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There is more than a little irony in the Soviet denunciation of the United States for its role in the Allied incursion into Russia in 1918. For, while the Soviets continue to castigate the United States—but, oddly, not Britain, France, or Italy—for its "predatory, imperialistic” adventuring against a war-and-revolution-ravaged country, our partners, including recently-liberated Czechs and Poles, were convinced at the time that America’s steadfastly limited military participation had prevented them from strangling the Bolshevik movement in its cradle.
The subject of American participation in the Allied Intervention in Russia during the closing days of World War I is one which American history books ignore or treat rather lightly. Little wonder, since it is not one of the more glorious or successful facets of our political-military past. It is, nonetheless, a fascinating story of an important period in U. S. Navy history, that provides a background from which political-military lessons can be drawn and shown to be applicable even today.
My own interest in the Allied Intervention goes back only to 1965, when I attended a press conference in Moscow conducted by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovsky, who at that time was enjoying
Bluejackets and Marines from the USS Albany, together with U. S. Army units, march through Vladivostok.
ALL PHOTOGRAPHS COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
considerable international prominence for his book Voennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy). The Marshal, flanked by a number of military and political experts (all in uniform), conducted the press conference in typical Soviet style—by fielding selected written questions submitted by the journalists beforehand. Following the press conference, which the personable Marshal handled quite deftly, we were treated to the unadvertised showing of a Soviet film on the Allied Intervention in 1918.
Having studied the Soviet Union for several years, and at that time having spent close to two years in the U.S.S.R. as Assistant Naval Attache, I was relatively inured to the anti-American aspects of Soviet propaganda. I was not prepared, however, for the vituperative tone and blatantly anti-American theme of this film. In essence, it laid at the feet of the U. S. government the lion’s share of the blame for this venture, including alleged atrocities committed against the Russian people and economic ills that beset Russia for years afterwards. From all indications, the film had been produced primarily for domestic consumption and intended as a training aid for anti-American, anti-imperialist lectures in schools and Communist Party agitation sessions.
Concerned that such a distortion of history was being planted in the minds of Soviet citizens and others that might be exposed to the film—yet unsure as to where fact left off and Soviet invention began—I decided to look further into the story of the Allied Intervention. My research revealed many inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the Soviet version of the Intervention—and in the American version as well. But more important, this research showed me that, regardless of which version contained the most truth, here was a vital episode in U. S.-Soviet relations in which American diplomacy had failed miserably. I saw in this first diplomatic encounter with the infant Soviet nation a lack of communication and understanding which, more than 50 years later, continues to color relations between our two governments.[1]
Few Americans are even aware of the fact that U. S. military personnel once landed on Russian soil and remained there for almost two years against the wishes of the Soviet government. Soviet citizens, on the other hand, are frequently reminded of this armed interference in the internal affairs of their country. It is offered to them as "proof of the imperialistic designs” of America and the other Allied powers that took part in that misadventure. The Soviets seek to strengthen
their case by presenting the Intervention as an integral part of the Russian Civil War, which followed the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917. By treating the Intervention and the Civil War as a single entity, they imply that, without the Allied Intervention, the Civil War might not have taken place—and lacking popular support (in their view), it certainly would not have been so widespread and taken so long to resolve.
To a large extent, this implication is valid. However, Soviet historians and propagandists weaken their case by the too-simple explanation that they give for the Intervention: the Western powers were terrified at the emergence of Communism and thought only to save themselves by attempting to destroy the Soviet government in its infancy. Typical of Soviet propaganda, there is a thin thread of truth running through this explanation. Also typically, it conveniently ignores other issues which were at stake, oversimplifying the complex and confused circumstances which prompted the Allies to take this step. Omitted from this explanation, for example, is any mention of the Bolshevik withdrawal of Russia from the war and the disastrous effect this had on the Allied war effort. Ignored also is the power vacuum which existed in virtually all but the central part of Russia, and into which the Germans or the Japanese had already moved, or were threatening to do so. Not mentioned is the fact that, up to the last minute before the Bolsheviks signed a separate peace treaty with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, the Allies were led to believe that Russia would re-enter the war against Germany and would invite the Allies to land forces to forestall German occupation of outlying areas and seizure of Allied stocks of war supplies. Needless to say, the Soviets are wont to disregard the fact that, when Allied troops initially went ashore at Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in the Russian North and at Vladivostok in the Far East, it was at the invitation of the local governments of these cities, which were not yet under the control of the Bolshevist government in Moscow.
