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Admiral H. D. Felt, U. S. Navy (Reared)—People seem to ask, "Why is America faltering?” And then, "What can we do about it?” I decided to join 'he party by asking these questions of Myself, and the answers were very ‘nteresting:
One of the reasons for our faltering is taking inheritance somewhat for granted. America has carried tradition as a light load. And our culture has been wasteful of nature’s gifts.
Another reason is that people of Main Street are not as sensitive as they could be to the possible consequences of the major conflict of life—absolute disagreement about two basic doctrines:
On the one hand, free nations devoted to shaping their own destinies, and on the other side, the Communist dogma and its strategy of eliminating Western influence and substituting Communist control.
Every Main Streeter wants peace— which, to him, means to live with free choices and let others live likewise. The Communists also are for peace—but their philosophy is dramatically different from ours. To free peoples in the world, they say, "to have peace, take your chances with us—or die!”
Still another reason: Voices around us have undermined steadfastness of mind. Our tensions have been manipulated. The Communists are clever at psychological warfare. We have not been as good at waging it. Nor have we been successful it immunizing ourselves to the tricks
used to confuse us. We are losing the war of ideas. We are being led down a path of accepting false premises and arriving at silly conclusions—down a path of donothing.
Fortune magazine, speaking to the "Why?” says that modern society has lost, to a large degree, the supports which helped people in earlier times—religious faith, tradition, and a sense of place in the social world.
I tried several definitions of patriotism and settled on a very brief, but most complete one: "Devotion to the welfare of one’s country. Constancy—full time dedication.”
Patriots cherish their inheritance and their form of government. They are beneficiaries of rights and the bearers of responsibility. Some of us, however, including me, have a difficult time composing our belief into uncomplicated language. Furthermore, we stumble in trying to formulate a simple statement of standards by which to measure behavior. Religions have commandments and laws. American policy has its Constitution. From it, I derive these standards, which I hope you will agree make good glue to hold the base together: Freedom—the eternal foe of tyranny, Personal Worth, Equality and Individual Opportunity, Rule of Law, Public Morality—standards of decency, and Individual Responsibility.
We can do a better job at organizing the good of life—we can shine up America’s wings. The formula, I suggest, is the approach of reason—backed by strength. Our culture is determined in the home, school, church, club, business mart. Obviously, these are the places for works to give life to faith— the positions of leaders—the places to apply wisdom.
As George Washington asked men and women who were creating our Republic—his spirit is commanding us constantly: "Raise the standard to which the wise and honest can repair.”
"The Military Critic”
(See P. M. Flammer, pp. 28-36, March 1973
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Philip Af. Flammer, U. S. Air Force, Editor, Aerospace Commentary and Associate Editor, Air University Review—I am very much impressed with the manner in which you and your staff presented my article. The fact that the Proceedings published the article is most refreshing to me and helps relieve some of the skepticism left me by my research. For that, among other things, I am profoundly grateful.
Helicopter ASW
Lieutenant J. A. Babb, U. S. Navy— Helicopter ASW has been the "stepchild” of the Navy for a long period of time. There are several significant factors which have contributed to this. One factor has been the manner in which the helicopter, itself, has been developed. Another factor has been the type of equipment the helicopter has been provided. A third factor has been the low priority assigned to training helicopter ASW crews. These three elements are actually quite closely interrelated; by removing one of these causes, the effects of the others should be diminished.
Basically, the methodology of producing a helicopter has not changed. When a helicopter is built, there is no specific mission assigned to the helicopter, nor are any special systems designed to be placed specifically in a given helo. When the SH-3 was being built, it was advertised as having an ASW capability, not as being an ASW platform.
As a consequence of the sporadic development of the helicopter, the procurement of helicopter ASW equipment has been hampered. The basic attitude has been one of trial and error; an initial installation of some new gear has generally been jury-rigged to the airframe of the helicopter and if it worked, the jury rig became part of the airframe. As a result, the ASW helicopter has been plagued with cast-offs from other communities, or the equipment has been designed from random spare parts rooms. For example, the SH-3 helicopter is equipped with a navigator/plotting board from the P-2, a doppler radar from the same aircraft, a surface search radar used by fishing trawlers, an intercom system which requires 14 black boxes, and a control stick which resembles that of a T-28 Trojan. Similarly, a number of special airframe changes have been performed on certain random helicopters in order to modify that particular aircraft to tow, sling, or load various and sundry items designed to do everything from provide troops with ground support fire to retrieving practice torpedoes or drones. Surprisingly, the armaments system seems to have escaped the Rube Goldberg syndrome (complex machines to perform simple tasks). The aircrew- men are not required to roll torpedoes out the cargo door; ASW ordnance is launched from external racks. When using sonobuoys, however, the aircrew- men are required to launch the buoys from the cargo door, by hand. They
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
must also launch all-smoke markers and other marking devices from the cargo door. It appears that in the SH-3H, the sonobuoys will have to be launched from a tube extending through the fuselage—another unfortunate Rube Goldberg design.
A classic example of the Rube Goldberg syndrome of equipment development for the ASW helicopter is the LAMPS program. Originally, the program was to design a new helicopter to assist DEs in prosecution of long-range sonar contacts and to provide early warning of cruise missile attacks. The UH-2C was designated to be used to evaluate the equipment to be placed on the LAMPS helicopter. Since the UH-2C was to have been an interim, temporary vehicle, a somewhat ungainly-looking bulb was attached to the nose of the aircraft to house the radar; a pod was attached to the side to house the MAD gear, and the P-2 Neptune AYK-2, two-point plotter plus the reliable, manually operated Mark-6 plotter were installed in the cockpit to use for solving ASW tracking problems. The funds for the LAMPS project were curtailed, and the interim helo was designated the LAMPS, SH-2C. The old utility squadron, HC-5, was redesignated HSL-31, and the LAMPS program was declared operational.
Another example, is the SH-3 sonar. The sonar used in the SH-3 aircraft, the AQS-13, seems reasonably well adapted to the helicopter, but this piece of gear was designed to track conventional submarines or German U-boats. In short, it suffers from obsolescence. The AQS-13 has difficulty detecting or tracking nuclear submarines because it has a short range, and the high-speed of the nuclear submarine enables the sub to quickly break off contact or hide from the pursuing helicopters. Additionally, the airspeed of the helicopter is severely limited. Thus, the helicopter presents planners with a dilemma—how may the helicopter assets be effectively used in precise localization operations, when it takes so long for a helo to transit from one section of an operations area to another? For example, a helicopter stationed 30 miles to the south of the carrier with a destroyer, would require 45 minutes to transit to a datum generated in a buoy field 60 miles to the north of the carrier. In addition, because of
the short range of the helicopter sonar, at least two helicopters are required to effectively prosecute a contact or search a datum area.
Currently, the helicopter community is scheduled to receive the SH-3H aircraft. The SH-3H is another manifestation of the Rube Goldberg syndrome; the SH-3H is an SH-3D with the old cast-off avionics of the S-2 Tracker. This, it appears, will merely aggravate a problem of obsolescence. To begin with, the submarines gained a quantum jump in technolog)' when they began using nuclear power- The nuclear power plant of a submarine enables it to be faster and quieter than ever. As the submarines continue to apply refinements to their equipment, their advantage in ASW becomes exponentially, not proportionally, greater. Therefore, the ASW helicopter must gain a quantum technological jump in order even to begin to narrow the advantage possessed by the submarine in ASW.
The following represents some ideas to narrow the advantage and produce an effective helicopter ASW platform.
The "new” platform should be capable of speeds in excess of 200 knots; which performance is already a reality for helicopters (e.g., the Lockheed Cheyenne, and the Sikorsky Black Hawk). The added speed should reduce that critical factor known as time late at datum.
The helicopter ASW platform should use a passive dipping sonar of a design that parallels that of the modern fast attack nuclear submarine. The sonar should be capable of detecting, analyzing, and obtaining bearings on low frequency noises. The minimum acceptable range of this sonar should be ten kilo- yards in the poorest of water conditions- The AQA-81 MAD gear should be installed to help classify and localize contacts. Additionally, the helicopters should be equipped with digital readouts of the ranges and bearings of other helicopters in the area, in order to obtain accurate cross bearing fixes from the information provided by the sonars.
