Free World’s defense, a model member of the world community, and, as can be seen from Taipei’s teeming streets, a model also of highly successful development and trade. For these and other reasons Taiwan could gain a new distinction—as the issue that could force a reluctant Japan to at last assume a political position in Asia.
For more than a quarter century, since the end of World War II, Japan has lived comfortably in a sort of neuter status in international politics, not only without the necessity for spending very much of its growing product and income on armament, but also without the need for taking difficult positions on world issues. Taiwan could become the issue that will force Japan to emerge into a political position in Asia.
It has become almost a cliché to say that Japan has thrived in the shade of America’s nuclear umbrella. This is certainly true as far as defense against major and all-out aggression against Japan itself. But this is only part of the story, and likely the part of lesser importance.
The more important boon to Japan has been the fact that the United States has handled the tough issues for Japan in Asia, generally and more or less in a way that has accorded with Japan’s interests. The war in Korea was the first and most critical issue. War in Vietnam is by no means so clearly seen to be in Japan’s interest, but if the United States had not intervened there Japan would have had to commit itself to a position vis-à-vis that torn country. Southeast Asia is much too important for Japan simply to accept whatever happens there without attempting to guide it.
What is true of Southeast Asia is many times more true of East Asia, and most particularly of neighboring Korea and Taiwan. A dagger pointing at the heart of Japan, or whatever the simile, Korea is a country which Japan can disregard only at peril to its survival. Taiwan similarly is astride the ocean approaches to east Asia and, more important, astride the routes to Japan from the south over which perhaps 300 million tons a year of coal, oil, and ores move to Japan. It is in the same category as Korea to Japan. At the beginning of its modern age, the Japanese empire consisted of Korea and Taiwan. Empire is no longer thinkable, and Japan must be careful to keep it unthinkable, but the strategic situation has not changed.
What about Taiwan? For the past 20 years and more, the United States has also taken care of that problem for Japan by guaranteeing Taiwan its freedom from conquest by the Communist mainland. The physical presence of the Seventh Fleet has been mostly a psychological barrier; it is doubtful that any conquering would have been possible anyway. But, by sponsoring the Republic of China in Taiwan, the United States has given Taiwan a status and preserved a status quo that meets the strategic needs of Japan without imposing upon Japan a responsibility for doing anything about it.
Taiwan’s future has now become less certain, and Japan, now faces the necessity for meeting this issue head on and taking a position of its own on it. It is a commentary on Japan’s lack of political awareness to date that the subject has not yet been discussed in that light in Japan. There is strong movement in Japan for the achievement of better relations with Peiping, but no thinking through, in public discussion at least, of just where this policy of conciliation of Peiping will leave Taiwan, or just how much Japan might have to commit itself to a position in its own interest. It is a strange phenomenon that Japan seems or pretends to seem, unaware of it as an issue that is vital to Japan itself, and not merely an awkward case of relations with two opposing governments.
The whole matter seems to be coming to a head rapidly now that the United Nations has expelled the Republic of China and as more and more countries seek to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese mainland government. There is talk in Japan of the need to do the same in order not to miss getting on the bandwagon. Whether or not there is a bandwagon is beside the point, Japan simply cannot afford to think in those terms. Let others—Asian and non-Asian countries alike—climb on whatever bandwagons they will, Japan is too important a nation, too intimately involved in all matters Asian, to become a passenger on anybody’s bandwagon.
What Japan must do is make some hard decisions on its own—because of the wavering attitude of Washington. Whereas, for more than 25 years the United States could be counted on to defend the Free World, there are many signs now that the country has grown tired of the responsibility, that it is both bewildered and divided over its role in Asia. The war in Vietnam, of course, has brought all this on, but the change in attitude was probably inevitable in any case. Inevitable, too, was the realization on the part of Japan that its own stake in Asia—and its growing strength and ability to protect it—has reached a point where reliance upon the United States to settle issues of vital concern to Japan is no longer wise or safe. Taiwan is precisely such an issue.
Over the years, while Japan, more than most countries, has unofficially kowtowed to Peiping, the United States remained the most steadfast sponsor of the Republic of China in Taiwan as the legal government of China. Via one device or another, including its influence in most of the Free World, the United States maintained until recently Taipei’s place in the U.N., a position which was considered to be important to the structure of government in Taiwan and beyond the importance of the U.N. as an organization. With its expulsion from the U.N., Taiwan’s future is now very much up in the air.