This is not to suggest that the Allies were completely blameless; far from it. Some of their later actions were definitely directed against the Bolshevist government. The very fact that Allied troops remained on Russian soil for upwards of a year and a half after the end of the war leads one to question their motives. The Allies must also answer to the Soviet charge of having aided counter-revolutionary White Russian elements in their efforts to wrest power from the Bolsheviks. Although not militarily supported by Allied troops, the Whites did receive a great deal of encouragement and material assistance from the Western powers—Great Britain in particular. It is also a fact that counter-revolutionary'
Intervention in Russia (1918—1919) 55
resistance dissipated rapidly once Allied support was withdrawn. To this extent, then, the Allied Intervention and the Russian Civil War were related. One would be hard-pressed to argue that Allied actions during this period did not constitute direct interference in the domestic affairs of the Russian people.
The Soviets are not content to leave it at that, however. In their zeal to wring every possible drop of glory out of the final victory of the Bolshevik forces in the Civil War, they picture the Allied Intervention as a major military effort on the part of the capitalist powers which was "smashed militarily” by the infant Red Army, aided by the proletariat of the West and the Communist sympathies of the intervening troops. This makes a dramatic case for World Communism, but hardly an accurate one. As noted earlier, there was never any direct military association between the operations of the Allied forces and those of the White Russians. Moreover, in dignifying the Intervention as a major military effort to unseat the Bolshevik government, the Soviets credit the Allies with far more unity of purpose than they deserve. With the exception of some small-scale fighting in the Russian North and a few minor skirmishes elsewhere, Allied troops did not confront the Red Army in any actions of significance throughout the two years that the Intervention Forces remained on Russian territory. When these forces were withdrawn, it was not as a result of Red Army actions, or of Communist influence at home or among the troops. World War I had been over for many months,
and there was understandable pressure to bring the boys home and demobilize them.
Militarily, the Allied Intervention was a farce. Politically, it was a disaster. It accomplished nothing positive, but only served to strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks in Russia, to create dissension among the Allies, and to render the Western powers vulnerable to charges of armed interference in Soviet domestic affairs. These charges had decided impact on East/West relations for years. It is not inconceivable that they underlie some of the distrust of the Western powers existing in the Kremlin today, more than half a century after the fact.
America’s stake in this ill-fated venture is a study in contradictions. If one were to judge from the current Soviet version of the Allied Intervention, America would emerge as the prime mover in an abortive effort to destroy what was later to become the U.S.S.R. In actual fact, of all the foreign powers involved in the Intervention, America is probably the least blameworthy. It can even be demonstrated that owing to the reluctance of the United States to become involved militarily, the Bolsheviks were not overthrown. This reluctance was the main point of dissension among the Allies, and it was viewed by the other intervening powers as the major factor leading to the ultimate failure of the entire Allied effort. The point to be drawn from this is that the United States, in landing troops on Russian territory, had a very limited and purely idealistic objective in mind. This ran counter to the objectives of the other Allies, and yet no effort was made to iron out these important differences beforehand. President Woodrow Wilson did not believe in, or agree with, British plans to penetrate into the Russian interior from the landings at Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. He envisioned that U. S. troops would be employed only to secure those port cities against possible German action. He was not prepared to see American forces used against the Bolsheviks. The situation in the Far East was comparable. Wilson’s purpose in landing troops at Vladivostok was simply to safeguard the Allied war stores stockpiled there, and to
German officers greeted Leon Trotsky, white muffler, and other members of the Russian delegation at Brest-Litovsk where, in March 1918, the Germans imposed a treaty that stripped Russia of the Ukraine, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic provinces. The wily Trotsky then led American diplomats to believe that the Russians would resume the war against Germany during the winter of 1918.
secure the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad for the evacuation of the beleaguered Czech Legion. He never had any intention of deploying U. S. forces into the interior, or of supporting anti-Bolshevik elements fighting in Siberia. In effect, the U. S. decision to intervene was a unilateral one, and Wilson’s failure to seek prior accommodation with the other Allies can justifiably be said to have led to the ultimate failure of the entire Allied effort in Russia.
Thus, the United States stands accused by the Soviets of having been instrumental in an abortive effort to overthrow the infant Soviet government, and by the Allies of having caused the effort to fail. In truth, the Allied Intervention almost certainly could not have taken place without U. S. participation, and it might well have developed into a successful overthrow of the Bolsheviks, had the United States been as imperialisti- cally-inclined as the Soviets now charge.
