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The Japanese admiral ordered his warships into a neutral port, with the ships of neutral navies present, and—even before a declaration of war had been announced—gave two Russian warships an ultimatum to come out and fight before noon or be sunk at their anchorages. And, to the cheers of the crews of the foreign warships, below, the Russian ships accepted the challenge.
/% s if his unsheathed samurai sword lying on the table behind him were not proclamation enough, Admiral Heihachiro Togo declared, “We sail this morning. Our enemy flies the Russian flag.” To the veteran commanders assembled in the sparsely furnished stateroom of the commander-in-chief on board his flagship Mikasa that dark morning of 6 February 1904, the announcement came as no surprise. Togo read several imperial orders including General Fleet Order Number One:
The fleet will sail at nine this morning and will steer a course for the Yellow Sea to attack enemy squadrons at Port Arthur and Chemulpo. Rear Admiral Uriu, commanding the Second Squadron, reinforced by the armoured cruiser Asama and by the Ninth and Fourteenth torpedo-boat flotillas, will attack the enemy ships moored at Chemulpo and will cover the landing to be made at the same place. The First, Second and Third divisions, and all other torpedo boats, will make directly for Port Arthur. The torpedo boats will go forward in advance and they will attack the enemy on the 8th under cover of darkness. The squadron will follow up the attack on the following day. The salvation of our country depends on this war .
An oriental David was about to attack an occidental Goliath, but, to the commanders and men of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the odds did not seem insurmountable. The fleet had been ordered to prepare for war from the day in October 1903 when the rheumatic Togo had been summoned from his sickbed to Tokyo for an interview with Baron Yamamoto and Admiral Ito. Togo had calmly accepted Yamamoto’s word that “to all appearances there is going to be a war.” The war’s imminence did not surprise Togo, but Baron Yamamoto’s next statement did: “I have the pleasure of informing you that the High Authorities have decided to entrust supreme command of the fleet to you.”
Although not especially brilliant or colorful, Togo was a thorough, intrepid, tireless, commander and had proven himself an aggressive and capable fighter. He retired to the naval base at Sasebo to name his carefully chosen subordinates and to prepare his campaign. Togo could afford to overlook nothing, for he realized that in using the entire Combined Fleet to issue Japan’s first declaration of war against a European power, he was betting everything on a single roll of the dice. If he did not strike a quick, decisive blow and wrest command of the sea from the Russians, the Japanese Army could not be transported to and supplied in Manchuria. Unlike the Tsar, who had naval units in the Baltic and the Black Sea, Togo had only what was assembled at Sasebo; thus, he needed maximum success with minimum loss of ships and men.
Togo took command of the newly reorganized Japanese Navy on 28 December 1903. As commander of the First Squadron, he automatically became commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, assisted by Rear Admiral Nashihi Tokioki’s division of six modern 12-inch-gun battleships and Rear Admiral Dewa Shigeto’s cruisers, the Chitose, the Toshino, the Takasago, and the Kasagi. The Second Squadron, composed of two cruiser divisions, was commanded by Vice Admiral Kaminmura Hikonojo in the Izumo, Rear Admiral Misu Sotaro in the Iwate, and Rear Admiral Sotokichi Uriu in the Naniwa. Rear Admiral Uriu commanded the Naniwa, the Akashi, the Niitaka, and the Takachiho. The
Third Squadron of merchantmen and auX' iliaries was commanded by Vice Admit3* Shichiro Kataoka.
With these men-of-war, Togo planned 1° tackle the world’s third largest navy—2(- battleships and 272 other vessels. Yet, this WaS far from a suicide mission. In the Far East, the Russians had only seven battleships, five protected cruisers, two gunboats, 25 destroy' ers, and two mine-layers at Port Arthur, three armored-cruisers, one protected cruiser, and 17 torpedo boats a thousand miles away at Vladivostok, a cruiser and a gunboat a* Chemulpo. Furthermore, Togo’s excellent intelligence network knew the precise location and condition of them all. He knew like' wise that the Russian Navy was poorly led; untrained in fleet doctrine, and unprepared for war.
