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others. Familiar icons to Americans, f°f ample, include such things as the Na1"
Anthem, the Harlem Globetrotters, and daily Dow Jones averages. Any hero, .. or dead, serves a similar purpose, as do ■
ho"'
Politics has many aspects. Mainly:
co111'
blJ
Policy-makers, it must be remember^
id.
make decisions based upon the geograp^ environment as they imagine it to be, n°
tl>e
A reincarnated Phineas Fogg could still take 80 days—or considerably less if he chose—to circle the earth and would find that the terrain hasn’t changed much in the 97 years that have passed since his last trip. But pity poor Passe Partout, Fogg’s redoubtable manservant. Even Passe would be hard pressed today to work out an itinerary with all the new, strange names that make even a pre-World War II map virtually useless in 1969. Should Partout’s master, for example, visit either Mauritius or Mauritania, on what continent (s) are they? And how, presuming he cared to, would Fogg get from Lesotho to Rwanda? Via Chad or Guyana?
Let us leave Fogg and Passe and their bottomless bag of pound notes to work out their own peculiar travel schedule. For, our problems far outweigh theirs.
Since World War II, we have watched the colonial “captains and the kings depart;” we have seen revolutions topple the old, comfortable regimes; we have observed civil war first decimating, then disseminating, entire populations. And we have learned that there is no such thing as a “local issue.” Most modern political events exert some sort of influence on the entire world.
No nation can stand aloof from world politics. Participation is mandatory, but the manner in which a nation responds to any given situation must be carefully harmonized to the prevailing world environment and orchestrated to evoke favorable reactions. In short, modern international politics require interpretation by a trained political expert— a political geographer.
Many false conclusions have been reached by people who simply pick up an atlas and examine it for a few moments. They see population clusters, climatic conditions, vegetation distribution, and, of course, boundaries. Too frequently, however, they make the mistake of identifying some “natural” boundary, such as a river, mountain range, or desert. In reality, the first geographic lesson to be absorbed is that boundaries only exist because a political unit feels itself different from its neighbor.
To be an identifiable nation requires a great deal more than an unusual climate, a prevalence of certain vegetation, or the presence of some topographic feature. A be-
Jfl
lief, a language, or a common history uSf forms the iconography—an accumula1*0^ national symbols—that causes one t0 J pride in his own country to the exclus'01’ ..
tl>( livitf do terns of religion, economics or politics- •' v thing, in fact, that gives a people a sen^, uniqueness, a nationality, can become iconograph, and even cursory geogrfPj shows that most boundaries, both nat‘° and international, are not caused by P ography, but are divisions rising from minds of men.
ever, it is the social power of the state in'3 ing control of men by men. Those in mand must be able to elicit favor3 responses from those who are ruled. * ‘ must be able, through some type of perS j.t sion, to inflame a population to war or m3 it acquiesce in defeat; they must, in s'l3;]f politically control the major sector of v population or resort to violence, allo'v archy, or be deposed.
Such a task is formidable even for Sl1 small political units as municipalities, a3f when it is broadened to ever-larger units job becomes progressively more difficult- , the time we reach the international poliu . plateau—diplomacy, for lack of a bett., word—world powers face the even 1110 j prodigious task of making their political a’’ economic systems acceptable to their nd!? bors.
Each country, of course, has evolved j own personality; its own value system! 1 own methods. It is left to the political Se°\ rapher to collect pertinent data, integral into a global context, and translate the ** suits into ideas that are understandable by set of values peculiar to his own nation.
necessarily as it is. To illustrate, early in morning on 7 December 1941, military cO^ manders at Pearl Harbor acted as if a norm3 Sunday were commencing. Actually, a Jap3 nese attack force, part of the real environmel1
all!
