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Within the lifetime of the U. S. destroyer Allen (DD-66), f101,1 ^ January 1917 to October 1945, depicted above during World Woi ^ America and her Allies twice paid a terrible price for their tare in practicing the ancient art of convoy.
P jyj- a century ago, Alfred Thayer l"°y «v„fn Wrote that, “the results of the
warrants the inference that,
VPrs0ystem
hav°^Cr^ systematized and applied, it "'■dual ni0re success than hunting for in- ^ marauders—a process which, even fS t‘loroughly planned, still resembles fieabiiit0; a neec^e *n a haystack.” The ap- ^ ^ ^his dictum to modern warfare
^ WoricjVY^nv^ronment was confirmed dur- ‘^ats a . ar I when the depredations of \\ an<-l |^a'nst: Primarily independently sail' " ' to , nesc°rted merchantmen forced the
.,y cSeems to go without question hat tQ lrse of action for us to pursue is to \y e ancient practice of convoy. This
[jt CanCe '■ an offensive action, because if - lect ittrate our shipping into convoy and Hyf with our naval forces we will °rce the enemy, in order to carry out
his mission, to encounter naval forces. . . we will have adopted the essential principle of concentration.” The results of the convoy system, once introduced, were dramatic; merchant ship losses dwindled and U-boat losses rose sharply as predicted by both Mahan and Sims.
It was in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II, however, that Mahan’s dictum received its fullest confirmation and vindication; although this historic battle came precariously close to being lost—first by the British and then by the Americans, both of whom initially disregarded the costly lessons of World War I.
Prior to World War II, there was considerable discussion in British circles regarding the merits of the convoy stystem. The Air Staff, in particular, opposed the system while the British Admiralty, giving full credit to the costly lessons of World War I, staunchly defended the escort-of-convoy concept. The issue was resolved by the end of 1937 in favor of the convoy concept; and when war erupted on 3 September 1939, the Admiralty was able to implement in very short order the convoy and escort of merchantmen.
It was not long before the escort-of-convoy concept was challenged anew by the proponents of the offensive school of thought who held that the best defense against submarines was to hunt them down and destroy them. This vast, high-seas, hunter-killer action would be performed by independent aircraft and escort flotillas sweeping the Western Approaches to Britain. This proposal could not be taken lightly, for its foremost champion and spokesman was the First Lord, Sir Winston Churchill. Adamantly opposed to what he considered to be a defensive obsession, he pressed the Admiralty to take the offensive against the U-boats.
Thus, shortly after hostilities began, the fleet carrier Courageous, with only a small screening force, was dispatched on a submarine hunting mission in the Western Approaches to Britain. On 17 September 1939, she unknowingly encountered the TJ-29, who, becoming the hunter instead of the hunted, penetrated the screen undetected, ASDIC notwithstanding, and sank the Courageous forthwith. Although counterattacked by the screen
atf*1
able to maintain an average U-boats on station in the Atlan11 .eit11 pared to six during the perioc 1939 to July 1940. It was this small ^ ^0. in the average number of U-boats . that made it possible for Doenitz^ ^ojf.p3l
.1H'1
21 311
The full force of the blow fell 011
of i°nl
its
o'1'
twe*1:: t)ic
A1
of a convoy of 15 fully laden sj4P^e l8 ^
peak of the battle, on the night ^ shipj^if one convoy and on the following -w 31
, - in wolf packs at night on the surta^t con'l> stroyed 38 ships from three differc No U-boats were lost. riaHY (o<
British errors contributed rZtotw, & success of the marauders. The -^e^) ,f.
S llirffj
seven from another. In three days^clush ferent U-boats, attacking almos
example, was still devoting
■3*1
advantages to be gained by U-^03
on
at night in co-ordinated groups face, like torpedo boats.
The British had persisted in
as<7 sU
the U-boats would attack on >
had dtehecT
and declared sunk, the U-29 returned home safely. This disaster caused the immediate withdrawal of fleet carriers from U-boat hunting but by no means stilled the voices of the proponents of the offensive school who continued to argue that offensive patrolling for submarines in the open oceans would be more fruitful as a U-boat killer and deterrent than escort-of-convoy.
This encounter also reiterated a primary lesson of the 1914-1918 war: major warships present a lucrative target to a submarine, and therefore must be provided adequate ASW protection at all times when at sea. In retrospect, it also demonstrated the fallacy of basing ASW doctrine upon a single technological advance made in peacetime but not tested in combat. In this case, the British placed undue confidence in the capability of ASDIC. They paid dearly in the months to come for this misguided faith.
