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When, three years ago, the Soviet Navy finally discarded the defensive policy which for centuries had been its role, and assumed an offensive posture, it thereby greatly increased the options open to it for bringing pressure to bear on the West and, by expanding its area of operations, created a problem regarding the protection of shipping which has so far been ignored, but for which a solution must be found.
cluding the Mediterranean) and the North Atlantic. Slightly less than half of Britain’s shipping is normally to be found in this area, and the concern evoked by this decision was forcibly expressed during recent debates m both Houses of Parliament. Replying to an Opposition motion in the House of Commons on 11 March 1968 accusing the government of failing to produce a coherent policy for the protection of Britain’s vital sea communications, the Under Secretary of State for Defence, Maurice Foley, said, “The fact is that trade, to a large extent protects itself by
mutual profitability. France knows this, Japan knows this, as do most trading nations ■ . . One does not see their national navies guaranteeing maritime protection in all parts of the world.”
The Minister’s statement about Japan ignores the fact that two years ago the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force announced the building of escort vessels for the particular purpose of protecting Japan’s petroleum lifeline with the Middle East, but for the rest, he has called into question one of the basic functions of seapower.
On 12 June 1968, during a debate on a similar theme in the House of Lords, the government spokesman, Lord Chalfont said, “Let us realize that one of the first principles of life today—of international life, of military life, of strategic doctrine—is the factor of the nuclear weapon, and the fact that it has completely revolutionized all political military thinking . . . Collective security is the only thing that matters, the only thing that will keep us safe.”
Of all the countries of the West, Britain is without doubt the most vulnerable to any interruption of her seaborne supplies, but to a lesser degree all member nations of NATO are dependent on imports, especially of petroleum products. As W. J. McNeil has pointed out in Naval Review 1968, “In some respects, the United States is becoming an ‘island economy’ and its position might be compared with that of Britain in the 1850s. If overseas resources were cut off today, U. S. industry would be in a most serious situation and the closer we come to the year 2000, the more critical to the very life of U. S. industry will our dependence on overseas sources of raw materials be.” As populations grow and
The recent creation of the NATO Standing Naval Forces—the British frigate Argonaut leads the American, Dutch, and West German destroyers Glennon, Zeeland, and Bayern through the English Channel—has been hailed as a great step forward. This step, which was almost 20 years in the taking, may not be too late, but it is most certainly too little.
Collective Security and the Defense of Shipping
industries expand, the importance of seaborne trade is enhanced and this can be seen from the increase, during the last 20 years, in world shipping, which has risen from 29,340 ships totalling 80,291,593 gross register tons in 1948, to 44,375 ships totalling 182,099,644 g. r. tons in 1967. Total world seaborne trade, which in 1964 amounted to 1,480 million metric tons, is increasing at an average rate of 9 per cent per annum. Of this total, about 60 per cent is accounted for by oil, the balance of 40 per cent being dry cargo. The member nations of NATO among them possess 22,162 ships totalling 95,159,940 g. r. tons, or a little over half of the world’s shipping, and this is the measure of the investment at risk, which in terms of money amounts to some 60 billion dollars.
When NATO was founded in 1949, it was believed that it would suffice if the security of Allied seaborne supplies in the North Atlantic could be assured. It appeared at that time that this was the area most susceptible to a Soviet attack; today that is no longer the case.
If, following Lord Chalfont’s advice, we move east from the NATO area in a search for collective security, we encounter the Central Treaty Organization, the members of which are Britain, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. If CENTO were responsible for the protection of shipping within its sphere of jurisdiction, which includes the highly important oil traffic up and down the Persian Gulf, it could not possibly meet this commitment without considerable British help. That help, under the policy of contraction being pursued by Britain at present, would be difficult to provide. In the rest of the Indian Ocean, which covers a number of important shipping lanes, such as the supertanker route along the East coast of Africa, ships plying between the Cape of Good Hope and Australia, India, and the Far East, there is no collective security organization for the protection of shipping- South Africa has accepted an undefined responsibility for this task in the South Atlantic and South Indian Oceans, but it is not bound by any international agreement to carry it out. It might well refuse to do so if the political motives which had given rise to the need were contrary to its own interests.
The long closure of the Suez Canal has brought about a change in the pattern ot shipping rounding the Cape of Good Hope- For example, 53 British ships now pass that headland daily compared with an average of one a day before the closure occurred. Even when the Canal reopens, the volume of shipping using the Cape route is likely to remain greater than before, both because of the supertankers that are coming into service and which are unable to transit the canal, and also because many shipowners trading with Australia will doubtless prefer the certainty
of that route to the uncertainty of the transit through the canal and Red Sea, especially since the British withdrawal from Aden.
The membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organization, including as it does Australia, Britain, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States, should, in theory at any rate, enable effective protection to be provided to shipping moving within its area of responsibility. But, unlike NATO, SEATO has no forces assigned to it and has no effective organization to meet this eventuality.
It is generally agreed that it would be impracticable to maintain permanently in commission the forces which would be needed to counter, simultaneously in every area, the threat to shipping which Russia is capable of mounting. Further, there is a difference of opinion between Britain and the United States regarding the possibility of such a universal threat materializing. In his statement introducing the U. S. Defense Budget for 1968, the former Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, said, “There is one possible contingency however which may require the large scale employment of our naval forces and that is a war at sea with the Soviet Union not involving land battles. Here our global naval power would provide us with a unique advantage, provided the Soviet submarine threat can be contained, which we believe it can.”
Replying to a question in the House of Commons whether or not the government shared Mr. McNamara’s views as quoted above, the Under Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Foley, said “We have not accepted and we do not accept the concept of an all-out war at sea.” Given the political and economic situation in each country, it is not surprising that Mr. McNamara’s policy should support the argument for strong maritime forces, while that of Mr. Foley favors the proponents of weak ones, but it should not be beyond the ability of the members of the Western alliance as a whole to size up the threat with which they are confronted and agree on the best way of meeting it. The facts are not in dispute. The Soviet Union has a navy second only to that of the United States and its composition is weighted in favor of a war on sea communications in any part of the world. The point at issue is whether Russia could so employ its maritime forces without bringing about the holocaust of a nuclear war.
The doctrine of massive retaliation vis-a-vis the Soviet threat on land in Europe has become progressively discredited as the sophistication of nuclear weapons has increased, but there has been a marked reluctance to concede a similar state of regression pertaining to a war at sea. The British government’s White Paper on Defence 1967 said, “it is no longer realistic for the Alliance to attempt to provide maritime forces for conducting a prolonged war at sea after the nuclear exchange.” But it is increasingly possible that a war at sea might precede a nuclear exchange, and in such circumstances, we can be sure that
Russia would use its submarines for attacks on shipping.
Various theories have been put forward regarding the way in which such a war might come to pass. These range from the denial of access to Soviet-controlled ports and waterways to full scale harassment on the high seas. The most probable threat lies in between these two extremes and would derive from overt Soviet support for one of two parties in conflict, such as might occur through a renewal of the Arab-Israeli war. As Russia’s maritime strength grows and is deployed in distant waters, the likelihood of intervention increases. The fact that Russia has hitherto refrained from action of this kind is no guarantee that it would not do so if it were to its advantage and the circumstances were favorable. There is the precedent of the Spanish Civil War to remember, when “unidentified” submarines began to torpedo ships believed to be carrying supplies to the anti-Franco forces.
In his book Maritime Strategy, Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton discusses at some length the circumstances which might bring about a conflict at sea between the West and the Communist powers. He draws three conclusions regarding the likely role of naval forces in such circumstances. First, that in the unlikely event of a general nuclear war, it would be one of relief and rescue only. Second, that the demand for ships and the traditional peacetime functions of naval forces during Cold War will continue. Third, that there are two kinds of limited war in which naval forces could become involved—a war of intervention and what he calls “the Grey war against sea communications.” Despite Russia’s undoubted ability to launch a general war at sea of worldwide dimensions, it is difficult to visualize such action occurring without at the same time provoking hostilities on land, notwithstanding Mr. McNamara’s view that such an event is possible. “The mere existence of a large Russian submarine fleet and of a Soviet doctrine endowing that fleet with the role of a general war on communications,” says Professor L. W. Martin in The Sea in Modern Strategy, “is certainly no sufficient reason for a commensurate counter effort. There is no need to plan for an implausible contingency merely because our opponents do.”
A graduate of the Royal Naval Colleges, Osborne and Dartmouth, Admiral Schofield commanded the cruiser Galatea and the battleships Duke of York and King George V during World War II. From 1941 to 1943, he was Director of the Trade Division (Convoy and Routing) of the Admiralty. Subsequently he was Chief of Staff to the Admiral, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D. C. Since his retirement in 1950, he has written the following books: The Royal Navy Today (1960), The Russian Convoys (1964), British Sea Power (1967), and (with L. F. Martyn) The Rescue Ships.
It is always difficult to assess an opponent’s most probable course of action and the best that can be done is to balance the possibilities against the available resources and make the most effective dispositions possible.