The aircraft should also contain some environmental features not found on other helicopters. Air conditioning is1 must. For example, in the South Chins Sea, a medical study revealed that the average temperature for both day and night was 105°F. in the cockpit of the
Comment and Discussion 85
helicopter. It was estimated that in the cabin, where the crewmen were seated, the temperature was another ten degrees hotter. Operations under these conditions were limited simply because crewmen cannot function effectively, if at all, under those circumstances. Adequate soundproofing is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the crewmen in differentiating helicopter noises from those sounds of the ambient noises and submarines in the ocean.
The helicopter will, of necessity, be large in order to accommodate the equipment necessary to evaluate the sonar information. Similarly, the engines must be powerful enough to operate all of the electronic equipment and air conditioning, and still be able to hover under conditions of high gross weight and density altitude. The size of the helicopter would be such that the traditional method of inflight refueling from a destroyer would be impractical, because the helicopter would be too big to hover over the fantail of a destroyer and because of the danger of the rotor wash pushing a man overboard. The speed of the helicopter, however, would be sufficient to enable it to refuel from an airborne tanker.
To return to problems of the present, the obsolescent equipment and the dilemma of proper use of current helicopters yields a third problem. The helicopter in an ASW squadron spends significantly less than half of its time performing ASW functions or missions, *nd the aircrewmen lack experience in prosecuting submarine contacts. Additionally, it is difficult to obtain the use °f a submarine for training with helicopter squadrons, especially on the West Coast. Although training devices may be used extensively, simulators cannot replace the real thing. Crew readiness and Morale are greatly improved by being able to show positive results in an exer- c‘se with a nuclear submarine. Experience is a necessity in effectively tracking 1 modern, high-speed, nuclear submarine, for if aircrewmen are required to detect a nuclear submarine, the only way they will be able to recognize one ls to be familiar with the sound charac- 'ctistics of a nuclear submarine, and this can only come from tracking the real ffiing. Exercises involving the tracking
nuclear submarines are necessary in
order to gain the necessary experience for crew and flight coordination and tactics to be employed.
The helicopter must make a quantum jump in its technology and design if it is to emerge from the traditional status as the stepchild of the ASW community. The design of the new helicopters should also allow the helicopter to make maximum use of its unusual flight characteristics and operational capabilities. Further, the crews of the ASW helicopter platforms must be given the opportunity to gain experience in tracking the nuclear submarines. The attitudes of the designers must change from that of "design the helo and see what it can carry,” to one of "design the helo for a mission and develop equipment for that design to allow the helicopter to effectively complete that mission.”
[Responding, as requested by the Editor, to Lieutenant Babb’s observations, the Op-506 D3 (LAMPS/ASW) desk comments as follows:]
Commander F. M. Dreessen, U. S. Navy— The dual-engine UH-2 Kaman Seasprite was selected as the vehicle to evaluate the merits of a single helicopter operating in a two-fold mission of ASW and Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) from the confined flight deck of a surface combatant. Because of the gratifying success initially demonstrated by the aircraft with its installed interim electronics equipment and the need to make LAMPS a viable weapons system in the Fleet at the earliest date possible, the program emerged as the newest addition to the naval aviation arsenal. By definition, all of the associated equipment- aircraft, acoustics, radar, electronic support measures (ESM), and the like, used "off-the-shelf” technology. Granted, LAMPS MK I could have been better, but not more inexpensive or obtained in a shorter period of time—both stringent requirements. Without the H-2 airframe, which has its recognized shortcomings, there would be no lamps program today.
Training of personnel, as with any new program has lagged behind Fleet requirements. The first Weapons Systems Trainer for LAMPS is on contract,
with a second expected to be funded in Fiscal Year 1974. These trainers will immeasurably increase the readiness posture of the LAMPS flight crews. The Fleet ASW schools are expanding their training curricula to accommodate more adequately this new dimension of instruction. At present, teaching techniques and training aids are being devised for deploying detachments, so that embarked technicians will be able to maintain their operator proficiency.
Some of the hardware listed by Lieutenant Babb as being installed in the LAMPS MK I aircraft was incorrectly reported. For example, the radar cited is not of the type currently carried in the LAMPS aircraft, but was, in fact, evaluated during one of the test phases. Developmental testing, which is continuing, will ultimately produce the MK III helicopter for the LAMPS program. That helicopter is anticipated to be of new design and outfitted with the latest mission equipment available from industry. Emphasis on ease of maintenance and operational reliability are established goals for both airframe and the installed equipment.
Although the picture, we think, is not as bleak as that which Lieutenant Babb describes, all helicopter people share his hope for a fully-funded development program that will provide the optimum combination of airframe, engine, and weapons systems we all hope to have in the near future.
Two Nations "Go Dutch”
In Naval Cooperation
Raymond V. B. Blackman, Former Editor, Jane’s Fighting Ships—I recently had the experience of appearing before Dutch television cameras to justify a forecast that I had made in 1969, that to obtain the best value from their waning strengths, the Royal Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy might have to be integrated.
When I wrote the Foreword of the 1969-70 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships, I added a tailpiece which made the headlines. I had made my customary annual survey of the world naval scene, as I had done for 20-odd years, outlining the trends and traits of warship development among the principal naval powers,
but I concluded with a suggestion for an alliance of the Royal Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy.
This was intended to make people think and to bring home to a deftnse- apathetic public, that if the British and Dutch navies were reduced any further, neither would be viable for the primary tasks of keeping open the ocean trade routes upon which the continued prosperity, indeed the very existence, of these two sea-created nations, straddling the North Sea, depended.
My tailpiece was taken up by the press all over the world as the main item of review. The Royal Netherlands Embassy in London, the British Embassy in The Hague, and the British and Dutch navy departments of the two ministries of defense had many inquiries as to the official views. But the buck was promptly passed back to me.
Upwards of three years later, I was asked by the Dutch how my prognostications had stood up to the test of time. Well, the Royal Navy has not yet amalgamated with the Royal Netherlands Navy. No marriage has been arranged,
nor has an engagement been announced, but if it cannot be implied that they are living together, it can at least be said that they are "just good friends.”
One of the most concrete and encouraging examples of Anglo-Dutch naval cooperation is the understanding of June 1972, on the operation of submarines of the Royal Netherlands Navy from the Royal Naval Base at Faslane, Scotland. These two submarines come under the operational command of the Royal Navy and are attached, in 14-week cycle periods, to the British 3rd Submarine Squadron.
The bilateral cooperation between the two navies now embraces personnel and shore training; operations, exercises, and policy; and research, development, and production of equipment. Several Anglo/Dutch joint committees meet at regular intervals.
There are arrangements for training exchanges and for liaison between Royal Navy schools and their Dutch counterparts. British naval personnel are trained at the Communications School, Amsterdam, and Netherlands naval person
nel have, in the past year, taken up over 80 places on courses at United Kingdom training establishments, most in the Portsmouth area, including HMS Dryad (Maritime Tactical School), HMS Mercury (electronic and communications); HMS Excellent (Seacat Trainer), HMS Sultan (gas turbines and degaussing) and HMS Dolphin (submarine commanding officers’ qualifying); also HMS Thunderer RNHC Manadon (engineering) and RMCS Shrivenham (communications and gunnery).
In addition, some 130 officers and men of the Royal Netherlands Navy trained in the submarine escape tank at HMS Dolphin during the year. Every year, four Dutch midshipmen and four British sub-lieutenants hold six-week exchange sea duty.
CONTENTS:
Art Historian and the Sublime Aspects of the
Naval Profession
D. M. Schurman, Queen's University
German Seapower: A Study in Failure
Theodore Ropp. Duke University
The R.N.A.S. in Combined Operations
1914-1915
Commander W. A. B. Douglas, Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters
The Dardanelles Revisited: Further Thoughts
on the Naval Prelude
Arthur Marder, University of California, Irvine
Smaller Navies and Disarmament: Sir Herbert Richmon's "Small Ship" Theories and the Development of British Naval Policy in the 1920's
8. D. Hunt, The Royal Military College of Canada Canadian Maritime Strategy in the Seventies G. R. Lindsey, Detense Research Analysis Establishment, Ottawa
Problems of Naval Arms Control: The High Seas, The Deep Ocean and the Seabed
William Epstein, Disarmament Affairs Division of the United Nations
The Seas in the Seventies
Lieutenant Commander A. D. Taylor, Department of
External Affairs, Ottawa
From Polaris to the Future
Ian Smart, Assistant Director. International Institute
tor Strategic Studies
Papers from the Conference on Strategic Studies at the University of Western Ontario, March 1972
Both navies have been deployed extensively in bilateral exercises, and Dutch surface ships, submarines, and maritime aircraft participate in British national exercises, such as the regular series of Joint Maritime Courses. Consideration is given to dovetailing operations and port visits wherever British
87
Comment and Discussion
and Dutch warships are deployed, in the Far East and the Caribbean. Close liaison has been established between the respective Fleet operating authorities.
