enemy. Reflecting a very old tradition of the armed merchant vessel that goes back to the East India Company and even further, the NAG concept may be useful in building a viable convoy system.
Most vessels today can carry the container, indeed, many new vessels are being configured for the cargo container trade almost exclusively. Noting the
Second Edition
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The second edition has been thoroughly updated and broadened in scope with the coverage of many new topics including: basic hydrodynamics of sailing, recent theory on rigging and sails, recent spinnaker theory, instrumentation, boat management in heavy weather offshore, auxiliary engines, and more.
1973. 303 pages. Illustrated. A Naval Institute Press Book
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SAIL AND POWER is the guide for sailing instruction at the U. S. Naval Academy and is the designated text for the Navy-wide sailing program. Covering all elements of basic seamanship, it begins with nautical terminology, takes the learning seaman through the rudiments of handling dinghies, day-sailers, cruising yachts, and single and twin-screw power boats, and goes on to discuss racing tactics, heavy weather sailing, and other advanced aspects of seamanship.
by Richard Henderson with Bartlett S. Dunbar
Power
Sail
proliferation of lightweight anti-air and cruise missile weapons and their small size and low cost, it may be that such weapons, mounted in container vans with folding sides, could be mounted on the decks of merchants as a form of portable armament. The units are self- contained, operating off ship’s power or their own generators. Manned by Naval Reserve units, the Armed Container Vans (ACV for abbreviation collectors) would be positioned upon mobilization at the nearest port for installation upon the decks of the ships of a convoy. While ships are unloading, the ACV unit is transferred to another ship for the return voyage, thus cutting turnaround time. The Naval Reserve units are based in peacetime all around the country with their container vans. Training is simplified as the vans are kept at the Reserve center. Training cruises are done on board Military Sealift Command vessels or selected naval auxiliary vessels. Trucks to transport the ACV units are widely available in the United States and could be assured in wartime through a small subsidy of some container firm.
"Naval Youth Programs”
(See E. L. Barker, pp. 42-48, June 1973
Proceedings)
Erik Syvertsen, Student, Food and Maritime Trades High School— Captain Barker appears concerned for today’s American youth and the need for the federal government to take direct action.
There is one school, however, involved in training American youth for careers in the merchant marine that has no direct connection with any federal department, and is run by a local city government. This school is the Food and Maritime Trades High School in New York City. The words Food and Maritime denote the two trades that were joined together because of budget reasons, and I will discuss only the maritime field.
Food and Maritime Trades High School is located on the Hudson River in the borough of Manhattan. It is a vocational school (run entirely by the City Board of Education). Classes are held on board the SS John W. Brown, an
old World War II Liberty ship on loan from the U. S. Maritime Commission. A second ship, the USS Twin Falls, an old Victory ship that had been used by the Navy as a missile tracker, has been given to the school by the federal government. Handed over to the school on 22 May 1973, she was rechristened the SS John W. Brown, II.
Students may choose between the deck, engine, or stewards’ departments. The students in the engine department receive training in basic electricity, machine shop, pipe fitting, operation of turbine and reciprocating steam engine, and operation and repair of diesel engines. Moreover, the acquisition of the former Twin Falls may make possible a course in refrigeration. The stewards’ department will give the student training in baking, cooking, storage of supplies, and ship sanitation. The deck department offers courses in small boat handling, marlinspike seamanship, wire splicing, general deck work, firefighting, navigation, rules of the road, cargo stowage, operation of the booms, and radar plotting. The school’s entire ship’s
faculty is made up of retired or former merchant seamen and Navymen. They are all teachers certified by the Board of Education.
The student receives his academic training in the academic building located a few streets away from the school ship where English, elementary algebra, history, biology, art, and economics are taught. Because of the trade courses, students are unable to take courses such as foreign languages and also some mathematics. Students who need these latter subjects for admission to most academies and colleges, must take them at night school.
On graduation, the student receives his high school diploma, plus his valuable seaman’s papers. The school then places some, but not all, students in maritime jobs.
In order to attend, a student must be between 14 and 18, and, of course, be a resident of New York City. There is also a waiting list.
No one in the Navy, in or out of Washington, should miss this entertaining book. Appropriate as a personal gift to friends or as an anonymous donation to the bureaucrat of your choice.