On the morning of 6 February 1904, as the mists began to clear around Sasebo, Togo’s destroyers stood out, followed by the battleships, cruisers, and jam-packed troop transports. As they steamed into the Korean Strait and set course for the unsuspecting Russian squadrons at Port Arthur and Chemulpo, Admiral Togo took his place on the bridge of the Mikasa.
Togo ordered his men to torpedo defense quarters as the fleet steamed into the inky night. By dawn they had entered the YelloW Sea and Mokpo loomed up ahead. Off this southwestern tip of the Korean peninsula, Togo detached Admiral Kataoka and his auxiliaries to patrol the straits against any raids by the Russian squadron at Vladivostok. With his rear position thus assured, the Admiral set course northward toward his objective and signaled farewell to Rear Admiral Uriu and the transports as they veered off for Chemulpo in the fading light of afternoon. Their mission was identical to his—to end the months of prolonged negotiation with action and to settle the Russian-Japanese issue with force.
The Russian-Japanese issue centered on a conflict of interests in Manchuria. Originally the territory had been won by the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and although officially ceded to the Japanese by the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 17 April 1895, had been restored to the feeble Chinese Empire
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'V Joint British, French, and Russian pressure. Loss of Manchuria chafed Japanese pride, tnying to Japan, as it did, both markets and
r°om to expand. Manchuria, therefore, became a recurring issue in the early years of the . °th century and a focal point in the continuing effort of the great powers to preserve the ^pen Door in the Far East.
Growing Russian aspirations in Manchu- tia in 1898, Russia had acquired a 25-year ease of Kwantung, and on that peninsula, uilt both Port Arthur and Dairen—supported by an alliance with France and unofficially backed by Germany, alarmed the j-ffiinese and caused the United States, Great ritain, and Japan to fear eventual division
China. Further complicating the situation Vvas the desire of the Japanese to regain Manchuria either by peaceful alliance with Russia 0r by an attack on Russian Manchuria supported by an alliance with the British. Eventually the British, determined to avoid the Experience of isolation they felt in the recent °oer War, took action. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed 30 January 1903.
This alliance temporarily checked the Russians in the Far East and pressured them into promising the evacuation of all their troops in Manchuria by 8 October 1903. Unfortunately, they failed to keep their promise, adding to an already lengthy history of bad faith, and negotiations were resumed. Naturally, the Chinese refused to accede to fresh Russian demands and the situation deteriorated so rapidly that Admiral Robley D. Evans, the commander-in-chief of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, feared that war would break out at any moment. Accordingly, the United States stationed three battleships, two monitors, and several cruisers at Chefoo, China, during the summer of 1903. In July, the Japanese began separate negotiations with the Russians, but the latter vacillated to such an extent throughout the summer and fall that the negotiators lost all patience. Simultaneously, the British continued talks with the French and completed all but the finishing touches on an entente which was to be signed 8 April 1904.
As early as October 1903, press reports from the Far East were predicting war, and
by Christmas, the Americans in Japan were sending home alarming reports about the military buildup in Japan. Admiral Evans noted that in Nagasaki, “war preparations were evident everywhere, and I was thankful that the shops could spare time from their own work to do what was required for me. The work being done by the Japanese clearly indicated that they expected to ship a large number of men and vast supplies from this port.”
Vessels of several neutral navies and three Russian ships were moored in the anchorage at Chemulpo, as Rear Admiral Uriu’s squadron approached the port to disgorge the first three thousand regular Japanese Army troops. Among them was the USS Vicksburg, a gunboat of 1,010 tons displacement, commanded by Commander W. A. Marshall. The Vicksburg had been sent from the Asiatic Fleet moored in the Yangtze river to Chemulpo in answer to a request from the American minister for naval protection. In light of the tense situation in Korea, Minister Allen had good reason to be concerned; American interests in Korea in 1903 had a promising future. In addition to some 250 missionaries and Americans living in Korea, the United States had financial interests in the Seoul- Chemulpo railroad, and Americans ran all the electric lights, street lights, and gold mines in the capital city of Seoul.