U. S. sponsorship of the Republic of China had abundant merit in its own right. For the past two decades, Taiwan has been an island bulwark of defense, a model member of the world community and a model also of highly successful development and trade. It has long since dispensed with U. S. economic aid, and has attracted close to $600 million in foreign investment capital, much of it American and Japanese.
The Communist regime in mainland China by contrast has performed virtually every diplomatic outrage possible, and in the eyes of much of the rest of the world at least, has had a commitment to the creation of as much unrest and disturbance in the rest of Asia as it could. Its frontier quarrels with the Soviet Union—not to mention India—have posed as much of a crisis for the world as any trouble spot anywhere, and probably still do. Its trade, moreover, in spite of its enormous population, has been no bonanza; it is only fractionally greater than Taiwan’s and growing only sluggishly.
It is a question, nevertheless, whether the steadfast U. S. sponsorship of the Republic of China in Taiwan has not been as much the result of Peiping’s intransigence and hostility as it has the merits of Taiwan. Since for 20 years, Peiping has designated America as its enemy number one, and used Hate America as its primary political theme, Washington has had little alternative but to back Taiwan wholeheartedly. This is, of course, a negative policy, and negative policies can change.
There is some doubt also that American military conviction about the needs of its strategic posture in Asia can continue to prevail in Washington. The Pentagon is likely as much aware as ever of the strategic meaning of Korea and Taiwan to East Asia, but for a variety of reasons, mostly its bitter experience in Vietnam, the military’s views are no longer accepted as wholly compelling.
There are no signals out of Peiping to suggest that Communist China has reversed its Hate America policy. Quite the contrary: the Red Chinese diatribe against the United States in its maiden speech before the United Nations stunned those who expected the new Chinese delegation simply to acknowledge the warm welcome accorded it by 52 nations, most notably the United States.
Nor is there anything but a relative lack of public turmoil over the past year or so to indicate that anything has changed at all. What has happened is a slight improvement of Chinese manners—what the press calls a “smiling diplomacy”—as evidenced dramatically by the invitation to China of an American table tennis team, plus a handful of newspapermen, plus finally the overwhelming drama of President Nixon’s announced visit to China and Peiping’s apparent willingness to receive him amicably.
What all this means is debatable. As this article is written, the President has not yet made his visit and little has been made known even of the agenda of his expected talks. Nevertheless, in itself it is enough of a change from the dour harassment and harangueing [sic], which has been Red China’s diplomacy in the past, to lead the world to expect more change. That change may come first to the rest of the world, and the United States in particular may react too gratefully, if that is the word, and assume that there is more to this “friendliness” from Peiping than is actually the case.
In any event, American policy cannot be predicted with any confidence, and Japan, it would seem, must find a policy of its own toward China and Taiwan. The basis for arriving at this policy in all logic should be more a concern over Taiwan itself than over what Peiping thinks about it, difficult as that may be.
Unless Japan’s conception of its own geographic position has changed drastically from what it was for the past century or more, it does not seem possible that it could willingly accept a Taiwan under the effective control of a hostile—or even an unpredictable power. It is at least doubtful that Japan could live easily with Taiwan in the hands of any great power, even one demonstrably friendly. Finally, it is as certain as anything can be that Japan would view a military conflict over Taiwan as an unmitigated disaster.
If these theses are correct, Japan is in a very difficult dilemma at present, and one which it must work its way out of by itself if necessary. True, America has something of the same dilemma and quite likely, the same general view of the strategic importance of Taiwan. But, for the United States, Taiwan is merely one more important factor in America’s overall strategy in the far Pacific. For Japan, it is inarguable that Taiwan is a vital interest—even though it is not at all certain that all of present-day Japan sees it that way.
In an immediate sense, Japan must find a way to cope with the results of the U.N.’s having expelled Taiwan. As an international agency, the U.N. is not of great importance, but in regard to the China question, membership has acquired a sort of legitimacy vs. illegitimacy connotation. It is, therefore, most important now to preserve a status of some legitimacy for Taiwan and the Republic of China outside the U.N.
The maintenance of the status quo with regard to Taiwan, is the only course that seems likely to ensure peace in the Pacific. At the very least, maintenance of an international status for Taiwan is one way to ward off a major threat to peace.