1972. 96 pages. List Price: $4.95 cloth. $2.95 paper Member's Price: $3.95 cloth, $2.35 paper.
"No one without a sense of humor should be assigned to Washington, D.C., for duty. Humor, in the maelstrom of government, really should be as available by prescription as some of the more powerful yet less effective sedatives. Humor can prevent madness. Sedation can only delay it."
A sense of humor, a sharp wit, and a talent for biting satire are qualities that Captain Thomas possesses in abundance, and they are all brought to bear in this lively book which paints a controversial picture of Navy programs and official practices, and often touches bureaucracy in its tender spots.
Let a few of the chapter titles speak for themselves: "On a Clear Day You Can See Tomorrow’s Assignment Policy"
“But, Sir, This Secret Textbook Clearly States ...” "The Aluminum Overcast and Other Fairy Tales" "The Care and Feeding of Flag Officers”
"And Another Thing I’ll Say After I Retire"
from a small naval observatory
By Captain Walter “R” Thomas, USN
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The school may be the only one of its type in the United States. It is a shame that there are not many more.
Comment and Discussion 85
Lieutenant George K. Sargent, III, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—The Navy is overlooking one of its most ready and available sources of manpower—the Naval Sea Cadet Corps.
Last summer, while attached to staff of NRGC U-16(S) in Santa Ana, California, I was assigned to the Sea Cadet Corps for a month. They met every Thursday evening and spent three hours drilling in various training evolutions. 1 was certainly impressed and increasingly enthused over their training program, which could, under proper supervision, lead to a tremendously increased percentage of enlistments in the Navy. The age group is 14 to 17 years—and they are eager and enthusiastic about the Navy.
What is seriously lacking in their program is actual contact with active and ready Reserve Navy personnel. Although the older personnel administering the program are devoted, and providing the best training that they can in such subjects as first aid and fire fighting, they lack recent Navy experience, and would be the first to admit that they need active help from Reserve units to remedy lagging cadet interest.
The only real training with naval personnel that the cadets receive is a once-a-year, two-week cruise on a Reserve ship. Aside from this, there is no follow-up on a regular basis with current Navy personnel.
The Naval Reserve program provides no billets for Reserve personnel to be attached TAD to the Sea Cadet Corps. My own study was done on an informal basis and was only temporary. What the cadets need are one Reserve officer (to serve as CO), one enlisted personnel man, and one first class petty officer or chief petty officer to act as a training officer. They also need—and are eager for— weekend trips to Navy installations and ships for continuing training and exposure to the Navy way of life.
A lot has been written and spoken recently about the purpose and mission of the Naval Reserve program. What has been overlooked is its excellent potential in aiding the enlistment programs. The lack of a draft system has put the Navy Department in the position of having to seek out enlistees— and good ones—on a large scale. With a little effort and the proper use of
Reserve personnel in Sea Cadet programs, the Navy would realize a greater number of enlistees from the Sea Cadet Corps. In addition, these enlistees would arrive at "Boot Camp” with their training already underway and having benefited from a close association with the Navy through their Sea Cadet training and affiliation with Naval Reserve units.
"Graduate Education—
The Continuing Imperative”
(See M. Freeman, pp. 56-60, September; and pp. 87-88, December 1973 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Charles R. Jones, U. S. Navy— Rear Admiral Freeman’s figures comparing the manning of P-coded billets by restricted and unrestricted line (URL) officers fail to take into account the cross-fertilization generated by the practice of change of designator for many sea-experienced officers. Many of our most highly-motivated and technically competent URL officers have tired of their non-technical jobs use or, as in the
case of nuclear-trained officers, have endured intellectual stagnation in unending high-stress billets. For these reasons, they have sought a change in designator or gotten out of the Service. We have more sea-experienced restricted liners than the article recognizes.
Another generalization made in the article, is the inference that the civilian institutions can be replaced by the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, which can presumably provide the "broadening effect” previously attributed to these institutions. It is probably unfortunate that the Admiral never attended a civilian college himself.
■ International Law for
International Law For Seagoing Officers
By Burdick H. Brittin and Liselotte B. Watson Third Edition
Those who use the sea should be familiar with international maritime laws, for these laws have bearing on operations at sea and in the air space above.
This book, unique in its field, is not a lawyer’s law book.