Germany began World War II with only 57 submarines, of which only 39 were ready for action and of these, only 22, the Type VII and Type IX U-boats, were considered suitable for Atlantic operations. With these limited assets, it was only possible to maintain an average of six U-boats simultaneously on station, a number appreciably lower than the 100 U-boats that Admiral Karl Doenitz had stated before the war would be required to achieve decisive results against a worldwide convoy system.
By May 1940, however, U-boat support requirements for the Norwegian campaign had become minimal and serious torpedo problems had been solved. Thereupon, operations were resumed in the Atlantic where, in 26 days, the U-37 sank 43,000 tons of shipping. Of probably greater significance, the U-37 reported large numbers of vessels sailing independently and convoys weakly escorted, some even without air cover. Doenitz immediately resumed attacks upon the lightly protected convoys, and by July the assault was in full swing. Thus, began the first U- boat “Happy Time.”
On 2 August 1940, after the fall of France, Lorient on the French Biscay coast became operational as the first of several U-boat refit bases. From that time forward until August 1944, U-boats operating in the Atlantic no longer returned to Germany for refit and leave, but to the Biscay ports of France. In
addition, Type II U-boats were re ^ya'- the French Biscay ports from whir could prey upon the convoy concen ^,-js the Western Approaches. The nr* ‘ 94O''’'
that U-boat Command in the fal 0 (0
of eight coi„.
3 & 1ct io# id*
full effect for the first time J113 ctrinc ^ tactics which had been the basic all pre-war U-boat training. s to ^
The shift in U-boat operating ^ jpo* Biscay ports was partially offset Y ^ 0f 1 who re-routed convoys from the s° ce land to the north of Ireland ajic ^ 4 the North Channel to English P alo^ northerly shift of the convoy '<a s|aughtl however, could not prevent t1
that was to follow.
September when, during the firs*, y,0ats 52 able night convoy battles, five ^
11 merchantmen and damaged
October 1940, six U-boats sank^
1 0y - #
U-boats sank 14 ships from orJe ^ ejghtd cons'1
fort to offensive hunting and Patr^v0ys^' y ations in areas remote from the co^js0) j1'5^- meeting with very little success. ^,1 ,
Hitler’s Mein Kampf had not tI.U]lC vv'3' lieved, the British failed to hee ubl is
in Doenitz’ book, Die U-BootswoJI ’trayed : in January 1939, wherein ^e,^^tsatt3'f*,r ' TT tWs
** .,tr
to
merged; and therefore, they most of their pre-war ASW eff°r
Most of the 198 ships lost off the U. S. coast in the first three months of 1942 were sunk by individual U-boats attacking unescorted vessels. Still, almost as many, 195, were sunk by one man, Lothar von Arnauld de la Periere, in World War I. The all-time tonnage king, he was followed by a contemporary, Walter Forstmann, who sank 147 ships. Otto Kretschmer, the tonnage king of World War II, and Gunther Prien, the "Snorting Bull of Scapa Flow,” were both victims in the Battle of the Long Knives off Iceland.
i''0|Vnt
(je a better underwater submarine t0 ^1Ce' The result, ASDIC, was con- 0l|Sh C *Te answer to any U-boat who,
er- — design, had the misfortune V’Just t0 aPProach an escort. Accord- ,Jft* w Pri°r to World War II, British
or
T* werere ^ted with ASDIC and their trained to deal almost solely with ;.'rts Subinarines. As a consequence, r n° radar for some time after the
N»8a";
Sl§hti
and therefore, had to resort to
Kretschmer Prien
of concentration of force in the vicinity of the target, i.e. escort-of-convoy, rather than by any predetermined strategy or tactics based upon assumptions in these areas. The above also illustrates quite clearly the fallacy of assuming that the infinitely complex ASW problem can be solved by a single, simple solution.