One cannot help but wonder how the United States managed to get itself into such a predicament—how the decision to intervene could have been reached without a better appreciation for the ultimate consequences.
In analyzing the painful process whereby the United States reached its decision to intervene, George F. Kennan makes the observation "that had the United States government been more inclined ... to consult the judgment of the 'man on the spot,’ it would have been better advised and better equipped to take the decision that was now looming before it.” This assumes that the judgment of the "man on the spot” is worthy of consultation. It is my contention that such was rarely the case in Russia during this very confused period. This is not to suggest that there were no competent U. S. observers in Russia at that time; on the contrary, there were a few who were almost clairvoyant in their judgments. Unfortunately, their observations were all too frequently strangled by red tape or simply lost in the mass of reports—confused, conflicting and often biased--which were reaching Washington through both official and unofficial channels. Each of these reports came from a man on the spot and presumably was as valid as the next. It is little wonder that Washington was confused.
A major factor contributing to the welter of conflicting reports coming from Russia was the decision
U. S. Ambassador David R. Francis, seen at Archangel in October 1918, urged Woodrow Wilson to seize the ports of Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok, and cabled his view that: "History shows Russians incapable of great movements or great achievement. ...”
of the U. S. government—shared by the other Allied powers—not to recognize the Bolshevik government. This precluded any direct official contact between the Bolshevik leadership and Embassy representative. In the case of the United States, the "back door” contact was Raymond Robins, who headed the American Red Cross Commission to Russia during the war. Kennan describes Robins as a romanticist, a mystic, and something of an evangelist, who regarded himself as the intermediary between two worlds. He was openly sympathetic toward the Bolshevik leaders, to whom he had easy and frequent access. When the Bolsheviks moved their capital from Petrograd to Moscow, Robins and the other "back door” contacts followed. The Allied diplomatic missions had already been evacuated to Vologda (180 miles north of Moscow), and Robins and his British and French counterparts were very much on their own in the new capital. Circumstances thus permitted this Red Cross representative to dominate the first few months of Soviet-American relations.
The American Ambassador during this period was an elderly businessman and sometime politician from St. Louis, David R. Francis, who had been at his post in Russia since April 1916. Kennan describes him as a "provincial type,” set in his ways, courageous and loyal,* but poorly prepared in many respects for his unusual task. Although he remained in Russia until the fall of 1918, he never had direct official contact with the Soviet government, but dealt with the Soviet leaders through Robins.
Given the conflicting characters of these two Americans, it was inevitable that they would have difficulty in working together. Their widely-divergent views of the Bolsheviks did nothing to heal this breach; nor did the circumstances under which they were obliged to operate—in effect, two American ambassadors, one de facto and the other de jure. Relations between them gradually deteriorated, reaching what amounted to a breaking point during the spring of 1918, when persistent rumors were being circulated about Robins’ designs on the ambassadorial post in Moscow. Robins denied that there was any substance to the rumors, and Francis claimed that he was not in the least disturbed by them. In any event, Robins appears to have outlived his usefulness as a U. S. representative by this time, and at Francis’ recommendation, he was recalled from Russia.
With Robins out of the picture, Francis immediately arranged for his Consul General in Moscow to establish direct contact with the Soviet Foreign Ministry and to serve as the channel of communications between the Soviets and the Embassy in Vologda, 180 miles away. This set the stage for the first proper political discussions between the two governments. Prior to this, no U. S. diplomat had enjoyed this type of working relationship with the Bolshevik leadership; in fact, with rare and insignificant exceptions, Francis and his Consul General had not even spoken to Lenin or Trotsky. Robins’ conversations with them, on the other hand,
either Robins or Ambassador Francis colored such reports or otherwise diluted their value.
As for Robins, some of his judgments might suggest that he was an apologist for the Soviets. However, one should not hasten to brand him as such. If he was guilty of anything, it was probably naivete and excessive idealism—not unlike many others who have been taken in by the Soviets in later years. As Kennan notes:
had been frequent but not always objective.
Despite the continued absence of official recognition, there can be little question that this move to establish direct communications might have at least eliminated some of the confusion that existed in both governments. By this time, however, the groundwork for the American decision to land troops in Russia had already been laid. It was too late to forestall the Intervention, and no amount of conversation between Bolshevik and American representatives could do any good. However, one cannot help but speculate as to what might have been, had such a direct channel existed some six months earlier.
