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The First World War did not resolve the contradictions which had been engendered. Even 'bring the course of the war, while having economic Superiority over their rivals, the U. S. monopolists were hying plans to gain world domination. In this connec- tl°n, the ruling circles of that day felt that the avenue t0 world supremacy lay in the strengthening of their naval might.
The struggle for superiority at sea has always occu- M a significant place in the aggressive acts of U. S. foreign policy. However, this was displayed with par-
be Soviet submarine Komsomolka, left, together with her >lsler Komsomoletz, both built in 1933, were unusual among Soviet Union’s large prewar submarine fleet in that they Uer* built by subscription from members of the Komsomol, the ^"imunist Youth Movement.
ticular force in the initial postwar years, when American imperialism, having done its bloody business during the war, sharply expanded its activities in the countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In striving to eliminate the opposition of its traditional competitors on the paths of imperialist expansion, the American leaders set themselves the primary goal of weakening the sea power of England. "Anglo-American 'cooperation’ has turned into a clear Anglo-American rivalry, expanding the prospects for a gigantic clash of forces,” the Sixth Commintern Congress stated.1
The war of the diplomats for supremacy at sea was waged between all the imperialist powers at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the 1927 Geneva
1 Kommunisticheskiy intematsional v dokumentakh, 1919-1923 (The Communist International in Documents, 1919-1923). Partizdat, 1933, p. 772).
48 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1974
Naval Conference, and the London Conferences of 1930 and 1936. As a result of the prolonged struggle, the U.S.A. achieved international recognition of the "parity” of its naval forces with the British forces, which meant that the U.S.A. and England emerged with equal rights in this area. However, Japan, Italy, and later also Germany, not having achieved the armament relationships which they desired and favorable positions for themselves in the world markets by the diplomatic route, continued to feverishly prepare for war. The regrouping of the forces of the imperialist powers had begun, and the contradictions between them continued to grow.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s a most severe economic crisis broke out in the capitalist countries, and the U.S.A., England, France, Japan, and Germany were hardest hit.
As a result of the crisis, the conflicts became even sharper between the imperialist countries, between the states which were the winners and losers in the First World War, and between the home countries and their colonies. At the same time the crisis evoked a new upsurge in the class struggle. The revolutionary movement became particularly widespread in Germany, which was economically drained by the war, by the indemnities to England and France, and by the crisis which had begun. In order to preserve their power and prevent a further growth of the revolutionary movement, the German bourgeoisie with the support of the bourgeoisie of other countries brought Hitler’s Fascist Party to power.
The German Fascists marked their assumption of power, as we know, with the savage suppression of the working revolutionary movement, with the complete annihilation of bourgeois democratic freedoms, and with the unbridled militarization of the country and its economy. The foreign policy also took on a clearly anti-democratic aggressive character: Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, demanded a review of the borders of the European states for her own advantage, and overtly prepared for this redivision by means of arms.
One of the points of the military program of Hitler Germany was the rapid restoration of a powerful Navy, which was rather successfully carried out according to the principle of "cruisers instead of butter.” Thus, in March 1935, the Germans began the construction of battleships, cruisers, and submarines. At the same time, Hitler’s diplomats initiated talks in London to lift the restrictions on naval armaments which had been laid down by the Treaty of Versailles. In the summer of the same year an Anglo-German treaty was signed under which Germany was permitted to have a naval fleet with a total tonnage of up to 35% of the tonnage
of the British Navy; in this case the submarine tonnage was limited to 45% of the tonnage of the British submarine fleet; however, under "special circumstances,” it could be equal to it (the preparation by Germany for a war against the Soviet Union implied "special circumstances.”) In connection with this, the English press wrote that "Great Britain, having herself experienced this terrible naval weapon in the war period, is agreeing that the very same weapon will again appear in European waters right under her nose.”2
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Such an unceremonious breach of the Versailles Treaty was the consequence of the blind hate of imperialism toward the U.S.S.R. and the belief in the fact that Fascist Germany with a weapon thrust into her hands would use it only to destroy the first and only Socialist state on earth at that time.
The conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement marked the beginning of the Munich Policy of the Western powers in Europe, aided the Hitler leadership to finally cancel all of the other restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, and was the stimulus for an open-ended naval armaments race.