Gradually, the British, with characteristic dogged determination, began to tame the savage packs and, during the period of 17 to 31 March 1941, virtually brought them to heel. In a series of convoy battles south of Iceland, surface escorts supporting convoys sank five U-boats which not only accounted for one-fifth of the then operational boats, but also eliminated three U-boat aces—Gunther Prien (U-47), Otto Kretschmer (U-99), and Joachim Schepke (U-700). Doenitz’s uncertainty as to the reasons for the almost simultaneous loss of three of his most experienced and decorated commanders caused him to withdraw all U-boats from the area and con-
lng surfaced submarines before ing.
points out the fact that ntly than not, in both peace and ^ines fail
\efCe80ing V Sub:
on
of
to co-operate in the
Cprt Plans formulated for their al-
,;H destruction. A corollary might
0nly valid assumption that can be '•bo employment of submarines K , rare exception, they will attack;
^ b b flen’ an<^ wbere they can be en- est covered by the military dictum
an0.
the Gulf of Mexico, however,
into
along the East Coast. Doenitz soon ^ this selective use of the convoy syste]lCj tb°
a° rf
sent his U-boats into those areas
to
in his memoirs. He had reason
j log‘c
in
in*6
elSeWhecOlh0!'
the secor
routes. And so ended “Happy Time.”
It seemed to
the British authorities
jin1
.11$
Commander U. S. Naval Forces Europ
importance of adequate training aIlC cises and the value of efficient radar.
tin'
escort-of-convoy doctrine and expert ^ German authorities were of a sirni a^ t|,( ion, as evidenced by their comment a ^ic3ii
failed to profit from Britain’s war exp1
the U- S\ &
centrate them further south until the exact causes were determined. But, Doenitz never did determine the exact causes for these losses because they were not owing to any particular cause or to the introduction of any new antisubmarine devices, but rather to the bulldog determination and tenacity of the surface escorts supporting convoys. Thus ended the first U-boat “Happy Time.”
This abrupt halt to U-boat attacks illustrates what has come to be a key ASW axiom: Whenever submarine operations against shipping prove difficult or costly, the submarines withdraw, even prom tempting targets and go elsewhere for easier targets. This continued to be the case throughout the war for German U-boats— and for Allied submarines as well.
On 12 December, the day after Germany declared war on the United States, Doenitz deployed six submarines to American waters to initiate his Paukenschlags—Operation “Roll on the Drums.”
Although it would be five weeks before these and other U-boats started their attacks in earnest off the American coast, little was done by the Americans to adopt even the simplest measures for the control and protection of shipping. The war diary of the U-123 describes the scene off Cape Hatteras on the night of 18-19 January 1942 as follows, “It is a pity that there were not. . . ten to twenty U-boats here last night instead of one. Altogether I saw about twenty steamships, some undarkened; also a few tramp steamers, all hugging the coast. Buoys and beacons in the area had dimmed lights which, however, were visible up to two or three miles.” Thus began what the American historian Morison chose to describe as “a merry massacre” and U-boat crews referred to as the “Second Happy Time.” It lasted from mid-January through April 1942, during which time only one U-boat (U-85) was sunk in American waters, while 198 ships with a total tonnage of 1,200,000 tons, more than half of them tankers, were sunk in those same waters.
Most of these sinkings were made by individual U-boats attacking vessels sailing independently, since the Americans did not initially adopt the convoy system, as recommended repeatedly by the British. However, by the end of April 1942, the convoy system
was introduced along the East Coast ^ there, by May 1942, the heavy sinking denly ceased. ^ 1/
Believing that it was not feasible ^ ^
boats to operate deep in the Carib
F P the Amerf did not introduce the convoy syste^iCtiofl those areas concurrent with its intro ^
‘ ,d
massacre continued. Another leSS° ^ it learned: the submariner frequently will op^jj. a manner assumed by the uninitiated to be )S. cal or impossible and thereby seize or retail itiative. Doenitz was very specific a ^e\\e'e
what he wrote, for he fell victim to its -- ^ the form of Sir Max Horton, as we s c$•
Belatedly, by July 1942, the American tended the convoy system into the D ,jateb and the Gulf of Mexico, and i'n°°! merchant ship losses dwindled ana losses rose sharply. coSt &
Once again, Doenitz considered t c ^ j,i; the game too expensive and with0 jjgfl U-boats from the once-rewarding N theater to seek easier targets this case, back to the North Atlantic . fliji
nd u
the Americans were both slow and UI^at, to start coastal convoys, considering . jpJ March 1942, the British First Sea presented a review of the Battle of the ^y. to Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. s ' flii* review summarized British ASW exp ar3' since the war began and stressed the c ue tive failure of hunting forces, the of aircraft in convoy protection, the s
American recalcitrance is the more P j,30 since, well before the war, America1^^! issued numerous publications reflecting
~ienC >
,erieilC
war that during the initial phase participation in the war,
Initial U. S. reluctance to employ convoys is puzzling because, not only had Britain shared her escort-of- convoy experience with America well before Pearl Harbor, but there was ample visible evidence, such as this convoy to the Middle East in December 1941, that the doctrine really worked. Imperial War Museum
eai>
tel>
fit1
t()f
hi*
-in
■ol
;h3‘
in?