It would be manifestly unfair to suggest that the American decision to intervene in Russia was based solely on the inaccurate or inadequate reporting of U. S. representatives on the scene. Many other factors and judgments entered into this decision. It is a fact, though, that President Wilson was influenced by some poor man-on-the-spot reports from Russia. Equally serious, he did not have the timely benefit of some valid observations which would have been of significant assistance to him in reaching his decision. All too often, in such cases, the personality or preconceived views of
"Robins, to be sure, did make mistakes. Above all, he made the mistake of drawing general conclusions from too small a selection of particular phenomena. Because the Soviet leaders proved, or appeared, to be co-operative in one particular set of circumstances, and in one single field of activity, he allowed himself to suppose that they could easily be brought to respond the same way in other situations, if only they could be approached in the proper, sympathetic manner. In this, he was only the first of a long series of respectable Western sympathizers and fellow travelers who would insist on drawing general conclusions from similar partial manifestations of Soviet behavior.”
The Bolshevik leaders with whom Robins dealt— Trotsky in particular—appear to have judged him more accurately than he judged them. In addition to naivete and idealism, they saw in him a certain conceit, reflected in the exaggerated view he appears to have held of his importance to both governments. The Bolsheviks did nothing to dispel this idea, and one cannot help but feel that Robins was led down one primrose path after another. He was encouraged to believe, for example, that the Russians would resume the war against Germany during the winter of 1918, if they were given sufficient military assistance along with the assurance that the Japanese did not intervene in Siberia. Even after the Treaty of Brest-Li tovsk was signed, Trotsky was able to convince Robins that the Allies might be invited to land troops in Russia to fight the Germans.
It was on the basis of such information, relayed to him by Robins, that Ambassador Francis claims to have delayed for six weeks his recommendation to land troops in the North. To the last, Robins remained convinced that the Russians would invite Allied intervention and would establish with them "an actual fighting front opposed to Germany in Russia.” The key to this, he felt, was to be found in American economic cooperation with the Russians. In a report tendered to Secretary of State Robert Lansing upon his return to the United States, Robins outlined his recommendations with regard to such economic assistance. Some of his comments are worth noting, particularly in light of the fact that the Russian request for American economic aid came more than three months after the Bolsheviks had signed a separate peace treaty with Germany:
"The leaders of the Soviet Government realize that their social-economic revolution must fail, and that Russia will inevitably fall under the complete domination of autocratic Germany unless immediate and effective assistance in the reconstruction of economic life can be obtained. Their faith in the formulas of International Socialism naturally repels the suggestion of friendly cooperation with so-called Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments, but the compelling realities of life have led in this case, as in many others, to readjustment and compromise. Hence the present suggestion coming from the responsible head of the Soviet Government which is ' an earnest request for America’s cooperation in the internal reconstruction of economic life.
' "It is my sincere conviction, if this suggestion is acted upon and such economic reorganization is accomplished as is needed to equip and support a revolutionary army, that such an army can and will be formed and that in such event the assistance of armed forces of the Allies will be gladly accepted by the Soviet Power.”
Intervention in Russia (1918—1919) 59
Robins’ report was forwarded to President Wilson, who commented on Robins’ recommendations: "I differ from them only in practical details.” At the time, however, he took no action to implement them; quite the contrary, very shortly thereafter he announced his decision to land U. S. troops without waiting for a Russian invitation.
It is interesting to speculate what might have been, had Wilson acted on Robins’ recommendations at that time. The Allied Intervention almost certainly would not have taken place, with one possible result being that the Bolshevist government (without a common threat to unify diverse factions in the country) might have been overthrown. It is more likely, however, that the Bolsheviks would have been able to use this American assistance to help consolidate their domestic position and thus gather strength for the ultimate battle against capitalism abroad. There is no reason to believe that they would have had a change of heart or altered their basic policy toward the United States. Subsequent events would tend to bear this out, as successive generations of Soviet leaders have sought temporary economic and political accommodation with the West, but without wavering from their ultimate goal of world Communization. In short, it is unlikely that anything would have changed, other than the time schedule—the Soviets would have been prepared that much earlier to challenge the West.
Robins was not alone among those who failed to perceive this ambivalence on the part of the Soviets— their ability and willingness to accept temporary accommodations and setbacks, in order to advance their cause. Nor was Robins so completely blinded by his misjudgment of the Bolshevik leaders that he did not understand what was happening in Russia. Quite to the contrary, despite his limitations, he understood—perhaps better than anyone else at the time— that the problem in Russia was not solely an internal one; rather, that the true challenge was that of International Communism. Further, that since International Communism presented an ideological challenge to Western society, it could not be defeated by force of arms alone. Unfortunately, there were few others who shared Robins’ appreciation of the threat in Russia and the means whereby it must be combatted. Ambassador Francis was not among them.