It is a readily understandable text covering international law as it affects those who use the sea and the air space above it.
It also presents the developing law of space.
The first edition, published in 1956, was swiftly adopted by the naval establishment, the Coast Guard, and various merchant marine activities. The enlarged second edition was translated into six foreign languages.
Newly designed and reset, the thoroughly revised and expanded third edition includes not only the changes and modifications that have occurred since the second edition was published in 1960, but also the most up-to-date examples and revised regulations.
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One becomes broadened more by the exposure to different types of students than by the relatively interchangeable faculties. This has always been a weakness in us Naval Academy graduates, in that the regimentation and conformance required does not prepare us to interact well with enlisted men, much less with the civilians over, for, and with whom we work during our careers. The man who attended a civilian university dur-
86
ing the Vietnam era certainly received a broadening experience, but even without such a controversial environment to enhance our education, Naval Academy graduates generally need such exposure to civilian attitudes.
It is also obvious that the restricted line community will not be easily convinced that the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School should take over such well established engineering programs as that at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which forms the core of the naval architecture and marine engineering community, if not all EDOs.
There is no one in the Navy, I am sure, who will dispute Rear Admiral Freeman’s call for more efficient use of officers with advanced education, but the implementation of his specific suggestions would be thwarted (as have similar ideas for some time) by the special interest groups in the Navy. For example, Admiral Rickover makes it a point to recruit the best engineering talent available, teaches his trainees the meaning of hard work and discipline, as well as a staggering amount of engi
neering, then he must protect his nuclear power community from the loss of career personnel to the restricted line.
The BuPers Manual presently requires nuclear-trained officers to serve a department head tour on a nuclear ship before they are allowed to change from unrestricted to restricted line. This takes about ten years of commissioned service, mostly in nuclear propulsion billets, to accomplish. During this period, the only respite is a postgraduate tour, frequently demanded under threat of resignation, and then grudgingly approved. Commitments to Congress to predesignate graduate’s billets for postgraduate education inputs will probably eliminate all hope of advanced schooling of nuclear power officers. Retention will fall back on the monetary bonus.
Identification and correction of problems such as these may well be beyond the capabilities of the naval Service, however, since it is very difficult to muster sufficient insight into the complexities involved, much less the authority to make changes across the lines of the special interest groups.
"The Carronade”
(See S. C. Tucker, pp. 65-70, August 1973
Proceedings)
4
The attack on the Italian fleet in its strongly defended base at Taranto on 11th November 1940 was an event of far reaching consequence in World War II. It demonstrated, for the first time, that carrier-borne aircraft were not only invaluable as "the eyes” of the fleet, but that they possessed a formidable striking power capable of inflicting serious damage on a fleet lying in what, up until then, had been regarded as a well protected harbor.
In this book, the author traces briefly the development of British naval aviation from its early beginnings in 1912, through its part in World War I, the frustrations of the interwar years, to the conception and execution of the attack which added such lustre to its name. It is a dramatic story of individual achievement by a handful of officers and men whose enthusiasm, skill, and tenacity more than made up for the obsolescent aircraft which they had to fly. In a final chapter the author describes the heavy price subsequently exacted by the German Luftwaffe and the Italian Regia Aeronautica in a combined all-out but unsuccessful attempt to sink the aircraft carrier, HMS Illustrious, from which the attack on Taranto had been launched two months previously.,
1973. 94 pages. Illustrated.
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Vice Admiral Jonkheer H. A. van Foreest, Netherlands Royal Navy (Retired)—The remark about the Dutch being "late in adopting the carronade for their naval vessels” is incorrect. In 1780, the Zealand captain Van Kinckel brought home from England two specimens, which were tested in September of that year on the beach of Scheveningen before a committee of three flag officers and two captains. These trials were so successful that the admiralties of the Maas and of Amsterdam immediately ordered a good number of those pieces to be placed on various frigates and smaller warships, and also on some ships of the line. However, as the war with Britain (the fourth Dutch war) broke out in December, it is extremely doubtful if any carronades had been delivered in time In 1781, one of the members of the committee. Rear Admiral Zoutman. fought a fierce, undecisive battle against Sir Hyde Parker (Nelson’s C-in-C a1
Comment and Discussion 87
Copenhagen). No mention is made of the use of any Dutch carronades by Zoutman or by any of his ships, while HMS Berwick, flagship of Commodore Keith Stuart, (second-in-command) was said to be armed with several guns of that kind. Apparently the results were not staggering, as the Berwick (74 guns) got quite a beating on short distance from the Admiraal-Generaal (76 guns), flagship of the Dutch second-in- command, Captain Van Kinsbergen.