Midshipman Leroy R. Brooks, Jr., two years out of the U. S. Naval Academy, was on board the Vicksburg when she got underway and stood out for Chemulpo on 27 December 1903. Crossing the waters between the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, the Vicksburg reached Mokpo, in much the same manner as Togo would six weeks later, and turned north. Picking her way between the fringe of islands that lay off the Korean coast, the Vicksburg headed for Chemulpo. On 30 December, the ship stood in toward the harbor and up the narrow channel and finally came to anchor in 12 fathoms of water.
As was the custom in those days, the Vicksburg exchanged boarding visits with the other ships in the anchorage, including the Russian cruiser Variag, which had arrived the same day.
The first morning of 1904, the crew of the American gunboat dressed ship for the New
Year’s Day holiday, flew the Japanese flag at the masthead in honor of a Japanese holiday exchanged visits with other vessels, fired gun salutes for the Queen of Italy’s birthday an® the accession of the English king, and held the usual field days, signal drills, and inspec tions. The routine was broken slightly on 5 January when the ship dispatched Lieutenant McDougall, U. S. Marine Corps, Lieutenant Witherspoon, a hospital steward, and a Ma' rine guard of 35 men to duty in the U. S’ , Legation in Seoul.
On 4 January, another American vessel) the supply ship Zafiroi arrived to join the Vicksburg, HMS Sirius, HIJM Chiyoda, and the Russian gunboat Giliac. Another British man- of-war, HMS Cressy, anchored the following day and was joined by the Italian cruisef Elba on the 7 th, the Russian Boyariu and Hth- Talbot on the 9 th, and the Russian gunboat Koritz. A German ship, the Hansa, was in and out, as was the French cruiser Gueydon. By the first week in February, only the Elba, the Pascal, the Vicksburg, the Zafiro, the Koritz, the Variag, and the Sungari remained. HIJ^ Chiyoda, in Chemulpo to reconnoiter the naval scene, had sailed to rendezvous with Rear Admiral Uriu.
Having an opportunity to visit these men- of-war, Midshipman Brooks jotted down notes in his cruise journal, including a description of the Chiyoda.
H.I.J.M. “Chiyoda” is a steel protected cruiser-
2 screw, 7 funnel, and 3 military masts. Length 310 ft., beam 42 ft., mean draft 14 ft. Displacement 2450 tons and IHP 5500. Speed 19 knots. Coal capacity 420 tons . . . Armament consists of 10 4.7" Q.F. guns, 14 3 psc R.F. and 3 Gatling guns. Also
3 torpedo tubes.
Of the Chiyoda’s adversary-to-be, Brooks commented:
Russian “ Variag” is a steel protected cruiser of 6500 tons displacment, 2 screws, 2 masts, and 4funnels. Length 440 ft over all. Beam 52 ft. Mean draft 19ft. I.H.P. is 18,925 giving a speed of 23.25 knots on a 12 hour trial run. Protection: by coal and by Krupp steel deck 1\" to 3" thick. Cofferdams packed with cellulose. Heavy gun shields 4\” to 5" thick. Conning tower 3" thick. Armament: 12 6" Q.F. 12 12pds R.F. 6 3pds R.F. 4 torpedo tubes, 2 submerged.
nknown to the officers and men of this lser, the Variag and Koritz were awaiting a j 3te wiffi destiny. Midshipman Brooks wit- essed the 9 February 1904 engagement:
ev .,e Japanese fleet appeared off Chemulpo on the ^ning of Feb. 8th and part of it, consisting of two cUlSerp four torpedo boats, and three transports, AN inside and anchored. During the night about g tr°ops were landed, half of whom went to wbile the rest remained at Chemulpo, the sh' ^ fface being under martial law. The Russian cfs Variag” and “Koritz” lay at anchor in I ternulpo where they had been for about one month, Snorant that war had been declared from the 8th.
