View From the Bridge—1980
By Captain Fred A. Hill, III, U. S. Naval Reserve-R
Some exciting new concepts in naval strategy and tactics will dictate significant changes in structure of future naval forces, their weapons systems, and supporting forces. As these concepts evolve, they may hold the key to a quantum step forward in naval warfare, and thus enable us to retrieve our waning leadership in global seapower. Development of the elements of these forces will be undertaken in the 1970s, and the late 1970s and 1980s should see major operational deployment of these concepts.
The new concepts recognize the limitations of current ships, aircraft, and equipment, and attempt to resolve the shortcomings through a combination of new hardware development and changes in strategy and tactics. They concede, for example, such limitations as the inability of the surface ship, without assistance, to conduct surveillance or weapons delivery beyond its electromagnetic horizon; the exponential increase in the cost and complexity for modest increase in capability associated with active underwater acoustic systems; the excellent targeting information provided by a pinging, radiating, and emitting main force steaming in close proximity; the vulnerability of undispersed forces; the lack of versatility in the “special purpose” aircraft carrier; the increased budgetary limitations and decreased number of aircraft carrier inventory, and thus the decreased strike and friendly air cover capability attainable from carrier as well as shorebased air.
The Navy is responding to these shortcomings, and others, with such concepts as light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS), the “quiet force,” regional random dispersal, sea-mobile response force, and the air-capable ship, more recently named sea control ship.
The quiet force, for example, is a force observing continuous emission control (Emcon). The surface units of such a force would generally use no hydro-sonic transmissions, but would monitor passive acoustics systems. Electromagnetic emission would be infrequent and highly directional. The airborne elements ranging from the surface units would also be non-emitting during the search and surveillance portions of their missions, and would have a complete spectrum of passive sensors including electronic support measures (ESM), infrared (IR), and perhaps towed-array sonar, and “noise maker” underwater decoys.
Recent studies by the Center for Naval Analysis have indicated that random dispersal of force units in a given area, as opposed to formation tactics, results in higher probability of submarine threat detection and lower vulnerability. A sea-mobile response force would consist of airborne troops and armament completely based afloat which could respond rapidly to local “hot spots” and limited engagements. Other new ideas concerning tactics and hardware are only now emerging.
The one new concept which holds promise of perhaps being the most revolutionary in ship, aircraft, and equipment design and tactics is the sea control ship. The concept envisions numerous highly mobile ship platforms for the hangaring and operations of multiple aircraft. This concept is still formative; the size, type, and configuration of the ship is wide open. Consensus of opinions and study to date indicate that it should be an unsophisticated platform dedicated to the support of at least six, ranging to approximately 30, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL), air vehicles.
The ship would carry little integral defensive or offensive systems other than her aircraft components. She should be fast, with minimum underwater signature, and able to operate for fairly extended periods without replenishment. Current thinking is that the aircraft would have independent operational capabilities and would be a mix to include perhaps large and small helicopters, and higher speed VTOLs with loiter or even ocean-alighting capability. Possibly mixed with these might be air cushion vehicles and/or hydrofoils.
The sea control ship would function as a “mother ship,” and could also be envisioned as supporting smaller ships with air detachments, such as current destroyer escorts with LAMPS. Evolution might be expected to change the design and characteristics of this class of ship (DD) with time. In fact, the sea control ship concept raises as many questions concerning the validity of the armed and armored man-of-war (whether large or small) as it does about the high cost, limited area coverage/single point vulnerability of carriers for use with dispersed forces, or escort type missions—strike warfare excepted.
In future perspective, the sea control ship may turn out to be several types and sizes of platforms, replacing the carrier/cruiser/destroyer of today with new capability embarked in widely-dispersed, new forces. These ships would have several different types of aircraft complements. One visualization includes several types of ACS, tailored to support amphibious landings and operations ashore, and incorporates some innovations in supply and support operations.
Currently under study are the possibilities for modification of all classes of ships to have some air capability and increased versatility through mixes of conventional aircraft helicopters, other VTOLs (tilt-wing, tilt-prop, lift-fan, and the like), air cushion vehicles, and possibly airborne submersibles. Collaterally, such air vehicles are being considered for use with higher-speed and quieter-displacement hulls, catamarans, surface effect ships, semi-submersibles, hydrofoils, satellites, and new submersibles. The potential employment of these vehicles and forces is being examined in the conventional offensive and defensive roles in antisubmarine warfare, advanced surface missile defense, anti-air warfare, mining and mine countermeasures, and strike warfare, as well as investigation into new recombinations. The primary missions of naval forces, of course, remain the same—to protect free use of sea lanes by friendly forces and to deny the enemy use of ocean areas.