"Retirees—The Forgotten Men”
(See T. E. Beard, p. 94, June; and p. 91,
November 1973 Proceedings)
Commander Jack A. Vaughan, U. S. Navy (Retired)—1 regret that Warrant Officer Beard feels that it is necessary that he withdraw from one of the few facets of naval life in which his voice can still be heard. I do, however, understand his frustration.
His statement that the Navy would like to forget that he exists, is truer than most active duty personnel can imagine. To those who are daily inundated with messages, directives, and periodicals, it may come as a surprise that the only contact the Navy has made with me in the past year is the monthly retired pay- check (for which I am exceedingly thankful), a bimonthly newsletter that devotes itself mostly to reunions and survivor’s benefits, and a request for Navy Relief contributions. Nothing was received that would help me understand the direction that the Navy is taking or any information which would provide up-to-date recruiting information.
The CNO has expressed the policy of the "Navy family,” but those of us in the retired ranks feel more left out than included. Many local (and not just San Diego) policies tend to strip the retiree of his rank and of the consideration due him. We realize that the Navy does not function to cater to us, but neither should the retiree be treated as someone who rates below the commandant’s cat.
I would implore each officer in a responsible position to examine the policies of his organization to see if the Service retiree is being made a second class member. You have good reason to do this, for in the future you will be on the other side of the fence and at
retirement time then it will be too late.
I have some few suggestions which I would hope might be a spur to further ideas. First, the Navy ought to provide a single office in the Bureau of Naval Personnel to act as a central point for liaison with the retired community. Second, the Navy should establish local advisory boards and disseminate information on how to communicate with the board. These boards would then act as feeders for the Navy-wide board presently established. Third, the Navy could provide, through mailings and/or seminars, information on the Navy and other armed services. This should include information on ships, aircraft, weapon systems, policies, recruiting information, and the like, not just more CHAMPUS and Survivor’s Benefit information. Consideration should be given to classified information to those of us still retaining clearance. To broaden the coverage, this program might be combined with a similar program for the Naval Reserve. Lastly, investigation of use of retired personnel on a volunteer, part-time basis to ease the workload in the shore establishment. An example might be the usage of retired medical and dental personnel to assist with administrative duties in overworked hospitals and dispensaries. The expertise of many retirees could greatly aid the Navy and they might be willing to perform if they felt their efforts were needed.
"Blue Water Monitor”
(See J. A. Knowles, Jr., pp. 78-79, March;
p. 96, August; and 93, September 1973
Proceedings)
Lieutenant A. R. Shapack, U. S. Navy— Mr. Knowles’ statement that Ericsson did not test the construction, but simply turned out working drawings and thus the early vessels were slow and poorly ventilated, does a disservice to a hardworking patriot, John Ericsson. The contract for the original monitor was signed 4 October 1861, and she was launched 112 days later. Ericsson could have built her faster by the use of night gangs had the government met its contractual payment obligations in a timely fashion, thus providing necessary capital. Knowles is correct that early monitors were slow, but all monitors, early and
late, were slow. Ericsson designed the original ship with a speed of nine knots: her service speed was six knots. No Civil War era monitor ever achieved her designed speed and the maximum service speed was the nine knots posted by the Monadnock, Canonicus, and four river monitors of the Milwaukee class. Author Knowles notes that ventilation was a problem on early monitors. As early as 18 October 1861, Ericsson recognized the problem and wrote to the Navy Department’s representative, Commodore Joseph Smith, about the monitor’s ventilation system. This problem was never really solved until the designers of the "New Navy” monitors of the 1880s and 1890s added a substantial deck house, thus negating concealment, a principal feature of the monitor concept.
A warships’ principal function is to provide a stable weapons platform, and monitors were incapable of this task on the high seas. Writing of his monitor experience, Bradley Fiske noted:
In an ordinary ship . . . the motion is uneven . . . but in [a] monitor we rolled . . . with the regularity of the pendulum of a clock and it was exasperating beyond words.