* 8-'30 a.m. on the 9th, the Japanese ships all
got under way and stood out, laying off entrance to the harbor just out of sight, being joined there by the remainder of the fleet that had not come in.
About 7:00 a.m. we received notice from the Japanese Rear Admiral, brought by a Jap policeman from shore, that war was declared and that it was his intention to attack the two Russian ships at their anchorages, providing the latter did not go out by noon. All foreign men-of-war were warned to keep clear of the scene of action.
About 9:00 the two Russian ships commenced clearing for action; little preparation was made by the “Variag,” but “Koritz” cut down all topmasts, and put hammocks along after rails as protection.
At 11:20 a.m. “Variag” got underway and at 11:25 “Koritz” got underway and stood out in
Barbara Brooks Tomblin
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Afterward, on board the U. S. gunboat Vicksburg, Midshipman Leroy Brooks recorded his impressions of the events he had witnessed. Among the several illustrations in his journal is his sketch showing the approximate position of the hits the Variag sustained.
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column. At 11:50 the first gun was fired by a Japanese ship, when the Russian ships were nearly out to Todolmi Id. The engagement thus commenced at a probable range of 1000 yards or over■
It is almost certain that the Japanese guns that did the firing were only the heavy calibers, equal to 8" at . least, and above. Probably the battleships did most if not all the firing, the range being too great for the use of smaller guns. The Japanese ships could not be seen at all until they closed in at the last of the engagement. The Russian ships used brown or black powder while the Japanese used smokeless powder entirely. From all accounts the “ Variag” never got within striking range with her 6" guns, the heaviest she had.
The general movements of the Russians seemed to be that the “ Variag” circled with starboard helm after passing a little way beyond Todolmi Id. firing each broadside as it bore on the Japanese ships, , while the “Koritz” ran in and fired her forward 8" guns during the turning of the “Variag.” The “Koritz” kept to the southward and eastward of the “Variag” the whole time, except once when the latter passed her to the eastward. About 12:15, the .
“ Variag” turned to the westward and ran in so as to place Todolmi Id. between her and the Japanese fire, the “Koritz” still remaining some distance to
e<jsttoard but also running in behind Yodolmi. The apanese fleet now closed in rapidly from S. W. and rj-°pened fire as soon as their guns were able to fiar; one large ship probably the “ Asama” passed °dolmi heading eastward. About 12:25 or 12:30 oth Russian ships headed in for Chemulpo anchor- agt full speed. The Japanese fire was continued at lerr>, principally the “ Variag,” until about 12:40 when firing ceased on account of danger to foreign ,nen-of-war present in the harbor. As the “Variag” ported in, a Japanese torpedo boat stood in rapidly Rivards her from the S. IV. but was repulsed by her re before getting close.
C{ Russian ships stood in and anchored, the Variag” at 12:50 and the “Koritz” at 1:20, tvhile the Japanese fleet lay off the entrance to the arbor. The “Variag” exhibited slight list to port and was on fire aft slightly.
The English, French, and Italian ships all sent °spital boats to lend medical assistance and we sent °ur medical officer in whale-boat to do the same, to the “Variag.” The approximate loss was one °fficer killed (Count Alexis Nierod) who was blown to pieces by a shell on the bridge, two officers seri- °Usly wounded, 34 men killed, and about 70 bounded.
About 2:30, the “Variag” was listed considerably to port and in sinking condition, so started to abandon ship, all foreign men-of-war including ourselves, sending boats to take off men and officers. These were all transferred to the “ Talbot,” “Elba,” and “Pascal.” Two officers were brought here but later sent to the “Elba.”
About 3:40 the “Koritz” abandoned ship in their own boats, leaving their ship apparently in perfect condition, and going to the “Pascal.” At 3:57 the “Koritz” was blown up internally, evidently done by a time train intentionally; and sank at once, only smoke stack and part of the upper works remaining visible. The “Variag” continued listing heavily to port and the fire gained headway aft, due probably to ammunition left loose on deck, and soon after flames broke out fiercely on her quarter-deck. She continued sinking over to port until 6:01 when she went down on port beam, with a fearful sound as water filled her, leaving only a little of her broadside visible.
