The Elusive Goal of Nonproliferation

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Beginning with the Baruch Plan in 1946, America has fostered a policy to retard the acquisition of nuclear arms by additional nations. Under the 1946 McMahon Act and subsequent legislation through the years, the President and Congress have hewed to that policy. But emphasis waxed and waned. Within the last four years, interest has height­ened in securing an international agreement. The draft treaty tabled at Geneva’s Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in August 1965 can be described as the culmi­nation of this effort. Attempts to reconcile the counterversion proposed by the Soviet Union were fruitless until 1967. Agreement followed in the wake of “the spirit of Holly Bush” and the Glassboro summit meetings between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin. By 14 March 1968, the ENDC transmitted the text of an agreed-upon treaty to the United Nations General Assembly. After six weeks of free and full debate, the General Assembly, by a vote of 95 to 4 (with 21 abstentions), passed in plenary session a resolution commending the draft treaty. On 1 July, the treaty was signed in Washington by 56 nations. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was dispatched on 9 July by the Secretary of State “for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.” After hearings conducted over only four days in July, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported favorably “with­out reservation” and sent the treaty to the Senate on 26 September. Partisan politics delayed further action. Ratification was carried over for the Ninety-first Congress.

At the time of this writing, a new Adminis­tration is expected again to ask the Senate to take up the proposed treaty for settlement. If it subsequently passes, this discussion can serve only as one man’s guess of what will then result. If the treaty is still pending, admonitions on the inherent weaknesses and pitfalls may impel additional reflection on the possible consequences of this foreign policy action by the United States.

Why nonproliferation? One answer is that power imposes obligations—puissance oblige. Hence, this nation assumes world leadership in the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. Nuclear weapons,

it is said, are provocative and dangerous in the hands of the less rational and less reliable . nations. Thus, the United States, with ^{a 1} moral obligation to future world peace and stability, must prevent the horror implicit in nuclear weapons being perpetrated else- | where. This rationale falls short of the mark- Questions of morality aside, the basic j purpose lending impetus to efforts to halt the j spread of nuclear weapons rests on the as­sumption that proliferation threatens the 1 security of the United States. The mutuality of interest manifested by the United States and the Soviet Union is based on the fundamental desire of the superpowers to maintain nuclear hegemony. The role of the United Kingdom ' as a co-sponsor in this venture is moot. Lack­ing participation by the other nuclear nations —France and China—Britain occupies a role with the nuclear-greats only as a kind of courtesy and by the fact that the United Kingdom is a nuclear power of sorts.

The central point, of course, is that the United States, through its official spokesmen, t senses increased danger in the international environment with additional nations holding the means to nuclear destruction. Implicit is the concept that newer members of the nuclear club would be somehow less respon- j sible or unrestrained in the use of these weapons. However, the dangers envisioned ¹ by the “responsible” powers stem from the ( possibility of accidents and escalation—spread ; of limited war into much larger, more violent; and less controllable wars. This was the , danger cited by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in his landmark Am¹ * Arbor address. This viewpoint may be less than credible since it is likely that, initially; ¹ none of the new nuclear-possessing countries , would have resources to create much more than a limited pre-emptive capability. As­suredly, an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons will not be symmetrical. No military element has done so in the history of warfare- _v Diplomacy that ignores militancy is barren statesmanship. Tactics in diplomacy, like tactics in warfare, must rest in part on calcu­lated risk, to be sure. But the payoff must make the venture worth the gain. After a ; period of past indecision, the United States I^s now committed to an international venture unswervingly aimed at preventing the spread

°f nuclear weapons. American statesmanship ^and prestige affirm the rightness of that deci- ^Sl°n. Still, policymakers have been known to delude themselves.

While publicly proclaiming that the chance °f accidental or local conflict involving the great powers is increased and stability de­ceased by the growth of additional nuclear Powers, the United States has nevertheless ^aided proliferation de facto. Directly, U. S. distance helped Britain to become a nuclear ^state. Indirectly, through its program of genial to France—by a variety of real or 'magined slights—the United States again was '■he primary agent in furthering nuclear

growth.

An avowed policy of nonproliferation by 'he United States, then, did not retard the decision by Britain or France when each of 'hese countries decided on a national nuclear orce. (A strong case can be argued that h ranee, the once-staunch NATO ally and haditional friend of America, would have ^elcomed the co-operation extended Britain.