The monitor-type vessel is best considered as a prototype. Incorporating many well-known concepts into one revolutionary design, she remained, nevertheless, a vessel with a relatively narrow purpose and utility. Although her abilities were often overblown by a grateful public, even the later, more sophisticated versions retained the essential nature of John Ericssons’ initial effort—a coastal defense vessel only intended for and capable of coastal and riverine warfare.
"Civilianism, Civilianization, and the Military Services”
(See). C. Sandsberry, pp. 62-67, November 1972; pp. 95-96, June; and p. 95, August 1973 Proceedings)
David L. Woods—Captain Sandsberry offers some sound food-for-thought on vital issues. His opinions, somewhat naturally in view of his experience, are heavily weighted toward civilian operations within Department of Defense (DoD) agencies. I offer a few reflections
based on a decade of experiences within the Department of the Navy itself— about 30% as a naval officer and 70% as a civilian employee.
Civilian "power”—At least within the Department of the Navy, career civilian employees are far less influential than Captain Sandsberry indicates. In nearly 200 years, the late Graham Bannerman is the only known career civilian employee to become an Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Of course, the author did not seem to include political appointees (in Schedule C posts) in his discussion.
A more typical Navy' Department example finds a Navy captain heading an office with perhaps two commanders and a GS-14 as his leading subordinates. In the absence of the captain, logically enough one of the commanders will take charge. But in that unlikely event of the absence of the captain and both commanders, will the GS-14 take over? Certainly not, the mantle of official "leadership” will fall to the lieutenant (j.g.) (even though he usually works for the GS-14). All too often, I fear, the lack of civilian "responsibility” to which
Captain Sandsberry aludes is not at the civilian’s choice. Most of us with prior naval experience are fully aware that we had greater responsibility and authority as junior officers than we now have— perhaps 15 years later—as more senior civilians.
Civilian "grade creep”—A. lot of present GS-i4s and GS-15S would like to know where and how we can "inevitably become 16s, ns, and iss,” as Captain Sandsberry claims. Within the Navy Department, career civilians who perhaps do creep up to the 14 or 15 level seem to remain there somewhat interminably as did middle-grade Army officers between the world wars. Subsequently, the author Sandsberry more properly labels this civilian group as: "a sizeable and ever-growing layer of dead- wood who are on the payroll until death or retirement.” Incidentally, a survey should reveal that the majority of these individuals work in personnel, services, or administration—the only fields in which the Navy usually is willing to forego line officer leadership.
Several barriers to truly meaningful
civilian careers with the Navy, unfortunately, do not become clear until one has become almost fully committed to the "system.” These include:
(1)There is no medium providing information about, or consideration for, higher positions within the federal government (including DoD) for which one may be qualified. If you start out as a Navy civilian, you are an overwhelming choice to either end up a Navy civilian or to leave federal service altogether.
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The book provides the reader a valuable opportunity to analyze current Soviet policies as they seem likely to bear on Moscow’s strategy for the remainder of the '70’s.
1973. 241 Pages. Clothbound. Footnotes. Index.
The Soviets view peaceful coexistence as a struggle, as distinct from a gentlemanly contest, with unlimited objectives in which no holds are barred, at least on the Soviet side, other than attempts to shoot each other down.
This vital difference, often misunderstood in the West, has often been explained by Soviet commentators. Typical is a 1970 statement in an authoritative treatise on LENINISM TODAY: . . . Peaceful coexistence does not extinguish or cancel out class struggle—it is a new form of class struggle employed by the working class and the socialist countries in the world arena. It ‘cancels' only one type of struggle—war as a means of settling international issues.
SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence
By Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure, and Richard Soli
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(2)There is no medium providing information about, or consideration for, higher positions even within the Department of the Navy itself. To keep up with such information in the Washington, D.C., area alone requires maintaining almost daily contact with several dozen different personnel offices. Moves from one Navy agency to another are extremely rare and normally only because of personal contact. And in these days of position reductions, frequently higher posts are limited only to those now employed by that agency and often to individuals working within only a specific segment of that agency.
(3) Civilian employees soon become wedged into a very rigid series of position classifications. Moreover, the longer one is employed in such a specialty (similar to officer designators), the less likely any change is possible. Incidentally, there is no comparable position classification to unrestricted line.