in
,tic
<n> hi* i e* (T ,u C xfi •r
Vs
P^abl,
Morison was the U. S. Navy Y unprepared, materially and for the U-boat blitz on the Atlantic
this
unpreparedness was largely the
~Mt(0|VVn fouit. . . it had no plans for lr%le t ® Protection of shipping, and was The lrnProvise them for several months.” '.ll0st sobering fact associated with this '*ch *ne hlitz, and certainly related to the
Doenitz’s personal adversary-in-chief, and as such, probably contributed more to the final victory against the U-boats than any other individual. Admiral Doenitz conceded as much when, some years later, in his memoirs, he wrote: “Whoever has been given the task of protecting convoys against submarine attack and of conducting antisubmarine op-
or
great,
er potential submarine threat we
aA is that there were never more than W^elve U-boats actively and simul- ^ engaged in the war on shipping off
'CtlreAme
lerican coast during the period of _vfUttl havoc, January to April 1942—no p’^t strength than they concentrated S [<j- a single British convoy during the in Time” in 1940. The advantages hvr,. .ch the dire necessity for—escorted
%
a hostile submarine environment
ItyL
, 0j| ,^re else in history so vividly portrayed. St0n hiovember 1942, Admiral Sir Max Ic^ ’ Flag Officer Submarines, Home ■'fom anh a renowned submarine com- ,‘ancie^ ,°f World War I, became Com- fr0u Jn'h-hicf, Western Approaches.
It fob3 ^ no other Allied officer understood °hon,>larine commander’s mind better than jfoely and therefore could anticipate more i fotz e moves and countermoves which 'foclerj &nh the individual U-boat corn- might make. He became, in fact,
::v<-
'brj;
'"■> f
■>1
-Is].
t#:
stated that it was willing to take ovdi in order to expedite the transfer, P*-y,-
’tion
'°rts
d'
'bat;
c°rn.
Marshall that the Navy would be rea1
dy.
erations should himself be a man with experience in submarine service.”
March 1943 saw the Battle of the Atlantic rage to a pitch of intensity and a delicacy of balance which came near to disrupting communications between America and her European allies. It also was a month of monumental decisions in the area of ASW strategy.
One was the famous “horse trade” between the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Army Air Force that probably was conceived at the Atlantic Convoy Conference on 1 March 1943 in Washington, D.C. Admiral Ernest King, in his opening remarks, expressed his faith in convoys, not only as the best means for protecting shipping but also as the most attractive bait for U-boats. Further, he stated that escort carriers (HUK Groups) should be used in direct support of convoys and that for the time being antisubmarine warfare “must concern itself primarily with the escort-of-con- voy.”
The U. S. Army Antisubmarine Air Command labeled this concept as “purely defensive;” its slogan was, “Search, Strike, Sink.” Seeking the autonomy and full naval cooperation needed for prosecuting offensive ASW operations, the Army Air Force submitted a comprehensive report refuting Admiral King. Specifically, it stated that, “Convoying was at best a most inefficient procedure. . . . aircraft could be used much more effectively in carrying the attack to the enemy wherever he may be found.” Thus, the battle lines between the two opposing schools of thought were clearly drawn.
King, more secure in his faith in the convoy system with each passing day, became still further convinced as the battle in the North Atlantic raged to unprecedented heights. Thus, in May 1943, at the Trident Conference, Admiral King asked General Arnold, Chief-of-Staff, U. S. Army Air Force, to send an echelon of ASW-configured B-24s to Newfoundland to strengthen the air escort of the North Atlantic convoys. General H. H. Arnold complied with this request on 1 June, but ordered the squadron commander to engage only in “offensive” search and attack missions and not in escort-of-convoy. Admiral King reacted predictably. He convened a joint Army-Navy conference on 10 June to resolve the matter once and for all. At this conference the Army stated that ft be glad to withdraw from ASW as sod1 ‘t Navy was ready to take over; the
0veti
r’ Pr°$
that the Army turn over to the Navy >ts^(l configured Liberators for an equal nu>" ^ unmodified bombers from Navy assets- ^ Army agreed. Admiral King appro'1’1 t agreement and informed General Geoft;
take over by September 1943. Both P‘, formally accepted the agreement on 1943. Such was the famous “horse trade ^ famous, to some, namely the British C-0'1 Command.
