During recent years, a great deal of U. S. technical know-how has been brought to bear on rocketry, missilery, antisubmarine warfare, and the development of supersonic aircraft. Ships, by and large, have remained basically the same—with one exception—the development of new types and designs for amphibious warfare. The new LHA, amphibious helicopter carrier, with a well deck, was only recently approved. The LPD, landing ship dock, has been updated and improved to make her a more capable and functional ship. The new LST, landing ship tank, and LKA, attack cargo ship, have given our amphibious force the capability of projecting itself at 20-knot speeds anywhere on the seas of the world. Perhaps in the near future the controversial air-cushion vehicles (ACV) will also find a place in our amphibious inventory, thus giving the U. S. Navy truly an over-the-horizon capability.
What, then, is lacking? Almost every Marine will agree that it is air cover, close air support. We have achieved this to some degree with the helicopter transports and helicopter gunships. But, as shown in Vietnam, the helicopter is vulnerable to ground fire—although less so than, for example, the Air Force’s F-100s and F-4s. And, what of the situation where we do not want to land, but just want to show force? We cannot have attack carriers everywhere. We can, however, have jet aircraft everywhere that we have an amphibious striking force—through the use of the jet V/STOL close support aircraft. The use of a V/STOL close air support aircraft cannot necessarily bestow total air superiority. But local air superiority can be achieved over a specific objective for a limited period. For the purposes of this discussion, let us limit our thinking of V/STOL aircraft to its role in close air support. While it may be used in an emergency for other purposes, this is its primary purpose. If we are to consider the maintenance of complete air superiority for a prolonged period, we would need a much larger force than that which will be considered during this discussion.
The Naval Air Test Center Technical Report of 17 October 1966 on the suitability of the XV6A for carrier operations stated “Operations of jet V/STOL aircraft from CVA and LPD decks is feasible. The operational flexibility of the fleet would be enhanced greatly by the employment of jet V/STOL aircraft. Additional programs to exploit the potential of jet V/STOL airplanes on board U. S. Navy ships are recommended.”
Rear Admiral E. C. Outlaw, U. S. Navy, has stated in the Naval Review of 1968 that we should proceed with a “deliberate well-funded program leading to the earliest possible realization of vertical flight in naval and military roles.” Marine Brigadier General G. C. Axtell, stated in Aviation Week and Space Technology of 24 June 1968 that “During the next two decades, the primary amphibious assault capability of the landing force will consist of fully VTOL, mobile, Marine air-ground teams, launched and supported from mission-designed navy amphibious shipping under all conditions of weather and visibility.”
For a long time, too much emphasis has been put on the “V” in V/STOL. This has caused some people to fail to recognize that this type aircraft performs without penalty in a conventional mode. The usual question asked by military authority is how a V/STOL aircraft can fit into the military scheme and how its performance compares with conventional aircraft. Given a typical 5,000-pound warload and any radius of action appropriate to the modern close air support aircraft, the V/STOL can operate from a 300-yard strip, while the conventional aircraft will require approximately 2,500 yards of takeoff run.
Yet, thorough investigation fails to reveal a single Navy-sponsored program to develop either V/STOL transport or an aircraft capable of close air support of the Marine landing force.
This is the more surprising when one considers that nearly every major power in the world has been working on some phase of the V/STOL effort. Because of airport congestion the first U. S. V/STOL aircraft probably will be the transport. Until recently, the U. S. Air Force has been working in conjunction with NATO on a strike aircraft. But this program has not progressed very far. The “tail-sitters,” such as North American Aviation’s Pogo, showed some promise, but have not been developed. The most recent U. S. effort is Lockheed’s Hummingbird.
The U. S. Air Force has also tested the earlier version of Hawker Siddeley’s Harrier. The Harrier is now operational in the Royal Air Force and the British have ordered nearly 100. This aircraft, which has been undergoing tests and development for ten years and has been flying for nearly eight years, set an unofficial record for climb to 10,000 feet. The present Hawker Siddeley Harrier is capable of much better performance.
The Soviet Union has been working most diligently in the development of a V/STOL aircraft, perhaps because of the Egyptian Air Force’s experiences during the six-day war. Perhaps the Russians, seeing the bombed-out runways, concluded that there is something to be said for an aircraft that doesn’t need long runways.