The Chief of Naval Operations has established a program coordinator for Surface Ship Aviation Integration (SAVI) within the Department of the Navy, with offices responsible for programs such as the sea control ship, lamps, vertical replenishment, and airborne mine countermeasures.
While no master plan and schedule has yet been formulated for the sea control ship and her associated systems, the first step will be to convert an amphibious transport, dock (LPD) or other candidate ship, as a test vehicle, for operation of VTOLs. This conversion could involve installation of an elevator and alterations to provide hangaring and support for aircraft as SH-3s, RH-53s (mine countermeasure helicopters), Harriers, and LAMPS helicopters. Initial evaluations are being conducted this year, and it is hoped that conversions of other existing hulls may provide an interim sea control ship program by the mid-1970s, the “ultimate” sea control ship programs being introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
For the perceptive naval observer, even such brief descriptions of these new, developing concepts would appear to offer encouraging, timely solutions to offset our diminishing forces and lagging technologies. Equally evident too, is the hard fact that, to translate these concepts into realities, substantial funding will be needed in support of these programs if we are to realize their potential contribution to the Navy of the 1970s.
The Navy Enlistee, 1975—From Where?
By Master Chief Sonar Technician James C. Bussert, U. S. Navy, Staff, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
In the present day Navy, over 70% of the enlistees have joined because of the pressure of the draft. Over 90% of the first-termers are still getting out and taking cuts, even since the liberalizing Z-grams.
In a few years, the draft will inevitably end with much pressure from the news media, the Senate, and the civilian sector. In our schools and public life, patriotism is old fashioned and “square.” It is considered radical to love one’s country or show the flag. The nation’s youth are increasingly anti-military in their attitudes and actions, owing to the influence of leftist teachers, the news media, and even many of the nation’s elected leaders. Where are the non-draft sailors going to come from in 1975?
We have been trying the material approach to make Navy life attractive in order to lure and retain new sailors.* There is much (unpassed) pending legislation on proposed pay raises, bonuses, increased basic allowance for quarters (BAQ), newer housing, and new construction ships with increased habitability. In addition to the lack of high-caliber, motivated, and intelligent career men (not to be mistaken for the hang-on “lifer” who cannot make it on the outside), our Fleet consists of primarily old and tired ships, or ill-designed new construction, which are of doubtful survivability in an all-out sea conflict. Our whole Navy surface philosophy is built around the few carriers, which will theoretically have air coverage to protect each unit from the Soviet Styx and Shaddocks. This problem is one that can only be solved with massive, imaginative, and costly new construction programs. Even if the House and Senate gave us billions of dollars for a viable oceanic force, our critical problem of good career men or even good four-year men would remain. In fact, it would be greatly amplified without the draft.
* See C. McIntosh, “Retention: The Talk and the Deeds,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings this issue, pp. 58-63.
It is suggested that a very low cost, mandatory program start now, a few precious years in advance, to remold the minds of our youth and make them pro-military rather than violently antimilitary. We must replace the distorted My Lai image the newspapers have given us, and let all America, young people especially, see us as human, concerned people through amicable meetings rather than confrontations across bayonets on a campus. This writer suggests a five-point, inexpensive program that should be initiated by all of our Armed Forces. Naturally, my main emphasis is on the Navy’s needs.
Wear the uniform—As a rule, the more mature sailors generally wear civilian clothes when leaving or going to the ship or base. When going out socially with the family or on liberty where many chances to form a favorable opinion of servicemen could be fostered, the uniform is not worn. Much daily exposure in churches, restaurants, and stores is missed, because civilians are unaware that military people attend. Thus, the much-lamented, unfavorable “typical sailor” image of the drunk staggering out of the bars is associated with the Navy. This is going to require all of us to put ourselves out consciously to improve this one-sided image to the community.
Projects—Our overseas people-to-people projects and the immeasurable good they have done for our nation’s image overseas is well known. Let us use the same successful formula in the States to help in all the needy areas near our homeports or bases—in dungarees and with white hats. Much good could be accomplished by humane acts like clearing slums, painting schools, or assisting with ecology programs. The side benefits would be many new contacts and personal meetings of sailors with citizens who will perhaps see us as human beings, aware and concerned for others, and willing to help at home, too. They would see a mixture of various racial groups, religions, and backgrounds working together, side-by-side as we do daily on board ship. We should reach out to all ethnic and social levels and prove through personal contact and example, the falseness of the so-called military-industrial label we now bear.
