Some naval officers will remember the competitive negotiations conducted by the Bureau of Aeronautics back in the early part of 1964, for the development of an aircraft that would respond to the requirements established in the Sea Based Strike Warfare Study. That aircraft was described as the VAL which, in the vernacular of the trade, shakes out to be a carrier-based, light attack aircraft. Although never as controversial as the contracting for the TFX, VAL negotiations drew considerable interest, being conducted in the diminishing glow of that heated battle. Naturally, interest was even more pronounced within the confines of the attack carrier Navy, and specifically among the officers and men who flew and maintained the Navy’s then existing inventory of light jet and prop attack aircraft.
The decision is history, the winner of the contract award, LTV Aerospace Corporation, Dallas, Texas, launched immediately into the prodigious task of turning all of the winning contract guarantees and design specifications into hardware.
In the interest of brevity, it can be said that the development of the A-7A Corsair II was completed in record-breaking time. The airplane made its first flight on 27 September 1965, and was delivered to the Fleet (VA-174, NAS Cecil Field) in mid-October 1966. To give you an idea of the required timing involved, my squadron, VA-147, was not commissioned until February of 1967, and yet, amazingly enough, the squadron and the airplane deployed into the combat environment of Southeast Asia, as scheduled, on 4 November 1967. As of this writing, the squadron is on the way home from deployment, without recording a single operational accident in almost 4,000 hours of combat flight operations during the worst months of Vietnamese winter weather. In fact, due to the Pueblo incident in Korean waters, the squadron had the unscheduled opportunity to operate for one month, in February, in the cold Sea of Japan area. No major problems were encountered. This is a record unmatched by any newly introduced aircraft in aviation history. I submit that, as the Commanding Officer of the Squadron first to employ this weapons system in combat, the records are truly satisfying; for all concerned knew the results could have been vastly different when viewed from the predeployment planning time frame.
To support the evaluations to be made in this discussion, I feel I must submit my convictions in terms of the existing and future mission requirements for an A-7A type of aircraft. The Corsair II, in design concept, is a state-of-the-art, visual delivery, weapons system. There are many, and extremely knowledgeable officers who feel that a strictly visual delivery system fails to satisfy the requirements of Attack Aviation in this day and age. They offer further evidence to indicate that a common airframe can be “versioned” to meet various missions, thereby simplifying the problems encountered on our CVAs—such problems as the variety of engine and airframe maintenance logistic requirements. This observer cannot take issue with these advocates of commonality, and admits (as a maintenance officer of long standing) that the shop facility requirements in our carriers are approaching the saturation point.
At the time contracting for the A-7 was in process, in fact, to this date, in my opinion, there was no available airframe which could economically be made to satisfy the requirements necessary to meet the varied missions established for the attack carrier in today’s international political environment. Lead time for production of a modern weapons system is the single most critical factor in the Fleet introduction of a new aircraft, and the pressing requirement for a more capable and versatile light attack aircraft, was a fact of life at the time the A-7 was conceived.
A professional viewpoint, derived from association with the development of the Navy’s all-weather delivery systems, might be stated in this manner: While I am absolutely convinced of the requirement for the offensive capability such systems offer, I must maintain my immediate support for the best possible fast-response, visual platform, that can economically meet the demands of brush-fire war. The A-7 certainly offers such versatility, with the ability to respond to any escalating international situation that might reasonably be encountered.
The A-7 now exists in the Fleet inventory. It has had an admittedly short evaluation under combat conditions, but that evaluation has been more than satisfactory from any point of view. While the development and subsequent Fleet introduction of the A-7 experienced many growing pains, such as steam ingestion during catapulting, the initial deployment date was met on schedule. Further, and most unusual in past aircraft development to date, the A-7 has never experienced problems that have required the Fleet-wide grounding of the aircraft. This, in itself, is a significant improvement over most such introductions and to the best of my knowledge, is an all-time “first” in aviation history.
I had the good fortune to be the first Fleet aviator to fly the airplane in Dallas, in August of 1966. From my first flight I was impressed with the airframe, the engine, and primarily with the completeness of the weapons system. The A-7 as has been noted, was conceptually a state-of-the-art improvement in proven attack weapons systems. As such, many systems are “off the shelf,” incorporating, for example, the most recent A-4 Sky- hawk components. The current design allowed for functional installation of these components for optimum function and maintainability. The aircraft is virtually capable of delivering all weapons in the Navy’s arsenal, with minimum configuration changes, and maintains a respectable self-defense posture while in all of its attack configurations.
Probably its most desirable advantage, apart from the weapons versatility, is the installation of the first operational ducted fan jet engine in a tactical aircraft. The Pratt aft Whitney TF30-P-6 offers almost unbelievable fuel specifics in terms of previous jet engine performance. It makes possible the tremendously “long legs” attributed to the A-7. Naturally, internal fuel (just over 10,000 pounds) can be used for long-range flight profiles, or converted to long-endurance "loiter” times on station, as required by mission assignments. An example of the range was impressively illustrated by the Patuxent River-to-Paris flight, completed in the spring of 1967, to participate in the Paris Air Show. The profile was flown with four external fuel tanks installed, but without intermediate stops or in-flight refueling. The flight time 7 hours, one minute, over a distance of 3,327 nautical miles, and the aircraft landed with an adequate fuel reserve. This, as aviators will readily affirm, is an impressive range single-engine jet combat aircraft. The plane can be “trapped” on board ship with almost 6,000 pounds of internal fuel, and in a Carqual environment, uses only about 150 pounds of fuel for each cycle through the deck. "Bingo,” a one-word designator for that uncomfortable decision-situation comprising the sticky factors of fuel-remaining to get aboard versus the distance to the nearest diversion point of landing, or inflight refueling, is not a problem. Obviously, the increased flexibility offered the carrier skipper is a vast improvement over other jet aircraft that must constantly be monitored for fuel state to prevent embarrassment.