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In 1937 a new economic crisis broke out, hitting primarily the U.S.A., England, and France (it touched Germany, Italy, and Japan only slightly because their economies were supported by military orders). The battle for commodity markets, sources of raw materials, and spheres of capital investment heated up with new force among the imperialist powers. The threat of an armed attack by international imperialism on the Soviet Union also increased. The policy of the Western powers attested to this. Thus, the ruling circles of France assumed that Hitler’s aggressive operations in the East would weaken Germany, and this would facilitate the establishment of French supremacy in Europe. The U. S. imperialists, stimulating the aggressive intentions of Germany, believed that this would aid their policy of asserting world supremacy. Thus, the American "isolationists” and the European "peacemakers” essentially conducted the very same policy—a policy [encouraging] the aggressive drive of Hitler German)' against the U.S.S.R.
This is also attested to by the agreement in November 1937 of the British government’s representative, Halifax, with Hitler concerning the creation of an Anglo-German-French alliance, and also the conduct- ing of a secret conference on the capturing of the commodity markets in the U.S.S.R. and China, called at the same time by the financial circles of German) and the U.S.A.
In conducting planned preparation for war, Fascist Germany strengthened her military might on land,at
2The Times, June 19, 1935.
sea, and in the air. She not only re-established her main bases on the Baltic and the North Seas, but also built new ones. Ship construction was accelerated. Thus, in 1936, two 35,000-ton battleships, a 19,250-ton aircraft carrier, six 1,811-ton destroyers, and eight submarines were laid down, and in 1937 warships of an equal total tonnage were laid down. It was assumed that at those fates of construction Germany would fully restore her fleet by 1939- In 1938, Hitler demanded parity for his submarine fleet with that of the British. In 1939, the Navy of Fascist Germany numbered four battleships, U cruisers, 37 destroyers, and 57 submarines; and two battleships, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, 16 destroyers, and eight submarines were under construction. The tonnage of Germany’s merchant marine, which was the reserve of the Navy, was about 4.5 million tons at that time.
Thus, the center for the outbreak of a new world war was formed in the West, in the center of Europe.
A second center for the outbreak of a new world war was formed in the East. The imperialists of Japan, seeing that the European powers and the U.S.A. were busy with their own domestic affairs, brought on by 'be economic crisis, decided to better their position by 'be armed seizure of Northern China, and later of the ^viet Far East. In order to ensure herself freedom of aftion, imperialist Japan, like Fascist Germany, withdrew from the League of Nations.
In preparing for aggressive operations Japan strengthened and expanded her system of naval bases at which the naval fleet, which was under intensive c°nstruction, was scheduled to be based. By 1939 it bJd ten battleships, ten aircraft carriers, 35 cruisers, 106 destroyers, and 58 submarines. In addition, one carrier, 'Wo cruisers, eight destroyers, and eight submarines Were under construction. The merchant fleet tonnage Counting ships larger than 1,000 tons) was about five million tons.
Quite naturally our Party and government could not Overiook these facts, and, while continuing to consist- ently follow a policy of peace, they took measures to s''engthen the defensive capability of the Soviet Union.
Since J devoting
Navies in War and in Peace 49
In order to protect herself from the aggression of SUch powerful capitalist powers as Germany and Japan, Who were putting their entire economies, science, and !t(-hnology at the service of their militaristic aims, the Soviet Union needed powerful armed forces equipped W'th the latest weaponry and combat equipment. And 'be Soviet people did everything possible to have such ^rmed Forces. In this period aviation was furiously developed, armored forces were created, and the mo- b‘bty of the infantry and their firepower were increased, apan was a major naval power, Germany was particular attention to the restoration of a
strong fleet, and England, the U.S.A., France, and Italy, possessing large naval forces, had not dropped the thought of destroying the Soviet state, to protect its maritime borders, the U.S.S.R. needed a fully modern powerful Navy having a sufficient amount of all types of naval forces and all ship types in its inventory.
However, at the end of the 1920s our Navy consisted of combatants, batteries, and bases restored after the First World War and the Civil War, and reconditioned in the postwar period.
Significant in the history of the Navy were the decisions of the expanded meetings of the U.S.S.R. Revolutionary Military Council in May 1928, which defined the missions and the overall trend of development of the naval forces and which served as the basis for developing a naval ship construction program in the First Five Year Plan. The decisions said: "In developing the Navy, we shall strive to combine surface and submarine fleets, coastal and mine positional defenses, and naval aviation appropriate to the character of the combat operations to be conducted in our naval theaters in the situation of a probable war.”3 In other words, in those years the principle of creating a Navy consisting of harmoniously developed diverse forces had already been affirmed.