(4) To gain full retirement, today’s civilian must work at least 30 years and attain the age of 60. This practice serves to increase, rather than diminish, the amount of civilian deadwood. A civilian employee quite literally has virtually no choice in the matter. Contrary to Captain Sandsberry’s suggestion, we do not need an "involuntary retirement” program to clear the decks for a younger crop of civilians—merely a more flexible "voluntary” plan. Witness the mass exodus when periodic special one-time retirement "sweeteners” are offered.
Until then, most other Department of the Navy civilians will either get out—or like myself—keep plugging away trying to serve the government, the Navy, and the line officers and political appointees for whom we work as effectively for another 20 years.
From the range of an 18th century cannon-shot to the warship-enforced 200-mile claims of some present day Latin American states, the definition and extent of “territorial seas” have led to controversy and conflict in international politics and law.
In this important new book Captain Swarztrauber traces the history of man's concept of territorial seas from the second century to the 1970s, using the three-mile limit as the central theme, and discussing thoroughly yet concisely all of the approaches to the subject of maritime territoriality.
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1972. 300 pages. Bibliography. Index.
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Harvey Shaynes, Chief, Position and Pay Management Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, Aberdeen Proving Grounds— After reading the article, one could conclude that unless all hardware requirements deemed necessary by military' personnel of almost any rank are secured (and without noxious questioning by "civilian hierarchy”), the military members of the defense establishment should promptly resign to protest unjustified interference with military expertise and prerogatives. The statement, "The various Service Secretaries of time past were largely content to let trained and experienced military leaders determine Service tactics and armament requirements . . .” certainly warrants some examination. Service Secretaries have generally played a somewhat larger role than merely "budget justification.” That is, they have frequently been involved in the decision-making required in apportioning shortages of funds. The history of the United States from the very beginning consistently demonstrates the national desire to deny funds for the full "armament requirements” deemed nec
Comment and Discussion 89
essary by the military. The merits of this consistent tendency of the citizenry is of course open to question. On the other hand, however, it should be admitted that, being human, military experts have made their share of mistakes in both "Service tactics and armament requirements.”
As another example of his emotional treatment of a truly complex subject, the Captain has made no attempt either to define or suggest redefining the criteria for military incumbency of positions either in the field or at the Service or DoD headquarters level. Rather, he simply quotes statistics and views with alarm, the numbers of civilians and military in particular organizations. He also points to the escalation of civilian grades in military Service organizations, however, he does not point to the similar phenomena which has occurred with respect to the officer corps (ratio of field grade and above to enlisted). This is not to say that pyramiding (whether military or civilian) is something to be admired. With this sort of approach and
such vague and unsupported charges of "imbalance of rank structure between civilians and military” and "(less well paid) military co-workers, . . .” it is doubtful that any fair assessment of the article would result in a "constructive” evaluation.
Of the issues raised in the article, the matter of the roles of the military man and the Civil Servant seem to me to be a basic and a first concern. The Captain says he has no answer as to proper mix. The policies of the Services however, provide a number of answers. By and large, the basic criteria for military incumbency is the requirement for military expertise. Other criteria include providing for the rotational base and providing for the career development of the military. Obviously, the positions occupied by the "John Doe” so frequently cited by the Captain, whether they be computer specialists, scientists, or in other occupations, have one thing in common: someone decided they do not require military expertise. Instead, it was decided the positions require
rather lengthy experience and education, and do not require knowledge of either tactical or strategic operations. Predictably, all such decisions have not been correct. The only purpose served by the Captain’s airing of this admittedly complex problem is to raise the implication that there are far too many civilians in the mix at this time. It would seem to me that a more constructive approach would be to face up to why military personnel ". . . cannot operate on the same level or cope with senior, entrenched civilians.” Or to be even more constructive, let’s not even talk about it in terms of opposing forces (military vs. civilian), but ask some basic questions such as: Are most civilian employees competent in their field? If so, why is there friction? Does the training and development of military personnel provide them with sufficient technical expertise in fields not directly related to their military roles? What sort of reception do civilian "technical experts” get when they attempt to "orient” the military on a technical area? If the job of a Civil Servant is graded on the basis of his authority and duties, is it good management to reject his recommendations, decisions, or other work products? Why do civilian grades float upward? In what circumstances is this proper? Improper? What are the differences between the military and the civilian grading systems? Is there any valid way to equate specific military ranks with specific civilian grades? Discussion of these kinds of questions from an objective point of view may serve to improve understanding of all team members.