There is still only one satisfactory and effective way of protecting shipping, and that is in convoy, but to institute it in every area through which shipping routes pass is beyond the capacity of the Western powers, and would be a most uneconomic use of shipping- Hence, flexibility is essential to enable the necessary forces to be quickly deployed in those areas where the threat is sufficiently serious to make convoy mandatory. This point was made by Vice Admiral C. E- Weakley in his comprehensive survey of ASW in the U. S. Naval Review 1965, when he said, “The decision whether to convoy or not is one that must depend upon the circumstances in which we find ourselves, but we should be prepared to use convoy at short notice. So long as our preparations are adequate, 'v'e can have freedom of choice of specific areas and ship combinations for which the technique of convoy may be useful.”
Mr. McNamara, in the statement quoted above, makes success in a war at sea with Soviet Russia contingent on the containment of the submarine threat; Admiral Weakley suggests our freedom of choice concerning the introduction of convoy depends on the adequacy of our preparations. Although a very considerable effort and much money are being devoted to the study of ASW, the progress made has not kept pace with the develop' ment of the submarine. The result is that quantity must compensate for lack of quality, and this fact is most unpalatable to politicians in countries in which every nerve is being strained to cut down expenditure on the armed forces.
There is much talk of collective security, but so far there has been very little action to achieve it where maritime forces are concerned. The recent creation of the NATO Standing Force has been hailed as a great step forward, but it is a step that has required almost 20 years to take. More positive action ls needed to pool resources and to evolve a plan for their economic employment. First, 11 is necessary to abolish the unrealistic and artificial limits of NATO’s maritime boundaries. These only serve to conceal the universal nature of the threat with which we are confronted at sea and to provide governments with an opportunity to shelve their responsibilities for the protection of shipping in the test of the world’s vast expanse of ocean.
What is needed is to create a Maritime Defense Organization (MADO) to which every ship-owning nation in the Free World would be invited to belong. Every member would contribute to it a quota of escort vessels and ^aritime reconnaissance aircraft in propor- hon to the size of its merchant navy. Those unable for one reason or another to meet lheir quota would be allowed to make a cash Payment to cover the cost of the vessels and/or a>rcraft which some other nation would have to supply in their place. If, for example, every member nation of NATO were to contribute one escort vessel for every 100 and one Un-craft for every 50 ships in its mercantile eet, a force of 225 escort vessels and 450 air- ctafi would be available for the protection of “Upping, as can be seen from the table above.
If other countries—such as Japan with >877 ships totalling 19,587,000 gross register °ns joined, so much the better. The con- ^/butfons fall heavily on nations like West cntiany and Norway, which have only ^Utall navies, but it is only equitable that na- °ns with large merchant navies should make . Proportionate contribution to their defense u the same way as they do when they insure •Ur ships against loss from marine risks. *4 is suggested that a Supreme Commander °uld be appointed to MADO, who would place SacLant and take over his functions
Country | No. of ships of over 100 | Quota of Escort Air- | |
Belgium | g.r. tons 218 | Vessels 2 | craft 4 |
Britain | 4,020 | 40 | 80 |
Canada* | 1,296 | 13 | 26 |
Denmark | 1,140 | 11 | 22 |
France | 1,495 | 15 | 30 |
W. Germany | 2,732 | 27 | 54 |
Greece | 1,634 | 16 | 32 |
Iceland | 295 | 3 | 6 |
Italy | 1,490 | 15 | 30 |
Netherlands | 1,721 | 17 | 34 |
Norway | 2,881 | 28 | 56 |
Portugal | 348 | 3 | 6 |
Turkey | 298 | 3 | 6 |
U.S.A.f | 3,232 | 32 | 64 |
Total 225 450
* Includes Lake tonnage of 279 ships.
t Includes Lake tonnage of 274 ships.
(Source: Lloyds Register of Shipping 1968.)
in NATO as well as being responsible for the world-wide protection of shipping. SACMADO would station his squadrons in areas of the world selected according to the density of shipping, and he would arrange for their training, their refit periods and leave, for which purpose the respective units would rotate. In this way, a highly efficient organization based on collective security could be created. Anyone who is appalled by the magnitude of the task needs only to be reminded that, during World War II, the Admiralty, with the help of Lloyds List and Shipping Gazette, established a plot on which the movement of every merchant ship in the world was recorded daily. Once established, it is a comparatively easy matter to keep it up to date, and the value of such a plot in the event of any attempt to interfere with shipping would be inestimable. Not only would it furnish an instant appreciation of what was at risk, but also it would facilitate the taking of the appropriate action. The Automated Merchant Vessel Report System (AMVER) operated by the U. S. Coast Guard could form the basis on which such a plot could be compiled.
The writer is well aware that the above is only an outline plan and that it requires further detailed study, but there is too much at stake to allow of further delay in coming to grips with this vital problem.