This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
"Seapower and the Superpowers”
CSee C. Amme, pp. 26-35, October 1968; and 118— 119, April 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David R. Cox, U. S. Navy, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Captain Amme is quite right. I do agree with him that Soviet naval strategy is primarily deterrent and defensive. I would prefer to use the terms “counterforce” or “damage-limiting” to describe this strategy, however, for two main reasons. The idea of “counterforce” or “damage-limiting” operations is clearly connected with nuclear strategic warfare, which I believe to be the primary concern of the Soviet Navy.
I think it generally a mistake to speak of a naval strategy as being “offensive” or “defensive” in isolation from over-all national strategy. The distinction must be made between the use of the term “offensive” or “defensive” to describe military strategy and the use of the terms to describe political strategy. This distinction is usually not made, thus leading to some confusion between the two concepts. The terms I have suggested have only a military meaning and cannot be confused as descriptive of political strategy. “Counterforce” or “damage-limiting” operations can be used in support of either an offensive or a defensive political strategy where there exists concern over the possibility of a nuclear war.
Since the time when “the United States began to project its power and to seek its interests beyond the continent,” we have all been imbued with the idea that the purpose of naval power is the projection of national power abroad. Whether the ruling concept is “command of the sea” or “freedom of the seas,” the desired end result is to facilitate such a projection of American power. This is the mainstream of American naval thought.
Soviet naval writers are less impressed with the mainstream of American naval thought than they are with what we have considered to be at best a naval sideshow, namely the use of naval forces for nuclear strategic purposes. Admiral N. M. Kharlamov, Soviet Navy, for example, recently pointed out that the U. S. Navy now has one-third of 3 strategic weapons available to the U. armed forces. He used this as evidence 10 prove his thesis that “today the primary n1'5' sion of the main classes of vessels is consider^ to be not so much combat against the enen1) naval assault forces, but the launching 0 nuclear weapons at enemy ground objecti'ei , for the direct achievement of strategic result in a war.” At the same time, he points o')* j that since enemy naval forces can also execute strategic missions, it is even more imports111 to combat enemy naval vessels than in tne past. This mission, he observes, is divided iIlt0 two independent tasks: combat against surfa°e I vessels and combat against submarine3, “The execution of both missions,” he emph3' sizes, “pursues a single goal: that of prevent' ing nuclear strikes at objectives located in the interior of the country.”
Kharlamov, Admiral Yuriy A. Panteleyev> and other writers on Soviet naval strategy concede that in the past, operations to disrupt , enemy communications and protect one’s oWn communications have sometimes been impof' 1 tant, but they do not admit that such oper3' tions have ever been decisive. They expre5S doubt that such operations will remain impor' tant in future warfare. As for amphibioU3 warfare, they describe it as useful in support' ing the advance of Soviet troops in a “cot1' , tiguous direction.” The only mention of any' thing like the projection of national poWef abroad in Soviet naval writings is in referent i to the beneficial political results of ship visits-
These public pronouncements need not D themselves be taken as conclusive evidence of the missions of the Soviet Navy. But the pronouncements are supported by the fact that the Soviet Navy has been building ships dc' signed to carry out the announced missions and not sufficiently flexible to be easily adapt' able to other missions.
SOI
sai
tin
X;
“!
in
st;
ye
sc
ce
tr
vv
b,
se
P
t!
P
b
r
/
e
f,
v
t
1
1
Captain Amme has demonstrated very well . how historical circumstances and technology cal developments have led to a modification of Mahan’s concepts of seapower. I think we t must go further and perceive that two nations, both strong seapowers, may have valid rea-
,Jns ^0r differing concepts of seapower at the me point in history. I cannot put it better \.an Commander M. K. MccGwire, Royal «jafvy (Retired) \Brassef s Annual, 1968, p. 158]:
. we are to assess their capabilities and their er>tions correctly, we must come to under- n'i what the Russians grasped some 40 3rs ago. Maritime strategy is not a universal ence, but is particular to the country conned; Russia finds herself opposed to the ditionni maritime powers and the strategy ^ lcn she must adopt to counter this threat ears no relation to the ‘traditional’ use of Seapower.”
°rtrait of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
p ecJanuary cover; and p. 115, May 1969 r°ceedings)
Thomas F. Norton, Editor, The Skipper—- I n>ost all officers of the Royal Navy wear rf‘ast-pocket handkerchiefs. There are also a (Ul11 her of formal and informal portraits of niniral King showing his non-uniform pref- j;rence for the handkerchief. One of them is a 01 trial portrait made by Steichen, when he as head of Navy photography. Another is l^e shot of all the wartime leaders at Casa- anca, in which the Admiral stands behind res*dent Roosevelt.
★ ★ ★
Goinmander W. W. Willgrube, Medical Crvice Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I was staff officer and a member of the inspection j^rty when Rear Admiral George C. Dyer,
• S. Navy, inspected his staff in 1953, shortly ter he became Commandant, Eleventh Naval
district.
Rear Admiral Thornton C. Miller, Chapin’s Corps, U. S. Navy, former Chief of haplains, who was then District chaplain, l'’as also a member of the inspection party. ! e Wore a white handkerchief inserted in the ,':' t breast pocket of his uniform. Had it not een within the flag officer’s prerogative, Ad- ttaral Dyer would have never tolerated it.
Similarly, I have always understood it is a flag officer’s or commanding officer’s pre- r°gative to carry his sheathed sword in his left hand, if he so desires, rather than being carried by the belt hook, when swords are prescribed.
★ ★ ★
Commander Francis C. Pollard, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Admiral King (then Captain) wore a white handkerchief in his blue service breast pocket when I had a half-hour confrontation with him in the early 1920s. At that time, he was in command of the U. S. Submarine Base, Groton, Connecticut, and I was a first class cadet at the U. S. Coast Guard Academy.
On a bright September morning in New London, I was pacing the quarterdeck of the cadet training ship Alexander Hamilton (exNavy barkentine-rigged gunboat Vicksburg) in the lofty status of cadet officer-of-the-deck— lofty because there were no officers on board. I halted my quarterdeck pacing to watch a surfaced submarine diesel-chug up the Thames
British Information Services
■d
vitb
Oi>c
al'
River, bound for the Submarine Base. A signal from the searchlight on her conning tower sent a message to me: “Cannot make out signal at your fore starboard yardarm.” Unaware that my command was flying any signal, I looked at the foremast: A pair of black lace panties undulated at the yardarm! I was momentarily stunned and horrified, but recovered somewhat when I assumed the submarine’s signal was unofficial humor. I had the signalman blinker an answer: “You have a problem.” The problem proved to be mine —the submarine’s captain was not being funny—he reported the incident to his base commander as insolence.
A manuscript that I wrote several years ago, as yet unpublished, continues the description of the ensuing encounter:
About an hour later, the Commanding Officer’s gig of the Groton Submarine Base approached our starboard quarter. Soon we made out the four stripes of the base commander; he was sitting at attention in the sternsheets.
Then the long, lean, ramrod figure of Captain Ernest J. King leapt from the sparkling gig and came nimbly up our accommodation ladder. His was a familiar face to cadets; his was the most gold braid and miniature medals that decorated our cadet dances, where he danced expertly with pretty Connecticut College girls until midnight, when the orchestra signalled ‘Secure’ with “Good Night, Sweetheart.”
Captain King studied me with aloof distaste and snarled: ‘Were you flying a black pennant, and did you get snotty when one of my captains signalled he couldn’t make it out?’ I had never seen such bright gold on any uniform with more than one stripe. King gleamed Navy blue and gold from white cap cover to overshined shoes.
An immaculate white linen handkerchief peaked defiantly from his breast pocket, in violation of U. S. Navy uniform regulations, but in consonance with the eccentric dress of the Royal Navy. This handkerchief affectation had supposedly been introduced by officers who had served aboard the coal-burning U. S. battleships that constituted the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet in World War I; most U. S. admirals abhorred the hanky wearing and were often profanely critical of it. It took guts to sport the handkerchief, and Captain King had plenty of them.
"Naval Advisor Vietnam”
(See A. P. SlafF, pp. 38-44, April 1969 ProceedisC’
Lieutenant John S. E. Jiannas, U. S. Naff' former Advisor to the Commanding Officejj PGM-619, Vietnamese Navy—Captain has presented the first comprehensive rep°r that I have seen which discusses all of the & verse efforts of the Naval Advisory GrollP Vietnam, but he fails to provide much e” lightenment regarding the job itself—advisi*1' and being an advisor.
iuc luuuwmg icinaiKs are uaseu ui» own experiences as an advisor and are offer1 to complement Captain SlafTs article, the hope of benefiting other advisors in thcl‘ tours of duty.
The approach to the task of advising m11 be one of complete openmindedness. G must remember that the U. S. Navy has most 200 years of heritage, customs, and tra^1 tions behind it, while the Vietnamese Na'' has had less than 20 years to develop thesl necessary elements. Leadership, both office‘ and enlisted, cannot be developed overnigh1, and, each promising individual must be care' fully escorted along the path to indcpendG competence.
