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Throughout this century, the United States has conducted its wars in overseas theaters, and the lesson surely has been learned that victorious campaigns can be undertaken only when there is adequate merchant- type shipping available to assist the military. The need for ships already is appreciated, as is the basic economic fact that the defense establishment cannot afford to build and maintain, in a stand-by status, the auxiliary fleet it will require to respond to an emergency involving overseas operations. Major dependence for noncombatant-type shipping, therefore, has been and must continue to be placed on the active, privately-owned, American-flag fleet. No benefit would accrue here from a detailed analysis of the composition of the American merchant marine; we need understand only that the focal point of military interest is that segment engaged in the transportation of general cargo. Bulk carriers of both dry and liquid cargo and fully-refrigerated cargo ships have been excluded because their support functions in an assault operation are truly remote.
The fleet to which the military must look for augmentation consisted on 31 December 1972 of 339 ships, of which 189 were built and operated under subsidy contracts and were relatively new, averaging 11.7 years in age. These 189 ships were supplemented by 40 unsubsidized vessels with speeds of at least 17.5 knots, the majority (26) of which were container or vehicle carriers. The remaining 110 ships were smaller and slower, and of correspondingly less value.
Future demands upon the military forces of the United States are expected to be of the types of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts: "limited” wars in which the full resources of the nation will not be mustered, and in which requisitioning of ships from the merchant marine will not be approved. Given these restrictions, specific arrangements must be made during peacetime to assure that a dependable augmentation force, with the required capabilities, will be available whenever the need may arise.
The realities of commercial shipping obtrude upon military logistical planning at this point, because this augmentation force, by its very nature, will be engaged
in the foreign trade of the United States, and therefore will be deployed worldwide. Military need will be critical within the first 30 days of the inception of the conflict, and a number of ships will be required at the military loading ports within five days of the outbreak of hostilities. This demand can be met only by the most careful and long-range kind of planning.
Another fact bearing upon the logistics of an overseas operation is that a Marine amphibious unit cannot be "mounted out” in a heterogeneous collection of ships. In all likelihood, the merchant ships best adapted to support of this force will be those now employed as the sealift component of closely-integrated transportation systems which depend absolutely upon the unfailing availability of these vessels. Any disruption, even the traditional "cautious reduction” in the frequency of sailings which might permit withdrawal of one or more fleet units, is unacceptable to the business community, so long as the nation operates on the basis of "business as usual.”
Logistical planning staffs of the armed forces are struggling with these apparently irreconcilable difficulties. Some appreciation of their difficulties may be gained by realizing that there are under study contingency plans of a magnitude which will require that the preponderant part of the American-flag merchant fleet be made available within a matter of a few days. Granting the military necessity for response at this level, the effect of such wholesale withdrawals of ships from established routes and services can be nothing short of catastrophic for the commercial operators. That they will be reluctant to comply with the requests from the military, or even openly hostile, is to be expected, unless an elaborate plan to compensate them for their financial losses is revealed at the same time that the demand is placed upon them for the use of their resources. The cost of this support must be computed in peacetime, and the possibility of obtaining the necessary federal funds for such a program must be determined.
Marine Corps thinkers and planners are concerned with the twin problems of giving the assault units the
This artist’s rendering depicts a Lighter-Aboard-Ship (LASH) vessel, outfitted with revolving cranes atop its gantries, and thus converted to an Expeditionary Logistics Facility (ELF). While LASHes tend to make good Elves, an ELF can also be fabricated from other types of merchant hulls—e.g., containerships or tankers. Only through such bold innovations, conversions, and new construction will the U. S. merchant marine be able to operate in direct support of our combatant forces.
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kind and quantity of logistical support they will need during the first five to ten days of combat, as well as assuring that there will be adequate supplies available from sea-based sources until such time as port facilities can be established. During the first 30 days, it is anticipated that supplies will be brought from ships to troops by heavy-lift helicopters transporting either pre-loaded pallets or special expendable containers of noncommercial size. As the beachhead is expanded, amphibious craft will be used for surface transportation of replenishments of all types.