Talks—We could have some of our young, articulate sailors go to civilian schools and discuss facts with students about military life and thoughts. They should field questions intelligently and candidly. Naturally, the better our housing, pay, medical benefits, and the like, the better their position. This should not be done by a recruiter or older officer, but by a person young enough to be able to communicate and identify easily with the students. This is no place to let the age gap work against us. We should prove right on the schoolground the distortions concerning the military man and the Navy as a possible career. The Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet has initiated something like this, but on a small scale.
Open House—Presently, there are limited open house times on shore stations .and selected ships. These should be vigorously expanded and invitations widely sent to youth organizations or schools to visit on board ships or stations. It would be educational for them and would give us a chance to show off our ships. Naturally, a new construction guided missile destroyer could do this much more effectively than a rusty, 23-year old FRAM destroyer. If we can get construction money, people ought to see what their tax dollars are buying. Many older people would eagerly come to see how the Navy is changing. Security considerations must be weighed by commands, of course, and appropriate measures should be taken to avoid any possible demonstrations or vandalism.
Seapower—We have always been a great seapower nation with a few bleak isolationist exceptions, but most Americans tend to forget this history and its future import on the seagoing Soviet bear. A curriculum should be included in the schools on the reliance on the oceans of our nation for offense, defense, and trade, and our role in succeeding Great Britain as today’s enforcer of the freedom of the seas. Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History is a possible text. Things to be stressed would be our unique blessing in having an ice-free continental location between the two great oceans.
These five steps would enrich the minds of our young people so that, hopefully, they might regain respect for the Navy uniform and seriously consider enlisting. The military career would bear no stigmatism of an “establishment pig” or “killer” as it has been pictured lately. By personal example and friendly confrontations, these myths would be exposed for the falsehoods that they are.
We must do as good a job at being Madison Avenue-type salesmen for the Navy as we have done at being overseas diplomats in the past. Any honest salesman needs a good product to sell. Backing by the government in the form of realistic new weapons systems and new fighting ships built for the new Soviet threat would show the youth the nation’s confidence in the Navy and belief in seapower’s importance.
These are physical things with dollar sign values, and these alone will not “buy” the allegiance or enlistments of an anti-military, biased youth. What is advocated is basically a people-to-people program in the states to show the nation’s youth that we are simply people who care about our fellow men and our environment, as well as a potent and proud fighting force—a force they might like to be a part of, and possibly make a career in.
Communist China—Growing Seapower?
By Commander R. Waring Herrick, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Blaming Communist China’s lack of development of any significant naval and merchant shipping fleets on former head of state, Liu Shao-chi, Mao is cited in a People’s Daily article as calling for an all-out shipbuilding program to create both a strong navy and a large merchant marine. Despite Liu’s alleged opposition, Mao is credited with having developed shipbuilding greatly in the 21 years of his regime, progressing from construction and repair of small ships to that of modern merchant vessels. Nothing is said, however, about any advances in the more technically complicated field of naval ship construction.
The article makes it clear that there is very substantial opposition to Mao’s shipbuilding program, opposition which the article clearly is intended to help overcome. This it attempts to do through a combination of an exaggerated portrayal of the Soviet and U. S. Pacific fleets as colluding threateningly against China’s security and an equally exaggerated list of six objectives that purportedly would be accomplished by the projected expansion of Chinese seapower.* The naval strategy envisioned is purely defensive to provide the minimum security required for mainland China’s defense against seaborne assault. The expressed aims of “liberating Taiwan” and “furthering the world revolution” are seen as having at most propagandistic value for decades to come.
Finally, the possibility is canvassed that the shipbuilding program, less its Maoist crash element, may be a logical part of a rational government program for expanding China’s defense industrial capabilities and production.
* See E. B. Duffee, Jr., “A ‘New’ China Policy,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1971, pp. 18-23.
Liu Shao-chi, the unfortunate former head of state who served as the butt of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, is now being made to take the blame for Communist China still being the naval and maritime nonentity that it was in 1949 when Mao came to power. In an article in the People’s Daily, the readership is informed that Mao has from the very outset of his rule, sought with considerable success to develop the shipbuilding industry on which both naval and merchant ship construction depends. Nevertheless, it is claimed that Liu’s opposition significantly limited Mao’s shipbuilding through subversive and “traitorous” activities.
The reader is advised that despite Liu’s “continuous interference” and “sabotage,” Chinese shipbuilding did advance tremendously” in 21 years “. . . from the repair and assembly of small ships using imported equipment to the design and construction of large ships with native materials.” Specifically, through the exclusive use of indigenous material, the article claims, Communist China has built several 10,000-ton ocean-going freighters, a few 15,000-ton oil tankers, and an icebreaker.