^ut the “special relationship” did not extend '° France. A convincing case can, of course, ^e made for this decision.) Nevertheless, the ⁿuclear decision is an exercise of national ^s°vereignty. It is strange, then, that America ^Seeks to curtail this act of national sover­eignty by other nations, when it achieved only ^ahure in its efforts on behalf of two of its Warmest friends and allies.

Two additional nations, both members of Communist camp, have become nuclear Powers—the Soviet Union and China. Just ^as the United States could do nothing to pre­^Vent these nations from joining the nuclear ^ub, we can do nothing to prevent any other ''on-friendly nation from joining. Britain has ^altered and failed to keep its nuclear forces at ^a formidable level. France, stung by the ^r,Tictancc of the United States to treat it with ''T'al favor, set about a costly and tedious ohnical program of constructing its own ^cleaj- arsenal. Today, after eight years of ^0rt! the French nuclear program is still ^s'^ruggling to emerge as an effective force. The j^sultant schism in the Atlantic alliance, ^r°ught on by what seems to be a duality of Oierican purpose has grown over the years. That continued adherence to a nonpro­liferation policy will contribute to a further alienation within the Atlantic alliance is the opinion of many, including William C. Foster, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, generally regarded as the chief architect of the Nonproliferation Treaty. He acknowledged [in Foreign Affairs, July 1965] that an erosion of alliances could result from “the high degree of U. S.-Soviet co-operation which will be required if a non­proliferation program is to be successful.” Foster went on: “Within NATO, there could be concern that the detente would lead to a weakening of our commitment to Western Europe.” This problem, he noted, “will be particularly acute in Germany where there will be the added concern that the ameliora­tion of the East-West confrontation could lead to an increased acceptance of the status quo in Central Europe.”

His argument held that proliferation of independent nuclear weapons would lead

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not only to division within NATO, but also within the Warsaw Pact and other alliances as well. Moreover, Foster asserted, “we must accept the fact, then, that either nuclear pro­liferation or its successful prevention is likely to weaken alliances.” His disheartening- “damned-if-we-do-and-damned-if-we-don’t” dogma appears to offer U. S. diplomats little opportunity for positive, productive proposals. But of this we can be sure, the maladroit actions of the United States in its endeavors toward the elusive goal of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons assures the first portion of Foster’s prediction as a self­fulfilling prophecy.

Let us look for a moment to recent history and consider America’s diplomatic approach. First, in pursuit of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted a series of bilateral dis­cussions in an effort to reconcile their respec­tive versions of treaty drafts. Understandably, America’s alliance partners were miffed when the NATO Council received the draft agree­ment after superpower concurrence. Secondly, only after the press leaked reports of the State Department hints that it would proceed even without NATO’s blessing did the Council finally give its assent. Officially, unanimity prevailed. Privately, many NATO partners grumbled at the type of “consultation” employed by the American representatives. Genuine co-operation and consultation could have salvaged NATO unity and cohesiveness. Precipitate desires by the United States to ram through a superficial “agreement” may yet cost it dearly when the chips are down.

U. S. diplomacy, in tandem with the Soviet Union, promises to undermine the basic foundations of NATO. It should not be forgotten that one of the enduring goals of the Soviet Union is the systematic erosion of NATO. A coalition of the Soviet Union and the United States, intent on resolving one of the most formidable problems facing all human­ity, does not imply altruistic motivations for the Soviet leaders. These efforts serve to pro­vide a convenient vehicle to arrive at the same old destination.

European NATO members now see many signs of a new U. S. priority—detente—and, with it, superpower arms control agreement.

If this interpretation gains credence, it is certain to denigrate the Atlantic alliance and lead to eventual disillusionment within Europe. Their Soviet co-operation with the United States in nuclear arms control is regarded with much suspicion by Europeans, since Europeans know that the Soviet Union’s interpretation of alliance commit­ment cannot be equated with that of the United States. If, as Foster concedes, pro­liferation does weaken alliances, it can be expected that this development, should n occur, will weaken NATO to an extent far greater than it will the Soviet bloc, which rules and is ruled by an iron hand.

The recent crushing of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members testifies to this. The cruel checkmate of Czech freedom should put to rest the myth of a benevolent Soviet regime. The threat toward Western Europe prevails at an un­paralleled level. Brute force, when called for, will continue to typify the conduct of the Soviets toward friend and foe alike.