The very same, but even more vividly expressed, trend in the development of the Navy was also retained in the naval shipbuilding plan for the Second Five Year Plan. As the basis of the new plan, the requirement was levied for construction mainly of a submarine fleet and heavy aircraft possessing strong maneuvering capabilities on a priority basis.4
The character of naval construction in that period was determined by the missions confronting the Navy, views of the methods of its combat employment, the capabilities of industry, and the achievements of science and technology both at home and abroad. In this connection, the experience of past wars and also the trend in the development of naval forces of foreign states were taken into account.
On the basis of the developing international situation and the need to defend the country under the actual historical conditions, the Eighth Party Congress made a wise decision with respect to the need of the Soviet Union to have a mighty sea and oceanic Navy, corresponding to its interests. The naval forces existing at that time did not correspond to those needs. It was essential to create such a Navy in a short time. And the country proceeded with its creation.
The industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, the liquidation of the exploiter
3Central State Archives of the Navy, Photo 1483, List 1, File 80, pp. 23-24. Albid, Photo 1483, List 1, File 201, pp. 1-2.
classes, and the cultural revolution implemented by the Soviet people in the years of the initial five-year plans under the Party’s leadership permitted a sharp increase in the economic might of the Soviet Union. It was precisely in this period that the automotive, aviation, electrical engineering, and defense industries were created, and new shipbuilding yards were redesigned and built, thereby providing the material base for the construction of a new Fleet.
As early as 5 March 1927, the first Dekabrist-class Soviet submarines were laid down in the enterprises of the shipbuilding industry. From 1930 to 1934 the Leninets-class minelaying submarine, the Shchuka- and S-class medium submarines, and the small Malyutka- class submarines were turned out for the first time by industry. Soon construction was begun on the K-class ocean-going submarines. By 1 September 1939 the Soviet Navy had 165 submarines. The Soviet submarines were intended to operate in coastal areas as well as on the high seas, and were distinguished by their high performance characteristics. Thus, our Navy by the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War had become the possessor of the most powerful submarine forces in the world.
The creation of the naval surface forces was begun with the completion of cruisers which had been laid down as early as the First World War years. At the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s the Black Sea Fleet was expanded with the cruisers Chervona Ukraine and Krasnyy Kavkaz. Later, construction of new surface ships of various types was expanded. Initially stress was put on torpedo boats, escort ships, and destroyers, and later on light cruisers. In the first two five-year plans the shipbuilders gave the Fleet 106 surface ships: four cruisers, seven destroyer leaders, 30 destroyers, 18 escort ships, 38 minesweepers, one minelayer, and eight river monitors.
Performance Data of Soviet and U. S. Ships Laid Down Before the War
| BATTLESHIPS | HEAVY | CRUISERS | LIGHT | CRUIS^ | |
PERFORMANCE | Soviet Union | Iowa | Kronstadt | Alaska | Kirov | Bt$ |
DATA | 1938 | 1940 | 1938 | 1940 | 1935 | |
Displacement, tons full | 65 150 | 59 000 | 38 360 | 32 000 | 11 500 | 11J |
standard | 59 150 | 45 000 | 35 240 | 27 500 | 9 000 | |
Propulsion power, hp | 231 000 | 200 000 | 231 000 | 150 000 | 110 000 |
|
Max. speed, kn | 28 | 30 | 33 | 30 | 35 |
|
Guns, mm | 9—406 | 9-406 | 9-305 | 9-305 | 9-180 | |
| 12—152 | 20-127 | 8—152 | 12-127 | 6—100 | 5:*’ |
| 8-100 | 80—40 | 8—100 | —40 | 16-37 | |
| 32-37 | 48-20 | 24-37 | —20 |
|
|
| 8—12.7 |
| 8—12.7 |
|
|
|
Torpedoes | — | — | — | — | 2X3-533 | s' |
Mines | — | — | — | — | — | s' |
Aircraft | 1 catapult, 4 aircraft | 2 catapults, 4 aircraft | 1 catapult, 4 aircraft | 2 catapults, 2 aircraft | 1 catapult, 2 aircraft | 2 \ 4 ir |
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In 1938, with the adoption of a resolution on the construction of a large sea and oceanic Fleet, major surface ships were acknowledged to be its nucleus, although the interaction of different types of naval forces remained the main condition for the successful execution of missions. The shipbuilding program developed in accordance with this was weighted toward battleships and heavy cruisers, which were superior in quality to similar foreign ships. The change in views on the role of major surface ships took place under the influence of the fact that all the sea powers con-
Navies in War and in Peace 51
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tinued to feverishly build them, considering them to be the foundation of the fleet.