The historical significance of this II... tribution of aircraft assets is that Ad$ King—who, as Commander Tenth (also CNO and CominCh), was the AmC’^,, opposite to Admiral Horton, and with ton, was responsible for keeping An'W convoy lanes open in the face of mounting ; appalling shipping losses to U-boats j convinced that offensive patrol and hr,n ,, operations were futile. Therefore, he took and positive action to divert America’1 resources from offensive ASW operatic1’5 escort-of-convoy operations. ^
In the meantime, the Battle of the Ad3'1^ had reached its peak in March 1943. I’1 ^ j, first ten days, the Allies lost 41 ships a”
wc
re]
of
er
et
tv
*
tl
b
b
of,
acc
th,
In
ip,
v-tr,-
v'jy
V:M,.
iJr<n
Pf<n
bul
li.b
s’?n
a/>v
bfts
A
Ma
23
ter
°n
t>oa
he
the second ten days, another 56; more ^
r • • ’ • • 1
half-a-million tons of shipping, nearly 1
neously. And so it was that five surface port groups with their prosecute-to-kill bility, escort carriers with their air umbft and additional very long range aircraft close the “Black Pit” gap, all made theft‘V pearance on the North Atlantic convoy lal' in March 1943.
April 1943 saw a series of convoy ba wherein the additional forces allocated
thirds of which was sunk in convoy. F°r f, first time, as a result of combat losses |)fr serious consideration was given to whe j the convoy system was valid. Hunting patrolling had proven ineffective, and no" , appeared that the convoy system was 1 fective against the U-boat wolf pack atta ^ Defeat appeared imminent. But the l0’1., range plans to bolster convoy escorts and c^_ voy protection bore fruit almost sin11^,
^'boat escort: began to turn the tables on the "as fQS' Pne °f the fiercest of these battles *i>d »,U, 1 during the latter part of April
Sales ^ly MaV '
t}j3 f .
Ijtipert 1 SWept across the combatants with c°nsiSfUrbeci impartiality. Convoy ONS-5, rfiOre ^ °f 43 merchantmen and never C°rts Dl an^ °ne *ame than nine surface es- a'r cover, was opposed by some 51 boats , We^ve ships were sunk, but the U
scvetl the unaccustomed heavy price of C°rner k P1e’r number being sunk. The I ~'' ’
',-jer . ‘t'11 HU1UUCI
f- f. .d been turned.
7 i (ji tuc vjcimans,
kr n Were appalling losses, even for the bit- 24 warter battle being fought; and so, b°ats(.^ay 1943, Doenitz withdrew his U- be stapo,1^the North Atlantic. In his memoirs V0ys j Cs: “Wolf-pack operations against con- of0 n the North Atlantic, the main theater ^Ordrations- ’ ’ were no longer possible. . . Vth 1 withdrew the boats from the
the ft. ',tlantic on May 24. . . . We had lost Alu tl C Atlantic.”
^hoilo-h „r
Escort-oj-Convoy—Still the Only Way 53
\'J' I
in a series of North Atlantic
9
»hips aV> convoy SC-130 comprised of 35 '''erg s as opposed by 32 U-boats. No ships V°y Hh n^’ ^ut ^ve U-boats were lost. Con- sVstetll p9 fared as well. Faith in the convoy PtoVen lad been vindicated. It had been Pr0vicJ t"at both fast and slow convoys, if top)^ 5 vv*th air as well as surface escort, 'v'th ]Cross the Atlantic in either direction ,J'boatSht ^ any i°sscsi n° matter what the signjfj c°ncentrations. Of considerably more
« /WPP6 was the fact that far from making ^Uce defenswe passage, it had proven that both Vr of a*r escor^s could kill appreciable num- .A, j 'boats as the latter maneuvered to attack. •May iPp °f 56 U-boats were sunk in April- ^ daVs 3’f3A of which were sunk in the first tiieSp yS May nlone. For the Germans, tvere a- • ...
no
br' 24 to
'von ■ °'l[’rb the Battle of the Atlantic was relat^n Xlay 1943, a valid evaluation of the Asvy V C efficacY °f offensive and defensive 0f th(;S(trategy in relation to the final defeat ^nCe U-boats cannot be made without refer- t|Jrre two offensive operations which oc- Vere subsequent to the May victory. They &iSca lc big Bay Slaughter” in the Bay of the J offensive and the tactical triumph of boat, • escort carrier groups over the U- !n lhe Central Atlantic.