Well-meaning and, indeed, correct, efforts toward bridge-building and steps toward detente initiated by the United States need not be attained at a cost of close partnership with our allies in Europe. Only the cynic will crow: “Where else can they turn? They need us.” Perhaps so. But, co-operation conducted in an environment of acrimony and suspicion will yield only disappointment. The debacle of the Czech seizure and its chilling effect on detente diplomacy should galvanize the European nations of NATO to reassess the potential threat facing them. Fear of what the U.S.S.R.-Warsaw Pact forces could do might well provide the fuel needed to ignite action toward a strengthened NATO conventional force level on the continent. The defensive backbone of the alliance has needed stiffening for a number of years. At this juncture, the United States has an opportunity to lead its allies toward the improved NATO force structure that has long been lacking.

Continued emphasis by the United States on the possible hazards that may be en­countered by potential independent nuclear initiatives may only serve to cool the ardor of the allies to react in a positive manner to a revitalized alliance. The time is ripe for the West to capitalize on the political misadven-

Nuclear technology is no secret. A nation ^Can attain independent nuclear status by a ^variety of means well known to the scientific community. Every country that has gained ^s°nte measure of nuclear arms thus far, how­^ever, has elected to do so by means of the Saseous diffusion process. After preliminary efforts, the United States finally decided on |he diffusion process for its weapons program ^ln the 1940s. Until recently, other avenues Promised only uncertain results and costly 'avestments as well. Therefore, it is not mrprising that, following the lead of the ^ ⁿited States, every other nuclear nation has gained that status by the diffusion process.

resent technology, however, offers attain­ment by the plutonium reactor, which is far

costly and less difficult. A review of the

asic criteria for a weapons program is ^llseful at this point.

Lacking a substantial industrial base, a Ration is unlikely to make a decision to manu- actur⁶ _an independent nuclear arsenal, mgnificant scientific expertise is needed in a mrrnber of technical processes. Capability apuld include knowledge and experience in joining and milling, the refining process, ^abrication of the fuel element for the reactor, r^eactor operation, the chemical and metal- ^Urgical processing of radioactive materials, ^ail(i assembly. Few nations meet all these requirements.

Industrial capability, then, is not the sole ^Criterion. Each of the steps toward a status

^lures of the Soviet Union and turn the results ^to a military advantage. Implicit suspicions of Possible nuclear ambitions, inherent in Ameri­can emphasis on a Nonproliferation Treaty, ^Can only serve to divide the cohesiveness of NATO.

Political reasoning, however, can be de­nted endlessly. Persuasive argument may be Clustered with equal fervor on both sides of question. But, in addition to strong diplo­matic pressures that should give America Pause in continuing a policy with the empha- ^Sls on nonproliferation, inflexible technical ^reasons continue to raise serious doubts as ^ell. Certain hard and inescapable facts demonstrate that the issue of nonproliferation '^vill not be resolved on a rationale of moral diplomacy or political desires.

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of nuclear arms imposes some burden of economic, scientific, industrial, and political motivation. Given the requisite impetus, time is required for planning, design, and construc­tion of facilities, followed by additional time requirements for the production of material and weapon assembly. In all, a minimum duration on the order of years is going to be required to undertake a systematic annual output of weapons material, in order to con­struct facilities, and to acquire a stockpile of weapons.

The global distribution of nuclear reactors readily indicates the wide growth of nuclear technology. The U. S. Atomic Energy Com­mission (AEC) estimates that 442 reactors are built or being constructed by 70 nations. Of this number, at least 19 nations are proceeding with their own technological efforts. The remainder have received assistance from other countries (primarily from the United States and the Soviet Union). The United States alone has exported 57 reactors to 42 nations and the Soviet Union has sent at least 16 to 12 countries.

Today, a nation having a large commercial electricity-producing nuclear reactor is well on the road to becoming a nuclear power. This is so simply because these power reactors are directly related to plutonium production. Plutonium is one of the man-made elements used as weapons-grade material for the fueling of nuclear weapons. Without going into the technical background, it is sufficient to note that plutonium is a transuranic radio­active element, which is an unavoidable by­product derived from the production of power using nuclear reactors fueled by natural or slightly enriched uranium.

Harlan Cleveland, as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, stated that “in a world dotted with power reactors, each one of these contains the seed of warmaking potentials.” This is an inescapable fact.

For every 100,000 megawatts, a reactor will produce between 25,000 and 40,000 kilograms of plutonium annually. This fol­lows the projections presented in December 1967, when the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that global annual electrical pro-

duction from peaceful reactors by 1980 would equal 100,000 megawatts, producing 25 tons of plutonium: “An amount equal to 100 bombs of minimum size every week.” It has been reliably estimated that something near 8 kilograms of 95 per cent plutonium-239 is the minimum quantity needed for a nuclear weapon with a 20-kiloton yield (Hiroshima level bomb). Therefore, the following pro­jections reflect this quantity and level of production.