A concept is now being examined which casts a new light on the use of some modern ships of the American merchant fleet. This is the so-called "Merchant Ship Expeditionary Logistic Facility,” or ELF. The big carriers of the Lighter-Aboard-Ship (LASH) type, which already have huge gantry cranes mounted as integral equipment, will be converted into movable ship-unloading units by installing revolving cranes atop the gantries. The ELF will be moored in quiet water, and oceangoing ships will be brought alongside to be discharged either to landing craft lying in the lee of the ELF or direct to shore, depending upon the beach gradient. All that is necessary to make this plan a reality is to design and fabricate the revolving cranes, and to store them in selected ports where the LASH-type ships will be sent when the demand is made.
"All,” that is, except assuring that the ship will be available. There are in service or under construction a total of only 23 LASH-type carriers, and all of them are or will be components of integrated transportation systems. Just exactly how these probably indispensible ships can and will be furnished to the military without the use of requisitioning authority is the problem which must be solved.
Some understanding of the economics of the project may be gained by analyzing the costs associated with it. One standard LASH-type carrier is expected to cost—to procure the revolving cranes, modify the shipboard gantry cranes, and develop the various accessory systems essential to the concept—between $14.5 and $18.6 million. To maintain the ELF system in a stand-by status for a ten-year period will entail expenses of not less than $2.3 million and not more than $9.1 million. The larger figure provides for taking the ship out of commercial service for several months during each three-year period for use by the military as an ELF unit. The actual charter hire of the ship in time of emergency will depend upon the prevailing commercial market, but predictably will range between $3.5 and $3.9 million a year. It is unrealistic to assume that all 23 LASH- type carriers can or will be needed for duty as ELF units, but it may be noted that to equip the entire 23-ship fleet and keep it trained for ten years would cost $513
million at the minimum and $722 million at most. Prorated over ten years and all 23 units, the expense range is between $2.23 and $3.14 million per ship per year. The cost of disrupting the established steamship service is not included in this calculation, and would have to be developed by negotiation between the government and the shipowners.
Other types of ships will be required, and again the realities of commercial practice obtrude upon military planning. The use of containers to carry general cargo between industrialized countries has become commonplace, with the result that a lesser number of highly specialized ships of hitherto unimagined productivity is replacing the smaller and more versatile ships which up to now have been serving international trade. The impact upon military planning is very significant, because as the numerical size of the American merchant fleet is reduced, the responsiveness of that fleet to military demand is correspondingly decreased. Furthermore, the specialized construction of the new ships requires that assault-forces cargo be planned for containers, and some method must be devised by which the needs of battalion-sized units in combat may be met from container-carrying ships.
Space does not permit an analysis of the new techniques of combat cargo handling now being developed. Suffice it to say that procedures are being evolved by which comparatively small lifts of essential supplies can be assembled on board the container ships, and dispatched by helicopter to the battalions on the beach. What is important is that these techniques probably will require that the ships be equipped with mobile gantry cranes to bring the containers to the "flight deck,” and that the design of the ship makes it possible for helicopters to land on and take off from these carriers.
Modern technology in the field of air-cushion vehicles is advancing, and it is likely that they will be used by Marine Corps assault units in the future. From the viewpoint of cross-ocean transportation, special problems are presented, because of the size and weight of the vehicles. The barge-carrying (or "Seabee”) type ship—of which only three are in existence, and no more are under contract—appears to have the greatest potential to handle the air-cushion vehicles. It may well be that, as these vehicles are accepted for amphibious assault purposes, the Navy will have to build special ships for their long-distance transportation.
Roll-on/roll-off shipping, directly traceable to experience with the famous Landing Ship, Tank, the LST of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam fame, is growing in commercial acceptance. Eight RO/RO ships will be under U. S. registry and presumably available for emergency service in 1980. That they will be much in
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demand by the military is almost axiomatic. That they can be provided without catastrophic commercial consequences to their owners is unlikely, and therefore ways and means of reconciling these facts must be studied immediately, before the need arises.