Robins based most of his reports and recommendations on his own personal contacts or observations. Francis, on the other hand, was compelled by circumstances to rely on Robins and members of his own and other diplomatic missions for information. However, this did not prevent him from injecting his own views into the cables he sent forth to Washington. He also made some questionable decisions with respect
60 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1973
to withholding or delaying the dispatch of information with which he was not in agreement. On one occasion, the Ambassador withheld information of vital interest, apparently reluctant to risk chastisement for an error committed by a member of his staff. In this particular case—one involving the status of anti-German Czech troops to be evacuated through Vladivostok—had the information been made available to President Wilson, the U. S. intervention in Siberia might have taken another form, and conceivably it might not have taken place at all. In another instance, Francis failed to forward a subordinate’s valid observations on the futility of the planned Allied intervention in the Russian North, because they ran counter to his own earlier recommendations.
This indictment of the Ambassador may seem unduly harsh, but it would seem to be borne out, not only by a review of his actions in the light of later events, but also by a study of the views presented in his memoirs. I came away from my study of these memoirs with the distinct impression that, whatever his virtues might have been, here was a man who was so set in his views that he could not accept the contrary opinion of anyone else—particularly if the person happened to be his subordinate.
One such view held by Francis—formed the very day of the Bolshevik takeover and unchanged to the end— was that Lenin and Trotsky were in the pay of the German government, and that their sole purpose was to disintegrate Russian resistance and pave the way for German occupation. In a letter to the State Department, written a month before the Armistice, and in apparent reference to the relationship between Robins and Lenin and Trotsky, Francis wrote:
"These Bolsheviks have persistently endeavored by special favors and hypocritical expressions of friendship to American representatives to create discord between the Allies. They are in my opinion German agents and have been from the beginning.”
This view of the Bolsheviks not only colored his reports and recommendations to Washington, but it also caused him to refuse to have anything to do with the Bolshevik leadership, and to advocate openly the overthrow of the Bolshevist government. On several occasions, he issued statements addressed to the Russian people which could only have been interpreted as a call to counter-revolution. The wonder is that he was permitted by the Bolsheviks to remain in Russia, with such a blatantly hostile attitude toward the government and its leaders.
Francis also had little confidence in the ability of the Bolshevist government to survive—another view
he formed at the time of the Bolshevik takeover and maintained to the end. This was the view he reflected— hinting at strong anti-Bolshevik sentiments among the people—when he recommended in late February of 1918 that the Allies assume control of the ports of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Vladivostok. His message to the State Department also revealed his lack of faith in the Russian people to withstand any German effort to seize those ports and the Allied supplies located there:
"History shows Russians incapable of great movements or great achievements as whatever creditable has been accomplished can be traced to foreign inspiration and leadership. Now is the time for the Allies to act.”
A rather serious condemnation of the Russian people which history—both before and since he made this statement—has proved to be erroneous.
In making this observation, Ambassador Francis was not recommending intervention per se, but rather that the Allies "assume control” of the ports where Allied war materials were stockpiled. He still believed that the Allies would be invited to land troops—if not at the request of the Bolshevist government, then at the invitation of the Russian people themselves. He held to this belief until the beginning of May 1918, when he finally recommended that the Allies intervene without further delay:
"In my judgment time for Allied intervention has arrived. Have been hoping for request therefor by Soviet and have been discreetly working to that end. ... I have deferred this recommendation of the Allied intervention not only in the hope that the Soviet government would request it but . . . also with the hope that Russian people would by general expression request Allied intervention in default Soviet government’s doing so. . . . Various organizations throughout Russia have informed colleagues and myself that Russian people would earnestly desire Allied intervention but whether such feeling could assume physical form I doubt, as Bolsheviks treat with severity every such movement terming it counter-revolutionary.”
It was on the basis of such reports—if not this one itself—that President Wilson decided to land U. S. troops in Russia, a decision which he apparently felt would require but a small-scale commitment of American forces, and which would be welcomed by the Russian people. It is indeed unfortunate that his ambassador in Russia did not see fit to ensure that the
Intervention in Russia (1918—1919) 61
President had at hand, while making this decision, the contrary—and as it turned out, the more valid—man- on-the-spot judgments of his consul in Arkhangelsk.