Three officers of the Royal Netherlands Navy serve in integrated appointments on the staff of the British Flag Officer Sea Training. The number of Dutch warships assigned to Portland for working-up each year, was increased from three to four in 1973.
The Chief of Allied Staff at the Northwood Headquarters of the Eastern Atlantic and Channel Commands is a Dutch rear admiral, and seven other Dutch naval officers serve in other NATO appointments, this being only a fraction of the collaboration with the Dutch under various Treaty Organization arrangements.
Dutch naval officers serve in established posts in the United Kingdom, both in the Navy Department of the Ministry of Defense and in other naval establishments. Corresponding British naval officers serve similarly in the Dutch Ministry of Defense and naval establishments. There are exchanges of four ratings of the Women’s Royal Naval Service—two meteorological observers and two radar plotters, and a recently-established exchange at chief petty officer level.
In research, development, and production of naval equipment, there is regular consultation between the British and Dutch navies regarding projects of mutual interest. Both countries do everything possible to further equipment collaboration in the context of defense. Joint committees examine at Working level, and exchange information on such subjects as electronic equipment, mine warfare, and antisubmarine detection, and there are cross-purchases of equipment.
Bilateral cooperation also extends to the Royal Marines. A two-year exchange posting with the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps has been established. The Royal Marine officer serves in various operational appointments during his two-year tour. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps officer is a commander or deputy commander of a company in 45 Commando Group. A Dutch Major of Marines is attached to Headquarters Commando Forces at Plymouth. A Dutch-reinforced Company Group took
part in Exercise Strength Trial in June 1972 and in Exercise Strong Express, as part of 45 Commando Group in September 1972. The Dutch Group is reorganizing on British commando lines, is affiliated with 45 Commando Group and training with them in Scotland. This arrangement is intended to be annual. Attendance of Dutch Marines at Royal Marine training courses has been expanded. A Company Group from 45 Commando trained in the Netherlands in 1971. Liaison visits are made on a reciprocal basis with the Dutch.
During the summer, the Royal Navy is making a major "showing-the-flag” cruise to the Far East, including Singapore and Hong Kong, and probably Japanese and Australian ports. The Dutch Navy is contributing to the squadron. The Dutch have periodically sent warships to visit their former empire in the East Indies to promote goodwill, support financial interests, and protect the very extensive trade still existing between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The cruise could well be used as an experiment to ascertain the ramifications attending a duo-national naval presence in the Indian Ocean on the lines of the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic.
Rendezvous in Kiel
Lieutenant Commander Pierre Richard, French Navy—"To all those interested in sailing, the Tall Ships Race has become the event when one speaks of large sailing vessels. It is interesting to note that this event started in 1956, and has become extremely popular since then because the race is both an exercise in navigation and an international sporting event. I have no doubt that the 1972 race will enjoy the same success as the preceding ones and that the participants will never forget Scandinavian hospitality.” With these words, Prince Phillip of Edinburgh, the Presiding Officer, opened the 1972 Tall Ships Race. Anyone connected with these races will undoubtedly agree with him.
In order to conclude the Olympic Sailing Competition in a fashion corresponding with its significance in the sailing community of the world, it was decided that arrangements be made to unite in Kiel as many as possible of the
large sailing vessels of the world. With this in mind, the "International Sail Training Races 1972” were organized. There were two races, with starts in Cowes and Helsinki. Both races terminated in Malmo, Sweden, with all the participants continuing on together to Kiel, through the Baltic Sea via Liibeck.
Large sailing vessels may appear to belong to another era to those less addicted to the sea, but they are still training schools without comparison. These vessels teach the fundamentals of the elements of the sea and one becomes a true sailor. Most of the countries of the world that still require the qualities of seamanship and a true sense or feeling for the sea in its officers and men, continue to support, maintain, and sail these magnificent vessels in the manner in which they deserve.
Many nations were represented both as participants and as hosts. As could be expected, there were some friendly rivalries between the various ship crews and nations competing. Most of the differences between countries were discussed across a dinner table during the numerous stops ashore. The atmosphere created by the many seamen sitting around a table eating foreign food, on a foreign vessel, in a foreign port, and speaking and sometimes singing in a foreign language was something that had to be experienced to be fully appreciated. They exchanged many sea stories, some of doubtful credibility. The memories of wonderful days ashore and new friendships with fellow sailors from other countries left in us all an unforgettable memory.
Early on the morning of 2 August 1972, the Etoile, accompanied by the Belle Poule, left Brest Roadstead and set sail for open water. These splendid, two-masted topsail schooners (goelettes) from the French Naval Academy, represented the French Navy and France during the races.
The crossing to Cowes, Isle of Wight, was exceptional, with calm seas, and Eole, the God of winds, gave us just enough wind to arrive almost on time. This transit of the English Channel was a peaceful prelude to the difficult days ahead in the North Sea. At about 1000 on 13 August, with a brilliant sun shining and all sails set, the Etoile and the Belle Poule entered the beautiful harbor
of Cowes—a sailing paradise. During the two-day stay, our English hosts had the program of activities arranged to perfection for our 35-man crews.
The morning of our departure, we witnessed a spectacle which we will never forget. Through the early morning fog, we saw the three silhouettes of the three largest sailing vessels in the race; the Eagle (United States), Gorch Fock (West Germany), and Dar Pormoza (Poland). These three-masted barks were followed by eight schooners of our class and about 30 smaller ships. The sea was covered with a flotilla of all types and sizes of sail and power boats escorting us out to sea.
We arrived at the starting line, about three miles east of the Isle of Wight, followed by our escort. We had to be constantly alert to avoid running over them. How can you forget a canoe- kayak that follows you out to the open sea? We were too busy to think of the 645 miles between the start of the race and lightship, the Skaw, anchored off the northern tip of Denmark, which marked the finish line.
The start was at noon, and with all sails set, but little wind, we were off! Each one was at his station, ready to respond immediately to the captain’s orders. Because of the over-eagerness of the crew to do their jobs exceptionally
well, soon they began to sing sea chanteys. At about the same time, a British ship appeared off our port bow, and the singing became even louder as we overhauled and passed her.
As we continued on our course, leaving Oward, Colbert, Bassard, and Sandettie banks to port, toward the lightship Skaw, we were sure we would be among the first across the line. We had little time for the luxury of being bored, either by day or night, thanks to the never-ending work on the main deck. We fought against wind and current in an effort to maintain our projected course. The wind changed frequently, not only in force, but also in direction. With it the sea also changed its mood. The crew seemed more like acrobats than sailors, as some constantly clambered up and down the masts and rigging, raising and lowering the staysail and the gaff topmast-staysail, while others remained on deck and tended the sheets, halyards, and down- hauls. This was necessary in order to profit from the wind as much as possible but still not damage anything.
After five days, a tired, but happy crew crossed the finish line—the Belle Poule coming in third and the Etoile fourth. Two English ships were first and second, the Sir Winston Churchill and the Malcolm Miller.
With favorable winds and fair seas, we sailed to our next liberty port, Malmo, Sweden. When we arrived, there were already several sailboats present, creating a scene of rare beauty. They were participants in the Helsinki to Malmo race. There were six large square-riggers riding at anchor. Among them were the U. S. Coast Guard Academy’s Eagle, the Polish Merchant Marine Academy’s Dar Pormoza, the West German Navy’s Gorch Fock, the Colombian Navy’s Gloria, the Danish Maritime Forces’ Denmark, and the Norwegian Navy’s Christian Radich. There were also 14 schooners of our class (four Danish, three English, one Polish, one French civilian, and our two goelettes), plus 26 boats of 65 feet or more, and about 18 smaller ones.