Steps are being taken at this time to accomplish this end. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) now requires that American operators who contract to carry military cargo make a specified percentage of their fleets available for emergency service. The deficiency in this otherwise excellent arrangement is that many of the ships which will be provided are designed, built, and operated to meet commercial requirements, and are not in themselves satisfactory for the wide variety of military cargo which will have to be moved. Also, it must be pointed out, a few of the ships in the unsubsidized segment of the American merchant marine, which could be made available, date from World War II days, and have speeds of 17 knots or less. That these veterans of the cargo routes can perform a service can be accepted without argument; that their small size, slow speed, and age will render them only minimally useful to the military certainly must be taken into account in evaluating the type and extent of logistical support the merchant fleet can render.
Up to the time of this writing, only a handful of dry-cargo ships has been built under the terms of the amended and liberalized Merchant Marine Act, 1936. (The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 technically is an amendment to the older legislation.) The military need is becoming more obvious as the new ships are placed in service and the type and size of assistance the assault forces will require from the merchant marine are defined more precisely. It is appropriate, therefore, that the military determine fairly precisely what it will need in the decade beginning in 1980, and prepare to discuss ways and means of obtaining the requisite shipping. Adequate authority for both construction and operation of such ships appears to exist in the current legislation; only the problems of "hardware” remain to be resolved. These problems are of significant dimensions, because for too long a time the military has been content to stipulate that the "national defense features” in the design of American-flag ships constructed under subsidy be related exclusively to survival after torpedo and gunfire attack. It is right and proper that the concept of "national defense features” be broadened to cover, in addition, the actual transportation of military cargo.
A demonstration of what this could mean is already in progress. The MSC has modified the design of the LASH-type and the barge-carrying ships to meet specific military requirements, and is seeking proposals from the American shipowning community to build one of
each of these ships for operation under long-term charter to MSC. Specifically, the invitation calls for the ships to have accommodations for 250 troops, as well as an operating platform for a heavy-lift helicopter, in addition to the usual capabilities of this kind of ship. These vessels are to be privately owned and manned by civilian crews, but will be integrated into the MSC fleet just as was the RO/RO ship A dm. 1Vm. M. Callaghan, acquired for military use under charter in 1967. Four diesel- powered 37,000-ton tankers, built specifically for charter to MSC, came into service in 1972. The scheme is excellent, but does suffer from the fact that only that number of ships may be acquired which can be economically employed by the military.
A related arrangement also is in effect, wherein existing commercial tankers are now being used as modified fleet oilers for the U. S. Navy. Preliminary reports indicate that the results have been entirely satisfactory. As in the case of the dry-cargo ships, however, this type of employment merely assures that the immediate requirements of the military are met; there is no capability to augment the resources available to support suddenly enlarged demands. What is important is that the capability of the American merchant marine to operate in direct support of the combatant forces is being recognized and developed.
It is painfully clear to those concerned with military logistical planning that there is an urgent need to increase the responsiveness of the American merchant fleet to military requirements. The number of ships is being reduced month by month; the size of the new ships is becoming greater with almost every new delivery; the structural design of the merchant ships of tomorrow and also of the more distant future is more and more specialized; and the absorption of ships into "integrated transportation systems” is accelerating. All these factors immediately and drastically affect the ability of the combat forces, and particularly the amphibious assault units, to carry out the war plans now in existence.
Full credit for innovation must be given to the designers and operators of the lighter- and bargecarrying ships. Satisfactory in commercial employment, these big vessels have been accepted in theory by the military with the qualification that some solution must be found to the problem of discharging the lighters and barges at an undeveloped beach such as that encountered at Guadalcanal in World War II. The commercial technique of putting the lighter or barge alongside a pier or wharf and using a crane to unload is not feasible in the early days of an amphibious assault. The alternative is for the military to design, build, and stockpile lighters and barges with bow ramps similar to those on conventional landing craft.