As Captain Slaff points out, “The Vietnam' ese are as individualistic as the Americans- With this in mind, it is imperative that tne relationship, which the advisor builds with b*s counterpart, be based on a foundation of pr°' fessionalism and mutual respect. The advis°r should, of course, be friendly with his counted part, but never should he seek friendship- this type of relationship, familiarity will evef>' tually lead to contempt.
The image that the advisor projects must h above reproach. He is being observed at al times and in all places by his Vietnamese ship' mates. Correctness in appearance, behavior and temperament are of the utmost impOr' tance. The Vietnamese people scorn improper behavior and, therefore, the requirement to appear an “officer and a gentleman” never deserve more prominence in the per' formance of duty.
The advisor must also impress his counter' part in the gravity and responsibility of. botl1 of their respective jobs. It is paramount tha1 the counterpart feels that he is in a positio*1 of authority with the accompanying responsi'
akf that his job is enviable and desir
e> it is only nati c° keep that job.
Wh,
give
^'i°ns of the action sought or recommended.
Ile piece of bad advice, if of a serious enough aature, adv;
ofthe
tour of duty.
n all cases, before giving counsel on a sub> the advisor should place himself on the ■p^eiVlng end of the advice he wishes to give.
. at is, how would the advisor himself feel if c were someone constantly observing and “tmenting on his actions, decisions, and ... Almost any naval officer would resent
s> and it is to be certain that his counterpart
this area.
'pi°us—but still aboveboard—methods
tch I employed with varying degrees of jcess. An example of the latter is as follows: occasion, the ship was not quite up to stan- ru in several of the minor areas (knife- Ses, gaskets, etc.) and I didn’t want to ’nt out all of these troublesome discrep- cies. My solution was to find an appropriate
Cities and privileges pertaining thereto. When
d Kl ■ —
e> it is only natural that he will work harder en actually advising, the advisor must Proper forethought to his suggestion or cat' ITlrnenc^at*orl> considering all the ramifi-
On
can jeopardize the position of the isor with his counterpart for the remainder
Th' Carr’es some resentment in a<j ls not meant to imply however, that the his 1S°r s^ou^ only observe and not criticize acj ,c°Unterpart. It is meant only that the 1S0r should not be obtrusive in attempting Prod his counterpart along a course of l l0n- The advisor should be insistent, yes, l‘t overbearing, no!
ad • e'fe are as many waYs actually giving , ,ICe as there are advisors. One method i, f found to be most effective is what I the “question-recommendation.” For ex, P‘e> instead of saying “Captain, the mess I ck and the galley are dirty and both need to ^ drubbed,” I would say, “Captain, what . you think about the cleanliness of the mess dck and galley?” This removes the sting of foaviug a fault pointed out and provides a way ^ the captain to reply “I don’t think they e clean, and we must work on them.” The a to get the job done remains with the ^ Unterpart—a very important step in making uj11.1 ^dependent of the advisor, which is the Tnate goal of any advisory effort.
1 here are many other “devices” and rather
U. S. or Vietnamese commander or captain who desired to visit the ship. Then, I would ask my counterpart if he would like to have this VIP, who had shown great interest in the PGM-619, visit the ship. The answer was always “yes,” and a subsequent invitation was issued. The ensuing ship-wide field day in preparation for the impending visit brought amazing results.
In regard to the internal relations an advisor has with the officers and men of his unit, it goes without saying that he should be good of humor and open-minded. It behooves every advisor to learn some of the language and many of the customs. Knowing these things enhances the advisor’s effectiveness, because it confirms the sincerity and purposefulness in his being in Vietnam. In many cases, the fact that the advisor knows some of the more obscure customs and traditions gains him much stature in the eyes of his native associates. More often than not, this also embarrasses them into learning more about U. S. customs and traditions, thereby elevating the desired mutual understanding that is necessary for advisor-counterpart relationships.
The advisor must consider external relations as another point of significant importance. They should be positive. The advisor is the public affairs officer for his unit, and, if he consistently derides it among strangers or acquaintances, the unit can only have a bad reputation. This does not generate esprit de corps. On the other hand, if the advisor speaks exclusively of the good points to outsiders, a good reputation can follow. In my own case, the commanding officer, officers, and crew knew that I broadcast their attributes. Consequently, they tried to live up to that confidence. There can be no doubt that the advisor
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
will always have problems and gripes, but he must keep them to himself or speak of them only to his contemporaries.
There are no two counterparts who will react in the same way to an advisor. A successful advisor must always rely on his own initiative to find the correct, most effective way of getting the job done. The job is as much diplomatic as it is military. The Naval Advisor is called upon to exhibit the utmost of his intellectual, professional, and humanistic skills.
"The Moskva Joins the Soviet Navy”
(See S. Terzibaschitsch, pp. 107-109, April 1969 Proceedings)
Commander Richard T. Ackley, U. S. Navy, Staff, Commander Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet—Mr. Terzibaschitsch’s informative article gives rise to two varied but interesting aspects of the Moskva-Leningrad type of Soviet helicopter carrier warship. First, is the non sequitur scenario that resulted in the construction of a type of aircraft carrier; (the Soviets have called the Moskva an “antisubmarine helicopter cruiser”) and second, is a speculation into the nebulous realm of future Soviet aircraft carrier construction.
A brisk historical survey of Soviet literature reveals their distinct aversion to the acceptance of the aircraft carrier as a viable adjunct to the Soviet naval inventory. As early as 1956, Soviet naval Captain 1st Rank K. K. Frantz, writing in the Soviet naval journal Morskoy Sbornik, stated that aircraft carriers transport English and American police forces. And furthermore, he adds that recent events -—the Korean War, aggression against Egypt, the Cuban crisis, England’s interference in East Africa, and the Gulf of Tonkin provocations by the U.S.A.—confirm the fact that carrier forces are the primary forces of aggression and maintenance of tensions in various regions of the world.
A year later, Marshal G. K. Zhukov announced that carriers were so vulnerable that they were only useful for first-strike missions, and ergo, only of interest to aggressors such as the United States and Great Britain. Accordingly, Marshal Vasiliy D. Sokolovski in his 1962 book, Military Strategy, revealed that the first and most important mission of the Soviet Navy from the beginning of any war, would be the destruction of the enemy’s
attack carrier striking force. .
Necessity seems to have overcome polemics when the decision to build Soviet aircra carriers was made. Possibly, the Soviets we>c swayed by the generally accepted estimate that the largest per cent of tactical air supp°rt in “brushfire” wars and chronic hostilitieS' which took place in the past 20 years, "aS supplied by carrier aircraft. And perhaps, 11 ambitious open-ocean maritime aspirations of the U.S.S.R. played an important role 1,1 the decision to commence an aircraft carriO building program. The true rationale for 4’1 decision may never be known.
With no illusions of clairvoyance, it is 3,1 exciting exercise in speculation to ponder t possible future of the Soviet aircraft carric* construction program. The editor of Jane Fighting Ships, 1967-8, said that for the PaSt several years the U.S.S.R. has produced 3 prototype ship each year, and it has even tually run into series production. So, if l*,L Moskva and the Leningrad are the first of 3 series of ships, named after the heralds “hero cities” of the Soviet Union, we mig1 expect follow-on carriers named Kiev, OdessOi Sevastopol, and Volgograd. Furthermore, wo'1 it be logical for a nation embarking on afl aircraft carrier construction program to beg1'1 with helicopter carriers and progress, 'V1 ^ time and operational experience, towar attack carriers?
"The Research Catamaran T-AGOR-l^
(See J. C. Froid, pp. 132-136, December 1968; a,lC* pp. 110-112, May 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Albert H. Robbins, U. S. Nav) —As an engineer, I am naturally enthusiast1' about efficient and effective machinery. Cat amarans do easily what we have done b) brute force with existing ship-types. .
Commander Brown might be interested 111 a number of other modern twin-hull craft:
• Nippon Kokan’s Shimizu yard is buildmS two 2,200-gross-ton catamaran ferries. T||c first is now entering service on the 112.5-m'1 Kobe-Takamatsu route. The six-foot draft cats are designed to carry 50 large and ten sma ^ trucks, 50 cars, and 450 passengers at a spee of 19 knots. ,
e The Suerita, a small catamaran ferry Unseated passengers) is in service in England’ Built by Breydon Marine, Ltd., the 67-tofli
and is 49 tons. The designer expects the mzedj-79 jet engine will give a top speed
N,
The United States Marine Corps 1775-1962
0°t-9-inch overall length, 20-foot-2-inch- e^a'u Vessel is propelled by a 62-h.p. diesel in ^ C 1 hull. This small cat has sailed into 35- winds and nine-foot head seas.