After a most entertaining visit in Malmo—which included the "borrowing” of the "skull and cross-bones” pennant from the Swedish schooner Falken, and flying it from the mainmast of our ship—we weighed anchor on 27 August for Liibeck. Before leaving, however, the organizers of the course, the Sail Training Association, arranged for an exchange of crewmen between boats. Embarked on board the Etoile, we had representatives from Poland, West Germany, Colombia, and the United States.
The transit across the Baltic Sea could not have been better. We anchored off Travemiinde on the night of 28 August, and preparations were made for a "spectacular” entry into port the following morning.
At 0600 on 29 August, we made our grand entrance into Travemiinde in two columns with the larger boats in the lead. Despite the early hour, a large crowd had gathered along the entrances. An orchestra played the national anthem of each ship as she went by. We sailed past the Passat, a magnificent four- masted ship which now serves as the home of the German Navy sail-training courses.
Everyone except for the Eagle and the Gloria, which sailed directly up to Liibeck, either anchored at Trave- miinde, near the mouth of the Trave River about five miles from Liibeck, or moored at the fisherman’s wharf.
Among the numerous activities reserved for Liibeck were individual and team competitions, which counted to-
wards the final standings for the race. Competition included heaving-line throwing, regattas in "420s,” volleyball, and swimming. It was also in Liibeck that the awards ceremony was held.
When we departed on 2 September, the shores were again lined with people. Everyone we had met or who had visited our boats seemed to return to bid us au revoir. From Travemunde, we headed for our rendezvous point off Kiel. The next morning we were surrounded by spectator boats of all types. This warm reception was probably the most moving of all. We sailed in two columns, passing in review before President Heinemann of the Federal Republic of Germany, rendering honors as we drew near.
Up until about 1400, when we were actually standing into Kiel fjord, the number of spectators was unbelievable. The local press estimated that there were about 200,000 people and about 5,000 boats. The crowd was even more extraordinary than in Liibeck, if that was possible. Nothing was lacking. There were fireworks, saluting batteries, or
chestras, and cheering. I doubt that I shall ever again witness anything to compare with our arrival in Kiel. This port, long awaited by the crew, and the city itself combined to make an enormous festival. The French Ambassador gave a cocktail party in our honor to start things off and, for the next four days, we were invited to breakfasts, luncheons, receptions, dinners, and parties. We met the French Olympic Sailing Team.
After the Olympic Games were over, it was time to return to France. The incoming class of Pistols (plebes) were divided into two groups, one embarked in Kiel and disembarked in Amsterdam, where the second group embarked for the return to Brest.
On the morning of 7 September, we left Kiel by the Kiel Canal and headed for the North Sea where a slightly choppy sea surprised a few of our new sailors. We stopped over in Amsterdam for two days. Our return trip passed without incident, thanks to a favorable wind and sea, and on the afternoon of
15 September, after an absence of about one month, the goelettes were once again moored in their familiar location at the foot of the famous chateau in Brest.
Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Commander Richard is the head of the sailing, seamanship, and shiphandling department, Ecole- Navale (French Naval Academy). He was commanding officer of the Etoile and operational commander of the two goelettes during the races.
"To Use the Sea”
(See L C. Kendall, pp. 58-67, December 1972 Proceedings)
Commander John J. Palmieri, U. S. Navy— The author has clearly outlined the need for a national merchant marine policy that recognizes the strong interdependence between commercial and national defense objectives. A reader, however, may wrongly infer that the civilian
agencies of government have developed a viable commercial capability at the expense of broader national strategy considerations. Such is not true. The commercial objectives have been handled no better than the larger questions of national maritime strategy.
Prior to the 1970 revisions to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the major subsidy support was in the form of construction and operating subsidies to the foreign trade dry cargo carriers (liners). The commercial purpose of this support was to develop a merchant marine sufficient to carry a "substantial portion” of our waterborne export and import commerce. In 1954, faced with block obsolescence of the World War II-built fleet, the government and subsidized liner operators embarked on a construction program designed to replace the 300-ship fleet by the early 1970s. The program, concentrating on high-speed breakbulk cargo liners, failed to meet its goal, and through 1970 only 158 ships had been delivered.
The program failed on two counts. First, there was no policy declaration defining "substantial portion” and therefore, no effective Federal Program to expand or maintain U. S. liner carryings, either on an absolute tonnage or share of the market basis. In the period 1956 through 1969, U. S. liner share of our foreign trade dropped from 6.9% to 2.3% and actual tonnage carried decreased by over 40%. Although the author gives the Department of Commerce credit for positive efforts to enhance U.S.-flag participation in our foreign trade, it was not until 1970 that the Maritime Administration implemented a comprehensive market development program. (Its effects are not as yet evident.) This decline in carryings eroded the financial condition of the subsidized operators and limited their ability to meet replacement commitments.
Secondly, the ships constructed were not sufficiently productive to operate profitably, even with subsidy. They were constructed in small lots, individualized to owners’ requirements, yet with arbitrary speed criteria set by the government. The latter, determined principally for national defense reasons, increased ship and crew costs with no commercial benefit. More important, however, the
designs involved no reduction in cargo handling and in-port costs which, after subsidy, are the operator’s major out- of-pocket costs. The failure to foster the development of containerization in the early 1960s was the primary technical deficiency in the replacement program. (Containerization was, in fact, introduced by two non-subsidized operators. They are among the most profitable operators in the industry.) As a result, the operating subsidy necessary to equate U.S.-operator costs with foreign operator costs remained high. In the period 1962 through 1969, it pre-empted two-thirds of the total direct subsidy funding and reduced construction subsidy funds to be less than that needed to modernize the liner fleet.
As the author discusses, the inclusion of foreign trade bulk cargo carriers under the 1970 construction and operating subsidy programs is of valid concern to military logisticians. It should, however, be made clear that this provision of the 1970 Act is intended to eliminate the expensive cargo preference program. This indirect subsidy program has supported an increasingly obsolete bulk/tramp fleet. Not one new ship has been constructed in the post-World War II period as a result of cargo preference.
The cargo preference statutes basically require that 50% of government- sponsored cargoes (100% for military cargoes) be reserved for U. S. ships. These ships, which because of age and higher U. S. operating costs cannot compete profitably with foreign ships, are employed at a preference rate which is generally l‘/2-to-2-times the foreign shipping rate. The program is administered by a number of agencies, including the Department of Defense, Commodity Credit Corporation of the Department of Agriculture, and the Export-Import Bank, with funds not specifically identified as a maritime subsidy, and without coordinated direction as part of a purposeful maritime policy. The total preference differential, excluding defense cargoes, is estimated to have exceeded $100 million for each year between 1962 and 1969. This makes it larger than the construction subsidy program in the same period. The ultimate bankruptcy of the preference rate program is that it included none of the features of the direct subsidies under the Merchant Ma
rine Act of 1936, which commit operators to ship replacement. The result has been the maintenance of an overage fleet (approximately 90% over 20 years old) which depends upon preference rates for 70% of its cargo.
A Naval Medical Officer as a Naval War College Student
Captain John W. Johnson, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy—The Naval War College class of 1973, contains no medical officers as students. Current guidance from higher authority indicates a cessation or severe limitation of medical officer attendees at all military colleges. The most common response to that statement has been "Why should a medical officer attend the Naval War College or any military college?”
It is readily recognized that the attendance of a naval medical officer at the Naval War College could create inquiry if only one facet of the professional expertise and expression of a medical officer is considered; that of a physician, concerned only with direct primary care of a patient. The naval medical officer, however, is a multi-faceted professional rather than just a physician, and the fulfillment of all of his responsibilities and duties as a medical officer requires an appropriate educational and experience base in each of these areas. Attendance at the Naval War College provides one such vital and unusual learning opportunity, and applies to his role as a senior naval medical officer.
The private physician can focus and limit his attention to the diagnosis, prognosis, and specific treatment of a patient’s present illness, but the naval medical officer recognizes that his vision must be broadened to encompass the determination and management of the medical capability required to provide total health care delivery to the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps, afloat and ashore, in peace and in combat. Provision of this capability extends beyond the single patient to include the preventive medicine, industrial medicine, and medical care capability components of the current and projected strategies and tactics of the U. S. Navy. The historical and conceptual basis of these strategies, as well as their impact on international
Comment and Discussion 91
relations, is the foundation of the Naval War College curriculum. Therefore, his attendance at this military college assures the proper polishing of this facet of his professional background. Similar background preparation is afforded by each of the military colleges.