This would seem to be the most serious error committed by Ambassador Francis during his more than two years in Russia. It involved his handling of a dispatch from Vice Consul Felix Cole. Kennan evaluates the content of Cole’s message, prepared well over a month before the decision to intervene was reached, as the most penetrating and prophetic of all statements by Western observers on the prospects for an Allied intervention in Russia. Cole accurately foresaw the enormity of the effort required and the failure inherent in it. He also gauged with great insight the effect that such an intervention would have on the Bolshevik leaders and the Russian people. Most important, he realized and so reported that, "The ground for landing an interventionary force has not been properly prepared. The North of Russia is nowhere near as pro-Ally as it might be. . . .” As the man-on-the-spot, he was in the best position to know. However, the Ambassador did not think much of Cole’s views—they happened to agree with some of Robins, and they ran counter to Francis’ recommendation of a month earlier. He therefore made no effort to forward the message to Washington by electrical means. Another copy of the dispatch, mailed by Cole directly to the State Department, reached there on 19 July, two days after President Wilson sent his aide-memoire to the Allied ambassadors in Washington, informing them of his decision with regard to intervention.
This was precisely the sort of man-on-the-spot judgment which Kennan feels might have served to better advise and better prepare the U. S. government for its decision on intervention. Unfortunately, it was not the only such man-on-the-spot judgment which stumbled at the first hurdle—Ambassador Francis.
The Failure of American Diplomacy. From a vantage point five thousand miles and more than 50 years later, one can see where both Robins and Francis misjudged the Bolshevik leaders and their methods and motives. Perhaps they were too close to the scene to evaluate accurately the Russian people and the great upheaval in which they were involved. At any rate, their observations—at times erroneous and lacking objectivity—can now be seen to have contributed to the already confused picture emerging from Russia. It was out of this confusion that the decision to intervene was made.
Robins and Francis, however, were not the only "villains” in this failure of U. S. statesmanship at the outset of Soviet-American relations. Robins and Francis held no corner on the market in misjudgments. Serious errors and questionable motives were to be found in other quarters as well.
With the wonderful gift of hindsight, one is permitted to see that the most serious and basic errors of all stemmed from the overall ineptitude of U. S. diplomacy at this point in history. True, a world war was in progress, and all attention was riveted on it. However, this hardly seems to justify the "maybe-it-will-go- away-if-we-ignore-it” attitude that characterized for several vital months the official U. S. position with regard to the Bolshevik revolution. The war also offers no excuse for the U. S. failure to resolve beforehand glaring differences of purpose with regard to intervention, issuing instead a unilateral dictum which could only bring chaos out of the Allied effort in Russia.
Tragically, we appear not to have learned a lesson from this failure in American diplomacy. Traces of the "maybe-it-will-go-away-if-we-ignore-it” attitude remain. There is still the tendency to issue the unilateral dictum, rather than attempt to talk out differences with Allies. We have yet to develop the ability to look in more than one direction at once—our attention is riveted there, while crises develop in other quarters, placing us in what always seems to be a reactive posture. Most disturbing of all, 50 years, dozens of encounters, and thousands of man-on-the-spot reports later, and the Bolsheviks are still not fully understood. Their descendants have adopted a more respectable outward appearance, but their methods and motives have not changed. In this respect, they have always been—and presumably always will be—completely inflexible. They continue to demonstrate, however, that this dogmatism does not prevent them from accepting—even seeking—temporary accommodation with capitalists or imperialists or anyone else, if such ultimately advances Russian national interests or the cause of International Communism. Today, even more so than at the time of the Allied Intervention, they represent much more than an alien ideology or external power threat which can be countered by force of arms alone. They have grown all the more dangerous over the intervening years, adding economic and political weaponry to their ideological and military arsenals. After more than half a century, it should be obvious that they will not go away if ignored.
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1949, Captain Shapiro has served in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, as well as in various staff assignments in Washington, London, and Japan. He is a Russian linguist and a graduate of the U. S. Army Institute of Advanced Soviet and Eastern European Studies. He has travelled extensively behind the Iron Curtain, and was stationed in the U.S.S.R. as Assistant U. S. Naval Attache from 1963 to 1965. He attended the Naval War College in 1965-66 and holds a Master’s degree in International Affairs from George Washington University. He commanded the Naval Intelligence Processing System Support Activity in Washington before assuming his present duties in Norfolk on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic.
[1]See K. Tolley, "Our Russian War of 1918-1919,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1969, pp. 58-72.
See also C. V. Jackson, "Mission to Murmansk." ibid. pp. 82-89.