A Russian merchant ship at anchor near the “Koritz” was abandoned before the latter blew up, and was later set on fire and burned until 2:00 a.m. before sinking.
The opening engagement of the Russo- Japanese War was thus a victory for the
Japanese squadron. The commencement of hostilities in such an unusual manner, both at Chemulpo and at Port Arthur, prompted Admiral Evans to call it “a proposition so startling, so new, so at variance with custom and international law that men did not believe it was serious until the result of the fight that followed a few hours later was flashed over the wires.” Rear Admiral Uriu had ordered his ships to enter a neutral port where ships of neutral navies were present, and he had issued an ultimatum to Captain Rudneff of the Variag before a declaration of war had been announced officially. Admiral Uriu’s audacious act sounds more like something he might have read in the U. S. “penny dreadful” magazines of that day rather than at the U. S. Naval Academy, from which he graduated in 1881, 26th in a class of 72.
Had the Russians remained in the anchorage after the hour specified in the ultimatum, one wonders whether the Japanese would have entered the harbor and fired on the Variag and Koritz in the presence of neutral men-of-war. The fact that the Japanese ships ceased firing when they came within range of the neutral ships promotes this speculation.
The Russians might have chosen to wait and fight the Japanese well within the narrow confines of Chemulpo anchorage. Had they done so, the outcome of the engagement could have been very different. The neutral vessels might have been hit and probably would have opened fire in self defense.
In a situation so elaborately confused by alliances, the result of such an engagement is difficult to predict. The British, represented at Chemulpo by the Talbot, were allied with the Japanese, but simultaneously were conducting secret talks with the French, who were represented by the Pascal and were allied with the Russians. The Vicksburg, representing the United States, was pledged to strict neutrality. Teddy Roosevelt was, however, an admirer of the Japanese and a sympathizer with their cause. Furthermore, U. S. relations with Russia were strained, and the memory of a nasty incident involving the crew of the Vicksburg a few years before remained fresh in Roosevelt’s mind.
An indication of the difficulties of maintaining strict neutrality in the Far East in 1904 lies in the incident that Marshall, commanding the Vicksburg, created by his actions during the Chemulpo incident. As Midship" man Brooks related, boats from the neutral i vessels were sent to aid the wounded and carry off survivors. The Russians asked ; Marshall for permission to use the USS Zofiro for their wounded, but Marshall refused. He thought that the Japanese Red Cross hospital in town was more adequately ^ equipped.
Later, the Russians carried angry articles , in their press denouncing Marshall for refuS' ing to aid Russian survivors and for not receiving survivors in the Vicksburg. In addition, Marshall was denounced for not joining the other neutrals in a protest to the Japanese.
Secretary John M. Hay considered Marshall’s actions proper, as American naval officers were not permitted to join in diplomatic protests without instruction from their government. As we have seen, the two engineering officers who had remained on board ( the Variag to open the sea cocks were taken off by Brooks’s boat and first taken to the Vicksburg before they requested a transfer so that they might report to their commanding officer. The Russians, however, were not satisfied with the American explanations, and the issue was revived in May. The press then published a dispatch from the Russian minister in Seoul, citing certain brutalities al- 1 legedly committed by Marshall. These were emphatically denied, but they indicate the delicacy of the international situation and some of the problems of neutrality.
The Russian accusations are best understood in light of their humiliation. They had boasted for years that the Japanese would never dare to attack them and now the 1 Variag and the Koritz were gone, not to mention those ships damaged at Port Arthur.