The career progression of the naval medical officer is initiated by the commissioning of a medically-educated physician. The transformation of a physician to a naval medical officer begins when he becomes aware that the proper use and preservation of that segment of U. S. Navy medical capability delegated to him will require the acquisition of a concept of management. The required reconciliation between the capability that he desires and that which is available from the resources of the U. S. Navy medical services, should be the initial motivation for him to become knowledgeable in managerial techniques. If he achieves this initial reconciliation, the advancement to a consideration of the formation of the resources should follow, i.e., personnel training and utilization, effective administrative
procedures, and efficient supply systems. Coexisting growth in the doctrines and practices of preventive medicine, industrial medicine, sanitation, and overall medical support capability will illuminate the requirement of readiness and adaptability, as well as the overall integration, of the medical capability assigned to him. These requirements must be oriented not only to parochial needs, but also to the parameters of the entire U. S. Navy and Marine Corps systems if this capability is to remain viable and realistic. The medical officer is the only member of the U. S. Navy Medical Department with sufficient background in both the medical and military needs to manage this orientation. At this point, the naval medical officer becomes a qualified member of a dedicated system of total health care that is integral to a coordinated fighting team. Planning now becomes possible and pertinent. The fusion of a continuing medical education, an increasing experience in its military application, and an expanding comprehension of the complete U. S. Navy/Marine Corps system, will
provide a basis for such projection when an understanding of strategies is added. The conceptual comprehension of strategy and its internation ramifications is the raison d’etre of the Naval War College. It would logically follow that the attendance of the senior naval medical officer at this college would permit and ensure this invaluable augmentation of his educational background and potential expertise.
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More than exciting sea tales, the articles in this book are naval history at its best.
1973. 241 pages.
U. S. Seapower in the 19th Century
Compiled and Edited by Clayton R. Barrow,
They turned their broad backs on an untamed continent; for they were mariners, blue-water men. Many of them were knob-knuckled sea dogs, feverish with visions of gold and glory; others were as cold and hard as the ice floes that battered their wooden-walled sailing ships. These men and the i they did are here brought vividly to life by fourteen historians who have shown what it was like to go down to the sea in ships when Ante young and high-hearted.
erica ^Sp Her Sails
The experience of the author as member of the Class of 1972 of the Naval War College confirmed the availability of, and access to this strategic augmentation for the senior medical officer. In addition to these significant educational advancements, other direct and indirect benefits were obtained. The author used the opportunity to acquire varied and advanced managerial theories and concepts. Research into these managerial systems and the existing U. S. Navy hierarchial systems permitted the development of a research paper pertaining to new concepts of medical services management. Direct and informal access to both promulgators and practitioners
of the current and proposed managerial procedures of the U. S. Navy, provided invaluable insight as to the parameters to which operational medical support must conform. The author was uniformly and unreservedly accepted as a working and contributing member of the class and varied committees. The medical input was welcomed and stimulated feedbacks as to the merits and discrepancies of existing and projected medical policies and procedures. An overview of national, military, and naval strategies fortified a decision base from which to define a medical capability to appropriately support these strategies.
The common denominator of "student” created a communication environment from which emanated an exchange of knowledge and experience acquired prior to enrollment, and the formation of friendships and close acquaintances that should extend far beyond the date of graduation. This interlinkage, coupled with future diverse assignments can only function to fuse the U. S. Navy/Marine Corps into a closely integrated and coordinated sys
tem. The status of health care delivery is a highly significant consideration in the creation and maintenance of any military capability. Absence of a senior naval medical officer in this Naval War College educational and exchange matrix, encourages a loss of balanced input, and a reduced medical comprehension of the direction and goals of the U. S. Navy/Marine Corps. Without this bridge of common communication, technical guidance, and coordination of the medical services to support, the accepted strategies become limited and uncoupled.
Once the difference between a physician and a naval medical officer is recognized and appreciated, the presence of the medical officer at the Naval War College should no longer appear to be unusual. It becomes evident that he belongs there to preserve an appropriately oriented total health care system for the U. S. Navy/Marine Corps of today and tomorrow. As an accepted and integrated member of a coordinated team, devoted to the Navy projection of U. S. interests, objectives, and poli
cies, he must be present to help define the medical support capability required to achieve that projection. A logical ongoing inquiry would be: "Agreed he should, but how and when does this naval medical officer define and provide the required medical support capability?”
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Second Edition
SAIL AND POWER is the guide for sailing instruction at the U. S. Naval Academy and is the designated text for the Navy-wide sailing program. Covering all elements of basic seamanship, it begins with nautical terminology, takes the learning seaman through the rudiments of handling dinghies, day-sailers, cruising yachts, and single and twin-screw power boats, and goes on to discuss racing tactics, heavy weather sailing, and other advanced aspects of seamanship.
The second edition has been thoroughly updated and broadened in scope with the coverage of many new topics including: basic hydrodynamics of sailing, recent theory on rigging and sails, recent spinnaker theory, instrumentation, boat management in heavy weather offshore, auxiliary engines, and more.
1973. 303 pages. Illustrated.
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by Richard Henderson with Bartlett S. Dunbar
Sail
and
Power
The operational medical officer is usually double-hatted to an operational commander’s staff. The senior medical officer ashore commonly finds that he is required to function in a similar capacity. In this commander’s staff environment, the naval medical officer is expected to define and provide medical support appropriate to the missions of the command. It is considered that the director, Fleet and Marine Corps Medical Support Division of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BuMed), my current assignment, represents an excellent example of the environment in which a medical officer must be prepared to function. The duties of this assignment involve the administration and coordination of all of the BuMed responsibilities relating to Fleet and Marine
Comment and Discussion 93
Corps medical support capabilities. The Fleet and Marine Corps Medical Support Division must study, evaluate, coordinate, and make recommendations concerning medical support requirements and doctrine, organizational planning, medical personnel programs, and operational medical logistics. The division is also responsible for periodic studies of the requirements and standards for medical spaces and medical material in ships. The division must maintain liaison with the Chief of Naval Operation, Commandant, Marine Corps, the Systems Commands, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Fleet and type commanders to coordinate matters of mutual concern and prepare recommendations for higher authority.
No number of years of experience as a physician would be adequate to comprehend, much less coordinate the responses to all the varied requirements for appropriate ship medical space designs and specifications, concepts, and policies for medical support afloat and ashore, and proper research to update and advance medical support consistent with the "state of the art.” Only operational experience and the educational base provided at the Naval War College and similar military schools/college would permit a naval medical officer to attempt to make pragmatic and parochial adaptations of the best possible medical care to the varied operational environments. It should be emphasized that the medical officer is not only responsible to provide the best medical care possible, but to be able to provide that care in the operational environment, consistent with its restrictions and caveats. The support considerations pertinent to provision of medical care afloat, on board a space-limited vibrating and rolling sea platform, or ashore in a hostile amphibious operation hardly resemble those attending the same level of medical expertise in a naval hospital. Any physician can monitor the latter, but only a naval medical officer can provide the former. Perhaps this is the reason a medical officer wears a Navy uniform with pride and a physician has no incentive to do so.
The objective of this discussion is to revive a concept that was once clearly recognized as accepted; a naval medical officer is a specialized physician. To be
able to achieve the specialized educational and experience requirements necessary to meet the responsibilities inherent to that specialty, the medical officer must ensure viability of the concept and maintain accessibility to the educational and experience base. To make an appropriate and coordinated contribution to the medical support component of the Navy operational team, the naval medical officer must remain a manager and a naval officer.
"The End of an Era”
(See R. Beavers, pp. 18-25, July; and
pp. 92-93, December 1972; and p. 92,
February 1973 Proceedings)
Commander P J. Doerr, U. S. Navy—The idea that we are spending huge sums on useless ships is based upon some serious misconceptions. First, we are not spending relatively all that much on destroyers. One-third of construction funds are going for strategic systems (principally SSBNs), another third to attack submarines, and only a third to all surface forces. Of this last third, the lion’s share is not going to the destroyer force. Our replacement program is nowhere near keeping up with destroyer retirements. The same can be said about air ASW. The slice of the budgetary pie going to this ASW platform is small, compared to expenditures on attack air, AAW air, and carriers.