From 1938 to 1940 the laying down of the first of the Sovetskiy Soyuz [Soviet Unionj-class Soviet battleships, the Kronstadt-chss heavy cruisers, and the Chapayev-class cruisers took place. By the outbreak of war, there were 219 ships in various stages of construction in the yards, including three battleships, two heavy cruisers, ten cruisers, 45 destroyers, and 91 submarines.
Naval aviation was also expanded. However, it did not have special naval aircraft, and therefore was equipped with aircraft designed for the other branches of the Armed Forces. While effective for operations against land targets, they were poorly suited for carrying out combat missions at sea. Thus, due to the low speeds, short flight range, and small load capacity, the naval attack aircraft were unable to employ torpedoes with adequate success against warships at sea which had been detected at long ranges from the airfields. It is true that when the Navy received the DB-3 (IL-4) aircraft that this deficiency of naval attack aircraft was partially eliminated. Due to the short operating range, weak armament, and short endurance, naval fighter
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1940
2 750 2 050
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ESCORT SHIPS
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1940 1940
1 059 | 1 100 |
900 |
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3-85 | 3-76 |
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3—12.7 | -20 |
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Depth charge projectors
aircraft were not in condition to reliably cover forces at sea even at relatively short distances from shore. This considerably limited the employment of major fleet surface forces in zones within range of hostile aircraft.
The power of our coastal defense increased considerably: its equipment was upgraded, and areas of combat employment were expanded. In 1940 alone, the number of coastal artillery batteries grew by almost 45%, and the number of AA batteries doubled.
In the years of the prewar five-year plans, naval scientific and technical thought made a great contribution to the creation of new, and the upgrading of existing, models of mine, torpedo, and especially gunnery armament. In these same years the first radar sets were created in our Navy, models of infrared equipment made their appearance, subunits of remote- controlled torpedo boats were formed, the first types of air-cushion patrol boats were tested, and the employment of fighter-carrying mother aircraft was developed, which operated successfully at the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. All of this considerably increased the capabilities of the Navy.
Thus, in line with the development of the Socialist economy, the defensive might of our state was strengthened and the power of the Soviet Navy as an integral part of the Country’s Armed Forces grew.
The development of a Navy—a most difficult process in which outmoded weapons systems are replaced by new ones corresponding in the fullest measure to the latest level of development of equipment and to the requirements of naval warfare—is the final result of vast scientific work determining optimal variants for decisions of the most major strategic, strategic-tactical, and technical problems. The solution of these problems permits, through the most intricate combining in each ship of technical devices, systems, and complexes made up of the peak in engineering thought based on the very latest achievements in science, technology, and production, to concentrate the maximal combat capabilities with the most economical "expenditure” of weights, dimensions, and displacements.
However, the construction of a Navy is not just the building of combatants and batteries and the creation of new models of naval equipment. The construction of a Navy is also great organizational measures adhering to certain principles, the further development of the naval art, and the training of cadres of specialists.
The great importance attached to the Navy in the armed defense of the country was expressed organizationally in the formation in December 1937 of the People’s Commissariat of the Navy.
The formation of the People’s Commissariat of the Navy permitted concentrating the leadership of all of the measures connected with the construction of a large
Navies in War and in Peace 53
ocean-going Fleet in a few hands.
One of the organizational measures was the creation in 1932 of the Pacific Fleet and the creation in 1933 of the Northern Fleet. After the entry in 1940 of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia into the U.S.S.R., the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets considerably expanded their basing areas: the former emerged from the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland into the expanses of the Baltic Sea, and the latter toward the mouth of the Danube, where the Danube Flotilla was treated. Major formations of forces,' e.g., brigades and squadrons, made their appearance in all of the Fleets.
As the warship construction and the organizational measures were proceeding, a scientific quest was being made for more effective methods of combat employment of naval forces and of their weaponry in battle with a powerful enemy. In other words, the development of the naval art took place in accordance with the actual materiel-technical base of the Fleet.
The international situation and the overall missions °f the Armed Forces stemming from it determined the Navy missions: cooperation with the Red Army, repulsing enemy operations against our coast from the direction of the sea, the creation of favorable conditions for operations by our own forces in a naval theater (not just in the littoral area, but throughout the entire depth of the operation,) and action against the enemy’s economy by severing his sea and ocean communications.