I H ^escat A being built by Cesco Marine C l ustries, is a composite catamaran-hydrohull ^aS a ^4-foot beam, 80-foot twin
atari
• hull-borne, and 120knots on the foils,
si hJ. S. Surface Effect Ship (SES) des s are catamaran variants, as is the Hover- th ritle> h-'td-) HM-4. Hovermarine describes weir design as a “125-ton deep cushion side- 0j.a hoverferry.” She will have a top speed si r ^nots' an<d a 35-knot service speed in x" not waves (Sea State 4). She will have a fQV0-fo°t draft, 160-foot overall length, 68- ^ot beam and a height 30 feet above the ^r-waterline. The 60-ton payload and most de116 Vehicle weight is in the sidebodies. The j^eP cushion between these catamaran hulls, y cet compared to five-to-eight feet for coni' uonal air cushion vehicles, permits com- °rUible high speed open ocean operation. l... ae good seakeeping qualities, great sta- , lty> and shallow draft, of the catamaran, u trimaran), combined with the large rh • a™e deck area, make her an attractive Vy°1Ce f°r a number of special applications.
, e will be seeing many more large multi- k -d vessels as they become more widely n°Wn and appreciated.
' • • Nor Dark of Night”
|iuf 37. Gallery, pp. 85-90, April 1969
°ceedinos)
Commander James H. Trousdale, Jr., U. S. i aval Reserve (Retired—Anyone who has u experience with night carrier operations 1^. appreciate Admiral Gallery’s story about |ds development of around-the-clock flying 6f?tr* escort carrier; USS Guadalcanal, (CVE- . ' m the Atlantic. It required great quanti- s °f intestinal and mental fortitude.
I do not wish to detract one whit from his . Cortiplishments, but when speaking of early |'*5ht carrier operations, there were people in e Pacific who also deserve mention. I have j0llle reservation with respect to Admiral Gal- erV s statement that “In early 1944, carrier
Progress, p. 148, June 1969 Proceedings.
flying was still a dawn-to-dusk operation. True, some of the big carriers in the Pacific had a few specially trained night fighter pilots. But they were a small, elite group. . . . Regular flight operations were not deemed possible from carriers.”
In November 1943, during the occupation of the Gilberts, in an on-the-spot improvisation, Admiral Arthur Radford, the task group commander, and Captain M. B. Gardner of the USS Enterprise (CV-6) launched O’Hare, Phillips, and Skon to intercept a Japanese night torpedo plane attack. Phillips flew a TBF with ordinary search radar and O’Hare and Skon flew F6Fs with no radar. Two Japanese aircraft were shot down. On returning to Pearl, we commenced to practice interceptions at night with these “Bat Teams,” but before the Marshall Islands operation, we received a few radar-equipped night fighters. Our group was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Chick Hariner. He and his men were truly an elite group. I don’t recall Har- mer ever having to take a wave-off.
“. . . by far the best and most comfHWhensive one-volume history of the Marine Corps.”
SOLDIERS OF
-pi_ |p OCA • The Unite'
| lie OE/i ■ Marine Co
By Colonel Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, with Foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. Over 100 illustrations. More than 40 maps. Bibliography. Index. 692 pages.
List Price, $14.00, Member's Price, $11.20 (Please use order form In booklist section.)
A United States Naval Institute Book
Pictorial—"The NC-4: History Preserve'
(See J. Johnston, pp. 94-105, May 1969 Proceedings)
Commander Lucean H. Rhudy, U • Naval Reserve (Retired)—I deplore
u.s-
Lieutenant (j.g.) John F. Ebersole,
Coast Guard—One of the participants in
In February 1944, during the first raid on Truk, then Commander William I. Martin’s torpedo squadron executed a successful night bombing attack on ships at Truk. Recommendations were then made that regular night operations be instituted—round-the-clock flying that would keep the enemy grounded. Such operations were undertaken later with the return of Bill Martin and Air Group 90.
Night operations in the Pacific was a controversial subject, but we did have some, including Jack Griffin, as well as those mentioned above, who were willing to try that gut-sucking business in late 1943 and 1944.
Old Navy on "The Bennington Disaster”
(See Lee Strobel, pp. 148-153, April; and p. 113, August 1969 Proceedings)
Charles Rossner—Under the photograph of the ill-fated gunboat USS Bennington, it is stated that: “Masts and spars in the background belong to the famous down-Easter Benjamin F. Packard.”
To an old windjammer man like myself, it is immediately obvious that this is not the case. One glance at the ship in the background will convince anyone that she was a ship with double topgallants; the Packard like most down-Easters had single topgallants. She also had skys’ls, at least in her earlier years, which this one did not have. The Packard was later cut down to royals, but I am sure that was after 1905. Just to keep the record straight.
★ ★ ★
Commander G. F. MacMullen, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I am referring to the caption under the photo of the USS Bennington, in San Diego, after the explosion in 1905.
Several photos taken after the disaster show the Benjamin F. Packard in the background, and when I was asked to supply caption material for the photo, which was used in Mr. Strobel’s article, I concluded that it was the well-known, old down-Easter, whose masts and spars loom up behind the gunboat.
Another collection of early San Diego photos has now come to light. It includes a photo similar to the one used, but from enough of a different angle so that not only the masts and spars, but also the fo’c’s’le head of the windjammer can b.e seen. Through a magnifying
glass, I was dismayed to see that she was * steel ship—not wooden, like the Packard.
Checking back, I found that the Packet^ arrived a fortnight after the explosion, an took the berth just vacated by the British sh'P Brabloch, which came in a week before t disaster. So, the ship in the picture is 1 . Brabloch, not the Benjamin F. Packard. IIlfl dentally, the Brabloch was the last ship bring coal from Australia—a windjamn1 service which had started in 1882.
d”
s.
the
great loss of speed of the NC-4 in just f°u‘ pages (100 to 104) from 72 knots to 72 mi per hour. It isn’t miles per hour. I enjoy Proceedings very much and thank you.
Ed. Note: Error noted and regretted. The apparent headwind was, indeed, not aerodynamic, but editor1 Office refresher course in Mark 8 computer now underwit' the
historic NC-4 flights was First LieutenaIlt Elmer F. Stone, U. S. Coast Guard. As U. S. Coast Guard’s first aviator, he serve^ as a pilot-navigator on board that nr “Nancy” to cross the Atlantic. ^
Considered the father of Coast Guar aviation, Stone became interested in fly111* while serving on board the cutter Onandaga at Norfolk. Acting on his conviction that av>a tion held great promise for search and resd‘c work, he and another officer from the Onandaga began flying scouting missions 111 1916. These missions were flown in a pla>ie borrowed from the Glenn Curtiss Compaq (later to be the builder of the NC-type ah' craft).
So successful was Lieutenant Stone in com vincing the Coast Guard of the value of haw ing an “eye in the sky,” that he and five otheI officers were assigned to flight training wi^1 the Navy at Pensacola, Florida.
With the outbreak of World War I, the si* pilots were again to see duty with the NavV> flying submarine patrols. They were stn serving in this capacity when the idea of 3
i gp). r ------------------
s t very proud of my country, and the same
theUSa^an^C was born. A believer in
^ mission from the start, Lieutenant Stone cS selected to fly the crossing in the NC-4, j^e*1^nanciecl by Lieutenant Commander
^After the NC-4’s conquest of the Atlantic, t^°ne became more anxious than ever to get l^C Coast Guard airborne. Using a tent Cr ^ar anc* borrowed, outmoded Navy air- th fi an<^ a ^andful of supporters set up p. rsl; Coast Guard air station at Morehead North Carolina.
f heir efforts produced the following report j^1'1 Commandant W. F. Reynolds to Secre- y °f the Treasury Andrew Mellon:
.Hie aPP^cah°n of aviation to the uses of e Coast Guard in saving life and property r°m the perils of the sea, in locating floating reflets along our coasts and in rendering tler kindred service, can now be regarded an assured proposition. It is earnestly recommended that Congress give its support ° the development of this activity in the t-mast Guard.
Was not until 1926, however, that Con- p Ss heeded this recommendation and ap- al]Priated the necessary funds. The initial 0 °Cahon of $152,000 (less than the cost of aij6 a'rcraft today), for two bases and five eCraft> was brought about by the service’s Pending role in enforcement prohibition. ahe it was “demon rum” that finally got for P°ast Guard an air arm, had it not been th ^etermtnation of Lieutenant Stone and , e success of NC-4, the wings might have en several years later in coming.
^ *ct°rial on "Remembrance of My Cruise”
■ 10 A' Focht> PP- 88-103, August; and pp. 109- K ’ December 1968; and pp. 112-113, May 1969 Feedings)
Howard Serlick, Ship’s Yeoman, Sea Ex- _^°rer Ship USS Olympia—I am 16 years old, a serve as yeoman in the Sea Explorer Ship p. ^ Olympia. The USS Olympia is berthed at to*er 11 North in Philadelphia. She is starting s 7c[ run down, but the Government doesn’t •p, Slr-hze the restoration work on the Olympia. g Hull plates on the Olympia still don’t leak,
5; s^e is floating on her own. j Aery time I walk by Independence Hall,
feeling comes over me when I walk the decks of the fine, old ship Olympia and see the worn decks, and the familiar cracked portholes, and the dogs missing on the watertight (or once watertight) doors.