The Japanese wrought this destruction on the Russians without receiving any hits or suffering any casualties. News of the success reached Admiral Togo as he was en route with the fleet to a rendezvous off Chemulpo, j Togo was elated to add Rear Admiral Uriu’s spectacular success to his qualified victory over the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. At the cost of four dead and 60 wounded, Togo’s Combined Fleet had sunk a merchant ship, a gunboat, a cruiser, and had damaged the Cesarevitch, the Revizane, the Palladia, the
A shell from the Asama exploded at the foot of the Variag’s mainmast, detonating the ammunition that had been placed there to enable her quick-firing guns to maintain their rate of fire.
The French cruiser Pascal, and all foreign men-of-war in the harbor, sent boats to take survivors off the Variag, which was anchored, but listing considerably to port, and in a sinking condition.
Her list to port grew, and she heeled slowly until all her gear fell with a tremendous crash across her decks. She finally went under, a hissing mass of flame, settled, and lay with her starboard side just visible, her guns pointing skyward, her torpedoes in their tubes.
Novik, the Askold, the Bayane, and the Diana. Although by no means a total success, it had at least accomplished the immediate goal, so seriously weakening the Russian Asiatic Fleet that Japanese command of the sea was assured. The oriental David had trounced the occidental Goliath thoroughly. The world could not ignore this triumph and at last Japan was recognized as a modern naval power to be reckoned with.
In Tokyo, word of Togo’s victory was greeted by a thousand banzais, a sentiment not shared in other world capitals. In St. Petersburg, as in Port Arthur, the Russians were in a state of shock. Togo’s guns had blasted them out of a dozen years of complacency and negligence. The Tsar was outraged, and immediately issued a declaration of war, but nothing could compensate for his inexcusable ignorance of the rudiments of naval strategy. That the Variag and the Koritz had been trapped, unprepared for war, in the anchorage at Chemulpo violated many principles of the naval profession. Later, in a book written after the war, Mahan severely criticized the Tsar and his admirals for ignoring the principle of concentration and allowing the Russian Navy to be dispersed to the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Far East. Mahan clearly demonstrated that, unless a naval power is obviously supreme, it does not attempt to do two things at once. Yet the Russians tried to use their navy to defend their interests in three different areas of the world. The Black Sea squadron was useless, because Japan’s allies, the British, controlled egress through the Dardanelles and considered the Russian commander’s request to leave with his squadron as humorous, but impossible. The Baltic squadron would not have been able to defeat the British Grand Fleet in event of a war; but had it been united with the other units, it would have been powerful enough to prevent a Japanese attack on Manchuria. According to Mahan, the Russian navy should have been united in one place; the precise location of Vladivostok, Port Arthur, or the Baltic was not the crucial factor.
Within the Far East squadron itself, the principle of concentration was notably violated when the Russians sent ships to Chemulpo and Vladivostok, separating them from
A graduate of Scripps College Claremont, California, Mr*' Tomblin drew much of thc material for this article froi1’ the cruise journal of Lero)’ R. Brooks, Jr. “Lt. Brooks/ she wrote, “resigned from the Navy in 1908. ... I suspect3 certain Florence Metcalf (later Mrs. Brooks) had some' thing to do with this decision She bore five children, one of whom was my father Grandfather’s support of the Navy continued until his death in 1963. For many years he was a member of the Naval Reserve and the Navy League.” Mr®- Tomblin was an Assistant Librarian, Cleo Press (Hi*' torical Abstracts), Santa Barbara, California. She is presently engaged in writing a book on the Mediterranean theater in World War II.
the main force at Port Arthur. This division could perhaps have been upheld in other circumstances, but during the winter of 1903" 1904, diplomatic atmosphere in the Far East was extraordinarily tense. This tension culmi' nated in the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan on 5 February 1904, and violently erupted into war three days later. Hindsight reveals that this Russo- Japanese War had been brewing for over ten years over the control of Manchuria, though the Russians steadfastly refused to believe that the Japanese would resort to war. Yet even in 1902-1903, most naval officers and informed persons in the Far East saw the war as inevitable.