Taking into account the state of the Soviet and foreign navies and the immediate prospects for their development, our naval science came to the conclusion fhat the outcome of the war would be decided on land, and therefore the Navy would have to carry out mis- Slons in the war stemming from the missions of the ground forces. In addition, our naval thought did not rule out the fact that in some stages of the war the Navy could also carry out the main mission in one heater or another.
Questions concerning theory in the naval art were forked out in accordance with the new missions of the Navy in the academies and scientific research institutes. This creative process took place amid a situation °f a sharp clash of opinions between proponents of °ffensive and defensive views on the role and employment of naval forces in the forthcoming war. The
former were still under the influence of the "small war” theory, which was correct in its day, while the latter, believing that our Navy had already become capable of conducting combat operations beyond the limits of our own coastal waters, held to the "control of the sea” theory. However, the interpretation of the term "control of the sea” was somewhat different than that held in the West. Thus, in a Naval Academy course of lectures of that period it was stated: "To achieve superiority of forces over the enemy in the main sector and to pin him down in the secondary sectors at the time of the operation means to achieve control of the sea in a theater or a sector of a theater, i.e., to create such a situation that the enemy will be paralyzed or constrained in his operations, or weakened and thereby hampered from interfering with our execution of a given operation or in our execution of his own operational mission.”5 It was precisely this interpretation of sea control which was the basis of the employment of naval forces in naval warfare.
Naval combat training in the prewar years was directed toward the development of the tactics of a naval battle primarily in our own areas which had been previously equipped. The main attention was focussed on the organization of a joint concentrated attack of surface ships, torpedo boats, aircraft, and submarines against groupings of hostile surface ships in the coastal zone of a sea and against our mine and gunnery positions being built in the narrows and at the approaches to the naval bases. In addition, a great deal of attention was also attached to so called hit-and-run operations (in the form of strikes against ports, naval bases, and groups of ships in enemy coastal waters) carried out by surface forces independently or in concert with the aircraft.
A great achievement of Soviet naval science was the development in the 1930s of a new chapter in naval art—the theory of the operational employment of naval forces. It correctly analyzed the role of various types of naval forces in armed combat and, in particular, pointed out that in actual operations the role and significance of one type of naval force or another or
n 1939, two modern Type VII destroyers and one of Russia’s three battleships, the October Revolution, maneuvered in the Baltic. After 28 Type II destroyers were built with Italian operation between 1933 and 1941 —18 of which were ass'gned to the Baltic—the Soviet Naiy improved on the kalian design with the Type VII-U, of which 26 were built.
5Captain 2nd Rank V. A. Belli. Teoreticheskiye osnovy vedeniya operatsiy. Konspekty-tezisy. (Theoretical Principles of Conducting Operations. Synopses- Theses.) Naval Academy, 1938.
ship type depends on the missions being executed, the relative strength of the forces, and the military geographical conditions of the theater.
In contrast to bourgeois naval science, Soviet naval science correctly determined the role of aviation in naval warfare. And although in the official documents governing the employment of the Navy (including also those published in 1940) aviation was relegated to the role of one of the main means of reconnaissance and support, it was clearly stressed in the speeches of the Navy leadership, in the pages of the press, and in the courses for the students at the Navy Academy, that no naval operation is conceivable without air forces.
On the basis of Soviet experience in landing landing forces, Soviet naval art in the 1930s developed the very first theory of amphibious landing operations which was checked in the course of combat training.
It should be noted that in its zeal to somehow justify the shameful failure of the Dardanelles operation of 1915 by objective reasons and to save the faltering prestige of the "Mistress of the Seas,” the British Admiralty went so far that it not only convinced others, but also itself, of the impossibility of landing amphibious forces. As a result, as one of the most important conclusions from the experience of the First World War, naval theoreticians of the Western countries acknowledged the complete lack of a future for joint operations of fleets with ground forces, and especially one of such diversity as the landing of a landing force. This conclusion was contrary to the combat experience of the Russian Fleet, which successfully landed a landing force at Lazistan [Rize, Turkey] and also with the wealth of experience of Soviet naval forces in the struggle with the White Guards and interventionists on the Civil War fronts. It was precisely due to the ignoring of this experience and due to the inability to discover trends in the development of the form and nature of armed combat that at the outbreak of the War not one of the navies of the Western powers had a developed theory for amphibious operations and not one had specially constructed landing ships and troop units trained for these operations.