Several weeks ago, I worked with four other members of the USS Olympia’s, crew to ready her for an inspection by the Navy. We worked for six or seven hours, without a break, so the ship would be ready.
The Sea Explorers are now restoring an officers’ wardroom on the berth deck. The Olympia is all right, so don’t you guys at the Institute worry; she isn’t going to the scrap heap in the near future.
"Finnish Icebreakers”
{See G. Landtman, pp. 73-81, February and pp. 103105, August 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander L. C. Melberg, U. S. Coast Guard, Icebreaker Design Project Officer—For those not acquainted with icebreaker design, many of the considerations given by Mr. Landtman may be new and controversial. From the view of past performance and present involvement in construction by the Finns, the factors discussed are important and indeed represent considerable learning and experience.
Left out of the discussion are many other factors that should be considered by the designer. No mention is made of the various trade-offs in capabilities that must take place. The most critical is the balance between endurance, measured as some performance in specified operating areas, versus the installed horsepower. As the continuous icebreaking capability is increased, the horsepower required to provide the needed thrust begins an exponential climb and soon requires an enormous amount of fuel, and hence, hull displacement to hold it. This soon becomes a desperate race causing other capabilities, such as acceleration and horsepower-to-displace- ment ratio, to become less than optimum. When the continuous icebreaking requirements become too large, one solution becomes very evident—nuclear power. With nuclear power, one can again seek to balance hull displacement, horsepower, endurance, etc., because the weight of fuel plus machinery for nuclear plants allows the trade-offs to assume optimum relationships.
Another area not discussed is the users’ requirements. The design of a ship, essentially for icebreaking near to fuel sources, is much different from the design for one which requires long transits to remote areas through equatorial climates, or for one which provides for use both as a scientific platform and as a resupply ship.
Last and most important is the hull form and the capabilities. The hull lines cannot be based on one criterion alone, i.e., ramming or continuous ability. The sea ice environment, particularly in the Arctic, is a complete mix of pressure ridges, hummocks, sheet ice, leads, etc., so that a. balance between capabilities
is a necessity. The problem of encounters w*11 pressure ridges equal to or greater than du’ draft, with snow-covered ice in between, poseS a severe design variation. Consideration must be given to the ability of the ship 10 extract from an unsuccessful ram or penetr3' I tion as well as to the ability to proceed con ^ tinuously when snow cover is present.
"Our Russian War of 1918-1919”
{See K. Tolley, pp. 58-72, February; pp. 114-1^’ June 1969 Proceedings)
Bruce L. Bromberg—I should like to cot ■ rect an error which appeared twice (pages o and 68) in Rear Admiral Tolley’s interests? article.
The Imperial Russian Navy displayed the Cross of St. Andrew, not the Cross of S1, George. This was only appropriate, as St- Andrew is the patron saint of Russia. The i naval ensign was argent, a saltire azure; the reverse, as in the more familiar emblem 0 Scotland, of which St. Andrew is also the( patron.
The Cross of St. George is to be seen at the flagstaff's and gaffs of Her Britannic Majestys( ships.
★ ★ ★
Carl L. Rankin, Ambassador of the Unite<^ States (Retired)—Two articles in the Febr11' ary 1969 Proceedings are particularly llY teresting and valuable: Admiral Kemp To|" ley’s “Our Russian War of 1918-19,” all<1 Lieutenant Chester V. Jackson’s “Mission t0 Murmansk.” These factual accounts of aIj unhappy, but at that time seemingly j ustifietJ military operation, provide background which should be known to every well-11)' formed American. As was pointed out, tlus case of “aggression” against Russia by a force of scarcely more than 5,000 Americans, half 3 century ago, continues to be exploited out 0 all proportion in the Soviet Union. ThereU1 lies its chief significance today.
Writing in Foreign Affairs some time ago, the German statesman Franz-Josef Strauss sug' gested, “Possibly the Soviet Union could convince the West that world revolution is n° longer the motive behind its actions, whUe the West could persuade the Soviet Uniof that our aim is to uphold and protect a frce social order, not to eliminate Communist11
United States. In this they are supported ^ many politicians and publicists old
r^. military force.” Meanwhile, the Soviet ers continue to cultivate exaggerated fears q lQng their people, not only of a rearmed t,er®any, and of a Yellow Peril, but also of p imperialist” United States. v ew Americans of any age group can en- ge their country starting a nuclear war, or y ackmg Russia in any other way. Our unger generation, with no personal recol- diff10n World War II, finds it increasingly , lcult to believe that Russia would attack
b’
^n°Ugh to know that the problem is not so pie. When wishful thinking becomes a 0|ajOrity opinion in the United States, with- § ,an equivalent and decisive change in the °viet Union, our country will indeed be in 'j gravest danger.
th 1 doubtless is not too optimistic to assume nat great majority of Soviet citizens have the slightest wish to attack the United ates; quite the contrary. But, for the most t ii bear only one side. They have been d> in greatly magnified terms, of “Our
Russian War of 1918-19,” and except for some members of the oldest generation, they know little of the American Relief Administration after World War I, which saved probably a hundred thousand times as many lives in the Soviet Union as were lost during the Murmansk episode. In any case, their public opinion, unlike ours, is in no position to control the actions of a regime, to quote Dag Hammarskjold, “ . . . for whom truth is a function of party convenience and justice a function of party interest.”
Whatever may be said of the domestic policies of the Soviet Union, its foreign policy is completely uninhibited. Whatever truth, honor, and justice exist internally must, as a matter of doctrine, stop at the frontier. This is entirely consistent with a materialistic philosophy. It is simple prudence to assume, therefore, that an international agreement will be kept only as long as, and to the extent that the Soviets themselves consider it to their advantage.
The proper course for us is also simple: while we intend to keep our side of a bargain,
lited bruin- I Tol- and 1 n t° | ' an fied und
-in'
this
)fCe
ilf a tof -ein
i
the ug' 1 uld ! no
tile
ion ree ’
sro
The New Bluejacket’s Manual
18th EDITION
REVISED/UPDATED/REORGANIZED Expanded by 70 pages, containing — Completely rewritten section on Your Career in the Navy including Navy Pay & Benefits, Recruit Training, Service Schools, Educational and Commission Opportunities. Quizzes and answers for all 32 chapters. Up-to-date, well-illustrated section on Small Arms and Weapons Systems. Many new drawings and photographs. Expanded index of 1,362 entries for easy reference. New, color appendix of Naval Signal Flags and Pennants, Channel Markers, Ribbons of Decorations and Awards.
756 pages "--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- t f~~-
Illustrated Glossary Appendixes Hardbound ^ ^ ^
List Price, $4.00 Member’s Price, $3.20
A United States Naval Institute Book y
(Please use order form In book list section)
SURFBOATS AND HORSE MARINES
U. S. Naval Operations in the Mexican War, 1846-48
K. JACK BAUER
This definitive study of American naval operations during the Mexican War of 1846-48 is the first book devoted exclusively to the subject. Based upon official records, private papers, and published sources, it chronicles the actions of the U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Mexico, off California, and along Mexico’s west coast. The book describes in detail such events as the landing of General Winfield Scott’s army at Veracruz in America’s first large-scale amphibious operation, the conquest of California, and the little- known operations in the Gulf of California along the coast of Baja California. Essential reading for anyone interested in this formative period in American history. Index. Appendixes. 304 pages. 61 illustrations.
LIST PRICE, $12.50 MEMBER’S PRICE, $10.00 (Please use order form in booklist section)
A New
UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE BOOK we must ensure as far as possible that it ist0 their disadvantage to do otherwise. In other words, any beneficial agreement with the Soviets involving our national security can be obtained and carried out only from a positi011 of strength, a position that must be carefully maintained.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Commander Hague Callister’ U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Nostalg’3 comes easy from the pages of Proceedin'35 but particularly acute was my reaction pictures of and comments about the “Eagle( boats in “Our Russian War of 1918—1919 in the February 1969 issue—also to E. &• Anderson’s March 1969 letter about Seattles “pickleboat.”
There are many destroyer officers fr0*'1 World War II who went through the WeS| Coast Sonar School at San Diego as part 0 their training will remember one, or perhaps both, of the “Eagles” attached to that facility’ Fresh out of Local Defense School at Treasure Island as an ensign in 1942 I was assigned 10 the PE-38. Counterparts of these two, I recall’ were at the Sonar School, which was locate( at Key West, Florida.
Principal duty for the “Eagles” and creVs was to host classes of officers and enlisted in6'1' who were to put their shore classroom learning to work in actual antisubmarine tactics win1 our own, tame, “S” boats. During these activities, the ship was conned by the attack' ing officer from behind a screen, and although we cut a few buoy tow lines trailing from oU1 friend below, we never did any real damage except for wrapping the line around our po°r single screw and shaft.