The Captain comments on the deterioration of morale among the military because they feel they are second-class citizens. Obviously, he has no perception of the fact that the attitudes expressed in his article when manifested by military personnel (in their day-to- day dealings with either their civilian subordinates, counterparts, or superiors), do exactly the same thing to the civilians. There is no policy in any of the Services to the effect that it is the particular "turf” or preserve of its military members. Certainly no Service can be fully effective unless all of its personnel feel that they are an integral part, a valuable component, a significant con
tributor to the overall objectives.
In my opinion, Captain Sandsberry’s article basically states his feeling that whatever the role of the civilian, whatever his authority or responsibility, whatever his talents may be, he is "second class,” and primarily serves to interfere or play a counterproductive role with respect to attaining the objectives of the Service. The Captain’s use of such terms as "the dedicated career military man” in opposition to the civilian who swings a "disproportionate amount of weight,” reaches depths unattainable by our most advanced submersibles.
The Captain’s comments on "soft/ hard strategy” are interesting. This reader had not previously been treated to such a clear statement of pure prejudice labeling the whole corps of senior civilian advisors as "soft”—whatever that may mean. Further, with respect to "poor decision-making,” I have never before observed anything in print charging all the "just plain bad decisions” against the civilian component. This is not to say that civilians do not make bad decisions, however, only a modicum of humility is necessary to reach the obvious conclusion that all groups of humans make their share. I feel the Captain is correct in stating that continued "civilian-military dialogue” is important. I don’t see how a meaningful dialogue can take place, however, if one of the parties has a host of "hang-ups” about the other. Hopefully, something constructive will come of the article, but he certainly hasn’t made this easy.
Notebook Item—"New Canal Could Produce Many Ecological Problems”
(See Notebook, pp. 126-127, April 1972; and pp. 92-94, February 1973 Proceedings)
John C. Briggs, Director, Division of Graduate Studies, University of South Florida— In his comment on the original Notebook item about the sea-level canal, Dr. Voss devoted most of his letter to minimizing the statements of other biologists, and since he disagreed with my prediction in particular, I wish to take this opportunity to reply.
My prediction of severe ecological disturbance was based on the existence of two zoogeographic principles that
would govern the exchange of marine organisms should a sea-level canal be built. First, whenever two regions are separated by a barrier that is partially passable, the region with the richest (most diverse) fauna will donate species to the region with the lesser fauna, but will accept few or no species in return.
The second important principle states that along mainland shorelines each major habitat is probably supporting its maximum number of species. In such situations, it is recognized that the introduction of additional species can only temporarily increase the diversity and that, over a period of time, the number of species present can be expected to drop back to its original level. This means that a species that has been introduced or has migrated into a new area, may either survive in its new home by eliminating a species already there or it may meet so much resistance by the native species, that it will be unable to establish itself.
Dr. Voss thinks that my assumption, that the Caribbean (Western Tropical Atlantic) fauna is richer than that of the Panamic (Eastern Tropical Pacific) fauna, is untrue. Some recent articles have been published on the subject. For example, Abbott (1968) estimated that about 3,000 species of mollusks may be found in the Western Atlantic compared to some 2,400 for the Eastern Pacific, Chesher (1972) called attention to the presence of 143 species of Atlantic echinoderms versus 76 for the Pacific, and Porter (1972) noted, for Panama itself, the presence of 69 Atlantic coral species compared to 20 for the Pacific.
I am primarily an ichthyologist and, on the basis of my own studies, I have estimated the presence of about 950 Atlantic fish species compared to about 650 for the Pacific. A similar contrast in diversity apparently holds true for the marine plants since Earle (1972) recorded 125 species for the Atlantic shore of Panama and only 90 species for the Pacific side. On the basis of such data as these, one can make a strong case for a Western Atlantic superiority in species diversity.