There is evidence to suggest that both the British and the Russians are about to leapfrog ahead of the United States in the development of the vertical assault technique. Recently, for example, a British magazine indicated that a 700-Marine commando unit may be embarked with helicopters and V/STOL aircraft in one commando-type carrier as a landing task force. The Soviet Union, with its newly-acquired helicopter carrier, appears to be developing a new vertical take-off aircraft.
Yet, we still see no change in U. S. close air support tactics for the small landings such as those conducted at the Lebanon or the Dominican Republic. It seems strange that this area has been left in the doldrums, especially in light of our experiences which show that, with the exception of Korea, the majority of U. S. amphibious assaults since World War II have involved forces of between 2,000 and 5,000 men. Further, these amphibious task forces around the world have required the services of an attack carrier when a much smaller air support force could have done the job at least until the carrier could be made available.
For more than ten years the vertical/short take-off close air support aircraft has been controversial. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara indicated to Congress that engine development was the hold-up, yet today the newly improved Harrier, which will go into service in three squadrons of the R.A.F., has 19,000 pounds of thrust and is capable of delivering a 2,000-pound pay-load 500 miles. This can be done with less than 1,600 feet of take-off run. Later versions of this aircraft will deliver over 21,000 pounds of thrust. In the vertical take-off and land mode, the aircraft can deliver 2,000 pounds at least 100 miles. It must be remembered that the aircraft will not normally take off in the VTO mode. This VTO is a bonus which is not available in present U. S. aircraft. The United States has flown many test vehicles and has co-operated with the Federal Republic of Germany and Britain in the development of V/STOL attack aircraft. With the exception of Harrier, however, none of these aircraft has progressed beyond the test stage.
Considering the presently available aircraft for the V/STOL close-support mission, what do we really need? First, we want an aircraft which the Marines can operate from relatively unprepared fields in advanced areas with the minimum of repair facility. The Marines, recognizing this requirement, have included 12 Harrier aircraft in their budget. The aircraft must be small enough to be helicopter-lifted back to the main support base when repairs are required. It also should be small enough to be stowed in the present-day LPH and LPD and operated in forward areas for prolonged periods with a minimum of support.
Present-day V/STOL aircraft, such as the Harrier, give good performance in the V/STOL mode. Because of their tremendous power plants, they give outstanding performance in the conventional or STOL mode of operation. Both the military and civilian community seem not to understand that V/STOL is a plus that can be used—not a feature that must be used. Because of its basic design capability for V/STOL operation, such an aircraft can obtain an increase in weight-lifting ability of about 3-to-4 pounds for every foot of take-off run in a no-wind condition. Consider, therefore, the improvement in performance from an LPH with a 200-foot run into a 20-knot wind. This could mean, not 15 carriers available to the United States, but 30 to 40, depending on the number of decks in the amphibious force which were made available for use by a V/STOL close support aircraft. And, as has been pointed out, V/STOL can also be used for fleet air defense.
With V/STOL, the U. S. Navy would give up nothing, but would gain the extras of surprise, speed, dispersability, and a new power posture.
V/STOL can multiply the number of available aircraft bases because of the aircraft’s small field capability and the fact that it can be operated from any level platform at sea which is large enough to accommodate it. Currently available aircraft can deliver several thousand pounds up to 150 miles in the VTOL mode. Considerably larger payloads can be delivered in the conventional mode of operations.
This aircraft can provide the amphibious forces with an instantaneous strike capability any time it is required. It does not require large scale carrier operations. In fact, in carrier operations it could even mean that all V/STOL aircraft could be airborne practically instantaneously, without the expenditure of feed water that is required for steam catapult launches.
Another feature of the V/STOL which should appeal to the aviator is that the aircraft can be maintained in a constant state of readiness on the flight deck of, say, an LPH, in the area of amphibious operation. This obviates the requirement of transit times and the waiting on-station for a call mission. This saving in fuel will more than compensate for the high fuel consumption required for the VTO.
It is also interesting to notice that the British, who have had the most experience with this type craft, have not lost a single pilot in operations since 1961.
Critics say that the engine life-span will be unacceptable. Yet, the British expect to have at least 250 hours between overhauls. This will undoubtedly improve as the technicians gain operational experience.