I can recall, too, that another interesting collateral “Eagle” boat duty was to serve 3S target for the TBF pilots from North Island’ then hustle out to the end of the torpedo ru'1 and haul the fish up to the fantail for yet another day’s practice.
'
l
I
'
The World War I vintage “Eagles” were indeed primitive by World War II standard^ They rolled miserably, pitched up easily and then down with a resounding thwack, had 3 top speed of perhaps 14 to 15 knots, a balky engine room, no radar or other navigation3' refinements, but the fishing was quite good
if
0°n' the fantail at the usual 7-to-8-knot ^Perational speed. How those shown in the ruary Proceedings got to the north of peUs^’a in 1918-19 is difficult to imagine. ernaps the sailor of that day was a better n or perhaps a less complaining one. ack of radar made for really alert lookouts j/' a wide awake OOD on those nightwatches. Ven though we were seldom more than 25 1 es from Point Loma, the water was too
th ^°r Wadin.S’ and dle traffic was heavy and e days and nights often beset with fog. Later a during my Task Force 38 and 58 days in Western Pacific in the USS Twining, '540), it became obvious that the new neration of radar-trained bridge officers was relatively night-blind group depending on e repeater scope for station keeping and j Ver'ah safety. But that was easier than strain® one’s orbs through the binoculars. The k°’nt >s that “Eagle” boat training wasn’t ad training for whatever lay ahead.
] suspect that the “Eagle” boats are now ! gone and that their passing will not be *ssed by many—except for those more per- nally involved and nostalgia-prone.
hASH and Seabee—New Ideas in ^°gistics”
( 9
\[)t ^ Kendall, PP- 140-144, February; and pp. "108, August 1969 Proceedings)
Colonel Lane C. Kendall, U. S. Marine J°rps Reserve (Retired), Commercial Ship- h*ng Advisor to Military Sea Transportation ervice—In my essay, I stated that the con- for the Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) as developed by the naval architectural firm ? I’riede and Goldman of New Orleans. My 1 ormation was based on conversations with er°me L. Goldman of the architectural firm, ar>d Spyros S. Skouras, president of Pruden- la Lines, Inc., the steamship company which °rdered the first of the LASH-type ships.
L. Earl Mooneyhan of Columbia, South . ar°lina, informs me that he originated the 1 ea of a so-called “Cargo Locker Ship” as carly as 1957, and that this idea was patented °n 13 June 1961. In brief, Mr. Mooneyhan’s Patent (No. 2,988,036) relates to a system by hich watertight rectangular cargo lockers are hoisted from the water to a specially con- ?Ured ship by means of a crane installed at le after end of the ship. The containers then
are moved by overhead rail conveyors to the appropriate location in the ship, where they are lowered and secured in place for the ocean voyage. All containers are stowed below decks; the conveyor also operates completely under cover.
The first three paragraphs of the patent document summarize Mr. Mooneyhan’s intentions in devising this concept:
The present invention relates to a barge cargo ship, particularly for the transportation of a large number of cargo containing units in the form of floatable barges, an object of the invention being to provide an integrated arrangement of ship structure, barge units, and transfer facilities for loading and unloading the barge units, whereby the maximum cargo carrying capacity of the ship may be realized, and it becomes possible to efficiently load and unload the ship under widely varying conditions. In particular the invention makes possible the loading and unloading of the ship either at dock or in open water, the floatable barge units being capable of being towed, as by tugs, between the ship and any shoreline or up-river point of supply or delivery.
A further object is to provide a barge cargo ship suited to the needs of both commercial and military use, it being possible in either case to transfer cargo under normal conditions, as well as in areas where harbor or dock facilities are non-existent or have been destroyed.
Another object is to provide a cargo barge ship in which the barge units may be selectively and independently transferred from the ship without regard to their location in the ship.
"Radial Double Hang Recovery Method”
(See D. E. Cummins, pp. 117-118, April 1969 Proceedings)
Commander I. E. Johnson, Royal Navy— In support of Captain Cummins’ views, it may be relevant that his solution to the problem is almost identical to the standard method of recovering seaboats in rough weather adopted by the Royal Navy for some years.
There are some minor points of difference, mainly related to the equipment used. The British use Robinson’s disengaging gear as opposed to the Raymond quick release hook. This allows the gear to be set up very simply for hoisting before the boat arrives back under the falls. The swivel ring shackle at the end
of the nylon or rough weather strap is hooked on to the tumbler hook, thereby achieving the same aim as in Captain Cummins’ method by keeping the heavy blocks out of the way, but has the added advantage that the quick release gear is available for use again very shortly after arrival at the davit head.
An added refinement is the provision of an additional shackle on the side plate to take the long pendant. By separating the securing points of the two pendants, any possibility of a jam occurring when the weight of the boat is transferred, is avoided.
I believe that nearly all seaman officers in the Royal Navy will substantiate the virtue* of this method and would fully support Cap' tain Cummins’ offering. I also believe, ho'v' ever, that most would put the time of orig1" of the idea sometime before his inspiration1 HMS Llandaff, an air direction frigate, "a' fitted with this gear as standard equipment in 1960, when I was serving as executi'1' officer. Bearing in mind the time standard equipment takes to reach the Fleet, this would mean that the idea and trials in our service must have originated some considerable ti®e earlier, even if the Llandaff was the first so fitted, which I doubt.
However, this small point should not ob* scure the fact that many of us believe that the double hang method is a first class rough weather recovery method which, because its added speed and safety, should appeal to all seamen.
Navy Sailing Programs
Captain Robert D. McWethy, U. S. Navy> Commodore, Norfolk Naval Sailing Associa' tion—The U. S. Naval Academy maintains) with appropriated funds, a considerable fleet of sailing craft. I feel strongly that this, as intended, results in Naval Academy graduates being better shiphandlers than they would be without exposure to sailing. I estimate that a study in depth would show a correlation be' tween degree of sailing participation at the Academy—which varies from a compulsory minimum to a dedicated maximum—and shiphandling capability years later.
Many naval bases and ships also have sail'
ba^ ProSrarns- These are almost invariably S(‘d on non-appropriated funds and the in- „ cst °f a few individuals. Operating a fleet sa'bng craft is expensive and requires a lot Work. It would help if those interested in lnS included the commanding officer of activity with a respectable welfare and Ration fund.
livr 6 Norfolk Naval Sailing Association th *S PerhaPs midway between extremes r°ughout the Navy with regard to physical YjSet®- We have a fleet of 18 small craft— . °Djacks, Gannets, and Flying Juniors—begging to The Norfolk Naval Station Special _'-‘rvices Department. We have moorings in e sniall boat basin, an excellent building for sailing center, floats, a full-time “sailing llaster,” who maintains the boats, and some ffitional paid personnel in the summer.
I Naval Station pays the $16,000 annual 1 worn the welfare and recreation fund with ^0|tie help from the Fifth Naval District. This §Ure does not include boat or sail replacement. The NNSA runs an adult training pro- t’l'a,n with instructors on a volunteer basis, a Junior training program, racing, and social Program, and determines who is qualified to ^ the boats.
At Norfolk—and surely this must be true Scwhere—the program is wholly dependent uP°n some dozen key individuals who are Vvflling to exercise leadership and see that the 'arious facets that make up the program are f arried out. It is interesting, and perhaps significant, to note that the line personnel in ncse key volunteer billets are outnumbered tvvo-to-one by staff corps and Canadian offiCers stationed in Norfolk. Our professional Sa>|ars—the enlisted deck rates and junior line officers—are conspicuous by their small num- Crs- The others make the program worthwhile from the standpoint of recreation and Personal satisfaction, and it would be worthwhile even if there were no other benefit, mwever, the line personnel need the sailing experience for their professional development, specially those who have not had the exposure at the Naval Academy. The benefit to the •Mvy is measurable in better small boat and a>iding craft coxswains, more confident offi- |;ers of the deck, and fewer awkward situations °r skippers of ships ranging from minecraft to deep draft vessels.
The late Captain J. J. Vandergrift, Jr., was among the small group who started the Norfolk Naval Sailing Association in 1962. This was done with a view to establishing a U. S. Naval Sailing Association patterned after the Royal Naval Sailing Association (RNSA). The British Navy has traditionally encouraged yachting. The quasi-official RNSA has an outstanding reputation for its participation wherever their ships may be. A U. S. Naval Sailing Association was started in 1965 and does exist today. The Annapolis Naval Station USNSA was started on 1 June 1969. With the officers of the USNSA initially grouped in the Norfolk and Annapolis areas, the organization has grown rapidly. There are more than 20 branches of the USNSA at U. S. naval stations and ships in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
High-level encouragement of the USNSA and its local branches would pay important dividends to the Navy. Encouragement should include official recognition of the USNSA with delegation of appropriate authority, such as determining distribution of available equipment and establishing uniform qualifications. It should provide allocation of funds, probably non-appropriated, to support a USNSA headquarters with a small fulltime staff. Annapolis would be the logical place for this.