90 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1974
If providing ramp-bowed equipment were the only problem, there would be no difficulty in assuring that these desirable ships could and would be available to the military in time of emergency. Unfortunately, there are only 26 of these ships in being or under construction under American registry, and it appears highly unlikely that all of them will be available to the military in a time of limited war.
In essence, the problem facing the military may be stated as a need for an adequate number of ships designed, built, and operated with a view to serving as auxiliaries to the amphibious forces. It will take approximately six years to create such a fleet, which means that it will be at least 1980 before the first units of the "new” merchant marine can be in service.
Once the exact specifications for merchant marine auxiliary ships of the future have been determined, representatives of the ship-owning corporations will have to become involved in the planning process. Accepting as an axiom the statement that the military cannot afford to build and maintain an auxiliary fleet, it follows that dependence must be placed upon ships which can be used commercially to earn most or all of their expenses, but still will be available to the military for use in time of limited war.
There will be a gap between the ideas of the logistical planners and the position of the shipowners which will affect noticeably the profit-making potential of the "new” merchant marine. It will be difficult to bridge this gap, for the differences are substantive, and will occur in at least three areas. First, the number of ships the military will need probably will vary significantly from the number the operators can provide and still remain competitive in their commercial services. Second, the military will want certain features built into the ships to make them effective auxiliaries, and those features almost certainly will entail modifications of the commercially-desirable carrier. Third, it is predictable that the military design will impose construction and operation costs which will be unacceptable to the owner.
In this last particular, the nature and extent of the construction and operating differential subsidy undoubtedly will have to be redefined. Not only must the established differential between American and foreign costs of building and operation be subsidized, but also the loss of revenue, calculated for the life of the ship, resulting from the national defense features required by the military. Put in specific terms, this might mean that a fully commercial model of a containercarrying ship could bring in $125 million in revenues during a 25-year life. With the inclusion of all national defense features, the revenue potential would be reduced to only $90 million. The difference of $35 mil
lion appropriately should be charged to the military budget as part of the expense of preparedness. It would be paid in annual installments pursuant to a contract agreed to by both parties, and would be subject to periodic audit to protect the interests of both sides.
Aside from the innovative thinking required to put such a concept into active use, there seems to be no reason why appropriate formulae cannot be developed which could be applied to future construction of ships built in the United States and intended for potential service as military auxiliaries. In the effort related to determining both costs and formulae involved in the concept, the role of the Maritime Administration and the Maritime Subsidy Board will be of crucial importance, for subsidy must be the basis of the whole proposal. It is the thesis of this essay that it is of paramount national interest that subsidy funds be expended to create a merchant marine that is competitive in international trade and simultaneously both usable and available for military auxiliary service. The full authority of law supports this thesis: the declaration of national maritime policy found in Section 101 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, is that, "It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and . . . capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. . . .” It is therefore already a matter of national policy that the differences be reconciled between the requirements of commerce and the requirements of the military, and that public funds be allocated to assure that the burden of providing ships for the national defense be carried by the federal government. Likewise, national policy dictates that the relationship between military and shipowners be such that support from the merchant marine is positively assured.
To achieve this objective will require the negotiation of three sets of contracts. One would contain the standard agreements by which the government absorbs the fair and reasonable difference between American and foreign costs of construction and operation of the ship. The second would provide for compensating the shipowner for the extra costs resulting from building into the ship specified national defense features which either increase the expense of operation (e.g., speed, electrical generating capacity, water distillation, and storage equipment) or which actually reduce the cargo-carrying space which could be used by the operator but for the existence of these national defense features. The third contract would stipulate the formulae to compute the actual cost of using the ship for auxiliary' purposes.
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These formulae would recognize that some of the national defense features might be financially burdensome to the operators, affecting negatively the profitability of the ship, and therefore appropriately should be subsidized; that disruptions to service incident to using the ships for auxiliary purposes will be costly to the owner; and that restoration of full commercial operation at the conclusion of hostilities will be a slow and expensive process requiring the assistance of the government. They also would fix the basis on which charter hire would be paid whenever the ship actually was used as an auxiliary.