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id £*' | lll^
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tm ^out to make itself abundantly appar- fina 'rn*larly, the king and queen of Spain Ce<^ Columbus’ voyage to discover a did r°Ute t0 As‘a> even though such a route t* actually exist. And, on a smaller scale, into an<^s weUs are drilled every year
pQft^^ata that contain no oil. What is im- sibj nt’ *n each of these cases, is that respon- . lndividuals made their final decision
A
^1 M
V|t0 Ration might also be made of the British, u*lt a major base at Singapore on the a lnPtion that swamps and jungles would be fr0 ami barrier to attackers approaching
W/'"-
Fedibly
ttacker.
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Cje arge part of the reason for the dis- is raacy that exists between reality and what Imagined is a rapidly expanding world bayn°logy. Aircraft and ballistic missiles ^C shrunk the world greatly, and the aver- ;ji atan has had a difficult time keeping Coi)east of new information. Of almost equal ^^quence, however, is the fact that the Ca,^ c.0mrnon maps do not depict reality and Se imaginations to run rampant.
°ur
0n the best available information.
^lalaya. The French Maginot Line was er monument to misinformation. Inmany Americans still consider the a barrier sufficient to fend off any
-MUgluauuija tun lanipdiii.
Pe ubiquitous Mercator world map shows
. "'orld to be rectangular—not like a b^mas tree ornament glittering in space 'ita 3 sP°e^ox—usually with the United of |tCS strategically centered. Relative shapes
masses are faithfully preserved to be j>ro - but only through the introduction of q Ss distortions in relative size and distance, inland, for example, with an area of
sUr,
Policy and the Political Geographer 59
840,000 square miles, appears as large as South America whose area is over seven million square miles. And, the distance between Moscow and New York appears to be
shortest via London. .
It is impossible to illustrate the relative positions of North America and the Soviet Union around the North Pole by using a Mercator projection. If one relies only on Mercator, it is equally impossible to understand why the Defense Early Warning systems were located in Canada and Greenland or, for that matter, why Columbus didn t fall off the ends of the world.
Historically, the Mercator map has caused us to see geography from a world of fantasy. Its use caused otherwise intelligent people to lobby for a naval base at Pago Pago, American Samoa, as an “outpost” to protect the western side of the Panama Canal. It contributed to the 1898- annexation of Hawaii and Guam, which were touted as being on a direct line with the Philippines, but are actually some 2,000 miles too far south. Many other examples could be cited. The thing to remember is that people—a category, lest we forget, that includes presidents and military unit commanders-base their decisions on the information they receive and, as important, how they picture reality based on that information. It is therefore incumbent upon those who prepare briefings to select t e tools (maps, graphs, etc.) and materials that approximate reality the closest, which means that the Mercator map should be left to navigators, and that data should be closely examined to glean from it facts considered pertinent by those you are reporting on, as well a* those vnu are reporting to.
An enlisted man in the U. S. Navy from 1951 to 1955, Mr. Winters graduated from Ventura Junior College in 1957, then transferred to the University of California where he received his bachelor’s degree in geology. A petroleum engineer with Standard Oil Company of California from 1959 p|0 to 1962, he has since been em-
I>.( ;.?* by the U. S. Navy as a general engineer at the ^ Cl. c Missile Range, Point Mugu, California, work® ln the Satellite Geophysics Program.
To make political geographic analysis work, a certain amount of theorizing is,> ° course, mandatory. Political motives an is tributions are critically affected by unforeseen technological and environmental changes brought about by man or nature. lor accuracy, these factors must be made a part ol t e environmental equation.
Israel, for example, has become a major factor in the Middle East largely by converting deserts and swamps into productive land. Israelis have built airports, harbors, and highways; planted new forests; introduced nuclear
sho"'1’
iron’
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itho1'1
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Union emerging as the behemoths in an dustrially oriented world. This is basic3 , good for the two countries; however, pold1 analysts should always be aware that dustrialization has drawbacks as well. Spe^'j fically, in a major war it will be the indust11 nations that will suffer most, perhaps, to ^ point that world dominance would be a* sumed by emerging nations of Asia, Afrif3 and South America simply because the- have less to rebuild. .