Coastal Command aircraft had Patrolling the Bay of Biscay for U-boats
since 1940 with negligible results. However, by May 1942, Coastal Command, having made technical improvements in aircraft- dropped depth charges and radar controlled night illumination, laid on a concerted Bay offensive which met with immediate success. But, it soon became obvious to U-boat Command that the British had perfected long- range, one-and-one-half meter airborne radar. They countered in August with a crude but effective ECM receiver, Metox, and, by October 1942, U-boat losses dropped sharply, thereby bringing a halt to the Bay offensive which had seemed to offer such great promise.
However, in February 1943, Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, Commander-inChief Coastal Command and one of the foremost exponents of the offensive in ASW, tried again. And again, the results were disappointing, primarily because the U-boats still were able to detect the I5 meter airborne radar in use. Only one U-boat was sunk in the Bay, while at the same time four were sunk by aircraft supporting convoys.
By 20 March 1943, Joubert’s successor, Sir John Slessor, another vigorous proponent of offensive ASW operations, had in hand the device to implement the plans of his predecessor, ASV, 10-cm. airborne microwave radar, which the U-boat Metox could not detect. He resumed the Bay offensive. Initial results in terms of U-boats sunk were meager, but the renewed, unheralded attacks by aircraft, especially at night, on surfaced U- boats, led to decisions by U-boat Command that were to result in a rich harvest for Coastal
Command. .
In late March, the U-333 was surprised on the surface during daylight by an ASV- equipped Wellington and in the ensuing battle shot the aircraft down. In April, the U-376 was sunk and several boats were damaged but survived—all the survivors, including the U-333, reported “No Joy” on Metox. German scientists discredited the probability that the Allies had microwave radar. This convinced Doenitz that new transit tactics were necessary to counter the new and yet undetermined threat. Accordingly, in late April, he issued his fight back” order, wherein U-boats were to transit the Bay submerged at night and surfaced during daylight to recharge batteries, if sur-
that
Me
V0r
As
v0y
Vn
V
s
St,
’Ms
''rder
Mi
V<
'he
Th,
Ml,
siclet
Ms
Ms
Ml
air
bill Par1 trit
marine school in 1947, u
. . 1 „n01'
the USS Cutlass (SS-428), from 1957 to 1959. ^
prised by aircraft while on the surface, they were to fight back. This proved to be a serious tactical error which greatly benefitted Coastal Command and contributed materially to the sharp increase in U-boat losses that followed.
Notwithstanding mounting losses, Doenitz persistently held to his “fight back” tactics for over three months. During the six-day period from 28 July to 2 August 1943 alone, he lost nine U-boats in what Coastal Command called the “Big Bay Slaughter.” Such losses could not be sustained, and on 2 August 1943, Doenitz temporarily cancelled all further outward bound U-boat sailings and directed homeward bound boats to follow the “Piening (U-155) route” through Spanish coastal waters where ASV became landlocked against the Pyrenees. In less than a month, however, new ECM receivers, called Hagenuk, capable of detecting ASV, were installed in U-boats, and direct sailings across the Bay of Biscay resumed. None of the original ^'cum- koenig group of U-boats was lost, and from that time until VE Day, U-boat losses in the Bay averaged less than two boats per month. Thus ended the last and most effective Bay of Biscay ASW offensive.
A comparison of the results obtained by aircraft engaged in offensive operations and those obtained by aircraft engaged in convoy operations are revealing. From 1 June 1942 to 31 May 1944, aircraft engaged in the Bay offensive sank less than 3 per cent of the total number of U-boats in transit. During the same time, they sank 15 per cent fewer U-boats, flew over twice as many hours per U-boat sunk, and lost five times as many planes as aircraft engaged in convoy operations. Of greater significance is the readily apparent strong dependence of offensive operations upon tactical errors by the submarines or technical superiority of the ASW forces; for it was during the period 1 May to 2 August 1943 when Doenitz persisted in his “fight back” on the surface tactics in the Bay that Coastal Command sank over half of their total lot, suffered their lowest rate of casualties, killed their greatest percentage of U- boats in transit, and made a record score of hours flown per U-boat sunk. Unfortunately, this unprecedented tactical advantage and success was abruptly reversed on 2 August
,j[ 194
%
served in three submarines and commanded ;
commanded the USS Tringa (ASR-16), from 1956; served on the Staff of ASWGRU3, to 1964; served as ASW Officer, Staff, CornF"" j) 1965-1966; and commanded the USS Mo11" ;
• fw
signed to the General Operations Division U the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C.