From what has been said it is evident that Soviet naval art in the prewar years took a giant step forward and surpassed bourgeois naval art with respect to a series of issues. Prior to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War it represented a structured and completely modern (for that day) system of scientific views of the strategic and tactical employment of naval forces for the execution of the missions facing them. In this connection, in our naval art of those years the point of view predominated of employing naval forces for defensive purposes, although the missions and strategic and tactical plans were carried out strictly by offensive
methods. The employment, however, of submarines, including also raiding submarines having a very long operational range, was limited by the framework of the tactical missions executed by them which were primarily in nearby areas of the theaters. It was precisely because of this that the question of conducting combat operations in the ocean was not even raised, although the capability for this already was there.
Unfortunately this was not the only minus in the prewar construction of our Navy. Thus, the well developed theory for conducting amphibious operations did not receive the needed material or organizational implementation for several reasons (mainly of an economic nature): by the outbreak of the war not one of our Fleets had a single specially constructed landing ship. The Fleets also did not have the required number of surface gunnery ships to support the landing of a landing force because it was believed that this would be done by gunboats, cruisers, and destroyers. However, the cruisers and destroyers were trained mainly to combat enemy surface ships, and firing at shore targets was a secondary mission, while many slow-running gunboats, armed with one to three medium-caliber guns, were obsolete. All of this limited the Navy’s capabilities to carry out missions in concert with ground troops and made it difficult to conduct landing operations in far-off areas of a theater.
Unfortunately, questions of joint operations between the branches of the Armed Forces were also not given the requisite attention. One can see in this one display the underestimation by some leaders of the Armed Forces of the role of the Navy in the forthcoming wan However, precisely because of this reason, no unity of views was achieved on the principal questions of joint operations of naval forces and ground troops in coastal areas. Thus, as a result, the tactical cooperation of ships and army units was worked out only within general frameworks, and the amphibious training of the ground troops was relegated to a secondary position.
New guiding documents—regulations, directives, rules, and methodologies—were developed and introduced in the prewar years in accordance with the new missions of the Navy, methods of executing them, and the materiel base. They were all imbued with a spine of attack in any situation. The requirement for maintaining a high level of combat readiness for active offensive operations at sea, in the air, in coastal waters, off of enemy bases, and against sea communications was important in these documents. The documents recommended executing missions with concerted action by diverse forces, marshalling of forces for attacks, and a fuller utilization of firepower and mobility by fhc groupings participating in the battle.
The increase in the naval ship inventory and the
Navies in War and in Peace 55
number of naval units required training a large contingent of naval specialists and, above all, command cadres. In connection with this, in the late 1930s the network of naval training institutions was considerably expanded, and the schools training command personnel for the Navy were the first in the Armed Forces to be converted to higher training institutions. Thanks to this, the Navy was expanded by remarkable officers having sound general and special training prior to the Great Patriotic War.
By the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, our Navy had four major force formations: the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Fleets, and also the Danube, Caspian, Pinsk, and Amur Flotillas. The inventory of the Navy included three battleships, seven light cruisers, 66 destroyers and destroyer leaders, 22 escort ships, 80 minesweepers, 269 torpedo boats, 218 submarines, 2,529 aircraft of all types, and 260 coastal artillery batteries, which permitted carrying out the tasks of coastal defense and of supporting the Red Army. Although distributed throughout the individual theaters, the Navy as a whole still represented a considerable force. With respect to ship inventory and total displacement, it was about sixth or seventh in the world.
However, the insufficient number of ASW ships, •minesweepers, and auxiliaries, and the absence of spe- eially built landing craft considerably reduced Fleet capabilities with respect to maintaining favorable conditions in the theaters and made the execution of Attain missions difficult. It cannot be considered normal that not one of the Fleets had naval infantry, that •he air defense forces and equipment were weak, and •hat the stores of influence mines and sweeps turned °ut to be small.
Yet despite the series of deficiencies in construction Jnd preparation, the Navy as a whole on the eve of •he war possessed a high degree of combat readiness. This was one of the most important results of the work °four Party, which directed Navy personnel to main- •ain every ship and unit in constant combat readiness. The Navymen, educated by the Communist Party and Komsomol, were distinguished by exceptionally high •Morale and combat qualities. Their fleet friendship, ^‘thfulness to their military duty and to their remarkable revolutionary and combat traditions, and their fidelity to the Motherland ensured a constant high state
combat readiness and the combat capability of all °f our Fleets.