As to weapons capabilities, when fully equipped for self-defense, with two Sidewinders and over 600 rounds of 20-mm cannon ammunition, the A-7 weighs approximately 20,000 pounds. Its catapulting gross weight limitation is presently 38,000 pounds, which permits a useful load of fuel and ordnance of 18,000. A comfortable configuration includes a full 10,000 pounds of fuel, with four 2,000-pound bombs. This load rounds out to catapult maximum gross weight; however, if the mission or order-of-battle so dictates, and the flight profile permits, fuel quantity may be downloaded to permit use of two more bombs or any of the various air-ground missiles on the remaining two-wing pylon stations. The load has been employed in Vietnam as and it is an impressive configuration, by any standards.
Mission flexibility is virtually limitless. Valuation has been completed for most armed recce/strike missions, as well as for Anti-Sam employment, Rescap, Naval Gunfire Spotting, Long-Range Recce, In-country Close Air Support, Special Conventional Air- to-Ground Missile strikes and others. All configurations have proven most effective, and the computerized weapons delivery system has demonstrated a noteworthy improvement in delivery accuracy across the broad range of pilot experience.
Other significant improvements, most readily received by the pilot, include a new development Air-to-Ground Attack Radar, a much improved navigational computer, and a computerized automatic roller map to maintain an accurate “present position.” The cockpit display of these systems is outstanding, and though actual weapons delivery must be predicated on visual contact with the target, as previously pointed out, the en route navigation can be completed under solid instrument conditions. In fact, this squadron has conducted night low-level navigation flights through the Sierras on many occasions during pre-deployment training, and, after one gets used to the idea, the results are outstanding.
The natural reaction of the experienced weapons employment officer is to question the reliability/maintainability of a weapons system advertised to provide this improvement in capabilities with the resultant sophistication. Experience to date with the A-7 has proven it capable of being maintained at daily availability rates nearly equivalent with our sister A-4 squadron on WESTPAC deployment. Weapons system and delivery reliability was excellent, though, as one might expect availability started off rather low, principally because of our inexperience, and finished with the squadron averaging 10 to 12 aircraft available out of 13 on board the ship. This in spite of the considerably increased requirement to reconfigure ordnance systems for delivery of many more of the sophisticated guided weapons—now available through the introduction of the A-7—than was required of the A-4 or A-6 squadrons. Care and feeding of the A-7 has obviously required an increase in the number of men and rates assigned to the squadron. Further, considerable technical training is a prerequisite to the assignment of these personnel to the operational squadron. Consideration must be given, however, to the fact that the A-7 provides roughly twice the delivery capability of the A-l/A-4 systems it promises to replace. With this thought in mind, the personnel allocations are very much justified in terms of the total striking power available to the Attack Carrier Strike Group with multiple squadrons aboard. It is my prediction that the Navy will see much of the Corsair II in the future, and it is just possible that the A-7 will be around for as many yeas, and in as many different models as the Corsair of World War II and Korean fame.
Control effectiveness and handling characteristics are outstanding through all flight regimes, and for those who feel the A-7looks like the Crusader, let me hasten to assure you that its carrier landing characteristics are fat more similar to the A-4. All assigned squadron pilots enjoy flying the airplane and express ready confidence in its performance and reliability during operations on Yankee Station. That in itself constitutes a significantly favorable endorsement of the developmental efforts on the part of the Navy Systems Commands and offices, and the many civilian contractors that delivered the airplane to VA-147 for combat evaluation.
As of May 1968, it can be said that the combat history of the Corsair II, is the squadron record of the VA-147 Argonauts. It has been my pleasure to have had a hand in the welding of both the airplane and the squadron organization. No man could achieve greater personal satisfaction than to be assigned as the first commanding officer of a “brand new attack squadron,” be allocated the first deployment model of what promises to be a brilliant new carrier-based attack aircraft, and to be able to prove the mix in combat.
This is the Corsair II as I see it, a worthy heir to an illustrious name in naval aviation. And even in the awareness of the A-7’s admirable potential for operational longevity, there is equal satisfaction in the knowledge that the continuing process of development/procurement is concerning itself with the follow-on for the Corsair II and its successors.
Enlisting in the U. S. Navy in 1948, Commander Hill served at NAS Whidbey Island before transferring to the Aviation Cadet Training Program at Pensacola, Florida. His first tour was in an ASW squadron, and later he was an Instructor Pilot in the Basic Training Command. Following a shipboard tour in the USS Leyte (CVS-32), he went to A-4 replacement pilot training at VA-44, NAS Jacksonville, after which he was assigned to VA-172, operating from the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42). He returned to VA-44 at Jacksonville before attending the Naval War College. Having completed a tour as Commanding Officer of VA-147, he is now on the Staff of Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.