What will be gained from having an air support capability organic to the amphibious force? One of the projects which has long been considered is the deployment of a credible force to the Indian Ocean. With one LPH, one LPD, and one LST, we could at this time present a force in the Indian Ocean area which would be capable of transiting at speeds up to 15 knots, and be able to conduct demonstrations and show-of-force efforts at an extremely low cost and without obligating any aircraft carriers. This force could carry six to eight V/STOL aircraft and a like number of helicopters—or perhaps a few more.
If the force were committed, the back-up could come from airborne support since the force would already have its heavy equipment and close air support. The fact that the force could project and protect itself 100 to 200 miles inland, with V/STOL and light weapons, could act as a deterrent to would-be governmental manipulators.
An amphibious task force such as this will be able to place nearly 90% of the world’s population under the umbrella of U. S. deterrent power. It will not be costly in terms of foreign base rights, and can of itself be achieved at the lowest cost because all assault ships are currently in the inventory.
V/STOL aircraft can also be disbursed throughout the amphibious task force, if desired, to accomplish the on-station “ground” loiter when the force is expecting air attack. They might even be considered for use during surface engagements.
The advantages of having the V/STOL in the amphibious force again become apparent when we consider the possibility of early release of the aircraft carrier, saving in aircraft transit time from the carrier to the objective area, savings in aircraft casualties achieved by the low landing speeds, and losses which can be prevented by dispersal of the assets throughout the force.
V/STOL could be deployed with the advance force of an amphibious group if needed, and thus preclude the necessity of exposing the attack aircraft carrier to unnecessary danger.
V/STOL could mean operating more aircraft from the large aircraft carriers or using smaller aircraft carriers without catapults and with minimal arresting gear, thus saving a considerable amount of the cost of a new ship.
Weather is another not-immediately-recognized advantage to the use of V/STOL in the close air support role. The V/STOL is only concerned with local weather since it is not involved in transits. If the local weather is acceptable, the aircraft can be launched, conduct its mission, and be landed. In the past, missions have had to be aborted because of weather at the carrier or en route.
The aircraft itself is not extremely complicated. It could be maintained in the field by a minimum number of personnel.
Budget limitations have forced the British into the development of the Harrier. Certainly they do not relish the thought of giving up their naval air strike arm. But, after a good deal of study, they have found a high cost-effectiveness for the V/STOL aircraft on board aircraft carriers and other shipboard helicopter platforms. They have found that it is uneconomical to carry only 22 fixed-wing aircraft and eight helicopters in a ship with a complement of 2,400, when at reasonable cost, the same carrier could be converted to a commando carrier and in this form could carry a 700-Marine commando with 12 helicopters and 12 V/STOL Harriers. Thus, one ship can be an amphibious landing force which is not tied to the choice of beach, condition of surf, or other weather phenomena. The United States could take similar steps with our present amphibious forces and thus gain much greater mobility and increased speed with a minimum of experimentation.
In summary, then, V/STOL aircraft can increase the number of aircraft carriers available for strike aircraft by the number of platforms available without the expense of new aircraft-carriers. It can give us a small-field and a no-field operational capability, plus the advantage of dispersal when required. V/STOL can give us an effective crisis control instrument short of committing our larger aircraft carriers.
The price is right—just over two million dollars per aircraft when purchased in Britain. The loads, while small in V/STOL mode, can be delivered repeatedly without transit times. Loads can be varied at short notice. This type of aircraft is extremely safe for the pilot. All things considered, it appears that the V/STOL can offer the U. S. Navy an excellent close-support weapons system.
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A graduate of the Richmond Professional Institute of the College of William and Mary (now Virginia Commonwealth University) in 1950, Commander Boschen was commissioned an ensign in May 1952. He served successively in the USS Willard Keith (DD-775) and in the USS Taconic (AGC-17). After a tour at General Line School in Monterey, he served in the USS Canisteo (AO-99) from 1960 until 1962. He served as Operational Team Training Officer at Fleet Anti-Air Warfare Training Center Dam Neck from 1962 until 1964, and as Executive Officer of the USS John W. Weeks (DD-701) from 1964 until 1966 at which time he reported to Commander Amphibious Group TWO Staff as Operations Officer. Prior to assuming his present duty as commanding officer of the USS San Marcos (LSD-25), he served as Second Coastal Zone Advisor/CTG 115.2 Commander Central Surveillance Group, Vietnam.