The argument that air and destroyer ASW platforms are only marginally effective is not true. There is no doubt that the SSGN is a formidable opponent, and that his sensor and weapons performance has greatly degraded the effectiveness of traditional ASW techniques. Captain Robert H. Smith’s* article was important in stressing the revolution in ASW which is needed to counter such a threat. But scrapping our carrier air and ASW destroyer platforms in favor of more submarines is not justified. Air and surface platforms still have, and can retain, a potential for effective ASW if they are well trained and properly employed.
Let us talk about useful roles for
* See R. H. Smith, "Prize Essay—A United States Navy for the Future,” March 1971 Proceedings, pp. 18-25.
non-submarine forces in ASW. First, of course, we must remember that the SSBN is only really countered today by deterrence—our own SSBNs are the key—not ASW forces operating in any dimension. Second, the strike forces attrition of enemy submarine facilities would be an essential element in reducing enemy submarine numbers. Third, the use of air- and surface-laid (as well as submarine) mine fields could play a major role in cutting an enemy submarine force down to manageable size.
Destroyer ASW can be effective in helping protect surface ships against the SSGN. The beaconing effect which Captain Smith refers to in his devastating remarks on the detection imbalance between active and passive sonars, is only a liability if we insist on using destroyer-active sonars in old-fashioned screens around old-fashioned convoys or combatant formations. If we put destroyers onto the tactical offensive by the use of modern randometric dispositions and advanced cover and deception techniques, then long-range, high- powered active sonars can play a very useful role in detection and destruction of submarines. If we add passive systems to our destroyers, we can give them even greater capabilities against modern submarines.
Airborne sensors and weapons are being improved, too, and landbased aircraft are not all we need. We have to have our anti-SSGN forces at sea, where they can control the seas around our surface forces. This is perhaps the biggest reason why ASW submarines are not enough. The command and control systems which would enable ASW submarines to operate in direct support of surface ships do not exist now, and their development is going to take time. The same physical facts that make submarines hard to find make them hard to communicate with.
Another argument against total reliance on ASW submarines is, of course, the old "eggs-in-one-basket” problem. If a potential enemy had only one threat to fear—passive detection systems in ASW submarines—one technical breakthrough (in ship-quieting for instance) could wipe out, overnight, our capability to defend against him.
Finally, in the years which have seen the U.S.S.R. surface fleet materialize in
the Mediterranean, Pacific, and Indian oceans as a serious rival of U. S. naval power, it is hard to believe that the Soviet submarine is still the only major threat as was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. The changing world scene which Commander Beavers describes so accurately includes the rise of the Soviet surface navy to a new dimension of politico-military eminence. The Soviet submarine is no longer the only capital ship in the Soviet Navy. And if the U. S. Navy is to play the role in the power politics of the 1970s and 1980s that Commander Beavers sees as necessary, we are going to need balanced forces. It would be ironic indeed if the rise of the Soviet surface fleet were to be paralleled by the submergence (both literal and figurative) of the U. S. Navy. We need to improve our ships and aircraft across the board—not just concentrate on one platform. Obviously, we cannot afford quantity in the current economic climate, but we must afford quality. We must maintain our capabilities through the development of modern forces in all three sea dimensions. We must also perfect the new tactics needed to use these forces effectively. Finally, we must provide for training these new forces in these new tactics. A revolution in naval warfare has occurred, but a total reliance on submarines by the U. S. Navy would not be an effective way of meeting the new reality.
USS Hayter (DE-212)
A Ship of One’s Own
Afn. Maunne K. Hay ter— I wonder if there are any other Service families like my daughter’s, whose five children in every instance bear the name of a U. S. Navy ship as part of their Christian names?
When Phyllis Anne Townsend’s first son was born, she named him after her father, Lieutenant Commander Hubert Montgomery Haytcr, U. S. Navy. This seemed a particularly fitting thing to do, especially considering that I had christened the USS Hayter (DE-212) in my husband's memory. At that time, however, I did not realize that ship names for my grandchildren were to become a habit.
USS Sicard (DM-21), former DD-346
Second son Ian Ramsay Sheridan Townsend claims as "his” ship the USS
Comment and Discussion 95
Ramsay (DD-124), the four-stack destroyer his Grandfather Hayter put back in service in 1939 in record time.
Since my daughter Phyllis was married to Marine officer Jack E. Townsend (now Major, U. S. Marine Corps, Retired), their third son’s name of George Nicholas Siegloff Townsend included that of the USS Nicholas (DD-44s>), originally christened in honor of Samuel Nicholas, first Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The USS Augusta (CA-31) was flagship of the Asiatic Fleet when Grandfather Hayter served in her under the command of Captain Chester W. Nimitz. This name, appropriate for a girl, fitted nicely into the pattern when Maurine Kathryn Augusta was born.
The name of the fifth child, Andrew William Sicard Townsend, signalizes the USS Sicard (DD-346), put back into service in 1939 by his paternal grandfather, Captain Arthur M. Townsend, U. S. Navy (Retired).
These names, whose length may be a burden at times when they have to be listed in full, are proudly used by the family. Framed photographs of "their” ships are the children’s prized possessions. To the older generation, the names evoke many memories and symbolize a very special and unique heritage.
"Flexible Family Financing”
(See R. H. Bowers, pp. 52-60, October 1972;
and pp. 94-95. June 1973 Proceedings)
Captain C. M. Howe, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy— Captain Bowers’ fine article is very clear, and his rational approach to the subject should be of great assistance to all readers of the Proceedings.
I would suggest modifying the article slightly for the benefit of all readers, taking into account the recent changes in the military pay scale and benefits under the Social Security System. A lieutenant (j.g.), who died on active duty, would leave his wife and two children Dependents Indemnity Compensation (DIC) of about $280 per month until the older child becomes 18. This compensation would then decrease in increments (when second child becomes 18) to $240 a month. Based on his earnings as an ensign under the January 1972 pay scales, the lieutenant
(j.g.) would leave his family with Social Security benefits of approximately $560 per month until the children are in college; then the benefits will approximate $480 per month ($240 with only one child in college). When the second child leaves college, the Social Security benefits drop to zero until the widow reaches 62, when payments of approximately $260 per month would start. Consequently, during Case A, Part I, and most of Part II, the combined DIC and Social Security benefits would total about $840 a month.
Furthermore, under the present GI Bill provisions, the widow and each of the children would be entitled to 36 months of college at the rate of $220 per month. These benefits are considerably in excess of those in effect when Captain Bowers wrote his article. It is obvious that these increases in benefits have changed the family financing picture considerably for officers while they are still on active duty.
Naval Officers and the Sub-specialty
Rear Admiral C. 0. Triebel, U. S. Navy {Retired)—Six years of ship command and six more of other commands, have convinced me that every naval officer should have a sub-specialty in which he has demonstrated competence, in order to qualify for promotion to the rank of commander. Management and administration should not be acceptable as qualifying sub-specialties. Officers who wish to qualify for deck duty and command, would be volunteers from sub-specialties in any category.
Some men would not qualify, and some would prefer not to try. There would be no stigma nor down-grading of these men as useful, productive, and necessary naval officers. Such departure from current practice would not find ready acceptance. Initially, there would be a widened gap among naval officers. In the end, it could lead to a stronger, more closely knit, mutually dependent officer corps.
It is hardly worth repeating that leadership and command have always been intimately linked. Management, the organization man’s substitute for command, relies upon technical competence
to a greater extent than leadership. In the past, all line officers worth their salt have been expected to exercise leadership and aspire to command. But times have changed radically, and there is much to "manage” in a modern ship. On the material side, technological complexity has increased exponentially. On the human side, the young enlisted man can no longer be drilled, instructed, and taught to blindly obey the commander. Many young men today, especially those with a technical bent, are good leaders (managers) of a new type. They obtain results by an example of excellence in their chosen specialty, but they may lack that element of ability in human engineering which is the invisible thread binding leadership to command authority. On the one hand, they are lax disciplinarians, and on the other, they do not exert sufficient effort to secure recognition of the talents of their outstanding subordinates. This type of "leader-manager” is foreign to the Old Navy, but is more acceptable to many of today’s youth who resent all rules and regulations, and often do not particularly care for material advancement.