It would be difficult to stress too strong the impact of advancing technology upon t1 political environment. Policy-makers 11111 take this into consideration when they Ill3V their decisions. This means, in turn, that 3 visors to policy-makers must make m° realistic recommendations than they do no'1' And estimations at all levels must reflect ho'
water conversion plants even as they have made themselves a major regional military power. Few foresaw these major changes, and fewer still would have believed them possible. Nor is this the first time the world has been taken off-guard in the Middle East.
Opening the Suez Canal in 1869 focused the attention of the world on this same area. The canal probably would never have been constructed had Egypt been able to see it as England saw it. From its inception, the Suez was more than an artery for international trade, it was a route of national communication for England with India and Australia. Consequently, its strategic geography being rather obviously affected, England occupied Egypt and took control of the canal.
The United States, too, exhibited more than casual interest in the internal politics of Colombia when a trans-isthmian canal became a reality. Few analysts, on the other hand, were able to foresee the real strategic value of the isthmus or its future dominance of U. S. policy in Latin America before construction became a definite probability. Currently, of course, we are actively exploring for possible new routes across the isthmus. It must be wondered how much time has been spent to determine the effects of a new canal on the future politics and economics of the United States and Panama. Such analyses should be undertaken because man has the ability to control, at least to some extent, the outcome of projects planned and constructed by him. Man should take full advantage of what little environmental control he has because most changes occur whether he likes them or not.
Physical changes, beyond man’s control, have the potential to bring about radical political change. The results of a major natural catastrophe could, if it struck in the right place, seriously affect the defense capabilities of any nation. An earthquake in Iran could make the country vulnerable to attack, and a hurricane-ravished Cuba would certainly be a weaker opponent. And, how might the space race beyond the moon be affected by a hurricane that severely damaged launch facilities at Cape Kennedy, Florida, or by a devastating earthquake at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California? The space exploration initiative could easily pass, in its totality, to the Soviet Union, 3n<^ complexion of international politics certainly change. Natural phenomena, j* should play an important role in the ®a ^ of decisions; yet, seldom are they seri°u ^ considered. Catastrophes are, of c°l . ^ rather imponderable and we might f°r= .
their being overlooked, but the disdain advancing technology as a political env’1 mental factor is inexcusable.
By looking at the impact of technology
oceanic space for an example, we can ea ^
demonstrate what can happen. At the turnef
the century, theories concerning sea P°V
were nearly as old as the sea itself; yet, 10 ^
the old concepts are obsolete even though
oceans have changed scarcely at all- 5
marines carrying torpedoes and more ^
cently missiles, have come upon the see
aircraft carriers have replaced battles1 r
because man invented airplanes; nucle
powered ships can sail for months 'V1
refueling. All of these factors have playeu ^
significant role in the changing concep1
sea power, and they have exerted trernend
political influence. Add this to the fact 1
the oil industry has discovered oil 111t
offshore waters, and has the ability to prod11 ^
it in water depths exceeding 10,000 feet, a‘|._
sea power concepts take on entirely ne"'
mensions conditioned by industrialization'
Advanced technology is, of course, aln1f
synonymous with industrialization, and '
find both the United States and the So'1
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,iiy.
adversaries and allies view reality.
, Too often we accept decisions by foreign fitments as being beyond reproach We > to be saying that, if a decision has been 1 Cached, the decision-maker knew all the pos Cities. In truth, foreign diplomats, as well ks °ur own, make decisions which are, a close approximations of the optimum 1
',nV given situation. ,
now, it should be abundantly clear that 'n order for diplomacy to succeed, a grea ^ of diverse information must be collected analyzed. It should also be fairly obvious Tat the nnlitiral geographer has the unique
tra!