An immediate benefit accruing to the fiscal managers of the government from the acceptance of these formulae would be the capability, never before held, of budgeting adequate funds for acquiring shipping in times of emergency. Updated annually, with the assistance and concurrence of the ship operators, these estimates would facilitate enormously the management of seapower.
There is also a dividend for the shipowners. The techniques of military cargo handling which would be built into the ships might suggest commercial applications of significant economic importance. Take, for example, the idea of using heavy-lift helicopters to move containers between ship and shore. The enterprising shipowner could contract with commercial helicopter operators to provide this capability at the smaller ports on his route. He would save not only the cost of putting his expensive ship into port, but he would be able to deliver the container directly to the consignee, eliminating the delays which otherwise might be encountered in the routine process of discharging. Should inland delivery prove impractical for any reason, there still would be the economy of the shortened voyage and the other benefits of more efficient management of his fleet. American shipowners might be additionally encouraged to develop other concepts by providing that, for a specified period of years after such new ideas were put into commercial practice and greater profits were earned, no reduction in operating differential subsidy would be imposed.
At first glance, the program advocated in the preceding paragraphs may seem utopian, but more careful consideration will show that it is both realistic and financially attainable. In fact, it must be adopted if the United States is to have the capability in 1980 and thereafter to meet its commitments.
The security of the United States demands that the capability of its armed forces to implement national policy and strategy not be restricted to that which can be supported logistically by an obsolescent and shrinking merchant marine. No longer is it feasible to plan to acquire shipping resources after the emergency is
encountered. Instead, the specific needs, especially of the amphibious forces, must be determined in advance at the same time that ways and means are devised to meet those needs when "business as usual” prevails. Because planning of this sort must consider the practicalities of commerce and finance, it will become necessary that the military logistical planners sit down with representatives of the American shipowning industry and the Maritime Administration to develop realistic and attainable objectives. Dictating this new and coordinated approach must be the appreciation that the national policy ordains that the merchant marine carry a substantial portion of the foreign water-borne commerce of the United States and also be capable of serving as a military auxiliary in time of need. Proposals developed for congressional approval therefore must show what is commercially and economically valuable to the nation, what is needed, in addition, to satisfy the requirements for the national defense, and what the total cost of the program will be for the taxpayer. Subsidy will be essential. Where design features recommended by the military potentially have commercial utility, this fact should be specified; only when these features are proven not to be self-supporting should there be government assistance to offset the costs incurred by the operators.
"In time of peace, prepare for war” is an old adage which cannot be ignored. Even when national hopes are high that the tides of war never again will engulf the United States, it is axiomatic that if peace is to be preserved there must exist the capability to withstand aggression. Skillful and imaginative planning, coupled with revitalized thinking about the role of the merchant marine in peace and in war, are essential. A true auxiliary for the amphibious forces must be created if the United States is to have the capability to meet its commitments. In time of peace, when the pressures are relaxed and the long view can be taken, it is proper to give careful thought to the future. In this case, certainly, to think must be to act.
A native of New Orleans and a graduate of Tulanc University, Colonel Kendall was retired in 1969 from the U. S. Government service as the Commercial Shipping Advisor to the Commander Military Sea Transportation Service (now renamed the Military Sealift Command). He went to that post in I960 after 14 years on the faculty of the United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York. He was head of the Academy’s Department of Ship Management from 1950 to I960. The holder of both B.A. and M.A. degrees from Tulanc, he also did additional graduate work at the University of California (Berkeley) and at Princeton University. In 1939, he terminated four years of employment with W. R. Grace & Co. to accept assignment to active duty in the Marine Corps. He was released from military service in 1946, and immediately joined the staff of the Merchant Marine Academy. He remained active in the Reserve until 1961, and was finally retired from the Marine Corps in 1972, having completed nearly 38 years of accumulated service.