1943, when Doenitz cancelled his “fight tactics in the Bay, changed transit and installed ECM receivers to counter
The Biscay Bay episode leads to the elusion that submarines, when properly et,,[ ' and having as their sole mission a safe tranP' ,
P
As a corollary, it can be stated that counter technology can produce an almost irn"u > and possibly prolonged reduction in transit 1 ■ niques—aircraft employed were more effective as U-boat killers than allocated specifically to offensive hunting old1 trolling operations.
These data and conclusions are no' r j
doubt but that the offensive increased total number of submarines destroyed produced an incalculably deleterious ( on the morale of the U-boat crews; b°\ which substantially contributed to the .fi, defeat of the submarine threat in theAtUfJ History also shows that in the Battle 01 v Atlantic, which hung in such precarious J ance in March 1943, air escort-of-co’1' J played a vital if not critical role in avow
1(
n<>"
Kinley (AGC-7) from 1966 to 1968. He is
ba‘
tact11
asv
<?
make undetected transits routinely in a corn®
id'
vironment while subjected to intensive surve1.
transiting submarines encounter highly ef‘, ASW patrol forces, changes in transit tad11
One must also conclude that, irrespe^ of the criteria used—be it raw numbers ^ or more sophisticated cost-effectiveness
escort-»m
sented in an effort to discredit the Ba)
fensive, for such is not the case. There ,s
defeat. British historian S. W. Roskill sta
the early sp
‘For what it is worth.
s^1
ilfK
Escort-of'Convoy Still the Only Way
+Vi#* rntlVOV
55
j.l943 We had a very narrow escape from LCat in the Atlantic; and that, had we su - '.ied snch a defeat, history would have judge ’rat the main cause had been the lack of two squadrons of very long range aircraft c°nvoy escort duties.”
As- ■
yUl V yj- ^ ,
. , t attack the convoys then U-boats would not a-roving in
the escort carnenjho^oduced & ^
search of them. the close-support
deal transition where a roving
escort carrier group and finaily into an convoy support g™^’ Under this
Wepe»d»t were
95*J
•convoy escort duties.” . independent hunter-kiuer gi-m- ere n0
vQ s Previously noted, the superiority ° c0^ concept, escort group comm ,nuous air
,J escorts and heavy losses in the or l r required to maintain hunt down
^ntic caused Doenitz to withdraw U- ^ella over a convoy, but could hu
from that area in May 1943 and shift umW and hf/DF search Thes
Central Trans^lantic Conwy ^ the pe« ^ ^
lt«ntic %ats
S
Vte.
fa,
H
ltati
U-boats by air and H / May to AugUst
> tne cenirai ----------------------------- during the period , t and eight
This new area involved a ongei ’ accounted for out 0f an
,nsit for the U-boats; and therefore, w ^ cqWS) which left only ^ nQ
, jer to effectively increase U-boat concen j n milch cows, an lenishment
!°ns for wolf-pack attacks, Doenitz also With these limited P ^ in the
,, Pioyed tanker submarines, milch cows, to wolf-pack Lboa, possible;
ft area to refuel the U-boats on smtiorn resoum > was no longer P
__________________ were conducted Central ri_r1;tz withdrew ms ^
* -yed tanker submarines, milch co , sources, a wolf-pack u- possible;
he area to refuel the U-boats on smtiorn resoum was nc
refueling operations were conducted therefore) Doenitz withd ^ ^ doing>
lusively on the surface and required roncentrations from the Con-
^able radio traffic between the U-boats concen ^ eUminated a threats t^ ^
, d fhe milch cows in order to effect rendez the area, but also h “Happy
These operations, which involved ex- voys ,.,w h„A hecome the P
______________________ rUcrpo-arded the
Uhe milch cows in order to ettect renuc.- ~~ ^ ^ area, tut - - ^ «Happy
Js; These operations, which mvove me from what had e ^ carriers.