Policy and the Political Geographer )
„litics of a given nation or group of nations with far more acumen ttan^etwee„ ,he In the Union, all the
United States an h ld be utilized,
expert help available shou & yiable
Quite literally our very existen ^ ^ The
dem0t'awithP which we typically approach
^^’"S-^odern
phenomenon, whereas, ^1S i^^roSant- “line” has existed ^ “ don, and the Ro- ism, the industria the Eastern Orthodox
mans were stopped by , ^ penetrate it;
Church and the Tu aided by the
and, Western tho scYant indentation.
Voice of AmerlC and wherefores of this
IS-'u'nhnown and unstudied! soil,
advi*1
hangc
that animosities were very real before D ’ co-operation anything but good thereane In this era of brinkmanship diplomaw’ nothing can be left to the imagination. ^ perts must gather and evaluate informal1
simply because it does exist, this imaginary line demands our most imaginative consideration.
Americans tend to take a view of world politics described by Stephen B. Jones, one of our foremost political geographers, as kinetic rather than dynamic. Viewed thusly, areas may be in contact but not necessarily in conflict. To cite an example, California and Arizona normally have a kinetic relationship until one mentions Colorado River water rights. Then, as any Westerner knows, the relationship becomes very dynamic.
Stated another way, the kinetic approach to world politics sees all problems solvable by agreement, with dynamic, politically dangerous situations being converted to kinetic situations in the process. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, operates just the opposite and goes about establishing dynamic situations. The Soviet leaders are intelligent enough, however, to recognize and exploit our approach by constantly talking of “peaceful coexistence.” Vietnam is a typical dynamic situation that the United States is trying to convert to a kinetic one in Paris. At the same time, economic assistance and political propaganda flow in a steady stream from Moscow to maintain the dynamic status quo.
Everyone realizes, of course, that settlement of problems by treaty or agreements is far superior to war. We must, on the other hand, always remember that there is an operable force in international politics that sees things quite differently. If necessary, we must, on occasion, set ourselves to dynamic tasks even as firefighters occasionally use fire to fight fire. Constant analysis of changing situations is the key.
Mr. Jones has devised a unified field theory of political geography, which many have found extremely useful in analyzing world events. The theory consists of a chain of five links: Political Idea—Decision—Movement —Field—Political Area. This “chain” should not be looked upon as solid; rather it
should, in Jones’s words, “be visualized J chain of lakes” that can be entered at ' point, with freedom to move in either di tion for sake of analysis. t0
To show how one might put this the0^ use, the Soviet Union had the political 1 to obtain a foothold in the western hemisp*1^. A decision to actively seek the political 1 °V of Fidel Castro was made, whereupon ®°' ment of money, arms, and technical began. This field of Soviet activity, excH __ of diplomats, and economic assistance, led ^ Soviet allied territory, or political area, 1° . western hemisphere. This is but an exarnp. and others could be given. There is no l*1' . upper or lower, on the magnitude of a p°* cal idea. Limits are, of course, present for i cisions, movements, fields, and pold1 areas, depending on world events.
Jones’s theory offers a flexibility in politlC . geographic analyses for it allows the ana) to substitute factors as necessary. When de ing with the Soviet Union he can analyze° set of values that will describe our relat*0 prior to World War II, make a few adjuS ments, and do the same during hostilh1 Such an approach will clearly demonstr
tiof
that is ultimately presented to our P°*lC'|j makers. Otherwise our foreign policy prove no more fruitful than the action take1’ by the doctor who desired privacy. HaVir1' found that people frequently wandered int|| his unmarked office unannounced, he hn11" up a sign that read “Doctor’s Office—PlcaSl Knock.” Everybody did. Everyone 'v^’° passed the door dutifully knocked. In ^ effort to correct a bad situation, he had m3c it worse. He failed to recognize the suscep11 bility to regimentation, the impetuosity, ^ practical joker that is present to some degreC in all men—and in all nations.