This to a great degree fostered the introduction of a mew system of combat training which permitted the "'orking out of Fleet force and unit training missions (fie year round and a reduction in the length of prepa- tation for large all-Fleet exercises. (Whereas earlier such
exercises were normally conducted in the fall, in 1941 the Black Sea and Northern Fleets were able to complete them in the summer before the outbreak of war.)
An important moment was the new organization of the transfer of our Fleets to a higher state of combat readiness, which was worked out and checked even before the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. It was precisely owing to this system that the Fleets were brought to full combat readiness in time, successfully repulsed the first surprise attacks of Fascist Germany against our bases on the night of 22 June 1941, and avoided many severe consequences.
It follows from what has been said that the constant concern of the Party and government for the security of the maritime borders of the Motherland permitted the creation in a short time of an essentially new, fully modern Navy capable of executing the missions with which it was charged.
By the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 to 1945 the Soviet Navy represented an imposing force which our enemies were forced to take into account. It was completely prepared to defend the state interests of the U.S.S.R. in the contiguous naval theaters, to repulse the attacks of enemy fleets, and was able to operate in concert with major ground force groupings in the littoral areas and reliably cover their flanks and rear. Moreover, our Navy was capable of undertaking active operations against the enemy’s sea communications and against coastal groupings of his ground forces.
The fact of the creation of a rather strong Navy in our country did not go unnoticed by the naval powers, as evidenced by Britain’s invitation to the Soviet Union in 1936 to take part in the work of the London naval arms limitation conference. The Soviet government, true to its peace-loving policy, entered into negotiations with Great Britain in order to check the naval arms race to some degree. However, Moscow laid down the condition at London that Germany also be obliged to limit armaments. Great Britain was forced to sign such an agreement with Germany. However, the accelerating preparation of the imperialist powers for a new world war made such an agreement unrealistic. The London naval arms limitation talks showed only the final alignment of the imperialist powers prior to the outbreak of the Second World War and showed that the imperialist powers were grouping themselves not for the purpose of limiting naval armaments, but to wage the forthcoming war and to seek allies for themselves for a future war.
The creation of the Soviet Navy attested to the readiness of the Soviet Union to protect her freedom and independence from encroachments by aggressors in all of the maritime theaters contiguous to it.
Commentary
By Vice Admiral J. F. Calvert, U. S. Navy (Retired)
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the class of 1943, Admiral Calvert was a submariner during World War II. He commanded the USS Skate (SSN-578) when, in 1948, she became the first submarine to surface at the North Pole. He was Commander of Cruiser- Destroyer Flotilla Eight prior to becoming the 46th Superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy in July 1968. He assumed command of the U. S. First Fleet in 1972 and retired from active duty in 1973.
It appears from reading Admiral Gorshkov’s 50,000 word polemic on Soviet seapower that there is by no means clear agreement within the U.S.S.R- on either the size or the basic mission of its Navy. He has apparently written these articles in an attempt to justify his policy which has shaped the Soviet Navy for so many years. Almost surely, that policy is once again under internal attack.
His articles are Gorshkov’s own version of the influence of seapower on history. He attempts to defend his Navy by establishing the importance of all seapower, but Soviet seapower in particular, through the recitation of its history. It is anything but objective. Reading it brings to mind the book by Admiral Moorer’s old friend entitled "An Unbiased History of the War Between the States From the Southern Point of View.”
Underneath all the puffery, however, lies the shadow of two great factors in naval theory which Gorshkov is unable to master—nuclear war at sea and the ballistic missile submarine. Despite the fact that these eleven articles have apparently been written for a specific internal political purpose, Gorshko' is honest enough to reveal that the dilemma posed by these two factors in the structuring of his Navy has given him deep pause. As he attempts to come to grips with the nuclear exchange and the ballistic missile submarine, he talks increasingly about "presence.” For all its importance, "presence” can never be a major purpose of a Navy. It can be a convenient auxiliary use but, almost by definition, never * central one.
This is not meant to derogate Gorshkov or impty that any Western theoreticians have done better, h" only to ask that all of us try to learn from the exf^' rience of watching Russia’s leading seapower advocate stumble over the same questions that have plagued all of us for the last two decades.
This particular article deals with the rebuilding 0 the Soviet Navy from 1928 until the outbreak of World War II. The year 1928 is chosen because h saw the meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council which set forth the missions and development plan behind the naval construction program 111 Stalin’s first Five Year Plan. (It is an interesting c01” mentary on Soviet political thought that Gorshkov never mentions Josef Stalin despite the fact that hc dominated Soviet history throughout this period & few men have ever dominated a society.)