From reactors—about 600 megawatts (e) in output—already planned for production in the next few years, a number of nations will produce plutonium in sufficient quantities to fabricate significant numbers of nuclear weapons. (In the future, 1,000-megawatt (e) and 1,500-megawatt (e) reactors are en­visioned.) In Western Europe alone, the Federal Republic of Germany will have the capacity to produce approximately 350 20- kiloton weapons annually; Italy, 140; and Spain, 307. In the Soviet sphere of influence, the totals are quite low; only 20 or 25 for most nations, but 80 for East Germany. In the Middle East, the United Arab Republic has a low future potential for these weapons, but Israel could construct about 20. In greater Africa, Tunisia and the Union of South Africa will have a potential plutonium stockpile suffi­cient for a dozen or more weapons. In Asia, India is already storing plutonium stockpiles and is capable of fabricating about 85 20- kiloton weapons or a lesser number of greater yield. Japan has the resources to produce 400 or more weapons of this size.

As noted above, some nations will be ruled out of serious consideration as potential nuclear independents by the sheer scale of the technological requirements. France, for ex-

S- founder and, for a while, the only member of the Nuclear Club, the United ke ^t6S ^^as consistently opposed membership of all but the British. But that didn’t ~~~n^ °^Ut    ^^uss*^ans> the Chinese, and the French. Nor is it likely to bar any nation

° •flatter how backward or bellicose—that has a large commercial electricity- ^Ucing nuclear reactor. And 40 nations now have them.

¹¹ Photographs UPI

ample, has encountered embarrassing delays brought on by technical problems and lapses of expertise in critical areas. But a significant number of nations will find opportunity offered through a growing stock of plutonium to undertake a modest nuclear program. This is the specter that haunts American policy­makers bent on closing that opening for good. The technology is no secret. Plutonium pro­cesses are known and solvable to any nation with a fair degree of technical capability. Nuclear fuel is relatively abundant and avail­able on the open market. Given the needed political or military impetus, any nation that elects to do so will not find the path to inde­pendent nuclear status—of a sort—difficult to negotiate. Two potential stumbling blocks that might be expected are illusory; the cost is relatively modest and the operation can be conducted covertly.

The AEG estimated, in a report of January 1961, that an investment on the order of about $50 million would enable a nation to acquire plutonium sufficient to yield a “crude” weapon annually. In recent years, the march of technology has outmoded the concept that a nation can produce only an inferior nuclear weapon at great cost. Today, countries already possessing the requisite power reactors find costs to be far less. It should be stressed, however, that the proper perspective for the newer members of the nuclear club is that they might attain the status of France or China or even the United Kingdom, through modest investment, but only over an extended time period. In effect, new members can acquire nuclear arms, but members cannot expect to be of equal stature. None are likely ever to equal the nuclear superpowers, to be sure. Many may gain status, and perhaps equality, by matching the middle powers. The financial investment for a venture of such limited utility would not be high for a nation given reactor technology based on an ongoing production. The cost factor is no hindrance.

If weapon testing and source-ore-to-metal costs are considered for a completely inde­pendent program, the cost is still relatively modest. The projected expense of producing weapons-grade plutonium from a 600-mega­watt power reactor can be considered. Five nations are undertaking 400-megawatt re­actors; six plan 500-megawatt size; six are planning 600-megawatt types. With this large capacity reactor the cost of electricity production will be independent of the plu­tonium production. That is, the normal flow of electrical power for commerical and industrial resources will continue uninter­rupted. Operation of the plutonium output for a military program will not impair the peacetime effort.

A small program of production over a ten- year period of ten warheads annually, each with a yield of about 20 kilotons, would require a total of 80 kilograms of plutonium annually. The corresponding total plutonium produced in conjunction with electricity pro­duction in a large (600-megawatt) power re­actor, would cost only $22.4 million per year in capital and operating costs. Individual weapon cost breakdown for a 20-kiloton weapon process of at least ten annually, thus, would be only $2.3 million per weapon.