A co-ordinated, Navy-wide sailing program could, without cost to the taxpayers, enhance fleet readiness and improve shiphandling while contributing to recreation, morale, and good public relations. Who knows? It might even provide some career motivation.
"Military Aid and Comfort to Dictatorships”
(See A. H. Victor, Jr., pp. 42-47, March 1969 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Surely, the sad fate of Cuba and the uncertain status of Santo Domingo are examples of Colonel Victor’s hypothesis, as well as of the failure of our political masters to realize on which side of the bread we should have put the butter.
Referring to the Cuban tragedy, Colonel Victor writes: “We tend to lose sight of the fact that the choice is not always between good and bad but the matter of the lesser of two evils.” He is so right that there seems to be
no room for debate, especially when one of the two evils is Communism. Curiously enough, exactly the same thought was expressed to me by the President of Cuba, Fulgencio Batista, early in 1957, although not in the same words, since Batista would have had considerable difficulty in admitting anything he did was evil. Nevertheless, the same reasoning dominated three conversations I had with him during which he took a very practical viewpoint of why the United States should support him instead of Castro—that viewpoint being that Castro was a Communist and he was not. I thought then that he was right and I know now that he was.
These conversations occurred during a good-will, flag-showing cruise I made in my flagship through the Caribbean area in the early months of 1957. I had command of the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force. Among the ports we visited were Havana and Ciudad Trujillo; and in retrospect, these visits stand out strikingly in support of Colonel Victor’s thesis.
In Havana, I was alerted by our U. S. Ambassador, through whom arrangements were made for me to call on the President, that Batista undoubtedly would bring up his opinion of Castro as a Communist fugitive and his unfavorable reaction to the attitude of the United States towards his government. Accordingly, I was not taken by surprise when, after the usual amenities, the President suddenly asked: “Why is your government giving aid and comfort to a Communist revolutionary? What has your government got against me and what more does it want?” The questions were more rhetorical than direct, for he went on: “The record will show that my government has supported the United States and the Western bloc in the United Nations in every instance of an issue with the Soviet bloc and on every occasion that a vote has been taken.”
I replied that I was aware of the record and was quite sure that my government was grateful for the support of the Cuban government in the United Nations. The President said that “ ... if your government is grateful, it is taking a peculiar way of expressing that gratitude by covertly, and in some instances, overtly giving aid and encouragement to a red revolutionary.”
I did, of course, make these conversation5 the subject of intelligence reports through naval channels, as well as oral reports to our Ambassador, who told me that he had sent several reports to the State Departmen expressing his conviction that beyond a*1' doubt Castro was a Communist.
This does not support the implication 111 Colonel Victor’s article that our intelligent was inadequate to determine whether Castr° was really a Communist or not. In my judg" ment, our intelligence was highly adequate! but for one reason or another it was ignored' We are now paying a high price for that error-
Santo Domingo, while not nearly as it*1' portant strategically as Cuba, and Rafae* Trujillo, while not nearly as important politically as Batista, did, nevertheless, serve as an example of another dictatorship operat' ing as a buffer to Communism in that area- Batista and Trujillo were two very different personalities.
Rafael Trujillo was very vain. His vanity manifested itself when he sent an emissary t0 request that I give him five ruffles and flourishes when he returned my call. I sent back word that I had not officially called on hin1 but on his brother, Hector, who was officially head of state. Therefore, I assumed that President Hector Trujillo would officially return my call and that honors would be rendered to him. Since there was no provision for more than four ruffles and flourishes, that is what he would get. The Generalissimo did not give up. He replied that he knew all this, and that he would stand aside while his brother took the honors, but that if there were five ruffleS and flourishes, everybody would know they were for him. I shot a message about this to Washington through my CinCLantFleet boss, Admiral Jerauld Wright, and, by golly, I got a message back that since I was on a goodwill tour, I could give the Generalissimo all the ruffles and flourishes he wanted. The Marine guard captain and the chief musician were a bit perplexed when I informed them there would be five ruffles and flourishes, but that’s what they produced, and the old Generalissimo beamed.
He asked me if I realized that his nation was the only one in that area that had had a stable government for over 30 years. Later, my chief of staff, analyzed it this way: “What
t have here is a one-man democracy.
tley have free elections in the sense that you anh I can run for parliament and disagree '°lently with each other on issues. And one J us will be freely elected. The only hitch ls jhat both of us have to be for Trujillo.”
0r far too long, we have allowed emotions
an<j
diet;
vve
du:
°uth American nations, has left its mark on
Prejudices instead of common sense to ate our course in respect to dictatorship ^ vernments who want to be on our side, j., re is no greater threat to freedom than '0|nrnunism. Therefore, in our continuing ^r,lggle against the ever-encroaching menace the Communist ideology, it would help 0 he practical about keeping nations on our e who want to be on our side. After all,
even had the Soviet Union on our side ring World War II; and how much more f*ractical can we get than that?
|. hilark H. Crook—Colonel Victor has put
rWard an issue that will surely gain in im-
P°rtance as time slips by. His points are well
stated, but a closer look at the Latin American
asPect of the discussion is worthy of interest.
( ^hile there is little doubt that the threat
. 'var between the nations of Latin America is *
'tiinute, there has been, and there conges to exist, an element of prestige, laced **h a taste of apprehension, in the matter of j!Ccluiring modern weaponry of the Mirage Shter aircraft in the case of Peru; or of the ktX-30 tanks in the case of Argentina. ae fact that the Paraguayan war, the War °f the Pacific and the War of the Gran Chaco * took place, and that all involved several
military minds of Latin America. We aould not forget the present border dispute etween Peru and Ecuador. Yet it is probably to assume that the Latin American role !n the defense of the hemisphere can be left 'n the hands of the various naval and aero- ,lautical establishments under the guidance the U. S. Navy and Air Force advisors. The military aspect of the program is under c°ntinuous question, as Colonel Victor points ^t. Upon reading the Notebook item, “Latin Military Aid Misfires,” we can observe a typical example of such criticism. The author the criticism seems to believe that the °nly means to maintain a stable government is by democratic and constitutional means.
While such statements can be considered for their sentimental value, Colonel Victor has countered the argument in advance by quoting Crane Brinton where he states: “It is almost safe to say that no government is likely to be overthrown until it loses the ability to make adequate use of its military and police powers.” Thus, Colonel Victor has correctly pointed out that the military aspect of the Alliance for Progress, in light of the Cuban example, must concentrate upon the training of counterinsurgent forces as its primary goal. The threat is the same as existed years ago in Latin America, with the important difference that, in the light of the Cuban example, the forces pushing for insurgent and guerrilla activity are more often than not under the strong influence of Havana, Moscow, or worse, Peking. ■
Yet, is it enough for the United States to support an undemocratic, authoritarian, or dictatorial regime through its military aid programs, and to rely upon the comforting
USS BAINBRIDGE
The USS Bainbridge, the world’s first nuclear-powered frigate, is the subject of this full-color print in Mr.Charles Evers’ painting. It is lithographed on heavy matte paper and measures 26 x 22 inches (image size l4]/2 x 19") suitable for framing. The best techniques available for full-color plate making and printing have been used to create this handsome reproduction. List Price, $5.00, Member’s Price, $4.00
For a list of all prints and order form see booklist section.
A United States Naval Institute Print
freedom of the seas.
Our greatest potential adversary in coni is using our espousal of unrestricted seas as j means whereby he can act to establish nlS own command of the sea in selected areas. 61 the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Soviet MeC^' iterranean Squadron moved into the wate®s contiguous to the battle zone, and the SiV Fleet took steps to stay clear of the Soviet force, leaving it interposed between the con' flict and ourselves, and giving at least conifo’1 to the United Arab Republic. Within weeks of the British announcement of withdrawal from east of Suez by 1971, Soviet naval un>ts were making a series of calls in the India11 Ocean area. Neither of these actions by its® was belligerent, or offensive. They were pos1' tive actions, however—Soviet initiatives whi^1
thought that we are doing what is best for our national security, and with the added comfort of the eventual possibility of a spontaneous interest in democratization of society by an enlightened despot? Can we, as military strategists, afford to ignore the sometimes uncontrollable and overwhelming force of a grassroots insurgency or a mass revolution?
How long can we safely afford to support a regime which will temporarily serve our purpose of maintaining security but does not enjoy the support of the masses—or worse, a regime that may seek to maintain an absolute status quo on the social and economic plane. We must not ignore the fact that in such a case, in the public eye we would be siding with and abetting the oppressor.
The answer, because of strategic exigencies, as pointed out by Colonel Victor, is to support a friendly government to support itself. If we are to avoid the prospect of another Vietnam in our own hemisphere, we must begin now. We must have a co-ordinated effort to form the Latin American military organizations into truly formidable weapons against chaos, insurrection, infiltration, and oppression, both domestic and foreign.