A commander, by definition, is an individual who is backed by the authority of the establishment. He should be a leader, a manager, and an administrator. There are increasingly precise techniques to measure a man’s ability to manage and administrate. Leadership remains the intangible element. The "leader managers” know in their minds, or in their bones, that they do not want the responsibilities of decision-making that are essential to command. They shun the apparently nonproductive but essential administrative routines. They are the technical experts. There are a small number of strong, self-centered managers who would use the process of administration and power of authority as a substitute for leadership. Neither of these groups should be assigned a command. The young aviator or officer of the deck must make sound judgments promptly under stress. An accomplished staff officer or administrator who has little practical experience in stress situations lacks an important ingredient for command qualification.
What mix of naval officers do we need in the future? To see clearly, we must acknowledge the complex diversity
of the late 20th century. We must recognize the fact that a number of excellent, honest, hard-working naval officers do not possess all the attributes requisite in a commander. Among these men, there are many who have irreplaceable technological talents necessary to keep the Fleet in top operational readiness. They should travel first class along with every other commissioned officer.
Every naval officer who aspires to command should be proficient in some specialty. The very nature of the Navy militates that the broadest range of choices must fall in the technical fields: engineering, electronics, ordnance, navigation, communications, oceanography, and others. There are relatively few spaces available in languages, intelligence, international relations, and public relations. Systems analysis and wargaming, based on computer technology, are demanding new fields. Comp- trollerships, budget, and finance should receive the detailed attention of more young line officers.
The basic reason, for insistence, on a sub-specialty is not to enable the line
officer to compete with the full time specialist. It is to provide an essential ingredient of leadership. To exercise leadership, a man must in his own right command respect. A commander of a crew of knowledgeable specialists will not command this respect unless he is at least on their level of intellectual competence.
It must be repeated, a commander must have demonstrated his ability to react under stress, quickly and with calm good judgment. With this background, if he has the desire to be a team player, the courage to speak up in opposition, but the self-discipline to carry out an order to the best of his ability, he will need little additional training in management and administration. If he is truly interested in people, has the toughness to discipline, and the energy to promote his subordinates, we may lay cautious odds that he will be a respected leader. He may then be trusted with the institutional power of command.
An important task of a senior commander should be the observation of his subordinate commanders. The granting
of command status will illuminate an individual as no other light. The misfits and incompetents will always show quickly, and surely, but more slowly, will become apparent those otherwise good men who unfortunately lack the elusive spark of leadership.
Wherever the U.S. Fleet has touched shore, strange and exotic dishes have been "tasted out", written down, and treasured by seafarer's wives.
Now the residents and friends of Carl Vinson Hall-the Navy Marine Coast Guard retirement community-have gathered together their favorite recipes into a beautifully illustrated 159 page cookbook. Some are economical to fit tight budgets; others are for lavish occasions.
Come browse the pages of Appetizers, Soups, Salads, Seafood, Continental Main Dishes, Desserts ... even some com- monsense cooking tips. Then invite friends over to share the good food with you.
T6 TreasurecJ
Recipes
By SeaFarer's Wives
The saltwater sailor knows why the Navy has always favored deep-draft command as a prerequisite for selection to flag rank. It has been the ultimate test of true leadership. Now that seems to be changing and maybe it should. There is no reason why an officer who has demonstrated conclusively his higher leadership potential and ability to command on board a destroyer, submarine, or any other type ship with a tough operating schedule should have to requalify at sea after, say, his 45th birthday. Early commands should not be short tours. If by the practice of his sub-specialty an officer is able to contribute markedly ashore or on a staff to the increased efficiency of our technological Navy, he is most effectively employed. What must be eliminated is "make- work” on big staffs at big headquarters.
Comment and Discussion 97
That is another story; I mention it to remind us that leadership ability is a fragile characteristic. It can be killed by years of non-productive existence in a bureaucratic environment. To avoid that trap, it might be a more challenging task to the command-qualified 45-to- 50-year-old man than a deep-draft command.
We have a wonderful Navy with thousands of exciting opportunities for young men of the most diverse talents and desires. We must continually adjust the system (it is man-made, do not forget) in order that every man may contribute to the utmost of his ability, and in turn, receive the maximum of satisfaction in self-fulfillment of his personal life.
The Ship That Sank from Fright”
(See M. Fcathcrman, pp. 84-86, December 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant IV. T. Mallison, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—As one who had the privilege of sailing in the USS Oglala before she was sunk at Pearl Harbor, I should like to add some firsthand information about the Oglala during the period 1932 to 1934, when I cruised "nth her from time to time.
At that time she performed all of the duties connected with being the largest and most important minelayer in the hi. S. Navy. As the flagship of Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force, she participated in Fleet maneuvers in the Central Pacific and off the West Coast on a regular basis except when she had more important separate assignments to fill.
Between 1932 and 1934, the Oglala was commanded by then Commander T. Mallison, Sr., U. S. Navy. I had the good fortune to be an occasional unofficial member of the Oglala's crew "'hen I was a teen-ager, because the commanding officer was my father and he was sufficiently aware of my interest m a naval career to obtain the necessary permission to take me along during summer vacation periods.
It may be hard for those who serve ln the present Navy of highly specialized ship types to believe that in the "old,” that is pre-World War II Navy—many
ships regularly performed more than one function. The Oglala was equipped and operated as a flying boat tender. Her two large aviation gasoline tanks on the fantail appear in the photograph on page 84 of the December 1972 Proceedings just as they and the ship appeared between 1932 and 1934. (A good picture of the Oglala as she appeared in World War II is in Jane’s Fighting Ships 1944-45, Addenda page 30.) During this time, the Oglala participated in numerous "flying boat cruises” to various places in the Central Pacific including Midway Island, the French Frigate Shoals, and also Johnston Island.
The Oglala was indispensable for the flying boats of that period because of their relatively short range. The Oglala had to be there to fuel them so that they could come back, or on occasion she had to fuel them halfway to their destination, and then again after they had waited whatever period of time was necessary for the Oglala to catch up. On longer flights, the Ramsay, Gamble, Breese, and Montgomery of Mine Division One (they were four-pipe destroyers with mine tracks in lieu of torpedo
tubes) served as en-route-interval plane guards for the flying boats. The flying boats of that time were about halfway between the NC-4 type boats and the sophisticated versions flown during World War II. Their cockpits were decidedly air-cooled, and helmets and goggles were a necessity rather than a luxury. The longest and most interesting cruise I had the privilege of making in the Oglala was a flying boat cruise during the summer of 1933.
The Oglala functioned as a hydro- graphic and surveying vessel as well as a mine-layer and flying boat tender. For several months in 1934, she participated in surveying and charting the Aleutian Islands. At that time, she flew the flag of Rear Admiral Sinclair Gannon, U. S. Navy, who had additional duty as Commander, Aleutian Islands Survey Expedition, in addition to his regular job as Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force. The degree of accuracy obtained in Hydrographic Office charts of the Aleutians used in World War II, was one of the benefits of this 1934 survey expedition. Unfortunately, I did not make the Aleutian Islands cruise because it lasted
much longer than my three-month sum- mer vacation from school.
The officers and crew of the Oglala were professionals, and the high degree of personnel turnover, which is apparently typical of today’s Navy, was unknown then. When my father reported on board as commanding officer in 1932, the Navy’s personnel was at an all-time post-World War 1 low of about 88,000 officers and men. The depression was as evident inside the Navy as it was on the "outside.” In order to be allowed to "ship over” for a second enlistment, a man had to demonstrate his professional competence and be recommended by his commanding officer. In fact, the Oglala sent more enlisted men to the Naval Academy on Fleet appointments than did some battleships.
Throughout a naval career which spanned 42 years, from the time he entered the Naval Academy in 1903 until the end of World War II, my father commanded six U. S. Navy ships. He, along with many others who served in the Oglala in the 1930s, greatly valued his association with her. When I served in the USS Colorado during World War II, it was my good fortune to meet some of the Oglala veterans serving throughout the Pacific Fleet.
"Thoroughly Modern
Management”
(See R. Boyle, pp. 34-40, October 1972
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral F. L. Finney, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—Richard Boyle’s description of the problems which beset management of Navy programs, would be amusing were it not largely true. My own experience with Navy material management, particularly with Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) programs and the Navy laboratories, impels me to elaborate on two of the author’s points, and to provide some background material on another.