Therefore, for roughly the cost of one F-l05- type fighter aircraft, a nation can acquire ten 20-kiloton weapons per year; i.e., ³ rudimentary nuclear force. For a half-dozen nations this cost amounts to less than a 2 per cent increase in their estimated 1968 defense budgets. Others can produce sub- , stantially more weapons for similarly modest percentage increases: Japan, 100 annually fo^r 6.3 per cent; India, 20 annually, for 1.5 pet cent; Spain 40 annually for 7.3 per cent; the Federal Republic of Germany, 80 annually for 1.06 per cent. A number of other na­tions emerge as likely candidates for an ¹ independent nuclear force. Most are allies or friendly to the United States.

Technical capability is especially advanced in the industrial nations of Western Europ^e and virtually all of the NATO allies have ex­hibited progress in the peaceful application . of nuclear energy. The present research pr°" grams of the industrially advanced countries put these nations in the front rank as poten­tial nuclear powers.

In brief, research reactors and power reactors are ready sources of weapons-grade plutonium. The former offer less potential, but the latter facilities are capable of yielding sufficient levels of weapons-grade material that constitute a significant first step toward a weapons program. Subsequent technology;

^e-g., a separation facility, is available to the •nclustrially advanced nations. Moreover, the continuing research and technological investi­gations and increasingly active development of the fast-breeder reactors promise a future ^era of great growth. Hence, the outlook for eventual conversion to a nuclear program Presents a potential of virtual certainty.

Independent production of nuclear arms does not tell the total story, however; to be effective, some delivery means is required. Some few nations, notably Japan and Sweden, are working on missile systems that may find their way to the open market in the future. It ^ls more likely that the technology of miniaturi­zation for warheads would impose an onerous burden on most would-be nuclear powers. A more realistic outlook for the embryonic ⁿuclear nation lies with use of present air­craft. A number of nations—the FRG, Italy, Belgium, and Japan—could rely on the ttUclear-capable F-104 Starfighter, or some ^such similar aircraft. With the proper retrofit these aircraft can carry a nuclear payload. Their performance is comparable to the Mirage 4 in speed and range (with about 50 P^er cent bombload capacity), quite suitable for the new nuclear power. Bear in mind that the French depend heavily on the Mirage; the British rely on the aging V-series and Canberras. The Chinese to date have only subsonic Tupolev and Ilyushin aircraft. The ^spread in delivery forces between a new ’"•clear power and the established middle nations would not be difficult to overcome.

Moreover, the means by which a nuclear aspirant could begin to close the gap can be Undertaken on a covert basis. If as little as, ^say> 5 per cent of the plutonium produced by Peaceful reactors were diverted, the resultant UHal would still yield significant numbers of nuclear weapons. Japan could produce 40- "cld, the Federal Republic of Germany, 35; .Pain, 30, and so on. A 5 per cent diversion

quite modest and the related process can be ^Slmilarly hidden.

In 1966, Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman ⁰ the Atomic Energy Commission observed tat “it is perfectly feasible to build a clandes- ^llne chemical-processing plant using readily available technology and equipment.” Thus, espite existing technical and legal safeguards uected through the agreements of the

United States and the IAEA, there is ap­parently no safe, sure means to prevent a nation from acquiring the requisite weapons- grade material for a crude weapon. For example, the safeguards and the control oper­ations of the IAEA are only “nominal.” In order to be genuinely effective, the safeguards capabilities of the IAEA will have to be ex­panded. As former under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach noted recently, “. . . the safeguards system must be further per­fected. . .” The infrequency of inspection and personnel and expense shortages that plague IAEA at the present time do not assure that total and complete observance is possible. Under bilateral and IAEA agreements, the option exists to inspect large numbers of the current operating reactors.

But the real point is that there is little technical work on controls being performed by the IAEA itself. Moreover, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the past has publicly expressed doubt that the mini­mum safeguards for controlling the nuclear weapons material are being maintained. A special report of the United Nations Associa­tion cited the fact that the IAEA has a staff of only 15 inspectors applying safeguards to more than 50 reactors in 24 countries. There are now more than 300 research reactors and over 60 power reactors in more than 40 countries. Thus, many nations are in a posi­tion to carry out a clandestine unilateral nu­clear weapons program.

It should be clearly evident that neither technical nor economic barriers will serve to long impede any nation bent on undertaking an independent nuclear program. More disturbing, however, is the fact that covert or clandestine nuclear diversion can occur with little likelihood of detection. Responsible American and international spokesmen have acknowledged this fact affirming, to be sure, their strong conviction that diversion has not occurred. Perhaps they are correct. Perhaps not. The pertinent point of significance here is this: these present and inherently unreliable safeguards are the very same that are to pre­vail in force under the nonproliferation treaty.