Admiral Evans speaks for many observers of that era when he says:
Why they did not see, as the rest of us did, that war was inevitable and almost upon them was more than I could understand. Every Russian officer I met made the same grave mistake; they all underrated their enemy and believed that Japan was afraid to go to war with them. The preparations for war were so evident and so earnest that any reasonable intelligent observer should have seen them.
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In 1903, the press was sensationally predicting war and, although the foreign offices of the major powers were predicting peace, no thinking man could afford to ignore the strong possibility that war was imminent. Nevertheless, the Tsar sincerely believed that a peaceful
1° Asan> . „ . afng Squadron of which Togo, in Naniwa ^ riUs flagship at Chemulpo), was a mem- er- As the Tsi-Tuen proceeded up the chan- 6 ’ her steering gear jammed and she ran straight
_ for the Japanese. In the ensuing ^'itement, the crew of the Naniwa thought ey spotted a torpedo (there was none) and aPened fire. The rest of the ships followed, ^nd eventually a badly mauled Tsi-Tuen eached herself. The opening engagement of n Undeclared war was a Japanese victory W‘^h no casualties for Japan and heavy losses n icted on the Chinese. War was officially eclared a week later.
° ution to the issue would be found, and he uld not prepare his fleet for the conse- U^ces should negotiations fail.
*s folly is compounded when one con- j- ers the ironic precedent set ten years bee Jn the Sino-Japanese War. During this tlict the Chinese and the Japanese were *nPeting for control of strategically im- fo rt3nt Korea. Hostilities began prior to a I riTlaI declaration of war when the Chinese ofr> troops at Asan some 35 miles south Th ^ernu^P° to crush a rebellion in Seoul. e Japanese responded by sending 4,000 n to Chemulpo and they managed to gain sential control of the capital. Japan then 1 nt China an ultimatum demanding that the q, er renounce all her claims to Korea.
*na s answer was a convoy of troops es- J?rted across the Yellow Sea by a sloop, the yUjang-ti, and a protected cruiser, the Tsi- ^en- Near the mouth of the inland passage pj Asarh the convoy ran into Japan’s First
Togo was a critical observer of the Japanese Navy’s performance in this war, but he lcl not let its victory over the Chinese giant °ud his judgment or cause him to exaggerate Japan’s success. Instead, he took Ireful note of her shortcomings and saw e need for vast improvement in gunnery, navigation, communications, and engineer- ‘"g- Togo also realized the need for a firmer grasp of the fundamentals of naval strategy *n general, and for concentration of forces and proper deployment in particular. Neither
navy had been properly deployed at the beginning of hostilities. So, in retrospect, Togo knew that his success off Asan could easily have been the end of his career had the First Flying Squadron been caught by the main body of the Chinese Navy.
Admiral Togo was a realistic, farsighted man who sought lessons from the past and looked to the future with imagination. The Tsar of all the Russias was not. In these times, it may be well to recall the lesson of this war—that sheer size and reputation of superiority can be no substitute for training, efficiency, alertness, elan, and a firm grasp of the fundamentals of naval strategy. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the Russians should have realized that the new Imperial Japanese Navy was soundly built, precisely trained, ably led, and by no means awed by the Russian presence. Not having heeded the lessons of the first incident near Chemulpo, the Tsar remained in the doldrums of security. He failed to see that the Japanese were competent, spirited fighters who fought to win and were not above disregarding the laws of custom and international law.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was in a sense the prelude to the 20th century, a century that has been characterized by war. Japan’s surprise attack on Chemulpo and Port Arthur was the dawn of an era and another step in the rise of Japanese seapower. The Japanese were learning to compete with the Western world and, in the process of copying and refining Western ways, were creating a few ways of their own, among them a unique concept of warfare. It was as if the Japanese had surveyed the rules of warfare and international law and considered the formal declaration of war somehow passe in the 20th century. For, as the following years were to prove, war was no longer a “gentleman’s game” and the only “gentlemen’ who won were those like Admiral Togo, who realized that the subtle refinements and accomplishments of the past had no place in the ruthlessly competitive and mechanized world of the future.
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