The formula for doing this will be extraordinarily difficult to find. The concept of universality, and the acceptance of countries divided by ideology, comes up against a very different set of circumstances when applied to Peiping and Taipei. Both profess to loathe being two halves of a divided country and neither is willing officially to tolerate a Two-China principle. In Taiwan, the whole structure of government is that of being the legitimate government of China, and a change from that concept could have unforeseeable consequences. Peiping is equally committed to the “recovery” of Taiwan, although it has been more than a lifetime since any continued contact has been had.
Taiwan certainly wants no part of Communist rule, but too much has been made in the press overseas of the Taiwan independence idea. Nobody much in Taiwan is pressing for it, and the average Chinese in Taiwan, no matter where his birthplace, is quite satisfied with the present status of the island. The other half of this point of view is, of course, the fact that the Chinese who were born and brought up in Taiwan have little or no knowledge of the mainland, and not much interest in it either.
There is also Peiping’s attitude which would be even more hostile to an independent Taiwan than it is to the Republic of China, and finally, the rest of Asia which would be immediately suspicious of Japanese interest in an independent Taiwan.
All of this leaves a very muddled situation indeed, and one so typically Oriental that Japan may well feel that the United States would be incapable of grasping its essentials much less finding an acceptable solution. The United States is often underrated in this respect, but in the One China vs. Two Chinas impasse, it is probable that the only solution to be found will have to be a highly Oriental, and probably highly devious, sort of understanding rather than a solution. Japan is better able than any Western nation to pursue this aim and to recognize whatever progress may be made toward achieving it.
The best estimate of the form this understanding will have to take is something along the lines of one country and one state, but two de facto governments. This, of course, in reality is nothing more than a continuance of the present status quo which in fact seems the only tolerable solution, if it can be called that, from Japan’s point of view and probably from that of the rest of Asia. It will not be easily obtained. A status quo is one thing; acceptance of it and removal of at least some of the pressure and tension is another.
Japan will find it necessary to put on the line all of its considerable but latent prestige and influence to secure an understanding that the Taiwan situation will not be subject to a decision by force, or to the constant threat of force. In a sense this would be a replacement of the Seventh Fleet by Japanese—and Asian—self-interest, and that is as it should be. The Seventh Fleet might well always have the strength to prevent hostilities in the Formosa Strait, but this sort of peacekeeping is not permanently satisfactory, nor is it tolerable at all without tension. Japan is a great power, and if it makes clear its direct national interest in peace in its neighboring area and its determination to maintain that peace—and can demonstrate the support of the rest of Asia—it may be tentatively challenged, but it is not too likely that it will be confronted.
Japan must take a position and make itself understood. It must engage in active diplomacy among the other nations of Asia to make its position clear and to secure their support for it. Certainly that support is there. No country of Asia, with the possible exception of North Korea, wants any more warfare in the region. No country except Japan, however, has the strength or leadership potential to muster that support and to make it known as the will of Asia and not an imperialistic design by outsiders. Japan in turn must, of course, be extraordinarily careful to keep its own image free of what is certain to be cited by Peiping as imperialism.
The second stage for Japan may be even more difficult. It is that of resisting what may be called the present economic warfare against Taiwan—and Korea—which Peiping has been imposing upon Japan. Japan alone has been subjected to the so-called “four principles” of Chou En-lai, under which Peiping refuses to do business with anyone in Japan having American connections or affiliations of one kind or another in Korea or Taiwan. While Communist China has only a small trading volume—$4,089 million in 1970, compared to $3,100 million for Taiwan and $2,500 million for Korea—its imports are concentrated in such things as chemical fertilizers, of which there is a surplus in Japan, and in a relatively few other items. It has been able to use this leverage to force a kind of trade warfare upon Japanese business. It is divisive and bad for Japan and, of course, adds tension to East Asia. Taipei has retaliated in a mild way, but all of the impetus come from Peiping.
It does not seem possible for Japan to go on in this way for very long, and while there is sentiment in Japan for bowing even more deeply and placating Peiping further by sacrificing business in Taiwan and Korea, this would be neither in accord with the dignity of a great power nation nor in Japan’s long-term interest. Since bowing to Peiping in this trade warfare adds to tension in the area rather than the reverse, it is also a threat to Japan’s immediate interest which is the maintenance of peace and a lessening of tension. It is, finally, poor business; but that is a separate issue.