In summary, then, it is obvious that several issues of a political and technical nature mili­tate against the success of efforts to retard the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, there

are a number of serious defects within the body of the treaty itself. The limitations of this forum preclude full discussion, but it would prove useful to adumbrate the most significant drawbacks.

First, a serious incompatibility arises be­tween regional organizations like Euratom and the IAEA. Basically, the issue boils down to a question of authority. In order to conform to an international system, Euratom will be forced to relinquish a substantive degree of self-control. At bottom, the issue is sover­eignty. Inspection will come under the auspices of the IAEA, and in order for the treaty to be operative, a merger is necessary. The question that arises in all marriages is, which one will it be? The issue is resolved; IAEA will be dominant. The implications for future growth of the unity of Europe are widesweeping. Without the impetus of a deep regional tie, unity is likely to atrophy. Not only will Europe suffer, but also the conse­quences will have worldwide repercussions.

Secondly, as mentioned above, the security system itself is suspect. There is no safe, sure way to ascertain that cheating will not occur. The very serious issue of verification remains clouded. This is an area left to be worked out at a future date by the states concluding the treaty. Another area similarly vague and left for future resolution is the question of eco­nomic responsibility. The projected inspection costs range from a minimum of $11.8 million to $58.6 million in 1970 to better than a billion dollars in 1990. The issue of financing the expensive inspectorate staff and equip­ment required is unresolved. The financial obligation, unless adequately shared, would constitute a staggering burden if, say, the United States were forced to underwrite the fiscal needs of the IAEA.

Third, and perhaps foremost, is the fact that nations signing the treaty have only a hollow “pledge” of assurance as to their security. The Security Council Resolution 255 is a tripartite guarantee of little meaning. Under this guise of assurance, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain serve notice that aggression by nuclear weapons against a signatory state (i.e., one without nuclear arms) will be met by “immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the [United Nations]

A graduate of the University of Maryland in 1955, Doctor Harrison was employed by the Martin Company from 1955 to 1958 and the Vitro Labora­tories from 1958 to 1960. He was on the staff of the Institute for Defense Analyses, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group) Office of the Secretary of Defense, from 1960 to 1963- Since 1963, he has been with Research Analysis Corporation and a part-time instructor in the Uni­versity of Maryland’s Government and Politics Department.

Charter.” The usual allowances available under Article 51 are affirmed as well. The so-called assurances are contrived to be less than adequate and, indeed, promise no more than now prevails. The moral legalisms of this resolution are not apt to lure any nation into signing the treaty. Attempts of this nature by the superpowers to give a pledge of security are only ambiguous and uncertain. In times of crisis the only reliable trust will be found within the ties of existing alliances or extern sive bilateral pacts of a military nature. Any other promise to employ military force to resist attack on a non-nuclear nation must be assessed as less than credible.

Nations nearest to attainment as nuclear powers have in general failed to approve the treaty or else hold grave reservations. From ³ practical point of view, these countries are friendly to the United States. Their arms will very likely never be used against the West- Only the Soviet camp need fear this develop' ment. If America’s effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons applies only to its friends, where is the gain? Technical bilateral aid in the nuclear field, administered by the United States, will advance peaceful use of the atom' j Military efforts by friends and allies can be controlled through effective American dipl°' macy to a far greater extent than an inter­national agreement.

In conclusion, the treaty is ill-conceived- Attempts to build barriers that deny nuclear arms to additional nations asks those states to forego forever the possession of that which the major powers of the world deem essential to security. This self-abnegation cuts to the very essence of sovereignty. In an era of rising

nationalism, this is asking a great deal indeed. Compelling reasons suggest that the United States is unwilling to come to terms with the inevitable—which is, briefly, that the nuclear club will expand, whatever efforts short of a shooting war are invoked to retard it. Inherent *n the implications of the nonproliferation treaty are the seeds of discrimination and suspicion that will grow beyond discontent to discord. A prudent course for future American diplomacy should be to channel and control the inevitable and abandon a policy to pre- ^Vcnt that which cannot be averted.

U. S. diplomatic goals need rethinking. Nuclear proliferation will occur. But, if it

takes place amid the acrimony that charac­terized the French program, our diplomats will have learned very little from the lessons of recent history.

For the United States to continue to oppose nuclear development can only result in en­mity and weakened links in the West’s de­fenses. And, who will profit most handsomely? Would it be the Soviet Union, which now finds it so advantageous to link with us in com­mon cause? And, what will the United States gain from this partnership? Perhaps, if we are lucky, we will reap only a harvest of bitter resentment and disappointment.