The further claim is made:
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China and, in particular, since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China’s shipbuilders have adhered to Chairman Mao’s great policy of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own efforts. However, it is simultaneously admitted:
Whether we should adhere to the road of developing industry by maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our hands and relying on our efforts or take the road of being subordinate to imperialism and social-imperialism [i.e., the U.S.S.R.] by relying on foreign countries is an important aspect of the struggle between the two lines in the shipbuilding industry.
Liu Shao-chi and his supporters are accused of having opposed development of a large merchant marine. They are cited as having operated under a theory of “shipbuilding steps” which is said to have been tantamount to “abolishing the shipbuilding industry.” Liu is quoted as having held the following view on providing adequate merchant shipping services for China: “With foreign exchange we can buy more ships. Building ships is not as good as buying ships. Buying ships is not so good as renting ships.”
To the extent that Mao and Lin are able to overcome this active opposition, will a crash shipbuilding program be introduced at every shipyard, large and small? In the words of the People’s Daily article:
We must vigorously propagate and resolutely carry out the instructions by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin concerning shipbuilding at each and every unit. Let the great Red banner of Mao Tse-tung . . . wave high on the shipbuilding front forever.
To engage the interest and creative talents of the populace for the new all-out shipbuilding program, appeal was made to the pride presumably engendered in the breast of every Chinese Communist by the launching of China’s first artificial satellite:
. . . China launched its first man-made earth satellite and set a brilliant example for our shipbuilders. We must learn from this undaunted, thorough revolutionary spirit and strive to develop new techniques in our shipbuilding.
The object of the crash shipbuilding program called for construction of both “. . . a powerful navy as well as a mighty maritime fleet.” A further indication that Mao’s every wish is still not tantamount to an effective command is provided by the fact that the People’s Daily article finds it necessary to argue by fair means and foul in support of his proposal. In addition to labelling Liu Shao-chi’s shipbuilding policy as “traitorous,” the article first gives an exaggerated description of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and the Soviet Pacific Fleet as not only actively threatening China’s security but even collaborating in doing so:
At present U. S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism arc colluding while yet contending with each other for naval hegemony. They are pursuing a gunboat policy which is threatening China’s security.
The article goes on to note, additionally, that “U. S. imperialism continues to occupy China’s territory of Taiwan.” Since the capabilities of the present Chinese Navy are minuscule in comparison with the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the Soviet Union possesses the potential of using its Pacific naval forces against the coast of China almost at will. Since the Ussuri River clash in March 1969, there has been at least one Chinese charge that the Soviet Union has employed naval forces against China.
In addition to libelling Liu and exaggerating the naval threat, the People’s Daily article sets out a list of a half dozen partly practical, but partly propagandistic aims that supposedly would be accomplished by Mao’s projected great leap forward in shipbuilding:
Whether or not we vigorously strive to develop the shipbuilding industry and build a powerful navy as well as a mighty maritime fleet is an important issue, depending on whether or not we want to (1) consolidate our national defense; (2) strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) liberate Taiwan and finally unify our motherland; (4) develop the freight business and marine products enterprises; (5) build socialism; and (6) support the world revolution.
The article gives a clear implication that the naval strategy underlying the projected naval construction program is not the offensive, high-seas strategy that is implied by the expressed goal of conquering Taiwan. Instead, the article foresees a “fortress fleet” strategy suitable for a navy that for long would be inferior to both the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the U. S. Seventh Fleet. This is revealed in a statement of the missions to be performed by Communist China’s Navy: “. . . to build a seaborne ‘railway’ and develop China’s coastline into a great wall of steel.” Translated into conventional naval terms, this gives a twofold naval mission: (1) to protect coastal shipping, and (2) to protect the coast against seaborne assault, whether by air or missile attack, artillery shelling, or amphibious invasion. These constitute the minimum strategic defense requirements to be afforded by naval power to any country with a sea frontier. Thus, development of an effective Chinese navy of coastal submarines, coastal patrol, antisubmarine ships, and coastal aviation can scarcely be interpreted as other than a legitimate effort to carry out the first of the objectives. Only decades of Chinese naval expansion could provide an answer as to whether the expressed aims of taking Taiwan and furthering the world revolution are actually long-term aims or mere ideological window dressing.
One specific aim of the new defense program is said to be construction of a strategic network of railways. The aim expressed in the People’s Daily article of developing an offshore, seaborne railway may perhaps be viewed as part of a larger pattern of military infrastructure development.
More importantly, it is quite conceivable that the entire shipbuilding program being propagandized by Mao is actually government-planned. If it were carried out rationally instead of on a crash basis, such a major shipbuilding program could complement an overall development of Communist China’s defense capabilities.