"The Encircling Sea”
{See J. J. Clark, pp. 26-35, March 1969 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone Martin, U. S. Navy— Dr. Clark concludes that a maritime strategy should be most attractive to the United States. The outline he presents includes such phrases as “a sea-air team capable of dealing effectively with any threat” and “forces . . . capable of deploying to any threatened sector . . .” and “deterrent strategy.” He concludes with a quotation regarding command of the sea. Unhappily, he does not elaborate on the means whereby command of the sea can be exercised from a defensive or “counterpuncher” stance.
“Command of the sea” carries a connotation of positive action at whatever level required to exercise and demonstrate that command. It includes the ability to implement initiatives of one’s own choosing, and to control the situation as to the level of involvement. The state of war need not be involved. Shortly after World War II, two British destroyers were mined off the Albanian coast.
The Royal Navy, as an instrument of British government, demonstrated its con1 mand of the situation by subsequently silel,f ^ ing shore batteries, moving in minecraft, an sweeping the offending weaponry. The Wot Court supported the British action.
Until World War II, the U. S. Navy ^ in no position to exercise command of the s®3 beyond a very limited way. Through a va'1 ety of causes the Navy was in such a posit101' at the war’s end. However, other factors can'® to bear—including the nuclear threat an the national predilection for a pure defenshf stance—and now threaten our capability t0 command the seas. The problem is con1^. pounded by our support for the tradition 0
bal
were taken in the light of given political situ®' tions and also in accordance with existing foreign policy and goals.
These Soviet initiatives are even more dr®' mafic when we consider that, in many ways> theirs is a “have-not” navy. They lack the means generally to project air power in cofl' junction with naval forces. We have yet to see specialized underway replenishment groups. The amphibious capability is limited in terms of troops and, by our standards, lS deficient in the requisite shipping. But in this era of “peaceful coexistence” the Soviet Navy is able to exert a much greater influence on the course of events in selected areas of th® world than its inherent capabilities for waging a maritime war warrant. This is accom plished by its dynamic employment.
President John F. Kennedy is said to hav®
'r need not await commitment to all- Vvar under a nuclear pall. niarhime strategy—or any strategy, for at f matter—must provide for action options airly finite points in time and space, many ^ '''hich occur well short of the final roll of jj 65dice. History repudiates the “fortress ^eet or the “fleet in being.” The Russians
space, involvement in Vietnam, and
deb;
t>Ur
national consciousness.
entation. Specifically, he opens with the
^ take exception, however, to part of his
Pfesi
(^!Tlrnent that “Vietnam . . . has precipitated ^.fifst serious review of U. S. foreign and 7* itary policy since World War II.” That to° cavalier and unfair a dismissal of the jj riCern the leaders and people of our nation aVe shown for our national security and
world
inte;
t,ate<-i at one time that, through sea power, jr,6 ^ussians might “nibble us to death.” The ^ Plication seems to be one to the effect that Russians would keep making small gains i lQ,lgh initiatives of sufficiently low key na- § e to avoid arousing or provoking the United , ates to physical action, of always remaining l)a°n “challenSe” ^ne- ^ wish Dr. Clark |.'1 tQld us where he thought that line should e drawn, so that control of the “threatened Secto
ave learned that lesson well.
★ ★ ★
^ lieutenant William J. Veigele, U. S. Naval
'-'serve (Retired)—The present fascination
wuh
ate about an ABM system have distracted °Ple from considerations of long-term J^rategy involving “The Encircling Sea.” r- Clark has helped bring the oceans before
peace. Even a superficial survey of fnational events of the last two decades , eals that our strategy and actions have anged considerably as a result of continuous eviews of policy.
tty^’ states that, “On the periphery of
0 great oceans, further accretions to Ameri- f power are now confronted by the dy- a,riic expansion of the Marxist-Leninist I q tes-” Of this periphery, possibly at most Per cent is Communist and that is com- lsed primarily of sections of mainland China d the Soviet Union. The vast majority of tes and peoples on this periphery have s°Undingly rejected Communism. Communist China’s influence has been
almost completely disdained in Africa, Europe, Latin America, Indonesia, India, and most of Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union’s only recent expansion has been in influence with the troubled and uncertain Arab leaders, who are still struggling for the fulfillment of muddled and archaic dreams.
Dr. Clark’s observation that the world is becoming more pluralistic is accurate and discerning, and I submit that this condition belies the dynamic expansion of Marxist-Leninist states. Dr. Clark is correct, however, in his assertion that their march to the sea has progressed, and that this portends considerable danger for the Free World. It may be too late to impede this advance to and use of the sea by Communist China and the Soviet Union; therefore we should devise a strategy which acknowledges their increasing use of the seas. This is a maritime strategy..
Dr. Clark’s five-point maritime strategy may be summarized as maintaining a multipurpose defensive sea-air team; establishing offshore bases encircling Eurasia; garrisoning
Lapel Button
To Members only: one dollar
Write:
Secretary-T reasurer U. S. Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland
of these bases for their protection; organizing deployable land and sea forces; and developing a sea-based ABM system.
I propose the addition of at least one more point: a national commitment to explore, understand, and utilize the oceans.
A maritime strategy based on only our present knowledge of the oceans, without an energetic program for acquiring additional knowledge, would be equivalent to building a strategic Maginot Line. A maritime strategy, like any other, must change continually as world conditions change, or as our antagonists or we discover more about the oceans.
"A Southwest Passage?”
(See H. H. Gibbs, pp. 64-73, April 1969 Proceedings)
Honorable Daniel J. Flood, (D-Pa.), House of Representative, Congress of the United States—As a member of the Congress with assignment for many years to the Subcommittee on National Defense of the House Committee on Appropriations, and as a long-time student of interoceanic canal problems, I have read the article by Rear Admiral Gibbs with considerable interest. Though it introduces some new angles into current canal discussions, it does not present the real issues involved, which must be understood and not ignored if our canal policies are to be wise.
The gross investment of the United States, from 1904 through 30 June 1968, including defense, in the Panama Canal enterprise was $6,368,009,000. Total recoveries during the same period were $1,359,931,421.66, making a net investment of over $5,000,000,000.
The Isthmian Canal policy of the United States, as developed over many years and
which is embodied in treaty and law, haS ) these objectives: the best type of canal, at thc best site for the transit of vessels of all n‘1 tions, on terms of equality, with tolls that a,e | just and equitable. It was pursuant to tl>lS policy that the United States acquired yl I treaty with Panama the grant in perpetuity ^ of sovereign rights, power, and authority ovfl the Canal Zone territory and constructed thf high-level-lake and lock type canal, all to the entire exclusion of the exercise by Panama I of any such sovereign rights, power, or author ity. The United States also obtained owne1' ship of all land and property in the Zone b) j purchase from individual owners.
In these connections, it is important to re3' lize that Panama has been, and still is, a° | area of endemic revolution and endless polh}' cal instability; and that at the time of acquis1' ) tion, it was one of the worst pest holes in dlC world.
The construction of the Panama Canal "'aS one of the truly great achievements of man- Its subsequent maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection have measured up 10 our solemn treaty obligations. The trans'1 since opening to traffic on 15 August 19^ ) through 30 June 1968, of 403,230 vessels 0 various types and descriptions during both ' peace and war (World Wars I and , Korean, and Vietnam, as well as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis) completely establishes | the wisdom of the original construction.
As to current discussions over the type 0 canal, the idea of constructing a canal at sea | level is a “hardy perennial.” It appeal strongly to the manufacturers of heavy earth' moving machinery, dredging combines, 3 .
limited number of professional engineers, and various theorists. Many independent experienced engineers, navigators, and scientists oppose it. Thus, Rear Admiral Gibbs’s emphasis that certain large vessels now constructed or planned were designed to avoid transit of either the Panama or Suez Canals | for the reason that it is more economical f°r them to go around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope rather than pay tolls is most pertinent. Also, as he points out, the closure of the sea-level Suez Canal in 1967 by means of “primitive weapons” is highly significant. R : dramatizes the irrelevance of the ancient argument of “vulnerability” to enemy attack
has the na- are this by uity 1 3ver * the th«
trtia | lOt'
iter- 1 '*
tea-
an I liti- ! tisi' ) the 1
I
was | iao- ini' |
. to nsit 914 ,
5 of
otb '
II,
962 ihes |
;of
sea
;als
•th-
, a md pe- ;istS
an*
on-
oid
ials |
for
: of |
,er' *, the
of
r; .
snt
ick
ln the design of navigation projects. The true Criteria, the only basis, for such planning are ease and safety of navigation.
•Many years of experience in the operation °f the Panama Canal have shown that what is needed there is a two-way ship channel in the Surnmit level, with ample and logically arranged locks at both ends.