We know from observations made in various parts of the world that animals emigrating from areas with diverse, stable ecosystems tend to be superior competitors and are apt to displace and
Comment and Discussion 91
eventually eliminate species that inhabit less diverse areas. It follows that Atlantic species, upon gaining access to the Pacific via a sea-level canal, would in general be able to eliminate their competition. The Central American marine fauna is so rich that, over a period of years, we may expect several thousand species to make their way through a sea-level canal in both directions. But, it is the prospect of a huge and irrevocable loss of hundreds or even thousands of species native to the Eastern Pacific that constitutes the major ecological problem presented by the sea-level canal proposal.
Dr. Voss observed that "... about 50% of the two faunas are identical or similar . . .” and that ". . . all of the sharks now found on the Pacific coast of Panama already occur in Caribbean and Florida waters.” In his Origin of Species, published in 1859, Charles Darwin said:
No two marine faunas are more distinct, with hardly a fish, shell or crab in common, those of the eastern and western shores of South and Central America;
yet those great faunas are separated only by the narrow, but impassable, isthmus of Panama.
Modern biological research has tended to support rather than refute Darwin’s statement. In comparing the shallow water fish faunas on the two sides of Central America, I concluded (Briggs, 1961) that, aside from 16 cir- cumtropical species, only about 12 species (less than 2% of the total faunas) were identical. Comparative data on the various groups of marine invertebrates are scarce, but it is safe to say that, in general, somewhat less than 10% of the species on each side are identical. It is true that many other species on each side are very similar in appearance but, it is between such similar species that we can anticipate the most severe competition.
In regard to sharks, almost all of the strictly shallow water species on each side of Panama are different from one another. Not even all of the large, oceanic sharks on each side are the same. For example, in the genus Carcharhinus, which includes many of the species considered dangerous to man, only four of
the nine species occurring on the Pacific side are also found in the Atlantic (Rosenblatt and Baldwin, 1958).
In summary, my prediction of severe ecological consequences, should a sea- level canal be built, is not "alarmist in nature,” but is based on biological fact plus two Eoogeographic principles that appear to be reasonably well established.
I suggest that the United States should, instead of risking a sea-level canal, adopt an alternative such as the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan (Senate Bill No. 734). Briefly, this Plan would modify the present canal by eliminating the Pedro Miguel Locks, combining Gatun and Miraflores Lakes into one body of water, and installing a third set of larger locks. It offers highly important advantages: (1) we would still have a fresh water canal that would prevent interoceanic movement of marine animals; (2) capacity would be increased enough to allow about the same amount of ship traffic as would be provided by a sea-level canal; and (3), the construction cost would be about $850 million compared to at least $2.88 billion for a sea-level structure.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY
By Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Vladimir Prokofieff
"It seems clear to me that the Kremlin leaders have already made one fundamental decision regarding the Soviet role in the international arena which will continue to dominate their policies in the '70's: to try to 'overtake and surpass’ the United States in military prowess and in scientific pre-eminence." Foy D. Kohler, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union—from the foreword.
The purpose of this book is to give a documentary account of the Soviet leader's views of scientific-technological progress and the present and future role they expect it to play, especially in the sphere of East-West competition.
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Although the U. S. may be uneasy about Soviet capabilities for secrecy in action, Americans can have no grounds for complaining that Moscow tries to hide its purpose.
1972. 219 Pages. Clothbound. Footnotes. Index.
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"I Remember Pearl Harbor”
(See J. K. Taussig, Jr., pp. 18-24, December
1972; p. 91, April; p. 96, June; and pp.
97-98, September 1973 Proceedings)
Captain W. J. Buckley, U. S. Navy (Retired)— Admiral Sabin’s comment in the September Proceedings brought to mind a little-known incident in rebuilding the "cheer up” ship. I was proud to serve in the old Nevada for three years, one as senior assistant engineer and the latter two years as chief engineer.
[2] joined her in August 1942 at Bremerton, where she was being refitted after her return from Pearl Harbor. Her electrical system was completely fouled up and required, among other things, a complete rewiring job, plus rebuilding of her two main DC switchboards.
Copper at that time was a critical and scarce material. Lack of this was overcome by obtaining silver ingots from the Treasury Department. By rolling out this material, and fabricating it into bus bars, construction of the boards was completed and, after painting with Glyptol, few people were aware of the basic material and we had the most valuable DC boards in the U. S. Navy. I made frequent inspections of these boards to assure that no electricians mates were filing off a "poke of dust” to make a good liberty.
As the years passed, and with the