In speaking of Department of Defense (DoD) management guidelines, Mr. Boyle says "Tremendous emphasis has been placed on cost-effectiveness studies, and yet, all too often, we procure ill-conceived systems which are delivered late, are obsolete on delivery, and fail to meet specifications.” When the
mountain of paperwork prescribed by Secretary McNamara’s procurement directives was finally completed, it was designed to lead to a firm fixed-price contract for development of military hardware. Only one characteristic- built-in obsolescence—was absolutely guaranteed by this process. This was because new techniques and technological breakthroughs always became known before long development and procurement lead times had run their course, but the project manager could not incorporate changes and up-date his system without invoking the changes clause in his firm, fixed-price contract. If he did reopen and renegotiate his contract to take advantage of new approaches and technological advances, the contract price was almost invariably renegotiated upward and delivery schedules slipped. The choice between an obsolescent weapons system delivered on time to out-of-date specifications, and a more costly weapon delivered too late to be useful was not a very happy process.
Mr. Boyle deplores the laboratory consolidation program which began in the "late 1960s.” The background of this program, which actually had its inception in 1964, has not to my knowledge been previously published. Dr. Harold Brown, then Director of Defense Research and Engineering, had on his staff a small group of Ph.D. refugees from business and various universities who were determined to bring all DoD laboratories under the direct control of DDR&E and remove all military personnel from laboratory command and management positions. The then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, Robert Morse, recognized the dangers inherent in such a takeover of the Service laboratories. He was also well aware that to insist on maintenance of the status quo would not satisfy the modern managers on Secretary McNamara’s staff. Working closely with the Chief of Naval Material, Dr. Morse prepared and won approval of a plan to put the Navy laboratories— with the exception of the Naval Research Laboratory—directly under the military command of the Chief of Naval Material, and to establish on the staff of the Chief of Naval Material the civilian position of Director of Navy
Laboratories. Similar plans were adopted by the other Services, and the threat of centralized control of all Defense laboratories at the DDR&E level was ended.
This change in laboratory management was opposed and resented by the Bureau chiefs and, subsequent to the reorganization of the Naval Material Command, by the Systems commanders. The subsequent consolidations, splits of laboratories, and the re-naming of Centers further added to their unhappiness, but with the passage of time the wounds have healed. Redundancies are being eliminated, laboratories working on related problems are in closer communication, and the parochial views of some laboratories are giving way to a broader understanding of the overall needs of the Navy. In any event, the present system is infinitely better than the consolidation and civilianization of all laboratories originally proposed.
Mr. Boyle’s final point concerning the multiplicity of program managers (PM) is well taken, but a solution to the problem is not readily apparent. The success of the Navy’s first major program manager, Rear Admiral Raborn, and the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, led to the establishment of others, and at one time the solution for any development program that appeared to be in trouble was to "projectize” it, designate a manager, and forget it. From the early days of the Polaris Project, it was recognized by the wisest heads in the Navy’s Material Bureaus that there had to be a finite limit to the numbers of projects which could be managed in Polaris fashion. When the number of PMS reaches the point where their lines of authority conflict, and the available resources of manpower and time in the Systems Commands and laboratories arc exhausted, then there are certainly too many. There is also a strong tendency for PMs to perpetuate themselves and to find new reasons for existence once the program for which they were established nears completion. One solution to the proliferation of PMs at the Washington headquarters level would be to delegate program management responsibilities to field commands and laboratories. Parkinson says that administrators are more or less bound to multiply. Perhaps they would be less prolifk at laboratories than at headquarters.
Comment and Discussion 99
New Roles for the Submarine”
(See P. Cohen, pp. 31-47, September 1972 Proceedings)
Robert P. Largess—A. military scenario can be constructed in which a cargo submarine is valuable. But many more situations can be foreseen in which a substantial resource of U.S.-flag, American-crewed, merchant shipping is vital to our government, and considering its difficulties in retaining this resource, one wonders if the submarine carrier is worth thinking about. The economic problem we already have seems insoluble. Perhaps only a drastic decline in the American standard of living could make American labor, and our merchant marine, competitive.
As for the limits on ASW technology, the typical American warship of the last decade is expensive testimony to their existence. The new destroyers and DEs are burdened with sophisticated, logically conceived equipment, such as the DASH and wire-guided torpedoes, whose potential capability is great but which are too complex to be reliable—and too expensive to be worth using.
Suppose there were a need for a small American presence in an isolated spot— the traditional role of the cruising man-of-war. What would a DLG, say, patrolling the Straits of Aden, do if attacked by a squadron of MiG-i5s? Could the ship’s anti-nuclear submarine, anti- supersonic aircraft capabilities properly be considered expendable on such a mission? And how many such obsolete aircraft would one of its missiles be worth in dollars and cents? And, does the ship possess any weaponry appropriate to this mission?
Perhaps the word "capability” carries less import than "utility.” The diplomacy of the United States and the Soviet Union is changing, along with their strength relative to the other political entities of the world; and the military strength which supports this diplomacy must adapt to its new demands. There might occur, for example, a struggle for influence, and markets among nations who begin to view the United States and the Soviet Union with less greed and fear than they do their neighbors. A small nation decides there is more to be gained from conquering a small neighbor than from U. S. foreign aid;
a small nation fears a small neighbor more than Communism or Capitalism. Minor wars are becoming endemic and a "normal” condition of a political world in which we must maintain our interests. Such problems are becoming more pressing than that of a direct conflict with the Soviet Union by means of the most advanced technology and its weapons.
The problem of deploying a military force adequate to be effective in this diplomatic situation and expendable enough to be risked, is largely economic. Its chief requirement will be manpower— high quality manpower. The creation of an all-volunteer Armed Service, or an Armed Service freed from both the morale and manpower problems of today, promises to be a problem of another order than that of producing any material it will operate.
John C. Seymour’s article* in the same issue, urging that the return to an intelligent yet unqualified discipline in the Services, can be achieved only with an end to compulsory recruitment, strikes one as an attempt to "jawbone” a better Service into existence. There is a parallel with recent criticisms of American police departments: because the policeman faces critical, dangerous situations in which his choice of action may mean life or death to others, he should be a highly-trained and carefully- selected man. But an adequate number of high school graduates is already more than many cities can recruit or afford. Similarly, the quality of the personnel of a volunteer’s Armed Service will very likely depend on the material benefits the Service affords. If the living standard of the Service compares favorably with the living standard a well-qualified individual might enjoy in civilian life, such an individual may be seen as a potential volunteer. However, the limits here are obvious.
Mr. Seymour’s article deals with emotions and values, with patriotism and individualism, rather than with economics or budgets. Yet, even in this area he seems to be unclear. I would guess that a spirit of patriotism generally shared throughout a citizenry would predispose them to the concept of the
* See y C. Seymour, "Some Civilian Thoughts on the Navy,” September 1972 Proceedings, pp. 18-23.
citizen army. If the spirit evaporates, the abolition of conscription will not restore it. But, then, it seems such a spirit is not capable of sustaining painful halfmeasures such as Vietnam. Without conscription, the Service must be smaller, and if something "high, proud, and compelling” is to permeate it, I think it must be much smaller, and still be very expensive.
In 1870, the French army was largely officered by the sons of poor men, pursuing a less than honorable career. The Prussian army was largely officered by aristocrats. The French troops were professionals, habituated to military routine over a long period; the German strength was based on a highly-motivated citizenry, effectively integrated with the regulars through a brief active, longer Reserve service. Can any lessons be learned from these facts? Yes, but foremost that there are no simple answers to effective military structure. Professionals or volunteers, do not necessarily mean high morale; mass conscription does not necessarily produce cheap strength. As for the identification of military aims with moral purpose by the citizen, this is also not undivided good. In Germany, the identification of national interest with moral good produced three wars: one created a unified nation-state, another bankrupted it, and a third destroyed it.
America’s actions might well run closer to humanity if Americans recognize that they cannot always fight in the cause of overwhelming truth and undoubted justice, though they may often be forced to fight. In the world of the 1970s, our government may be forced to send troop detachments to Jordan, to the Dominican Republic, or to Cyprus, to gain some small end. We must cynically be prepared to intervene in our own interest. We must equally cynically be prepared to accept defeat, if we are beaten; to cut the losses from a bad investment.
Finally, to return to military hardware, it seems far wiser to turn our attention now to the problem of producing weapons valuable in an uncertain and complex future, where a variety of limited, but reliable capabilities are employed over complex, expensive systems designed to obtain in a superlative degree some single capacity.