The two-way ship channel will be supplied °n completion in 1970 of the enlargement of Dillard Cut from 300 feet minimum bottom "'idth to 500 feet. The required lock capacity arid arrangement will be provided under the Terminai Lake-Third Locks Plan.
This proposal, which would eliminate the bottleneck locks at Pedro Miguel, consolidate al1 Pacific Locks at one location south of •Thaflores, create a summit-level lake anchorage at the Pacific end of the Canal, and solve other important marine operating problems, '''as developed by the Panama Canal organization as the result of World War II experience. It was recommended by the Governor of the Panama Canal to the Secretary of War ^0r comprehensive investigation. It won the SuPport of the Secretary of the Navy, and "'as approved by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a postwar project.
The original Third Locks Project, authorized in 1939 at a cost not to exceed $277,000,000, was suspended in May 1942 because of more urgent war needs, after a total expenditure of $76,357,405, largely for buge lock site excavations at Gatun and biiraffores which are still usable. The estimated cost for enlarging Gaillard Cut is $81,257,097. These two projects together, ^Presenting an expenditure of more than $157 millions are a substantial commitment by our government for the major modernization of the existing Panama Canal. Moreover, Suc.h modernization of the existing Panama Canal enables the maximum use of all work So far accomplished in the construction of the panal and its subsequent maintenance, and it does not require a new treaty with Panama "foil the inevitable huge indemnity and inCreased annuity that would be involved. Thus, the United States would continue its full c°ntrol and ownership of the Canal Zone and Canal.
The principal issues in the present canal situation are:
SAIL AND POWER
A Manual of Seamanship
Richard Henderson and
Lt. Bartlett S. Dunbar, U.S. Navy
Illustrated by Richard Henderson
Widely-acclaimed as a singularly authoritative manual of small-boat handling and seamanship, Sail and Power is now available for the first time in a handsome, hardbound format. Written in a straightforward manner, it covers the handling of dinghies, sloops, yawls, and single and twin-screw power boats as well as racing.
The Ensign says, “One recommends it alike to the neophyte and the practiced sailor.” “The range of the book is remarkable... . The text is sharp, common sense and never preachy.”—Rudder.
284 pages, 66 photographs, over 125 line drawings, charts and tables. $9.50
A U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE BOOK Annapolis, Maryland 21402
[Please use book order form in booklist section)
• The safeguarding of our indispensable sovereignty over the Canal Zone, now jeopardized by ill-advised proposed new treaties.
• The necessity for increase of capacity and operational improvement of the existing canal through the major modification of the authorized Third Locks Project under the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan.
• The subject of a second canal.
As to these points, extensive clarifications in the Congress over a period of years have removed the confusion surrounding them and cleared the way for proper action by our government. This action is the major increase of capacity and operational improvements of the existing canal, and bills for the “Panama Canal Modernization Act” have been introduced.
The enactment of such legislation not only will protect the vital interests of the United States, benefit Panama, serve world commerce, and safeguard our indispensable sovereign rights, power, and authority over the Canal Zone and Canal, but will also clear up the entire canal situation.
A Lump Sum Retirement Payment
Captain Seymour Dombroff, U. S. Navy—- Whenever military career planning or motivation comes up for discussion, two items always are essential elements—money and retirement. In combination, consequently, retirement pay should receive the most searching examination of military personnel planners. The immediate payment of a substantial sum of money to the serviceman on retirement should be given careful consideration. Ideally, any pay plan for retired personnel should serve two purposes. First, it should be a significant contribution to the financial welfare of the retired serviceman, and second, it should provide an incentive for an individual to remain on active duty until he qualifies for retirement benefits. The present retirement plans fall short on both counts.
A petty officer retiring today after 20 years of service does not receive an adequate retirement income to permit him any latitude in selecting a second career. Because of the modest pay received during his service years, he has a limited nest egg to use for housing, education, or business ventures. Consequently, he is essentially restricted in what he can select as
a post-retirement career and he is under some urgency to accept early employment regard' less of desirability. This situation also applieS’ but to a lesser degree to those who remain 111 service longer or are more senior in grade.
The obvious solution to the difficulty ist0 pay the retiree more money. But modest and incremental increases are not satisfactory, and to provide adequate augmentation would so costly to the government that there is little likelihood of ever getting such legislation ap' proved. There is, however, a scheme which can put substantially more usable money 111 the hands of the newly retired, at no more cost to the government. This has been sue' cessfully adopted in Great Britain for its service personnel.
The idea is simple—give the serviceman, at the time of his retirement, a lump sum money up to one-half of his total projected retirement pension, the rest of the pension >s then paid in monthly increments for the remainder of his life. As an example, take 3 petty officer retiring after 20 years of service- Assuming that his retired pension would be $4,000 per year and that his life expectancy from actuarial tables is 32 years, then he would receive $64,000 (32 X $2,000) of his retirement money as soon as he trades his blue suit for pinstripe attire. His monthly pay check would be commensurably reduced one-halfi from $360 to $180.
For those who retire with medical disabilities after they would have qualified for the commuted sum if in good health, a determination for each individual would have to be made with regard to their predicted life span- A lump sum payment would then be reduced accordingly.
The projected life span of retired personnel for all age brackets can be reliably established for the large population size that our retired personnel represent. For those who die earlier than their predicted span, the government would be compensated by those who outlive the average figures. The maximum amount of money that a serviceman could request would be defined, but at his own discretion he could ask for a lesser sum or none at all.
pc
re
it
cal
sc
u
d(
rrl
cd
fii
Cd
la
tl
d
1
fi
t
tl
s
r.
c
v
c
I
I
1
1
1
I
The advantage of a commuted retirement plan would make a great career incentive. To tell a young man that when he is 38, he will be entitled to $60,000 or more, in cash, as
ar caused by the historically consistent ionary trends.
There are some disadvantages to the idea.
Th,
^ e serviceman runs the risk of losing, through uancial misadventure, a big part of his re
pay. However, it can be documented
"ep as monthly retirement pay, is a selling Point that cannot easily be topped. For the firing serviceman, petty officer or admiral, w°uld truly open the door to a second Career. If he wanted to buy a home, go to noolj or invest in a modest business venture, ,e would be prepared to do so. It could be one without jeopardizing any assets accumulated during his service years and without J,°'Uniitting himself to long-term restrictive nancial obligations. If nothing else, the money J°uld be put in a bank to draw interest. In the tter situation, a hedge is provided against e threat of a decreasing value of the pension Uollaj
'nflati tired
l^at our career personnel are essentially resPonsible money managers. If the entire commuted sum were lost, the retiree would still be
tawing at least 50 per cent of his pay, plus "'hatever increases might accrue because of c°st of living escalations. Considering that Poetically every retired person must work to Produce a necessary supplement to his retired paY» the possibility of a total loss of the lump Payment would not be catastrophic.
TVith regard to income tax on the commuted money, the pensioner would be re- 'luired to declare as additional income each 'ear for the period on which the lump sum 'Vas computed, a pro-rata amount of his origi- grant—$2,000 of his pay annually over ue 32 year span.
. Great Britain has been employing essen- tlally this procedure for retired officers and ^listed men under the Pensions Commuta- l|°n Acts, apparently with success. However, a retired person does not automatically get a ^prnrnutation of his pension if he requests it. 1,acli application is individually considered.
This suggestion should be pursued, espe- Clally now, at a time when we are looking for llleans of having an all-volunteer, career- motivated armed service.
"Oil Polution: No Solution?”
{See T. A. Clingan, pp. 63-75, May 1969 Proceedings)
William A. Sangster—It would be in the public interest to correct the impression given that the Santa Barbara oil spill was ever successfully capped. If the spill was capped at all, it was only for a very brief period. Oil has been spilling into the Santa Barbara Channel for over 100 days, and the spillage continues at a rate that is estimated to be from 20 to 200 barrels per day.
Another important factor not mentioned in the article was the poor judgment exercised in drilling in the vicinity of a known fault. In view of the oil company’s and the Department of Interior’s expertise in geology, it is difficult for me to find any justification for drilling in this area. Furthermore, the continued spillage has indicated that present-day oil technology is incapable of handling a simple emergency such as this.
The big question that should be faced is, what can be done when an earthquake occurs in the vicinity of these submarine oil wells? ★ ★ ★
Lieutenant (j.g.) Robert J. Clark, U. S. Naval Reserve (R)—The United States is not a shipowning nation, but it is a cargoowning nation. Why not hold the cargo owners liable for oil pollution damage? It is the cargo that is the actual cause of the pollution and not the carrier. Is not crude oil an ultrahazardous commodity to transport?
Let the cargo owner insure against the liability, with the tonnage of the carrier as the bases of his liability limitation. Cargo may change ownership many times during the course of a voyage, but it is feasible to require compulsory insurance as a portion of the cost of the crude oil.
In the last analysis, the cost of the insurance is passed on to the consumer of oil products, where it belongs. This requirement would be an incentive for cargo owners to select the safest routes and the most seaworthy ships to carry their products.
★