w°flve communications, disregard** Hunting Ground” °f 1 , eives were
^documented vulnerability of U-boats to Hunting ^ ^ groups themselves^ ^
r attack and the probability just as in instrumental in bringing a bT_boats. By
of aq\7______ +v»^t the. enemy had a tech . _ triumph over c^nf-c\
f ASV—that the enemy had a teen- - dcal triumph over forced
^gical advantage, i.e., effective ashore and Jenr the milch “W.S’n' erations
fat hf/df radio direction-finding capa- elumnat g ^ ^ refuehng^ oper^
ility. This was a serious tactical error on c had generated sue a to effect
*n of Doenitz and led to a major tactical wh h g the U-boa
^er^the U-boats" § ^ ^ «
Ti
b
rier groups radio traffic among^ ^ been very suc-
wei.tU T rendezvous. Thi hf/dF equipment,
!? the U-boats. . rPcSfully pinpointed by die hUK
i The Central Atlantic convoys, protected V and afloat, and rfaced
y escort carriers, were making passages both^ as ^ h_ghly vulne able s fcathed, although the escorts had ample Groups concentrations where they indications that U-boats were lurking ref S ^
)0ut. In early June, it was decided that if most oi
mnMPpi - mmm M||
May August
Between May d 15
grOUpS fore ng Doenitz to wolf packs
from this vital region.
ft*
strategy which fails to meet the actual ^ encountered in war can have serious 1 disastrous consequences. . 3
History leaves but little doubt that, g>' ^ choice, escort-of-convoy strategy should ^ precedence over offensive ASW concepB’^ least until such time as sufficient resource ^ made available to conduct both tvpeS operations simultaneously. . pVo
And yet, disregarding the lessons 0 jfl world wars, there is a growing tended.
U. S. and British naval circles, restrict6^ limited and shrinking resources, to c°a trate on offensive ASW programs. This 15 .
to say that offensive concepts and 0 fl{
TCP
five-
and bold changes in technology, equiplTie1^ personnel policies, and tactics. But, it can done—it must be done. t
As Admiral Ernest King said, . • esC^c is not just one way of handling the submar1 menace, it is the only way. . . .”
It is interesting to note that the HUK Groups triumphed in the Central Atlantic and Coastal Command had its greatest success in the Bay of Biscay during the same time frame May to August 1943—and that both offensive ASW operations ended abruptly when the U-boats changed tactics. This is a significant point, for much of the postwar U. S. HUK Group doctrine and new ASW concepts are based on searching for and destroying submarines in transit, rather than concentrating primarily on improving escorts, weapons and tactics for engagements close-in to naval forces and convoys. And there is little doubt but that substantiation for this offensive-mindedness stems largely from the ASW successes in the Bay of Biscay and the Central Atlantic during the period May to August 1943.
This could be a major strategic error, because it does not take into consideration the fundamental facts that both of those successes depended largely upon serious tactical errors committed by the enemy, and that they ended abruptly, never to be repeated, when the enemy changed tactics.
Of further significance is the fact that it took almost four years of war before the two major maritime and industrial nations of the time could mobilize sufficient national resources to be able to conduct simultaneously escort-of-convoy operations in the North Atlantic, and offensive ASW operations in the Bay of Biscay and the Central Atlantic.
Finally, a comparison between offensive operations and escort operations in the North Atlantic reveals what is probably the most significant of all ASW axioms—submarines are most vulnerable when attacking and least vulnerable when transiting.
Today, the Western powers are faced with a far greater submarine threat than in 1939. Determining what is the best strategy to meet this threat is of vital importance; for, the adoption in peacetime of a particular ASW
should not be developed during perl°' ,;ve limited resources. On the contrary, offell> fl[ ASW concepts and forces should be a any over-all ASW program because the) ^ only support the escort forces, but als° ^ tually contribute to the total number ofs marines destroyed. Extreme care, h°" e%CJl- must be taken in both peace and war t0 sure that the aggressive, and therefore ^ parently more effective, offensive A-SV*’ c u cepts do not prevail and eventually a^S°cSl the major portion of available resoiT^ unless, of course, fully justified by c011' experience. ]re
In summary, present and immediate-fo1 ASW strategy should be based on a ^ structure consisting primarily of a prep011 f ance of escort forces composed of air, surf3 ^ and submarine units, but also contain111?^, viable offensive segment. This predonuna1' ^ escort force must be equipped, manned, a‘V trained to engage the enemy, in close P1"0 . irnity to naval forces and convoys, rather 11 in the vast reaches of the oceans or in rent
waters. This will require new, imagina
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