Altogether Japan is faced with a very formidable task. In order to preserve a status for Taiwan that is safe for Japan, Japan must adopt a positive position and exert the leadership in Asia necessary to maintain it and to follow through on it. Considering, however, that Japan has an economy and a total product about twice that of all of the rest of Asia combined, and an awareness of the strength which this provides, such leadership should not be impossible. Considering also the fact that status quo for Taiwan—meaning peace in East Asia—is the desire of all of the other nations in this area, it is an issue on which Japan can exert leadership without rousing fears of domination and militarism. From that point of view, Taiwan, as the Republic of China, is likely the safest issue that Japan could pick for entry into the position of leadership in Asia, which Japan logically should have, anyway.
The very large question, however, is whether Japan is ready to take that step into leadership and whether the Japanese people can be convinced that it is a necessary move. The Japanese have not been tested politically in a quarter century, and Japan today appears to be not at all the homogeneous and single-minded community and society it once was. A large segment of the population is restless with the kind of democracy that Japan enjoys. It could move either right or left, but the left is better organized. Last year’s elections in Tokyo and Osaka, for example, were not decided conclusively on a left vs. right basis, but the winners were the Socialist nominees with all-out Communist support.
Japan’s middle class is pretty much like America’s—confused about what it has accomplished and with a strong desire somehow to improve the quality of living in Japan which it finds unsatisfactory. While it has had no Vietnams to generate bitterness, it is completely and totally against involvement in international politics. Having had no involvement for more than a generation, the average Japanese is also abysmally ignorant of the political forces loose in the world, and would find it most difficult to accept the idea that Japan could be threatened from any source or need to protect a strategic position. As much as any population in a modern, industrialized country can be, the Japanese people are politically passive and unaware.
Japanese businessmen who created the economic miracle of postwar Japan have a strange but persistent illusion where mainland China is concerned. Hard-headed and calculating in most of their market assessments, they still seem to view the mainland on a head count basis, and become awed at the potential of its 750 million people, discounting completely its failure to date to realize much on whatever that potential may be. Even their own estimates show the China mainland to have a GNP of only something in the neighborhood of $80,000 million, less than a third of Japan’s, and a total foreign trade only 5% of that. Japan’s exports to Taiwan and Korea are twice those to the mainland, and Japan’s sales to Southeast Asia as a whole are ten times the business done with Communist China.
Even if Communist China could duplicate the Japanese economic miracle and double its product and income in ten years—on its present record it will take nearer 50—it would still be a minor economy and nearly the poorest in the world, with small trade possibility. Japan’s present $800 million a year total trade with the mainland is about 2% to 3% of its whole trade, and cannot foreseeably reach more than 5% or so.
Businessmen in Japan, nevertheless, pursue the China mainland trade with an obsessive zeal—more than 2,000 of them visited the recent Canton fair—and seem to derive a masochistic satisfaction from kowtowing in Peiping in order to get it. How much other trade they would sacrifice for it is a question; it might be a considerable amount.
Japan, therefore, must take on a very formidable burden at home in attempting to move itself into leadership into Asia and to maintain its own position and policy in the face of whatever difference there may be with the mainland. There is no assurance that it will take on the burden and carry it. In spite of its modern appearance and its worldwide business network, its complete literacy and its wholly free press and communications, in a political sense Japan has quite literally been in seclusion, and much of it would prefer to stay that way.
Events and forces, nevertheless, move on, and Japan will either move with them or be submerged by them. The Japanese are fond of saying that they have renounced militarism forever, and perhaps they have. But a renunciation of militarism cannot be allowed to mean an abstention from a political position. When a great nation’s interests become directly involved, there is little room for straddling or temporizing or renouncing involvement.
It does seem that the future of Taiwan is an issue where Japan’s interests are directly and vitally concerned. If Japan fails to take a position on it, and does it with determination, it will forfeit to Communist China a dominating position in Asia, for if Japan refuses to guide events in Asia, China will. It is as simple as that, and the consequence either way will be incalculable for Asia, and for Japan.
__________
Joseph Z. Reday graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1933, resigning upon graduation. He served as Gunnery Officer in the USS Charger in World War II and with MSTS WesPac in the Korean War. He has been a businessman in the Far East for more than twenty years, and is a columnist on the English language Japan Times and a contributor to numerous other publications.