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Navies in War and in Peace 57
The plan set forth by the Revolutionary Military Council was a modest one which clearly reflected the dominance of the Soviet Army at the time. The Army and, more importantly, Stalin, saw the Navy as a coastal defense organization in a supporting role for the land forces. Two important characteristics of today’s Soviet Navy had their origins in this period— the emphasis on submarines and the use of landbased rather than seabased air. Both were probably extensions of Stalin’s view of naval forces; neither was developed very effectively.
Gorshkov recites a long, glowing list of concep- tud achievements by the Soviet naval profession dur- lng this period: the "correct” determination of the r°le of aviation in naval warfare, the "very first the- 0ry” of amphibious landing operations, and a "struc- ^fcd and completely modern” system for the strate- §*c and tactical employment of naval forces, to name 0rdy a few. To be fair, Gorshkov does admit to a kw shortcomings, mainly because of economic and Material problems.
At no time, however, does he come close to the ^rt of the matter—the fact that the period between foe World Wars was critical to the development of an effective Soviet Navy for World War II and, in foat regard, the Soviet naval profession of the 1920s and 1930s failed. It failed to develop three of its ni0st fundamental needs in the struggle with Ger- ®aily: an anti-submarine capability, a meails of sup- P'ying logistic support at sea, and a means of effec- tlVely projecting naval airpower over the sea. As a result, during the Murmansk resupply efforts, the tlsk of protecting allied convoys had to be left en- tlrely to the British and the Americans. In addition, e effectiveness of the Soviet Navy against the Ger- 111311 surface Navy and merchant convoys was ham- Perc'd by weaknesses in logistics and naval air.
fo honesty, it must be admitted that the Soviet j'avd profession had serious handicaps in the 1930s.
“onal
policy. Further, according to an oft-repeated,
operating in a totalitarian society heavily domi- nated by a dictator who was certainly no naval theo- ttlc'an. Indeed, there is no evidence that Stalin put . Uch value on seapower as an instrument of na-
'[P> particularly those who had a background in
Marines.
unconfirmable story, Stalin’s great purges of the 5te 1930s took a heavy toll of Soviet naval leader-
. Whatever the truth of the story, something, i ^y, was wrong with Soviet submarine leadership , ^orld War II. At the outbreak of the conflict
^Uf* ft
^ Russians call the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet ,aravy had 218 submarines with more building—the &Cst submarine force in the history of the world
to that time. It was more than twice as large as either the German or the American submarine forces of the time. And yet the Russians could make it count for only a very little in the struggle of 1941 to 1945.
These criticisms of what the Soviet naval profession was able to accomplish in the 1930s, however, only serve to highlight what the author himself has been able to accomplish in the nearly two decades that he has headed the Soviet Navy.
Gone, now, is the preoccupation with coastal defense and support of the Army. Gorshkov’s Navy is blue water, its communications and logistics can and do support distant operations, it has a respectable amphibious capability, and its submarine force shows many signs of the sophistication it once lacked.
Rarely in the history of navies has one man been able to remain in control of a navy for so long. In most totalitarian countries, the politics of the high military are too treacherous for such longevity and, in the Western nations, the custom of taking turns with the Fleet precludes any more than a passing touch by one personality. Gorshkov, however, has prevailed through it all. Through Stalin, Krushchev, and Brezhnev, the nimble admiral has remained at the helm. And it cannot be denied that he has created a formidable weapon of seapower. Perhaps most important of all, he has rarely forgotten what is so easy to forget—that the purpose of a navy is to fight at sea.
Whether or not he will prevail against his present critics remains to be seen. The very fact that he has been forced to defend himself with these articles is proof of his success. The Soviet Navy now looms so large in the Kremlin’s budget that the inevitable cries of disarm, withdraw, and scrap are being heard. As always.
But whether he succeeds or fails in his present internal skirmishes, those two larger shadows referred to earlier—the nuclear war at sea and the ballistic missile submarine—threaten his policy as they do that of every large Navy. These are the two great riddles of our profession today.
Do they mean that naval power is now the only truly relevant power—or do they mean that no naval power can ever again influence the course of international affairs as in the past? Either conclusion can be reached by the use of today’s theory and both cannot be correct. How long will it be before someone can articulate the answers?